Russia's “turn to the east”: a study in policy making

Abstract

Russia's recent reorientation “to the East” has gained increased urgency given events in Ukraine. Here the policymaking process surrounding the “turn to the East” is examined. The focus is on the economic dimension – the economic development of the Russian Far East and engagement with the Asia-Pacific region – rather than geostrategic and security issues. Policymaking is evaluated in terms of general approach and process, with the implications of the evaluation for Russian policymaking more generally then being explored. “Turn to the East” policymaking exhibits a strong commitment to strategic planning that is characteristic of Putin, and which in this case struggles not only with process issues but also with contradictions within the strategy and the challenging realities of the region. Regarding process, a far more institutionalized policy process than the currently dominant personalist view would lead us to expect is found, with relevant bureaucratic and non-state actors well represented in an elaborate and relatively formal process. However a considerable weakening of sign-off procedures is noted, which has lead to policy inconsistency and indeed “policy irresponsibility” among participants. The author attributes the weakening of sign-off procedures to Putin's frustration with the gridlock tendencies of strict sign-off regimes, rather than a desire to create a personalist regime of hands-on management. This suggests that improvement of the Russian policy process requires structural and procedural change, rather than simply leadership change.

Keywords::

• Russian Far East
• Putin
• policymaking
• strategic planning
• institutionalism
• personalism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

^1. For more detail on economic issues, including projects referred to in this article, see Fortescue (2015); on geostrategic engagement, see Lo (2014). For a useful effort to combine the two, see Kuhrt (2012).

^2. Approved through government decrees of 19 March 2002, No.169, and 7 July 2006, No. 419, accessible at http://Docs.cntd.ru/document/9018704.

^3. The FSB is the successor organization of the KGB. Siloviki are those with backgrounds in the so-called “power agencies,” above all the KGB/FSB.

^4. In the Russian context the “government” refers to the office of the prime minister and subordinate ministries and other agencies. It does not include the presidency and its agencies.

^5. For most of the period being discussed, one dollar bought roughly 35 rubles.

^6. The commission was created by government decree No. 810 of 17 September 2013 (http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/19/dv-komissia-site-dok.html), replacing the State Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Far East, Republic of Buryatia, the Zabaykal region, and Irkutsk region. The new commission is chaired by the prime minster, whereas its predecessor had been chaired by a first deputy. Its membership includes as business representatives Igor Zyuzin (Mechel), Yevgeniy Dod (RusHydro), Roman Gref (Sberbank), Aleksey Miller (Gazprom), Igor Sechin (Rosneft), and Nikolay Tokaryev (Transneft), the first being the only privately owned firm. The previous commission had Miller of Gazprom as its single commercial representative. The geographic extent of the Russian regions covered by the “turn to the East” is, as hinted in the change of the commission's name, a controversial issue that will not receive attention in this article. It is driven by the heavy resource orientation of Eastern Siberia as opposed to the hopes for a more diversified economy in the RFE narrowly defined.

^7. MFED has even claimed the right to have its permission sought before the prosecutor-general's office can bring charges against TOSER residents (Yedovina in Kommersant, April 17, 2015).

^8. Further spending is required to connect deposits to the main line railways and for port facilities. It has long been understood that this spending would be shared between the state and operators in the case of the former and largely borne by operators in the case of the latter. However, demands for greater state contributions have steadily strengthened.

^9. Expanded output in the RFE itself, particularly on Sakhalin, would not be dependent on the railway expansion.

^10. For a more detailed analysis of the prospects for Russian coal exports into the APR, see Fortescue (2015).

^11. In November 2014 Russian Railways head Vladimir Yakunin, in insisting that direct state funding was required, went so far as to describe the project as incapable of earning a commercial return (kommercheskiy neokupaemyy) (Zasedaniye 2014).

^12. See note 6. For another example, see Uchastniki (2014).

^13. Medvedev introduced the use of the directive as a coercive mechanism. Putin has continued the practice, albeit less abrasively (Fortescue 2012, 133–134).

^14. Ben Noble is conducting doctoral research at Oxford University on the use of the parliamentary approval stage of legislation as a forum for ongoing intra-executive conflict and negotiation (see Noble 2014, 2015).