Russian defense spending after 2010: the interplay of personal, domestic, and foreign policy interests

Abstract

Since 2010, Russia’s defense spending has seen an average annual real growth of 10%, causing a profound shift in the composition of government expenditure. This article examines the formal and informal processes through which Russia’s level of defense spending is determined and identifies personal, domestic, and foreign policy interests behind the rise in defense expenditures. Drawing on a combination of elite interviews and document and news analyses, I argue that domestic political and socioeconomic factors are at least as important as geopolitical and security ones in explaining Russia’s decision to push defense to the forefront of the political agenda. The findings suggest that high levels of defense spending may be politically sustainable in Russia, at least in the medium term, even though it comes at the cost of other public goods.

Keywords:

• Armed forces
• defense procurement
• economic policy
• military expenditures
• Russia

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Ruslan Pukhov and Konstantin Makienko (Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies), Tor Bukkvoll and Cecilie Sendstad (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment) and the two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Susanne Oxenstierna and Tomas Malmlöf (Swedish Defence Research Agency) and Richard Connolly (University of Birmingham) for useful discussions.

Notes

1. A total of six interviews with actors involved in drafting the 2011–2020 state armament program were conducted by a local partner in the summer and autumn of 2014. The interviewees were current and former high-ranking representatives from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance, a major Russian defense corporation, and a federal subject with a high number of defense companies. Because information on military procurement is subject to the law on “state secrets,” all interviewees have been fully anonymized.