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Abstract
A European scholar explores the changing dynamics of integration processes within the Eurasian Customs/Economic Union in the new context created by the Ukraine crisis. The article examines positions adopted by member states Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus before and after onset of the crisis in Ukraine. Several rationales for justifying the Union are derived from international relations theory and documented in the rhetoric of actors from these three countries. The evolution of conflicting rhetorical postures mirrors a slowdown of the Eurasian integration process and growth in the bargaining leverage of Belarus and Kazakhstan vis-à-vis Moscow.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank reviewers, the Editor, and editorial team for constructive and insightful comments and suggestions.
Notes
1. Launched in 2009, the EaP initiative aims to strengthen EU ties with six states of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), while offering the prospect of eventually concluding Association Agreements (AA) and so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA).
2. Examples include Laruelle (Citation2012), Frear (Citation2013), and Kassenova (Citation2013).
3. We acknowledge that narratives go beyond the text that expresses them, to the extent that they reflect specific social and communicative practices (Strath and Wodak Citation2009, 28).
4. This is not to argue that there has been little actual progress in Eurasian integration (Dragneva and Wolczuk Citation2013b), which is notable in several areas, including, more recently, progress in negotiations on the technical regulations on railway transport (agreed in February 2015), a common labor market, regulations on mutual recognition of educational degrees, or the development of a common market in construction (Boguslavska Citation2015). Rather, I argue that Russia’s position on the Ukraine crisis has made intra-Eurasian cooperation and integration a more complex matter.
5. Whereas in Belarus, this approach has been complemented by a Slavic brotherhood-in-arms theme, whereby Belarus was presented as a “balcony” over Russia’s potential Western military theater (Vieira Citation2014a), in Kazakhstan, “bandwagoning for profit” could be viewed as displaying an additional “hedging” dimension, which was reflected in the “multi-polar foreign policy” theme (Laruelle Citation2012, 9; Cooper Citation2013a, 30).
6. Such a future-oriented perspective also corresponded to Russia’s eagerness to detach the Eurasian project both from “more typical and less successful” integration à la the CIS and from the practice of bilateral arrangements (Dragneva and Wolczuk Citation2013a, 205). Russian elites also hoped to separate the Eurasian project from the idea that Russia’s leadership was attempting to reconstruct a new version of the Soviet Union. The latter had always been met with resolute declarations both by Dmitrii Medvedev and Vladimir Putin that such concerns were unfounded (Dragneva and Wolczuk Citation2013b, 5).
7. Based upon author’s interview, at an international conference in April 2014, with a Russian participant in negotiations leading to the establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union.
8. While the reasons for this decision were allegedly related to disagreements by the Eurasian partners on tax policy matters (Novosti Citation2014b), President Nazarbaev has always been a staunch opponent of any form of the Eurasian political union and monetary integration (Cooper Citation2013a, 28). Previously, the monetary union had also been among the main reasons for the decay of the Russia–Belarus Union State.
9. Initially established as temporary protective measures, the exemptions soon became a fundamental problem for the EEU. Chufrin (Citation2015) refers to 400 exemptions thus far (mid-2015).
10. The issues of a common foreign policy, common citizenship, and common border security were firmly excluded from the agenda.
11. The new reality led the Belarusian president to declare that the annexation of Crimea was a “bad precedent,” because the “… middle and small countries will now start thinking that they cannot defend themselves, maintain their territorial integrity” (Telegraf Citation2014).
12. In April 2015, the pro-Kremlin Russian daily Vzglyad published an article with an appeal for Belarus to either hold a referendum on becoming a part of Russia or to face Ukraine’s fate (Bohdan Citation2015a).
13. The position of Kazakhstan’s leadership was reinforced by Vladimir Putin’s controversial statement on 29 August questioning the statehood of Kazakhstan (Najibullah Citation2014).
14. In 2013, $3.3 billion worth of export duties were transferred to Russian state accounts (Preherman Citation2014a).
15. In addition, Moscow agreed to deliver the requested annual supply of 23 tons of oil, while also agreeing to another loan to Belarus from the Eurasian Development Bank and a settlement of the issue of selling cars assembled in Belarus on the Russian market.
16. The Belarusian leadership had previously adopted the same posture in early negotiations over a Eurasian Customs Union (Vieira Citation2014a), including the so-called “solvents” dispute in 2012 (Firsava Citation2012). In fact, the Belarusian leadership expected an exemption-free trade in energy resources, without having to pay oil duties, to take effect in the first days of 2014 (Bohdan Citation2013).
17. These products included fruit, vegetables, fish, milk and dairy products, beef, and pork.
18. Such a de-aligned posture provides additional confirmation of the reluctance of Belarus and Kazakhstan to support the Eurasian counterweight to the EU narrative.