State Duma of the Russian Federation of the 7th Convocation: Between “Sleeping Potential” and Party Discipline

Abstract

In the run-up to the elections of 18 September 2016, suggestions were made that a change in the rules for electing the State Duma (a return to a mixed majority-proportional system) would affect the qualitative composition of the deputy corps.¹ Today, a year since the Duma campaign, we already have sufficient information to move from hypothetical arguments to a specific study not only of the composition, but also the style of work of the new parliament.

Existing data allow us to say that two different tendencies exist in the Duma. One of them is connected with the change in the composition of the deputy corps, caused by the addition of a majority component, which has influenced the principles of selecting candidates, and by a number of other causes—from the assumption of a low turn-out to the emergence of new bans and restrictions in legislation. Another involves the change in style of work of the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly. Besides efforts directly toward reducing scandalous behavior and overcoming the reputation of a “maniacal printer,” this concerns attempts by the leadership of the Duma in general and individual parliamentary groups to regulate and centralize the lawmaking process as much as possible. If the first tendency involves increasing political independence of deputies (as a consequence of the increase of the importance of their personal qualities at elections), the second means an even greater reduction of their influence on decisions taken by the Duma. This article provides a detailed analysis of these tendencies.

Keywords:

• parliamentarianism
• division of powers
• political representation
• political parties
• political elites
• local self-administration

Notes

^1. See for example Kynev, Lyubarev, Maximov 2015; Mintusov (ed.) 2016; Mixed districts 2016.

^2. Features of political institutions in 2016.

^3. It should be remembered that since 2001, when the law “On political parties” came into effect, juridical possibilities for the functioning of regional parties have not existed in Russia.

^4. Half the members of the electoral commission of the region are appointed by the governor, and the other half by the legislative assembly, where the pro-governor “United Russia” almost always dominated everywhere.

^5. These results were first presented on 28 February 2017 at a scientific seminar of the department of political science of the HSE, “What we don’t know about the Duma of 2016,” and then partially published on the site republic.ru (see Kynev 2017a).

^6. See, for example, Elections in the Russian Federation 2008, Elections of deputies 2012, Elections in the regions 2014, etc.

^7. Belonuchkin (2003; 2004); Gaman-Golutvina (2006); Sakharov (2011); Pershina (2011); etc.

^8. Besides deputies working in the social sphere directly before election, this group also includes people from it who before entering the State Duma worked in a regional parliament or an Oblast or city administration.

^9. Legal and political features of 2016.

^10. Participant of 2016.

^11. For more detail see Kynev (2017b).

^12. “United Russia” 2016.

^13. An advisory body created under the Federation Council, which includes speakers of all regional parliaments.

^14. Khamraev (2017).

^15. Volodin (2017).

^16. Shul’man (2017).

^17. Ibid.