The Elite

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size

Notes

1. See “Bremia preemnika,” Pro et Contra, 2007, vol. 38, no. 4 (www.intelros.ru/2007/10/10/pro_et_contra.html; (accessed December 2, 2016).

^2. A. Makarkin, “Rossiiskie elity i kremlevskie ‘atomy,’” Pro et Contra, 2007, vol. 38, no. 4 (www.intelros.ru/pdf/pro_et_contra_38/makarkin-19-29.pdf; accessed December 2, 2016).

^3. See, for example, the speech made by V. Gelman at the roundtable “Political Trends: An Assessment, Analysis and Prognosis” at the Gaidar Forum 2014, Moscow, January 2014.

^4. “‘Pervaia sotnia’ kadrovogo reserva prezidenta. Polnyi spisok,” Argumenty i fakty, February 17, 2009 (www.aif.ru/politics/world/9358; accessed December 2, 2016).

^5. K. Latukhina, “Putin obnovil reserva upravlencheskikh kadrov,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, November 8, 2016 (https://rg.ru/2016/11/08/putin-obnovil-rezerv-upravlencheskih-kadrov.html; accessed December 2, 2016).

^6. See “Prezidentskii rezerv upravlencheskikh kadrov,” Gossluzhba (http://gossluzhba.gov.ru/Rezerv; accessed December 2, 2016).

^7. A good example is the departure of Evgeny Murov, the unofficial moderator in the entire security camp, from the position of head of the Federal Protective Service. He was replaced by a relatively young appointee who could in no way lay claim to the role of moderator. This kind of situation, when there is extremely weak institutionalization (the specific person is more important than the position), gives rise to uncertainty.

^8. The Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) was founded by Putin in 2011 to support unique socially important projects and initiatives of midsized businesses. The ASI, which continues to operate under the president’s control (Putin is the chair of its Supervisory Board), has also become an “institution for the development of people.” It plays the role of government supplier of cadres at the level of deputy minister and agency head.

^9. Even though Sergey Ivanov was officially appointed to the position of special representative of the president for environmental protection, ecology, and transportation and retained his permanent membership on the Security Council, this was essentially a dismissal, or, at least, a sharp fall in the hierarchy.

^10. Former officials in this category include Mikhail Lesin, the founder of the Russian media market of the 2000s (born in 1958, dismissed in 2015); Alexander Semenyaka, the former securities chief at Gazprom under Viakhirev (1965; 2002); and Sergey Dubik, Dmitry Medvedev’s former chief of staff (1963; 2015).

^11. “Putin vstretilsia s Yakuninym i obsudil budushchee eks-glavy RZhD, vyiasnili zhurnalisty,” Newsru.com, January 18, 2016 (www.newsru.com/russia/18jan2016/putinyakunin.html; accessed December 2, 2016).

^12. A presidential quota on spots in the upper chamber of the Russian parliament was introduced in July 2014 and required an amendment to the constitution. The quota gives the president the right to send seventeen federal senators to the Federation Council. See V. Petrov, “Prezidentskii tsentr,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, July 23, 2014 (https://rg.ru/2014/07/22/sovfed-site.html; accessed December 2, 2016.

^13. The word “disgrace” has started to be used frequently in the Russian political lexicon. For example, Sergei Ivanov used it in his interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda after he left his post as head of the presidential administration—naturally rejecting the proposal that he himself had fallen from grace. See E. Krivianika and V. Kon, “Sergey Ivanov: Nikakoi opaly ya ne chustvuiu,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 18, 2016 (www.kp.ru/online/news/2542532/; accessed December 2, 2016.

^14. Markin and Surkov exchanged barbs in public. NTV, May 7, 2013 (www.ntv.ru/novosti/584496/; accessed December 2, 2016).

^15. “Politburo 2.0: demontazh ili perezagruzka? Noiabr’ 2016,” Minchenko Consulting (www.minchenko.ru/Politburo%202.0_2016%2007.11.pdf; accessed December 2, 2016).

^16. See N. Petrov, “Ot federatsii korporatsii k federatsii regionov,” Pro et Contra, 2012, nos. 4–5 (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ProEtContra_56_all.pdf; accessed December 2, 2016.

^17. O. Kryshtanovskaya and S. White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 2009, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 289–306; D.W. Rivera, D.W. and S.W. Rivera, “Is Russia a Militocracy? Conceptual Issues and Extant Findings Regarding Elite Militarization,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 2014, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 27–50 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.819681; accessed December 2, 2016).

^18. See “Politburo 2.0”; N. Petrov, “Postroenie silovikov,” Vedemosti, July 25, 2016 (www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/07/25/650380-postroenie-silovikov; accessed December 2, 2016); T. Stanovaia, “Korporatsiia ‘silovikov’: kadrovaia ekspansiia na fone vnutrennykh ‘voin,’” Politcom.ru, April 19, 2014 (http://politcom.ru/17594.html; accessed December 2, 2016).

^19. See, for example, “Bastrykin i Markin okazalis’ ‘pod udarom.’ Eksperty—ob ‘otstavkakh v SKR,” Nakanune.ru, September 15, 2016 (http://www.nakanune.ru/news/2016/9/15/22447255; accessed December 2, 2016).

^20. A “feudal lord” or a “ruling prince” is the head of a state within a state. Under Yeltsin, regional leaders occupied a similar position while corporation heads have occupied this position under Putin. The current dismantling of corporations, especially security corporations of late, means that they are losing their autonomy to increased centralization.

^21. See “Sistema politicheskogo upravleniia v rossiiskikh regionakh nakanune Eginogo dnia golosovaniia 14 sentiabria,” Peterburgskaia politika, July 11, 2014 (http://fpp.spb.ru/fpp-political-control; accessed December 2, 2016).

^22. I. Lavrenkov, S. Sergeev, and A. Pertsev, “Kuzbass predstal v ‘Inskom’ razreze,” Kommersant, November 15, 2016 (www.kommersant.ru/Doc/3143247; accessed December 2, 2016).

^23. Federal Law of December 6, 2011 No. 395-FZ “On Amendments to Certain Legal Acts of the Russian Federation Due to the Introduction of Rotation into the State Civil Service,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, December 9, 2011 (https://rg.ru/2011/12/07/rotaciya-site-dok.html; accessed December 2, 2016).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nikolai Petrov

Nikolai Petrov is Professor of Political Science at the National Research University-Higher School of Economics.