Stavropol as “Russia’s Kosovo”? Nationalist mobilization and public response in a Russian region

Abstract

Russian nationalism after Crimea is commonly depicted as aggressive and expansionist – but few Russian ethno-nationalists would accept this description. Quite the contrary: they would argue that ethnic Russians as the majority population find themselves under “under siege” from ethnic minorities. A case in point, they hold, is Stavropol Krai in the North Caucasus. In local ethno-nationalist circles this region is depicted as “Russia’s Kosovo,” a glaring example of the Kremlin’s betrayal of ethnic Russian interests. This article presents a case study of the under-researched regional dimension of Russian nationalism. The purpose is twofold: to map regional ethno-nationalist discourse and, drawing on survey data, to explore to what extent this discourse is reflected in general attitudes toward the influx of migrants and plans for own migration. We find that local ethno-nationalists have succeeded in mobilizing support at the national level, but that, despite increased ethnic tensions in Stavropol Krai, few Russians contemplate leaving.

Keywords:

• Stavropol
• Russian nationalism
• migrants
• migrantophobia
• collective voice
• individual exit

Notes

1. Authors’ interviews with nationalist leaders Aleksandr Belov (Potkin) and Vladimir Tor, Moscow, October 2013.

2. We draw on a media survey of the regional press, fieldwork, and in-depth interviews in Stavropol Krai in June 2014 with local politicians, government officials, experts from media and academia, and activists, as well as a survey among Stavropol residents in September 2014.

3. This idea was also expressed repeatedly in interviews with local politicians, activists, and academics during our fieldwork in Stavropol and Pyatigorsk in June 2014.

4. The official line of the krai authorities is still one of “multinationalism,” “ethnic harmony,” and a “unique historical experience of coexistence” (see Pavlova 2012).

5. In federal ethno-nationalist discourse, this grievance has been expressed through the “Stop feeding the Caucasus” campaign (Khvatit kormit’ Kavkaz), fronted by, among others, Alexei Navalny.

6. A few weeks earlier, a shorter version of the report had been aired on Rossiya’s flagship news program, “Vesti nedeli,” with Dmitrii Kiselev as anchor (Vesti.ru 2012). Kiselev later claimed that it was his program that had launched the topic of North Caucasian migration to Stavropol as a federal concern (Tolz and Harding 2015, 473).

7. The “income per person in household” variable is recoded into three categories: low = below 5000 rubles per person per month; medium = from 5000 to 15,000; and high = above 15,000.

8. Age is recoded into low = 18–30 years old; and high = older than 30. The level of education variable is recoded into low = completed secondary education or less; medium = having incomplete higher education; and high = graduated from higher education institution.

9. The single biggest group of respondents nevertheless reported that “Migration does not constitute a threat” (44.4%).

10. The level of statistically significant relationships was set to 0.05 in all analyses.

11. Calculated based on data from Rosstat (https://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/accounts/#).