The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the strengthening of Ukrainian identity among former Soviet immigrants from Ukraine: Israel as a case study

ABSTRACT

This research examined the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war on identity changes among educated Ukraine-born women who have lived their adult lives in Israel. The data, collected in July 2022, were determined to be representative of educated women aged 25–60 who emigrated from Ukraine during 1988–2018. Findings revealed a strengthened Ukrainian identity in over half of the respondents. The Ukrainian-born Israelis, who held a hybrid Russian-Israeli identity, strengthened their Ukrainian identity. However, this strengthening was not uniform. It was associated with (a) frequency of exposure to Ukrainian news and social media that support the Ukrainian government; (b) attitudes toward the Russian-Ukrainian war; (c) the presence of the war in daily life; and (d) the geo-political place of origin in Ukraine. The study underscores the importance of researching identity shifts in people indirectly affected by crises in today’s information-rich age.

KEYWORDS:

• Russian-Ukrainian War
• identity
• immigration
• Former Soviet Union immigrants
• social media

Introduction

Identity has become an increasingly important concept in contemporary human and social sciences (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; La Barbera 2015; Prashizky and Remennick 2021). Identities, both at the individual and the collective levels, are formed and developed in complex processes that negotiate attitudes, values, and behaviors and shape our social and cultural practices. Identities, such as ethnic identities, are socially constructed (e.g. Alba 1990; Bhabha 2015). However, unpacking the component parts of identities and explicating how they are shaped in a specific situation is a complex endeavor. The disruption of everyday life can foster identity shifts. War perhaps constitutes one of the most profound disruptions to daily life, even if a person experiences it vicariously. War tests the parameters, meanings, and salience of identities to the extreme (Sasse and Lackner 2018) and the dynamics of identity transformation processes often intensify and accelerate during war time.

Immigration also creates and transforms ethnic identities in complex ways (Remennick 2005). Migration itself is frequently caused by the wish to join one’s ethnic group. However, upon resettlement, expressions of ethnicity are again reshaped, and even recreated, in light of the majority – minority relations in the receiving society (Prashizky and Remennick 2021). In fact, immigrant ethnic identity is always situational and often reactive: it is mostly crystalized as a reaction to discrimination or social exclusion by the hegemonic majority, and even more so in reaction to ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000).

Thus, war and immigration, each one separately and both together, are processes that leave their marks on the dynamics of identity change. The study of identities is thus an attempt to understand the essence of these dynamics. Investigating these phenomena during the outbreak of crises or war may offer valuable insights into such processes (Sasse and Lackner 2018).

A number of studies have examined the effects of military conflicts on identity transformations among those people who experience such calamities directly (Akgül, Klimstra, and Çok 2021; Koselleck 2022; Kulyk 2019). Research has also been conducted on the ramifications of war for people who experience it indirectly (Feinstein 2004; Meek 2011; Pinchevski 2016, 2019). The current study aims to deepen understanding of the effects of war on ethnic identity changes among long-term immigrants who experience the war vicariously during the time of conflict. This study attempts to extend the literature by examining the transformations of ethnic identity of immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in Israel as a result of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Due to the inherent limitation of the data (see subsection titled “Participants, procedure, and ethics” in the Methodology section – the sample was representative exclusively of women who held at least a bachelor’s degree), the study focuses on educated, long-term Israeli immigrant women who emigrated from Ukraine since the end of the 1980s.

In this context, it is important to emphasize that militarism and the military have become a way of life for Israelis (Ben-Eliezer 1998). Militarism is strongly embedded in Israeli society. From a very early age, the education system has been a powerful agent for developing resilience to ongoing military conflict. The centrality of the army in each Jewish individual’s life is demonstrated daily. The presence of war, conflicts, military activities, and militarism in public and personal spheres in Israel is part of daily Israeli routine (Roei 2012). Thus, experiences of war are part of both the personal and the collective identities of Israelis.

Although this study focuses on a very particular population group, the findings may be relevant to other Ukraine-born immigrant groups who reside in Israel or other countries. Furthermore, due to the expansion of international conflicts, these findings may also have significance beyond Israel’s borders.

FSU immigrants in Israel

In the late 1980s, the government of Mikhail Gorbachev opened the USSR’s borders and allowed Jews to leave the country. Consequently, about one million Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel under the Israeli Law of Return (Chachashvili-Bolotin 2007; Leshem and Sicron 2003). ¹Today, FSU immigrants constitute approximately 12% of the total Jewish population in Israel, and about 30% of these immigrants were born in Ukraine (CBS 2021; Tolts 2019). Despite the generally high level of education among the FSU immigrants, most of them had relatively poor economic means prior to their immigration (Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin 2007; Chachashvili‐Bolotin et al. 2016; Lissitsa and Chachashvili‐Bolotin 2019). These facts indicate that push rather than pull factors motivated their decision to migrate. In the time since migrating to Israel, most FSU immigrants from this wave have significantly improved their economic status, although insufficiently to close the gaps with those born in Israel, and with the immigrants who arrived earlier (Chachashvili-Bolotin and Lissitsa 2018; Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin 2018; Konstantinov 2015).

Around 80% of the 1990s FSU immigrants came from European FSU² countries (including Ukraine) whose dominant language was Russian (Chachashvili-Bolotin and Kreiner 2022). This has made Russian the third most spoken language in Israel, albeit without an official status. The Israeli establishment utilized the Russian language for education, culture, and as a channel of information to facilitate integration (Yelenevskaya and Fialkova 2003). The result is the enhanced preservation of the Russian language in both private and public domains. Economic constraints often obliged three generations of FSU immigrants to live together (Katz and Lowenstein 1999). Thus, many grandparents became the primary agents of their grandchildren’s “Russification” by providing a Russian-speaking home environment and exposing them to books and films in Russian (Perotto and Niznik 2014; Remennick 2017a; Remennick and Prashizky 2019). In the public domain, the FSU immigrant population was sufficiently large and educated to perpetuate the use of the Russian language (Dolberg and Amit 2023; Remennick 2017a). They established Russian-language theaters, newspapers, TV channels, and cultural organizations for adults and Russian-speaking kindergartens, afternoon schools, and clubs for children (Yelenevskaya and Fialkova 2017). Thus, the Russian language was not restricted to the home.

In Israel, as well as in Germany, Canada, and the U.S.A. (Remennick 2017b), FSU immigrants from Russian-speaking countries developed a hybrid identity. In the literature, this hybrid identity in Israel is referred to as “a hybrid Russian-Israeli identity” (Dolberg and Amit 2023; Prashizky and Remennick 2021; Remennick and Prashizky 2019). Thus, Israeli FSU immigrants are a good example of the Schiller and Fouron (1999) notion, according to which migrants may also maintain ongoing social connections with their country of origin (Li 2021). These connections invariably entail ongoing participation in the country of origin’s cultural and economic activities, and they may lead to hybrid migrant identities (Li 2021; Vathi 2013). This hybrid identity includes “in-between origin and destination societies and in-between the majority and other minority or indigenous cultures in the host society” (Li 2021, 545).

This Russian-Israeli identity was expressed in various fields of discourse in Israeli society: in culture, economics, education, health, politics, and more (Remennick and Prashizky 2019). For example, political parties were established by and for FSU immigrants in Israel, and existing parties catered to “the Russian voice” and its unique needs. In another area, Israeli bureaucracy provided many services in Russian (Yelenevskaya and Fialkova 2017). Culturally, a world-class Russian-speaking theater “Gesher” (“bridge” in Hebrew) was founded in 1991. As a group, immigrants from European FSU countries are jointly categorized as “Russians” both by Israeli-born and FSU-born Israeli citizens.

This hybrid Russian-Israeli identity has simultaneously benefited and harmed the immigrants. On the one hand, even if belonging to the “Russian” category is not always by choice, those included enjoy affiliation with a powerful, large group in Israel and are provided with designated services in Russian. On the other hand, their categorization leads to social exclusion and ethnic discrimination by the hegemonic majority.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, information dissemination, and the state of Israel

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and information dissemination

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, provoking the most serious military conflict in Central Europe since 1945 (Kurapov et al. 2022). By the end of August 2022, an estimated 5,718 Ukrainian civilians had been killed and more than 8,199 seriously injured (OHCHR 2022). The number of refugees abroad has reached about 12 million people (UN Refugee Agency 2022) and about 6.2 million have been relocated inside Ukraine (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2022). While previous wars, such as those waged in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Moldova, had transformed into frozen conflicts, by September 2022 this invasion became the most crucial open war in Europe since WWII.

From dramatic effects on food security to supply chain disruptions, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had profound implications for mass communication media, especially the news media (Pavlik 2022). As Gavin (2022) wrote, “[w]hile a hotly contested propaganda war is not a new concept, the Ukraine conflict has represented a marked shift in the manner in which information is gathered and disseminated in a highly fluid combat environment. The instantaneous nature of social media has added a new component to the conflict.” In the early stages of the war, information warfare was not merely an additional arm of strategy, but a parallel component of military campaigns (Gavin 2022). Thus, patterns in news media coverage of the war in Ukraine was one of the key issues (Pavlik 2022). Kersley (2022) reported that during the first few weeks of the war many news outlets recorded record-breaking levels of audience engagement.

Another important development in public engagement with news media and the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the rise of social media, which has played a key role in transforming what people know about the war (Pavlik 2022). The timing of the outbreak of the war coincided with the end of the global COVID-19 crisis, which had shifted many everyday life activities online and expanded the use of digital tools (Engblom-Pelkkala and Lehto 2022). The global COVID-19 crisis raised the level of digital literacy and significantly expanded the consumption of current information transmitted through digital means such as social networks. New media, including the full range of storytelling tools, enabled the creation of more immersive news narratives (Pavlik 2022). As a result, public engagement and empathy for Ukrainian citizens increased, especially in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Shumsky 2022; Voinova 2023). In contrast to other instances of subversion, invasion, occupation, war, etc., the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine became a call for universal empathy for Ukrainian citizens. Ashwill (2022) pointed out that “we are ‘the other’”. Through the social media, the public around the world was deeply engaged in news and information about the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as in mis- and disinformation (Pavlik 2022).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the state of Israel

The Russian invasion of Ukraine trapped Israel’s political echelon in a complex situation. Before the outbreak of the war, one of the largest concentrations of Jews in Europe (155,000 people) was in Russia (DellaPergola 2020), and thousands of Israelis lived there as well. In this context, it is also important to emphasize the complicated Israeli-Russian geopolitical relation.

Concerning the Ukrainian-Jewish population, prior to the start of the invasion, it numbered about 45,000, making it the sixth largest Jewish community in Europe (DellaPergola 2020). While at times this Jewish community flourished, historically it faced brutal persecution, massacres, pogroms, and antisemitic discrimination (Bergen 1994; Bilewicz and Krzeminski 2010; Himka 2011).

While anti-Semitism existed in both Russia and Ukraine (Gibson and Howard 2007; Kersten and Hankel 2013; Korey 1972), the prevailing perception among the Israeli public was that manifestations of anti-Semitism were more acute in Ukraine than in Russia, from pogroms at the end of the nineteenth century through the Holocaust (see, for example, Babyn Yar).³ In this context, it is important to emphasize that in Israeli public opinion, Ukraine, as well as Poland, are perceived as antisemitic states.

Jewish history in Ukraine shows that in the last third of the sixteenth century, the number of Jews in the territory of contemporary Ukraine increased greatly, and at the end of that century, about 45% of all the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland lived in the territory of contemporary Ukraine. They engaged in crafts, trade, and leasing estates, all from Polish nobles in Ukraine. Thus, the Jews of the territory of contemporary Ukraine found themselves between the enslaving aristocracy and the enslaved peasants. Consequently, economic-social hatred was added to the religious enmity felt towards the Jews. This enmity erupted during the Khmelnitsky rebellions (Cossack riots) and during the decrees of the Haydamaks in the eighteenth century and manifested itself in the murder of thousands of Jews and the destruction of their communities (Altshuler 1990).

With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the question of aid to the Ukrainian people, with its long history of anti-Semitic acts, arose in the media and in the Israeli public (Shumsky 2022; Voinova 2023). In this context, it is crucial to stress that Russian propaganda tools exploited the “Ukrainian topic” to underscore that Russia was waging war to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine, claiming that the Ukrainian government was Nazi or partially-Nazi (Hanley, Kumar, and Durumeric 2022; Rossoliński-Liebe and Willems 2022).

The geopolitical aspect and historical background were also reflected in the political arena (Magen and Kobzenzev 2022). In February 2022, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett expressed support for the Ukrainian people following the Russian military invasion (Kampeas 2022). Although he did not repeat Lapid’s condemnation of Russia after the invasion took place, Israel’s Prime Minister expressed support for the Ukrainian people, stating that “our hearts are with the civilians who, through no fault of their own, have been thrust into this situation,” and also offered humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians and help to Jews who wanted to leave Ukraine. Bennet was hesitant to assign the blame squarely on Russia due to ongoing military tension at Israel’s northern border (the Russian presence in Syria), stating only that there would be “continued regular discussions and assessments of the situation to evaluate future consequences (to the extent that there are any) for Israel” (Kampeas 2022; Lis and Sokol 2022). Moreover, almost after a year after the beginning of full-scale war, in February 2023, was the first official visit of Israeli delegation in charge of the Israeli Foreign Minister (Eli Cohen) to Kyiv.

In contrast to the Israeli political establishment, the Israeli media chose to unequivocally condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Most of the main public media channels dispatched senior reporters who actively broadcast and wrote articles from the combat zones in Ukraine daily in the first months of the war. These reporters from Israel, like their colleagues from Western countries, together with Israeli social media, created immersive news narratives from the battlefield. The Israeli public were able to consume information on diverse platforms such as Facebook, Telegram, Tik-Tok, and Twitter, where citizens of Ukraine and Russia shared videos, photos, and personal stories. All this was in addition to personal information received from family members and friends living in Ukraine through direct communication. As in other Western countries, social media consumption in Israel expanded significantly due to the growth in the level of digital literacy following the global COVID-19 crisis. All of these created (or perhaps fostered) an opportunity for a high level of engagement among Israelis in general, and among those who came from Ukraine in particular.

Research questions

As mentioned above, the effects of military conflicts on identity changes among those who experience them directly have been extensively researched (Akgül, Klimstra, and Çok 2021; Koselleck 2022; Kulyk 2019). There is also literature on the ramifications of war for those who experience it indirectly during their lifetime (e.g. Pinchevski 2016, 2019). This study aims to extend our understanding of the effects of war on ethnic identity change during the time of conflict among long-term immigrants who experience the war vicariously. This study examines the transformations of the ethnic identity of immigrants from the FSU in Israel caused by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

These long-term immigrants, living in Israel for a long period, experienced war, conflicts, military activities, and militarism in Israeli daily routine. More specifically, the study focuses on educated long-term Israeli immigrant women who emigrated from Ukraine since the end of the 1980s. Based on the literature review and the Israeli context, where war conflicts are part of Israeli daily routine, the following research questions were formulated:

RQ1:

How, if at all, has the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war transformed Ukrainian identity among educated Israeli women who emigrated from Ukraine since the end of 1980s?

RQ2:

What are the most prominent predictors of the transformation of Ukrainian identity among this group?

To answer these questions, the following research design and methodology were implemented.

Methodology

Participants, procedure, and ethics

This research draws on the data from an online questionnaire distributed through social networks in July 2022, while the war was ongoing. One of the main avenues for the data collection was Facebook forum “Russian women without a sense of humor and their friends.” This forum was founded in 2014 by social activist and journalist Lena Russovsky, who had immigrated to Israel from Moscow at the age of nine. The group became very popular among Gen 1.5 Israelis, mostly women who immigrated from the FSU independent of the country of origin, and today numbers 40,000 members (Prashizky 2020).

In this context it is worth noting that, as written in the description of this forum, “The purpose of the group is to provide a platform for discussing cases of racism against immigrants from the Former Soviet Union.” Moreover, the chosen name of this group highlighted this point by symbolizing the negative labeling of Israeli women who emigrated from the FSU by some Israelis. These women are commonly referred to as “Russian women” without distinguishing between their different countries of origin, and who stereotypically perceived as women who do not know how to enjoy life and laugh. As a result, with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian-born women did not leave the group.

The collected data were examined in accordance with the demographic and socio-economic characteristics (such as: age, year of immigration, education, income, place of living etc.) by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The sample was determined to be representative exclusively of educated (those who held at least a bachelor’s degree) women who were born in Ukraine and are between the ages of 25 and 60. Unfortunately, according to the CBS, this sample was not representative of men, of those who did not hold academic degrees, or of those older than 60 years old. Therefore, it was decided to focus on women who were born in Ukraine and were between the ages of 25 and 60 at the date of the data collection.

The questionnaire included about 40 questions concerning the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war, identity, and media, as well as demographic information. As was mentioned above, the data were examined in accordance with the demographic and socio-economic characteristics by CBS, and the sample (n = 182) was determined to be representative of educated (at least a Bachelor’s degree) women aged 25–60 who emigrated from Ukraine between 1988–2018 (see Table 1). Data analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS software version 27.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	Mean (SD) %
N	182
%	100%
Independent variables
Age	40.73 (7.34)
Age at immigration	15.18 (8.88)
Years since immigration	25.55 (7.51)
Marital status (% of married)	81.32
Perceived (subjective) economic status (scale 1–5)	3.69 (0.77)
% of those who reported “average +” (4) or “high” (5)	58.2
Relatives and/or friends living in Ukraine (%)	86.8
Relatives and/or friends living in Russia (%)	58.2
Place of birth (% of those who grew up in a place that was/is under direct attack by the Russian army)	47.8
Supported Ukrainian citizens in Israel or abroad during the war (%)	79.1
Position toward the Russian-Ukrainian war
% of those leaning towards Ukraine	87.4
% of those leaning towards Russia	4.9
% of those who don’t know or do not have any position	7.7
During the war – Exposure to media supporting Russian government (scale 1–5)	1.81 (1.33)
% of those who consume this media every day % of those who consume this media without consuming Ukrainian media	7.1 4.4
During the war – Exposure to media supporting Ukrainian government (scale 1–5)	3.36 (1.60)
% of those who consume this media every day % of those who consume this media without consuming Russian media	33.7 42.3
Before the war – Exposure to media supporting Russian government (scale 1–5)	1.73 (1.09)
% of those who consumed this media every day	10.4
Before the war – Exposure to media supporting Ukrainian government (scale 1–5)	1.76 (1.06)
% of those who consumed this media every day	9.1
War presence index (scale 1–5)	3.87 (0.97)
The issue of war concerns me every day (scale 1–5)	3.84 (1.22)
% of those who agree (4) or very much agree (5)	67.6
The issue of war concerns my family and/or my close friends every day (scale 1–5)	3.91 (0.99)
% of those who agree (4) or very much agree (5)	70.9
Dependent variable
Transformation (strengthening) of Ukrainian identity (scale 1–5)	3.32 (1.31)
% of those who agree (4) or very much agree (5)	54.2

In addition, the research was approved by the Ethics committee of Ruppin Academic Center. The questionnaire was anonymous. Participants signed an agreement and informed consent form prior to answering the questionnaire and received written explanations about the aims of the research and its procedure.

Measures

Dependent variable

Transformation of Ukrainian identity

Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “The 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war strengthened my Ukrainian identity.” The response was on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “totally disagree ( = 1)” to “very much agree ( = 5),” so that higher scores denoted a stronger Ukrainian identity.

Independent variables

The War Presence Index

This variable was calculated as the average of the two following items. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with two statements: “The issue of war is present in my every day” and “The issue of war is present in my family’s and/or my close friends’ every day.” Their response was on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “totally disagree ( = 1)” to “very much agree ( = 5),” so that higher scores denoted higher concern. The correlation between the two items was r = 0.53, p < .001.

Exposure to Russian/Ukrainian media supporting the Russian/Ukrainian government during the war

Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they consumed media by the following item: “How often are you exposed to Russian/Ukrainian news and social media that support the Russian/Ukrainian government with regard to the war?” The response was on a five-point scale: “not at all ( = 1),” “a few times a year ( = 2),” “several times a month ( = 3),” “several times a week ( = 4),” and “every day ( = 5).” The higher scores thus denoted greater exposure.

Exposure to Russian/Ukrainian media before the war

Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they consumed media by the following item: “How often were you exposed to Russian/Ukrainian news and social media before the war?” The response was on a five-point scale: “not at all ( = 1),” “a few times a year ( = 2),” “several times a month ( = 3),” “several times a week ( = 4),” and “every day ( = 5).” The higher scores thus denoted greater exposure.

Place of birth in Ukraine

Participants were asked whether the place they grew up in Ukraine was under direct attack by the Russian army, as for example, Kharkiv. This variable was dichotomous (yes = 1, no = 0).

Relatives and/or friends living in Ukraine

Participants were asked whether they have relatives and/or friends who still live or who lived in Ukraine at the beginning of the war. This variable was dichotomous (yes = 1, no = 0).

Attitudes toward the Russian-Ukrainian war

Respondents were asked to indicate their attitude toward the war. Responses included three categories: attitudes leaning toward Ukraine, attitudes leaning toward Russia, have no opinions or don’t know. Those holding attitudes leaning toward Ukraine were coded 1, the rest were coded 0.

Support for the citizens of Ukraine in Israel and/or abroad during the war

Participants were asked whether they helped or donated to citizens of Ukraine in Israel and/or abroad during the war. This variable was dichotomous (yes = 1, no = 0).

Years since immigration

This variable was continuous.

Age

This variable was continuous.

Subjective economic status

Respondents were asked to evaluate their economic status on a scale of 1 = low, 2=average-low, 3=average, 4=average-high, 5=high.

Marital status

Respondents were asked about their marital status. Married persons were coded 1, others were coded 0.

Findings: predictors of the strengthening of Ukrainian identity

Descriptive statistics

Characteristics of the participants are presented in Table 1. The study’s findings indicate that about 54% of respondents reported a strengthening of their Ukrainian identity, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This was despite the fact that their average length of residence in Israel was about 25.5 (SD = 7.51) years and the average age at immigration was 15.2 (SD = 8.88). Most of the sample were married (81.3%) and reported average-high or high perceived economic status (58.2%).

Most of the respondents reported having relatives and/or friends in Ukraine (86.8%) and in Russia (58.2%). Almost half of the sample (47.8%) reported that their place of birth was under direct attack by the Russian army. In addition, about 79% stated that they helped or donated to citizens of Ukraine in Israel and/or abroad during the war.

The reported attitudes toward the Russian-Ukrainian war were about 87% tending to support Ukraine, about 5% tending to support Russia, with about 8% not having an opinion. As shown in Table 1, during the war participants reported a higher exposure to Ukrainian news and social media that support the Ukrainian government with regard to the war (M = 3.36, SD = 1.60) compared to support for the Russian government (M = 1.81, SD = 1.33), t = 10.13, $p<0.001$. For example, while only about 7% consumed Russian channels, on a daily basis, which support the Russian government, more than 33% consumed the Ukrainian news and social media that support the Ukrainian government with regard to the war. In addition, while few of the respondents watched only Russian channels without watching Ukrainian channels (4.4%, see Table 1), the corresponding data regarding Ukrainian channels without watching Russian channels was significantly higher (42.3%, see Table 1).

In contrast (see Tables 1 and 2), before the war participants reported similar (t=-0.02, $p<0.849)$ and low exposure to both Ukrainian and Russian news and social media (M = 1.76, SD = 1.06; M = 1.73, SD = 1.09, respectively). Moreover, as shown in Table 2, while after the invasion, exposure to Ukrainian news and social media increased significantly (t = 14.71, $p<0.001),$ exposure to Russian news and social media remained stable (t=-0.95, $p=0.346).$

Table 2. Comparing exposure to media during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and before the war: t-paired samples test.

Mean differences	M	SD	t	df	p
Exposure to Russian media supporting Russian government (during the war) - Exposure to Russian media supporting Russian government (before the war)	0.10	1.40	0.95	163	0.35
Exposure to Ukrainian media supporting Ukrainian government (during the war) - Exposure to Ukrainian media supporting Ukrainian government (before the war)	1.61	1.44	14.71	172	0.00
Exposure to Ukrainian media supporting Ukrainian government (during the war) - Exposure to Russian media supporting Russian government (during the war)	1.52	1.92	10.13	164	0.00
Exposure to Ukrainian media supporting Ukrainian government (before the war) - Exposure to Russian media supporting Russian government (before the war)	−0.02	1.20	−0.19	171	0.85

The mean War Presence Index was 3.87 (SD = 0.97), on a scale of 1–5, with “the issue of war is present in my every day” at M = 3.84, SD = 1.22 and “in my family’s and/or their close friends’ every day” at M = 3.91, SD = 0.99. About 70% reported that the war was present in their own everyday life or that of their family and/or close friends.

Multivariate analyses of strengthening of Ukrainian identity

To understand the factors that can predict a strengthening of Ukrainian identity and to determine the net effect of the study’s variables (RQ2), a multiple linear regression was conducted. The multiple linear regression equation is as follows:

$Y=B_0+B_1{X}_1+B_2{X}_2+\dots +B_p{X}_p+\epsilon$

where Y is the dependent variable, X₁ through X_p are p distinct independent variables, B₀ is the value of Y when all of the independent variables (X₁ through X_p) are equal to zero, B₁ through B_p are estimated regression coefficients, and ε is the error term (residuals), representing the unexplained variation in the dependent variable. Each regression coefficient represents the change in Y relative to a one-unit change in the respective independent variable. Notice that the units of the independent variable are different. Therefore, it is convenient to add also Beta coefficients. In contrast to B coefficients, Beta coefficients are regression coefficients that are standardized, allowing for a direct comparison of the magnitude of effects among the variables. They are standardized to be represented “on the same scale.” Therefore, they can facilitate the identification of the independent variable with the strongest impact on the dependent variable. Accordingly, both B and Beta coefficients were reported (Table 3) to provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable. In addition, the final model has been checked for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity.

Table 3. Multiple linear regression: predictors of the strengthening of Ukrainian identity.

	B	Beta
Constant	0.68
Age	−0.03	−0.14
Years since immigration	0.02	0.10
Marital status (married = 1, else = 0)	−0.32	−0.07
Perceived economic status	0.02	0.01
Relatives and/or friends living in Ukraine	0.39	0.09
Relatives and/or friends living in Russia	−0.34	−0.12
Place of birth in Ukraine	−0.38*	−0.14
Support to Ukrainian citizens	0.22	0.07
Attitudes toward the Russian-Ukrainian war	1.09***	0.27
During the war – Exposure to media supporting Russian government	−0.09	−0.09
During the war – Exposure to media supporting Ukrainian government	0.24***	0.28
Before the war – Exposure to media supporting Russian government	−0.05	−0.04
Before the war – Exposure to media supporting Ukrainian government	0.28*	0.21
War Presence Index	0.26*	0.18
Adjusted R^2	0.424

*** p < 0.001; * p < 0.05.

As shown in Table 3, this analysis revealed five significant coefficients. Consequently, these results warrant five main conclusions. First, exposure to Ukrainian news and social media before and during the war was significantly positively associated with a strengthening of respondents’ Ukrainian identity ($\beta =0.21,\hspace{0.17em}p<0.05;\beta =0.28,\hspace{0.17em}p<0.001\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y})$. In contrast, exposure to Russian news and social media before and during the war was found to be nonsignificant. Second, respondents who hold attitudes leaning toward Ukraine experienced a higher degree of strengthening of their Ukrainian identity compared to those who did not ($\beta =0.27,\hspace{0.17em}p<0.001)$. Third, the measure of the presence of war in daily life was significantly positively associated with a strengthening of Ukrainian identity ($\beta =0.18,\hspace{0.17em}p<0.05)$. Fourth, surprisingly, respondents who grew up in the regions under direct attack by the Russian army experienced a lesser degree of strengthening of their Ukrainian identity compared to respondents from the rest of Ukraine ($\beta =-0.37,\hspace{0.17em}p<0.05)$. Fifth, age, length of residency in Israel, marital status, presence of relatives and close friends in Ukraine/Russia, and support of Ukrainian citizens were nonsignificant with the strengthening of respondents’ Ukrainian identity. Adjusted R² for all of the predictors was 42.4%.

Discussion

This study aimed to extend our understanding of the effects of war on ethnic identity changes during the time of conflict among long-term immigrants who experience the war vicariously. The research is an initial probe, which examined the effects of the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war on the identity of women who were born in Ukraine and have lived most of their adult lives in Israel. As Israeli citizens living in Israel for a long period, they have experienced war, conflicts, military activities, and militarism in their daily routine (e.g. Ben-Eliezer 1998).

Hence, examining the transformations of ethnic identity changes due to the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war is particularly interesting among long-term immigrants in Israel. This is because unlike most long-term immigrants born in Ukraine who immigrated to other countries such as Germany, Canada, and the U.S.A., the immigrants in Israel experienced the military in their daily routine. Thus, experiences of war are part of their personal life biography and because of this experience, the ramifications of war are not foreign to them.

As for RQ1—How, if at all, has the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war transformed Ukrainian identity among educated Israeli women who emigrated from Ukraine since the end of the 1980s? – the study findings show that the impact of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has spread far beyond Ukrainian borders and affected the Ukrainian identity of Israeli women with origins in Ukraine. These Ukrainian-born Israelis, who experienced the development of a hybrid Russian-Israeli identity after their immigration to Israel (Dolberg and Amit 2023; Prashizky and Remennick 2021; Remennick and Prashizky 2019), underwent another profound identity change.

The analysis revealed that more than half of the respondents reported that their Ukrainian identity was strengthened because of the war. However, the strengthening of this Ukrainian identity was not uniform across all Israeli long-term immigrant women from Ukraine. It was associated with (a) the frequency of exposure to Ukrainian news and social media before and during the war, (b) certain positions regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war (pro-Ukrainian), (c) the presence of the war in daily life, and (d) geo-political place of origin in Ukraine.

As for the predictors of the strengthening of Ukrainian identity (RQ2), the study’s findings emphasize the significant positive association between exposure to Ukrainian news and social media that support the Ukrainian government before and during the war and the strengthening of Ukrainian identity. The exposure to media supporting Ukrainian government during the war was one of the most prominent predictors of the transformation of Ukrainian identity. Moreover, after the invasion, exposure to Ukrainian news and social media increased significantly. As mentioned earlier, the Israeli media unequivocally condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israeli public consumed information on diverse platforms. In contrast to other cases of subversion, invasion, war, etc., there was a call for empathy for Ukrainian citizens in the social media, the public in most of the Western world, and particularly in Israel (Ashwill 2022; Voinova 2023). Thus, in line with the literature (Kersley 2022; Pavlik 2022), exposure to news outlets, social media, and the full range of storytelling tools enabling the creation of more immersive news narratives strengthened Ukrainian identity among those who came from Ukraine.

In contrast to exposure to Ukrainian news supporting the Ukrainian government, exposure to Russian news and social media supporting the Russian government was found to be very low before and during the war. In addition, the association between exposure to Russian news media and the strengthening of Ukrainian identity was not statistically significant. It is important to emphasize that few of the respondents watched only Russian channels without watching Ukrainian channels. One possible explanation is that most respondents have lived in Israel for more than 20 years and received their academic degrees in Israel. Thus, they were aware that the flow of information on Russian social media has been restricted greatly and that an army of paid trolls work around the clock to parrot the Kremlin line. Israelis were exposed to the specific views found in Western mass media and the social media and adopted more generally Western-style attitudes.

Not surprisingly, the analysis also found that respondents who hold attitudes leaning toward Ukraine, one of the most prominent predictors, and reported a higher presence of the war in their lives experienced greater strengthening of their Ukrainian identity compared to those who did not. However, the transformation of their Ukrainian identity was found to be much more pronounced among those who grew up in regions that were not under direct attack by the Russian army. One possible explanation is that most of the military actions are currently concentrated in eastern and southern Ukraine, where the population by and large are native Russian speakers who leaned towards Russia during the Soviet era (Frye 2015; Kulyk 2011). In contrast, the Ukrainian identity of respondents who grew up in western Ukraine, which historically has been much more pro-Ukrainian compared to eastern and southern Ukraine (Kulyk 2016, 2018, 2019; Sasse and Lackner 2018), became significantly stronger during the first six months of the war.

It is also important to note that length of residency in Israel and age were not associated with a strengthening of Ukrainian identity. In other words, the findings indicate that the strengthening of contemporary Ukrainian identity depends mainly on the experiences of life in Ukraine and not on the experiences of life in Israel. In light of these findings, it can be assumed that the phenomenon of the strengthening of Ukrainian identity may also occur in other countries of immigration. To obtain a deeper understanding of this finding further research is needed.

Limitations

Certain limitations of the study should be acknowledged. These include: (a) the self-reported nature of the data collected; (b) the limitation posed by the data collection at a single point of time during the war; and (c) the absence of data that could allow for a systematic comparison with the situation before the war. Moreover, the current questionnaire did not address questions regarding the respondents’ cultural identification with Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR before the invasion or in the more distant past. Therefore, the observed strengthening of Ukraine-born Israelis’ Ukrainian identity may have multiple origins. It can also be a continuation of a long process of identity (trans)formation that involved both the rejection and embrace of links with the former homeland and/or the change in perceptions of what that homeland is, whether the USSR, Russia or Ukraine, or all of the above. To investigate the phenomenon of the strengthening of Ukrainian identity in more depth, it is proposed to conduct a qualitative study that examines the intensity of the perceived experience of Ukrainian identity before, during, and after the war.

In addition, the data are limited to a specific population: Israeli-educated, long-term immigrant women aged 25–60 who were born in Ukraine. Nevertheless, this study tends to echo similar results to those reported in the literature regarding the impact of war in terms of identity transformation upon those who experienced it directly (Kulyk 2019; Sekulic 2004). Furthermore, the data analysis sheds new light on identity changes while war is still ongoing.

Conclusions and future research

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is having a significant impact on the transformation of ethnic identity of long-term immigrant women who immigrated from Ukraine years before this war began. This identity change is reshaping the hybrid Russian-Israeli identity; it affects attitudes, values, behaviors, and social practices. The identity changes will possibly be reflected in various fields of discourse of Israeli society, including culture, economics, education, health, politics, and more. The ramifications of these identity changes can extend to other ethnic groups, as well as majority – minority relations in the receiving society. To better understand the identity transformations of long-term Israeli immigrants who were born in Ukraine, and the meaning and components of identity changes among immigrants, further qualitative and quantitative longitudinal research is needed.

This initial probe should be expanded to include long-term immigrants with origins in Ukraine, in other countries such as Germany, Canada and the U.S.A.. In addition, it is important to examine identity changes among new immigrants from Ukraine in Israel as well as in other countries. Moreover, in the era of ubiquitous information technology and social media, there is a need for further research examining the effects of war and other crises on identity changes among people who experience it vicariously.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to express gratitude to the editors of Post-Soviet Affairs, anonymous reviewers, and various colleagues for their invaluable comments and suggestions. Special thanks are extended to Prof. Daniel Gutwein, Prof. Dmitry Shumsky, Dr. Tali Lev, and Lena Russovsky for their generous advice.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Svetlana Chachashvili-Bolotin

Dr. Svetlana Chachashvili-Bolotin is the head of the Institute for Immigration and Social Integration.

Notes

1. People with one or more Jewish grandparent, and their spouses have the right to relocate to Israel and acquire Israeli citizenship. For details see: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/an-introduction-to-the-law-of-return; https://archive.jewishagency.org/first-steps/program/5131/.

2. The FSU immigrants from the 1990s came mainly from the four Eastern European countries that were then part of the Soviet Union: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.

3. In the course of two days, 29–30 September ;(Yom Kippur Eve) 1941, 33771 Jewish men, women, and children were murdered at Babyn Yar by Einsatzgruppen C soldiers with the assistance of local collaborators. Jews who managed to escape the massacre in September and were discovered in the ensuing months were brought to Babyn Yar and murdered https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/communities/kiev/babi-yar.asp.