Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian Project

Abstract

The author analyzes the evolution of inter-Church and Church–state relations in post-Soviet Ukraine in the context of Ukrainian nation building and Russian–Ukrainian relations.

This article is the republished version of:

Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Ukrainian Project

Notes

1. The sociological surveys whose results are cited in the article were conducted by the Aleksandr Razumkov Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research between February 28 and March 6, 2013 in all regions of Ukraine. There were 2,010 respondents ages eighteen and over. The theoretical error is 2.3 percent.

2. VIL-infektsiia v Ukraïni: Informatsiinii biulleten' (Kyiv), 2008, no. 29, p. 21.

3. V.V. Dombrovs'ka, Iak nam zmenshiti kil'kist' samogubstv v Ukraïni: Proekt mizhdistsiplinarnoï programi suïtsidal'noï preventsiï (gromads'ka initsiativa) (Odessa: Gromads'ka organizatsiia “Ekologichne zdorov'ia liudini,” 2007), pp. 12–13.

4. Statistichnii zbirnik “Regioni Ukraïni 2009” (Kyiv: Derzhavnii komitet statistiki, 2009), p. 340.

^1. V. Marchenko, Listi materi z nevoli (Kyiv: Fundatsiia Ol'zhicha, 1994), p. 374.

^2. The destruction of the Greek Catholic Church was officially called the “reunification” with the Mother Church of those who had “fallen away” from it at the end of the sixteenth century and aligned themselves with Rome. “Unreunified” was a term used in official documents.

^3.Global Restrictions on Religion (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2009), pp. 50–51.

^4. In this connection, see the case in the European Court of Human Rights “Saint Mikhailovskii Parish versus Ukraine [Svyato-Mykhaylivska paraflya v. Ukraine] (no. 77703/01),” in Putevoditel' po pretsedentnoi praktike Evropeiskogo suda po pravam cheloveka za 2007 god, ed. V.N. Rudnev (Moscow: Novaia iustitsiia, 2009), pp. 291–92.

^5. The wooden stairway, placed by the right window on the second floor of the facade of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, is a symbol of the division of the Church among six Christian confessions—Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Syrian, Armenian Apostolic, Ethiopian, and Coptic. The stairway is already depicted on an engraving dated 1834. Its presence in its place is thought to signify observance of the agreement among the six Churches—not to move, repair, or change anything without the consent of all six.

^6. S. Vysotskii, “Period poluraspada: Moskva pytaetsia sokhranit' edinstvo UPTs,” Fokus, no. 30(242), 29 July 2011. See also A. Skoropadskii, “Tserkovnyi ukhod: Viktor Nusenkis mozhet otkazat'sia ot finansovoi podderzhki UPTs MP,” Kommersant”-Ukraina, July 14, 2011.

^7. See D.G. Gibson, “High Public Confidence in the Church,” East-West Church and Ministry Report, Summer 1996, no. 4, p. 9.

^8. “They believed in Mohyla as a zealot of Orthodoxy,” Father John Meyendorff lamented in this connection, “but they did not believe in Patriarch Nikon!” (Archpriest I. Meiendorf, “Ob izmeniaemosti i neizmennosti pravoslavnogo bogosluzheniia,” in Russkoe zarubezh'e v god tysiacheletiia Rusi [Moscow 1991], p. 196).

^9. The philosopher and Church and public figure Archpriest Vasilii Zen'kovskii writes very expressively about this. See V. Zen'kovskii, Piat' mesiatsev u vlasti; Vospominaniia (Moscow, 1995), p. 39.

^10. Metropolitan Mstislav died in 1993. Over the three-year period 1990–93, he visited Ukraine six times, traveling in a wheelchair.

^11. The new status entailed independent administration of the UOC and election of its primate by the Ukrainian episcopate, with the Moscow patriarch merely giving him his blessing. The primate obtained the right to bear two panagias [an oval-shaped medallion bearing an image of the Mother of God and worn on the chest—Trans.] and the title “Most Blessed”; the Synod of the UOC obtained the right to elect and appoint bishops, establish and abolish dioceses, and create monasteries, convents, and theological training institutions within the borders of Ukraine.

^12. In 1879, the Patriarch Joachim III of Constantinople justified the granting of autocephaly to the Serbian Church as follows: “Considering that pious and divinely preserved Serbia has obtained political independence and that its pious, divinely appointed, and most gracious prince Lord Milan M. Obrenoviæ IV and the most holy Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan of Serbia Mihail, in the name of the honest clergy and pious nation, have addressed themselves to us in letters and in conformity with political independence expressed a wish also for Church independence…. We have therefore decreed: let the Orthodox Church of the Serbian principality… that lies within the political and geographical limits of the liberated Serbian principality henceforth be canonically independent and self-governing.”

^13. To verify this hypothesis, I asked the sociological service of the Razumkov Center to include in its questionnaire a question asking respondents whether they belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church. As no Church with this name officially operates in Ukraine, a positive response can only indicate Russian identity. However, just 0.5 percent (in November 2010) to 0.8 percent (in February–March 2013) of respondents said that they belonged to the Russian Church. For a description of the survey conducted by the Razumkov Center in 2010, see “Tserkovno-religiina situatsiia ta derzhavno-tserkovni vidnosini v Ukraïni: pidsumki desiatilittia, tendentsiï i problemi,” Natsional'na bezpeka i oborona, 2011, nos. 1–2 (119–20).

^14. From the blog of Aleksandr Chalenko at Ukrainskaia pravda, December 18, 2009.

^15. V. Lipins'kii, Religiia i Tserkva v istoriï Ukraïni (Kyiv, 1993), p. 94.

^16. See, for example, Aleksandr (Drabinko), Episkop Pereiaslav-Khmel'nitskii, “Kiev—Novyi Ierusalim: K ocherkam o kievskoi gradosofii (Doklad na IX Mezhdunarodnykh Uspenskikh chteniiakh ‘Pamiat' i nadezhda: gorizonty osmysleniia i puti osoznaniia.’ Kievo-Pecherskaia Lavra. 27.09. 2009)” (http://arhiv.orthodoxy.org.ua/ru/node/27678/); Volodimir, Mitropolit Kiïvs'kii i vsieï Ukraïni, Predstoiatel' Ukraïns'koï Pravoslavnoï Tserkvi, “Pam'iat' pro Novii Erusalim i kiïvs'ka traditsiia (Slovo pro Kiïv na vidkritti IX Mizhnarodnikh Uspens'kikh Chitan' ‘Pam'iat’ i nadiia: gorizonti ta shliakhi usvidomlennia')” (http://orthodox.org.ua/ru/article/pamyat-pro-novii-%D1%94rusalim-ki%D1%97vska-tradits%D1%96ya/).

^17. “Blazhenneishii Mitropolit Vladimir: ‘V otnoshenii avtokefalii dolzhna vestis’ ochen' mudraia i vzveshennaia politika'” (www.mgarsky-monastery.org/main/79/).

^18. “Ukrainskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' segodnia: Doklad Blazhenneishego mitropolita Kievskogo i vseia Ukrainy Vladimira na Arkhiereiskom Sobore Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi” (www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1401848.html).

^19. “Arkhimandrit Viktor (Bed'): ‘Rishennia Arkhiereis'kogo Soboru RPTs nosiat’ dlia UPTs deklarativnii ta rekomendatsiinii kharakter'” (www.religion.in.ua/main/interview/8326-arximandrit-viktor-bed-rishennya-arxiyerejskogo-soboru-rpc-nosyat-dlya-upc-deklarativnij-ta-rekomendacijnij-xarakter.html).

^20. “Zvernennia Mitropolita Volodimira do Predstoyateliv Pomisnikh Pravoslavnikh Tserkov (12 zhovtnia 2008 r.)” (http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/resourses/church_doc/uocmp_doc/34737/).

^21. “Priamoi efir s Patriarkhom Moskovskim i vseia Rusi Kirillom” (http://inter.ua/ru/news/2009/07/30/3780/).

^22. “Ukrainskoe Pravoslavie na rubezhe epoch: Vyzovy sovremennosti, tendentsii razvitiia: Doklad Blazhenneishego mitropolita Kievskogo i vseia Ukrainy Vladimira na Arkhiereiskom Sobore Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi. 25 iiunia 2008 g.” (www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/427267.html).

^23. V.A. Tsypin, Tserkovnoe pravo: Kurs lektsii (Moscow, 1994), p. 147.

^24. Interestingly, the Moscow Patriarchate has by no means always condemned ethnophyletism—that is, a stress on the national instead of the universal principle in the activity of Orthodox Churches. “The condemnation of Church organization along national lines,” emphasized the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, “that was issued at the Constantinople Council of 1872 has local significance—for Constantinople. The Fullness of Orthodoxy has not accepted the decisions of this council.” Quoted from K. Skurat, “Konstantinopol'skii Patriarkhat i problemy diaspory,” Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarkhii, 1989, no. 10, pp. 47–48.

^25. However, in mid-2011, when the Universal Patriarch tried to use the theory of the Pentarchy to consolidate Orthodox Churches belonging to the Greek tradition, the canonists of the Moscow Patriarchate resolutely criticized this theory. “The theory of the ‘Pentarchy,’ which has neither canonical nor historical foundations, subsequently generated illusory arguments in favor of the hegemony of Greek-speaking Churches over non–Greek-speaking Orthodox Churches. The tendency that found expression in this theory… may cause complications in relations between the eastern patriarchates and the local Churches that have acquired autocephaly in the second millennium A.D.” (Vladislav Tsypin, Protoierei, “Pentarkhia” [www.pravoslavie.ru.arhiv/47426.htm]).

^26. See Rule 38 of the Sixth Universal Council (681 A.D.): “We too retain the rule laid down by our fathers, saying, if by the power of the tsar a town is newly established or will in the future be established, then let the distribution of Church affairs follow the distribution of towns and land”; see also the textbook for theological schools of the Russian Church (Tsypin, Tserkovnoe pravo, p. 201).

^27. “Sviateishii Patriarkh Kirill: ‘Ukrainskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ obladaet dukhovnoi sily i sposobnost'iu ob”ediniat' ves' narod, i to, chto ia vizhu zdes', obshchaias' s liud'mi, menia v etom ibezhdaet'” (www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/707283.html).

^28. This is how a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate who directly participated in the negotiations with the ROCA answered the question of whether he was bothered by talk of the virtually decisive role played by President Putin in the unification of the ROC and the ROCA: “The concern of the head of state for Russia (and Church affairs are an important part of Russian life as a whole) seems to me quite natural, a direct performance of his duties” (“‘Vossoedinenie—neobkhodimoe uslovie dlia normal'nogo sushchestvovaniia RPTsZ’: Beseda s doktorom bogosloviia, zaveduiushchim kafedroi tserkovno-prakticheskikh distsiplin MDAiS, protoiereem Vladislavom Tsypinym” (http://ruskline.ru/analitika/2007/06/04/vossoedinenie’_neobhodimoe_uslovie_dlya_normal_nogo_suwestvovaniya_rpcz/). And also in 2007 the Moscow Patriarchate made a declaration on the “Ukrainian question”: “The call (!) of the president of Ukraine to create a commission for the unification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the self-proclaimed Kyiv Patriarchate casts doubt on the secular character of the Ukrainian state” (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act = news&div = 16072/).

^29. “Poslanie Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rusi Kirilla arkhipastyriam, pastyriam, diakonam, monashestvuiushchim i vsem vernym chadam Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi po sluchaiu piatiletiia podpisaniia Akta o kanonicheskom obshchenii mezhdu Moskovskim Patriarkhatom i RPTsZ” (www,patriarchia.ru/db/text/2220312.html).

^30. “Patriarkh Kirill: Prichina ukrainskikh bed—tserkovnyi raskol” (http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/patriarh-kirill-prichina-ukrainskih-bed-tserkovnyi-raskol.html).

^31. “Konets tserkovnoi besprizornosti Ukrainy?” (http://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/66247.html).

^32. “Mitropolit Vladimir: UPTs MP nikogda ne otkazhetsia ot samostoiatel'nosti,” Fakty i kommentarii, July 20, 2012.

^33. Although the eastern patriarchs sincerely wished for the strengthening of the Muscovite kingdom, the transfer to the Moscow Patriarchate of the Kyiv metropolitanate, which from the end of the tenth century to 1686 had been under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Orthodox Church, initially took place without the consent of the Constantinople patriarch. He was presented with a fait accompli. As a result of negotiations that followed in 1686 between the Constantinople patriarch Dionysius and a Muscovite embassy headed by Nikita Alekseev, the patriarch issued a charter in which he confirmed the transfer of the Kyiv metropolitanate to the Moscow patriarch. For this Alekseev gave Dionysius 200 pieces of gold and 120 sables. Later, opponents of the patriarch in the Synod of the Constantinople Church accused Dionysius of ceding the Kyiv metropolitanate to Moscow and used this circumstance to dethrone him.

^34. “Kiïvs'ka popravka: Patriarkh Kiïvs'kii i vsieï Rusi-Ukraïni Filaret pro pravoslav'ia v suchasnomu sviti ta rol' u n'omu Ukraïni,” Ukraïns'kii tizhden', 2009, no. 10(71).

^35. “Mitropolit Mefodii: ‘Ukraïns'ka Tserkva ne mae prava na pomilku.’” Vidkritii list Predstoiatelia UAPTs Mitropolita Mefodiia Patriarkhu UPTs—Kiïvs'kogo Patriarkhatu Filaretu (www.religion.in.ua/news/1021-mitropolit-mefodij-ukrayinska-cerkva-ne-maye.html).

^36. Vladimir Romaniuk (1925–95) was a dissident priest and spent many years in Soviet labor camps. He headed the UOC KP after the death of Patriarch Mstislav in 1993. After his death, Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko), who occupied the post of deputy primate of the Church in 1992–95, but in reality already had full control over its affairs, was elected Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine.

^37. The Synod of the UOC KP and the followers of Patriarch Vladimir demanded that the authorities permit him to be buried inside the fence of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, but obtained permission only for his burial in the Baikove Cemetery, the most prestigious cemetery in the Ukrainian capital. However, the funeral procession, which happened to be headed by radical nationalists, moved toward the cathedral, where a violent clash took place with a special-purpose police detachment. Literally in the midst of the fighting, the participants in the funeral procession managed to break through the asphalt outside the cathedral gates and bury the patriarch right under the cathedral wall. Eventually the authorities were forced to accept this and a marble tombstone was erected over the grave.

^38. “Vystuplenie ministra inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii I.S. Ivanova na VIII Vsemirnom Russkom Narodnom Sobore. Sviato-Troitskaia Sergieva Lavra,” February 3, 2004 (www.mospat.ru/archive/6352.html).

^39. “This issue [of the pope's visit to Ukraine] was openly raised by prime minister of the RF Mikhail Kasyanov during his recent meeting with John Paul II in the Vatican.” Quoted from “V Moskve vyrazhaiut ozabochennost' v sviazi s podgotovkoi vizita papy rimskogo na Ukrainu,” March 30, 2001 (www.interfax-religion.ru/dialog/?act = archive&div = 9475/).

^40. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church regarded the transfer of the seat of its head from Lviv to Kyiv as evidence that it was a nationwide and not a regional Church, even though most Ukrainian Greek Catholics are in fact concentrated in Galicia. The Moscow Patriarchate called this transfer “a maneuver affecting the religious feelings of Orthodox believers” and a strengthening of the position of Greek Catholics to the detriment of the interests of Orthodox Christians.

^41. V. Solov'ev, “Konfeta po-kievski,” Kommersant”-Vlast', no. 7(861), February 22, 2010.

^42. On one case of such resistance, see N. Konova, “Ch'ikh budete?” Profil', no. 7(176), February 19, 2011.

^43. See the results of a public opinion survey reported in “Tserkovno-religiina situatsiia,” p. 71.

^44.Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2012), p. 62.

^45. The words are those of the well-known American sociologist José Casanova. See J. Casanova, “Incipient Religious Denominationalism in Ukraine and Its Effect on Ukrainian–Russian Relations,” Harriman Review, 1996, vol. 40, p. 9.

^46.Modernizatsiia Ukraïni—nash strategichnii vibir: Shchorichne Poslannia Prezidenta Ukraïni do Verkhovnoï Radi Ukraïni (Kyiv, 2011), pp. 42–43.

^47. The Law “On the Foundations of State Language Policy” substantially expands the sphere of use of regional languages and restricts the sphere of use of the state language—namely, Ukrainian. President Viktor Yanukovych signed the law on August 8, 2012, despite sharp criticism from legal experts, human rights activists, and public figures and the findings of specialists.

^48. The first of December was the date on which the popular referendum that confirmed the independence of Ukraine took place on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in 1991.