The articles in the current issue of Russian Politics and Law discuss how the conflict in Ukraine has affected politics in Russia. They include a discussion of the role that Russia played in the early stages of the conflict in the Donbas, two articles with contrasting views on reasons for the increase in popular support for Vladimir Putin and his regime in the immediate aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, and an article on how the Russian government is going about incorporating Crimea into Russia political institutions.
The first article in this issue focuses on the extent of Russia's role in fomenting the violent conflict in eastern Ukraine. In “The Donbas Rift,” Serhiy Kudelia argues that the struggle for the Donbas that was taken up in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 resulted in the loss of the territory for both Ukraine and Russia. Although many blame Moscow for starting the war in the region, the key role was played by processes that took place within Ukraine, beginning with the use of force by Euromaidan activists, which was not stopped by opposition leaders and resulted in the government's loss of its monopoly on the use of force. After the anti-Yanukovych forces achieved their victory through the use of force, this tactic gained legitimacy in society.
Members of security forces from the Donbas considered the new government illegal and supported separatism. Miscalculations by the government allowed the separatist movement room to consolidate. The active participation of national militia in the Ukrainian response and the indiscriminate use of force by government troops increased support for the movement among the population in the Donbas, encouraging it to overcome its traditional political passivity. As a result of these actions, a large part of the local population ceased to consider the Ukrainian government as legitimate and accepted the need for a military confrontation with it. Russia used these developments, but did not play a determining role in them.
The rest of the issue focuses on the impact of the conflict in Ukraine on domestic political developments in Russia. Kirill Rogov's “Crimean Syndrome: Mechanisms of Authoritarian Mobilization” analyzes the rapid shift in mass public opinion among Russians after the annexation of Crimea, which is usually attributed to the success of official state propaganda. The article asks how this success was achieved, given that the popularity of Putin's regime had been falling for several years while the opposition had been gaining strength. It highlights the role played by the changing political environment, which makes it difficult to compare responses over time, even though the wording of the questions asked has remained the same.
The themes of the return of Crimea and the war of Ukrainian nationalists against the Russian population in eastern Ukraine enabled the regime to return poorly informed citizens to political life. The war enabled the government to mobilize in its support the most apolitical part of society while serving as an excuse to repress regime opponents. The Crimean syndrome shifted the worldview of Russian citizens, who became less concerned about corruption and more supportive of government policies in general.
Leontii Byzov, in “National Consensus or Social Anomaly?: On the Peculiarities of Mass Consciousness in ‘Post-Crimean’ Russia,” takes a contrary position. He argues that the dynamics of mass consciousness in Russia, formed in the wake of the 2014 events in Ukraine and Crimea, testify to the consolidation and radicalization of the popular majority. The national consensus has shaped a high level of public optimism even in the face of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. However, this process temporarily brings to the fore conservative archetypal traits that focus on integration into existing social structures even at the expense of personal self-interest.
These traits in many ways run contrary to the modern desire for mass consumption and self-affirmation, and are also helpful in temporarily reducing social mobilization among the population. In the longer term, however, this contradiction will begin to affect the political process and the sociopolitical situation, making it less stable than in the first decade of the present century.
In “Crimea: Transforming the Ukrainian Peninsula into a Russian Island,” Nikolai Petrov discusses how the accelerated integration of Crimea into Russia's state system illuminates the overall sociopolitical process in Russia. He also includes a chronology of the integration process as an appendix to the article. Petrov shows that the process was largely improved, with various agencies each pursuing their own course of action. Some were formed on the basis of existing Ukrainian institutions, while others were created de novo. In some cases, locals were given senior positions, while in others the top posts were assigned to appointees from other regions who had no previous ties to Crimea. Moscow was careful to take into account local factors, such as the role of the Crimean Tatar population. In a move characteristic of the present Russian political system, federal supervisory positions were filled by representatives of the security services, primarily from St. Petersburg.
It is not yet clear how effective the new governing system will be. The situation remains fluid, with many state institutions still subject to modification. The federal Ministry of Crimean Affairs was liquidated only fifteen months after its creation as a result of turf battles between senior figures in charge of the region. This has made the region's governing system less transparent and focused primarily on using forceful methods to control the region. It appears that in the long run, the Crimean system will follow the trend in other Russian regions and will come to be dominated by leaders from other parts of the country who do not have close ties with local elites.
It has been widely noted that Russia's annexation of Crimea and the resultant conflict with Ukraine has caused a break in relations between Russia and the West. The negative effect of the annexation on Russian domestic politics has received less attention. The authors in this issue discuss how the Russian government has used the crisis to shore up public support among its population and sought to integrate Crimea into the Russian state institutional system as quickly as possible. They also highlight the limits of the Russian government's reach, in questioning its ability to use the patriotism generated by the crisis to maintain popular support beyond the short term, playing a secondary role in igniting the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and highlighting difficulties in absorbing Crimea.