Ukrainian Protest: On the Eve, During, and After (A Sociologist's View)

Abstract

On the basis of substantial sociological material, the author analyzes the political and social consequences of the Maidan protests and shows that they constitute a revolutionary movement that led to regime change. Although the negative side of these protests manifested itself much more than the positive, the protests nonetheless embodied the popular demand for a new socio-political system and a radical change in the existing system of public life; this was the cause of both the Maidan protests and the subsequent wave of political and social processes that took place in Ukraine. In light of the many unresolved problems and significant contradictions facing the country today, the author expresses the hope that the Ukrainian people will be able to adequately respond to the challenges of the day in order to bring about the propitious outcome well within their reach.

Keywords::

• Euromaidan
• revolutionary protest
• Ukraine
• political opposition
• state sovereignty

This article is the republished version of:

Ukrainian Protest: On the Eve, During, and After (A Sociologist's View)

Notes

^1. For the earlier phases of national self-determination, popular discontent, and protest in Ukraine see my previous work: “Rossiia i Ukraina: publichnye diskursy i ozhidanie peremen” [Russia and Ukraine: Public Discourses and Expectation of Change], Neprikosnovennyi zapas (2003), vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 43–52 (open correspondence with Ukrainian sociologist, Volodymyr Kulyk); “Rossiia i sosedi: problemy vzaimoponimaniia” [Russia and [Its] Neighbors: Problems of the Mutual Understanding], Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniia (2005), vol. 75, no. 1, pp. 19–33.

^2. Below, I will turn to the following resources: the article by V. Paniotto, “Ukraina. Evromaidan” [Ukraine. Euromaidan], Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniia, 2013, no. 3/4, pp. 17–23), the Levada Center's online resources, Inna Bulkina's work published in Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal (www.ej.ru), and A. Portnov's writing on the site Uroki istorii (www.urokiistorii.ru/). I use this material generally and without necessarily indicating their author by name; of course, all generalizations, interpretations, and conclusions are mine alone.

^3. In Russia, at the time—before the annexation of Crimea and events in eastern Ukraine—the ratio of responses to the question, “Is the country moving in the right or the wrong direction?” was relatively stable, approximately 40:40.

^4. Compare the protests in Moscow from late 2011 to mid-2012 where approximately 20 percent were non-Muscovite, but the majority from Moscow's periphery. Even if we include demonstrations in several other major Russian cities, it is clear that most Russians did not participate. If we take into account the population of Moscow and its surrounding areas, the 200,000 individuals that made up the Moscow protests account for just 1–2 percent of its population. However, at the peak of the Russian movement (or more precisely, foment), the protesters claimed they had roughly the support of 40 percent of the adult Russian population. For a more detailed comparison of the mass protests in Kiev and Moscow, and their social structure, see my article: “Protest v razreze” [Protest Transected], New Times (February 10, 2014). www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/78409/.

^5. About 50 percent of Maidan respondents, among other demands, put forward the need to improve the standard of living of the entire population. For comparison, it is worth noticing that in Moscow, precise economic demands were clearly articulated only in Sergei Udal'tsov's video-speech on Sakharov Prospect; Udal'tsov himself was at the time in prison. Of course, material interests are a necessary element in these movements and help connect the ideal with reality—integrating the aspirations of different groups and increasing the interest, activity, and resistance of its members.

^6. See T. Vorozheykina “Ukraina: neutrachennye illuizii,” Pro et Contra, 2014, no. 3/4. I thank the author of this article, who introduced me to her then-still-published article, which helped me with this final part of the present article.

^7. And not only from the big urban areas; for example, the number of citizens from small towns, with populations less than 100,000, who made journeys to Maidan grew significantly over weeks.—Trans.

^8. For more on the particularities of the Russian context, specifically Putin's regime, see L. Gudkov, B. Dubin, and A. Leonova, “Militseiskoe nasilie i problema ‘politseiskogo gosudarstva,’” Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniia, 2004, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 31–47.

^9. On these two examples and the situation itself, see Y. Levada, “Otlozhennyi Armagedon?” [Armageddon Deferred?] (2002) and “Uroki atipichnoi situatsii [Lessons in Atypical Situations] (2003), Ishchem cheloveka [In Search of a Human Being] (Moscow: Novoe izdatel'stvo, 2006), pp. 91–128. See his earlier article, “Pokazateli sotsial'nykh nastroenii v ‘norme’ i v krizise” [Indicators of Social Attitudes during “Normal” Life and Times of “Crisis”] (1998), Ot mnenii k ponimaniu [From Opinion to Comprehension] (Moscow: MSPS, 2000), pp. 345–58.

^10. The response of the Russian majority to these events and, as a result, to those of different departments and figures of the Russian government, I discuss in my articles “Reiting Putina i rossiiskii sotsium” [Putin's Ratings and Russian Society] Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal (August 3, 2014); and “Pervoe litso na fone tselogo” [The first person against the background of the totality], forthcoming.

^*Veche refers to a popular assembly in medieval Slavic countries.—Trans.

^11. Theoretically, more simple social structures are distinguished by weaker internal dynamics, since dynamics is connected with more complicated activity—both in terms of content and meaning, and structure and organization—in other words, simple structures are more susceptible to “fatigue.” This point was raised by I. Bulkina two weeks before the end of 2013 concerning the emotional tone of blogs relating to Maidan: “This is not yet fatigue, but frustration … ‘What should we do next?’” The topic of “early fatigue” of social movements deserves its own analysis.

^12. Let us not forget that during Maidan, an offer was made by influential Western officials (K. Ashton and B. Nuland) to hold roundtable meetings with the government and representatives of the protesting public, based on the Polish model. The offer was rejected. The position of “no negotiations with the government” won out, which is natural: the power of Jaruzelski and Yanukovych were, of course, fundamentally different. The acts of the former (in spite of serious problems) prevented the Soviet invasion of Poland, while the actions of the latter put Ukraine in the crosshairs of Russian aggression. However, the protesters paid dearly for their refusal to negotiate, and it is possible that these payments will continue to be made in the coming years. There are situations where there is no good exit; however, this does not mean that looking for an exit should be abandoned. These situations should not be heralded as special national feature or be a particular source of pride. In principle, contemporary politicians tend to try to avoid these kinds of situations; on the other hand, some politicians (who cultivate the art of compromise) and especially those of the adventurist character, deliberately and provocatively, prefer a different strategy.