Down the Funnel

Abstract

This article argues that the new legitimacy of the Russian regime has a military-mobilization character; in order to maintain it the regime needs a deeper confrontation with the West and a dismantling of the residual elements of the electoral legitimacy. This shift also requires stronger reliance on the use of force.

Notes

Nikolay Petrov is Professor and Laboratory Head at Laboratory for Regional Development Assessment Methods, Higher School of Economics (Russia). He may be contacted at [email protected] This article was written in English and has not been published previously. Published with the author's permission. This article is based on results of an ongoing research project of the Laboratory for Regional Development Assessment Methods, Center for Fundamental Research, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

^1. M. Lipman and N. Petrov, eds., Russia in 2020: Scenarios for the Future (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

^3. In addition to the mandatory replacement of law enforcement executives in the regions after four to five years on the job, starting in 2013, the executives of about fifteen more administrative bodies became subject to mandatory rotation.

^4. The Kremlin will soon acquire full control over the judicial system, which, in conjunction with “deoffshorization” and the transfer of business disputes between Russian companies under national jurisdiction, will dramatically increase the system's control over any personal assets and thus completely subjugate the recent oligarchs of various stripes.

^5. To a large extent, Putin's May 2014 “long” visit to China answered this question. A multitude of contracts and agreements signed during the visit reveal that China supplies Russia with funds, equipment, and labor, and receives Russian raw materials in return.

^6. S. Belkovsky, “Medvedev Is Putin Today,” 2010; available at http://slon.ru/russia/medvedev_eto_putin_segodnya-412293.xhtml.

^7. The elimination of mayoral elections in large cities and various criminal charges that mayors increasingly face effectively eliminates the upper tier of the local government and sends similar signals down the power vertical.

^8. For instance, Igor Sechin with his Fuel and Energy Commission.

^9. The Kovalchuk brothers are in charge of business, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and media; Yevgeny Shkolov monitors the force structures; Igor Sechin is responsible for the oil sector.

^10. Vice Admiral Oleg Belavintsev, known for his KGB background, was appointed envoy to the Crimean federal okrug in March 2014; Lieutenant General Sergey Melikov of the Internal Troops became head of the North Caucasus federal okrug in May; the former commander of MVD Internal Troops General Nikolai Rogozhkin was put in charge of the Siberian federal okrug in May. In addition to the previously appointed envoys, FSB Colonel General Vladimir Bulavin (Northwestern federal okrug, March 2013), and the former prosecutor general Vladimir Ustinov (Southern federal okrug, 2008); generals make up the majority of presidential envoys, just as fourteen years ago when this institution was introduced.

^11. The MVD chief in the Sakhalin oblast Vladislav Belotserkovsky was arrested on charges of unauthorized surveillance of FSB officers in March 2014; another regional MVD chief—Alexander Nikitin from Ivanovo oblast was arrested in November 2014.

^12. For example, the creation of Russia Today in place of RIAN and the replacement of Svetlana Mironyuk with Dmitry Kiselev.

^13. For example, the MVD system has a special order in which new appointments and promotions, especially to higher-ranking positions, must have personal guarantors. According to this rule, introduced by executive orders of the minister of the interior issued in 2010 and 2012, the guarantor bears moral and sometimes also administrative responsibility for the appointee in question (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation No. 522 (Moscow, 2012); available at www.rg.ru/2012/07/11/prikaz-dok.html).

^14. Maria Lipman, “Putin's ‘Besieged Fortress’ and Its Ideological Arms” In The State of Russia: What Comes Next?, edited by Nikolay Petrov and Maria Lipman (Palgrave Macmillan 2015), pp. 110-136.

^15. In a short period of time, several leading experts—Sergei Guriev, Sergei Aleksashenko, and Mikhail Dmitriev—were driven out of the decision-making process. The RISI analytical center, which is close to the Foreign Intelligence Service, published a report listing all research and educational institutions that receive foreign funding. The investigation of the expert analysis on the second Yukos case is yet another example.

^16. Andrei Zubov was dismissed from his teaching position at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations) for his disloyal remarks. Grigory Revzin was promptly recalled from his curatorial job at the Russian Pavilion of the Venice Biennale. The famous musician Andrey Makarevich was not able to perform at some of his concerts because of his independent position on Ukraine. The musician later became the object of personal attacks on television.

^17. The change of editorial policy at Kommersant is a vivid example. This media outlet had long been hailed as a standard of high professionalism in the Russian media community.

^18. For instance, wresting the VKontakte social network from its founder Pavel Durov.

^19. See, for instance, the appeal in support of the Russian president's position on Ukraine and Crimea signed by 511 cultural figures; available at http://mkrf.ru/press-tsentr/novosti/ministerstvo/deyateli-kultury-rossii-v-podderzhku-pozitsii-prezidenta-po-ukraine-i-krymu/.

^20. Some materials used in this section come from discussions with other contributors to this issue and outside experts.

^21. Lipman and Petrov, Russia in 2020, pp. 497–500

^22. B. Nemtsov and V. Milov, “Putin. Results. Ten Years,” 2010; available at www.putin-itogi.ru/doklad/.

^23. Aleksandr Morozov prefers the term “loyal institutionalists” to “liberals.” A. Morozov, (2014) “What Happens to the Kremlin? The Defeat of the ‘Loyal Institutionalism,’” 2014; available at http://gefter.ru/archive/12799/.

^24. Sechin is a doctor of economics and vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2001–13). Nekipelov is chairman of the Board of Directors at Rosneft.

^25. Here “nomenclature” is understood as a hierarchical personnel system in which the influence of a particular figure is mainly linked to position rather than personality.

^26. M. Lipman and N. Petrov, eds., Russia 2025: Scenarios for the Russian Future (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

^27. V. Ryzhkov, “Russia: Five Million Restricted to Travel Abroad,” 2014; available at www.echo.msk.ru/blog/rizhkov/1328544-echo/.