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Notes
132 Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that Khreish distanced himself from the Lebanese Front, the main Maronite group during the Civil War, and rejected the extreme views of right-wing Maronite politicians, such as Etienne Saqr (aka Abu Arz). See further CitationMordechai Nisan, The Conscience of Lebanon: A Political Biography of Etienne Sakr (Abu-Arz) (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 45.
131 Al-Nahar, 1 May 1964, p. 1.
130 For the formation of the Tripartite Alliance see CitationEntelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon, pp. 161–163.
129 Chehab tried to prevent Meouchi from having a private meeting with President Kennedy by asking Lebanon's ambassador to Washington, the Sunni Ibrahim al-Ahdab, to accompany the Patriarch to the White House meeting. Toward the end of the meeting, Kennedy invited Meouchi for a private walk so that he could show him where he intended to plant the cedar tree the Patriarch brought as a gift. Meouchi was thus able to have a few minutes in private with the president, which he judiciously used to convey his opposition to renewing Chehab's term. In addition, he urged Kennedy to check Nasser's growing influence in the Arab world. CitationNaoufal, Arab America, pp. 116–117.
128 Awad, Al-Tareeq ila al-Sulta, pp. 260–261.
127 For an insider account of the SSNP coup, see CitationFouad Awad, Al-Tareeq ila al-Sulta [The road to power] (Beirut: n.p., 1973), pp. 161–215; see also the two books by : Fouad Chehab: Zhalik al-Majhoul [Fouad Chehab: that unknown] (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbouat lil-Tawzeeh wa al-Nashr, 1988), pp. 65–70; and Fouad Chehab (Beirut: Muassat Fouad Chehab, 1998), pp. 53–54.
126 Al-Nahar, 27 April 1960, p. 1.
125 Al-Nahar, 27 April 1960, p. 1. Chamoun's visit to Meouchi provided the background for the following joke (told to me by Nassif Asmar, interview with Nassif Asmar):
A friend tells Chamoun: The Patriarch's pictures are all over Basta. Chamoun: I know a way to bring them down.
Friend: How?
Chamoun: Tomorrow I will visit the Patriarch and the pictures will come down.
124 CitationQubain, Crisis in Lebanon, p. 42.
123 Meouchi's guests on Independence Day (22 November 1957) included opposition leaders and the aforementioned delegation of Syrian deputies.
122 Al-Nahar, 12 February 1958, p. 3. Meouchi's remarks shocked Chamoun loyalists and right-wing Christian politicians, like Pierre Gemayel, who asked Bkerké to provide a written text of the Patriarch's speech; but no such text was issued.
121 Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, 24 July 1958, FRUS, vol. XI (1958–1960), pp. 386–387.
120 Al-Nahar, 23 March 1957, p. 2.
119 Malik was foreign minister in three consecutive governments headed by Sami al-Solh between November1956 and September 1958.
118 Here it must be noted that a number of Muslim politicians (the most prominent of them being Prime Minister al-Solh) supported Chamoun in his decision to keep Lebanon out of the Egyptian–Syrian sphere of influence.
117 Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, 24 July 1958, FRUS, vol. XI (1958–1960), pp. 386–387.
116 Nassif, Camille Chamoun, p. 103.
115 Interview with Abou Zaid.
114 Al-Nahar, 12 July 1958, p. 8; and ibid., 13 July 1958, p. 2.
113 Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, 30 May 1958, FRUS, vol. XI (1958–1960), p. 81.
112 Al-Nahar, 5 June 1958, p. 2.
111 Al-Nahar, 3 June 1958, p. 2.
110 L'Orient, 1 June 1958, p. 2.
109 Al-Siyassa, 27 June 1958, p. 1.
108 L'Orient, 4 June 1958, p. 2.
107 See, for example, the statement of deputy Anwar al-Khatib, L'Orient, 1 June 1958, p. 2 The letter was signed by deputies Jean Harb, Maurice Zouein, Qabalan Issa al-Khoury and Nouhad Boueiz.
106 See, for example, the statement of deputy Anwar al-Khatib, L'Orient, 1 June 1958, p. 2.
105 See, for example, the statement of deputy Anwar al-Khatib, L'Orient, 1 June 1958, p. 2.
104 L'Orient, 31 May 1958, p. 1.
103 Al-Nahar, 22 May 1958, p. 1.
102 Al-Nahar, 27 May 1958, p. 2.
101 Al-Nahar, 22 May 1958, p. 1.
100 Al-Nahar, 24 May 1958, p. 2.
99 Meouchi said this in his 30 May press conference. See Al-Nahar, 31 May 1958, p. 5; and L'Orient, 31 May 1958, p. 1.
98 Al-Nahar, 23 May 1958, p. 2; and ibid., 25 May 1958, p. 2.
97 CitationRobert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 400.
96 For a pro-opposition account of the 1958 Crisis, see Nadia and CitationNawwaf Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawra al-Lubnaniya: Asbabuham Tatawuruha, Haqaiquha [The reality of the Lebanese revolution: its causes, development and realities] (Beirut: Karam Press, 1959). For more neutral accounts, see CitationQubain, Crisis in Lebanon; and Abou-Saleh, Al-Azama al-Lubnaniyya ‘Am 1957.
95 Al-Nahar, 11 March 1958, pp. 2, 7.
94 Undoubtedly, Meouchi is referring here to Chamoun loyalists.
93 For the text of the speech, see Al-Nahar, 11 March 1958, pp. 2, 7.
92 Al-Nahar, 5 February 1958, p. 1.
91 CitationKalawoun, The Struggle for Lebanon, pp. 46–50.
90 Al-Siyassa, 26 November 1957, p. 4.
89 Al-Siyassa, 24 November 1957, pp. 1, 8.
88 For the reaction of Hourani, see al-Siyassa, 24 November 1957, pp. 1, 8. In a statement, the UNF denounced the ‘reckless measure’ and Tripoli went on strike to protest the treatment of the Syrian deputies. Al-Siyassa, 24 November 1957, p. 5.
87 Al-Siyassa, 26 November 1957, p. 4. In late December, the Egyptian government protested to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry about a conspiracy that was hatched in Beirut to assassinate Nasser; see Al-Nahar, 27 December 1957, p. 9.
86 Concurrent with the statements made by Syria's foreign minister, Nasser accused the Lebanese authorities of: (1) granting freedom of action to the SSNP which opposed unity between Syria and Egypt; (2) allowing certain Egyptians who fled their country to work with the imperialist circles in Lebanon to harm Egypt and Arabism; and (3) turning Beirut into a center for fabricating false stories about Syria. See Al-Siyassa, 26 December 1957, p. 3.
85 In late December, Syria's foreign minister, Salah al-Din Bitar, noted that ‘Lebanon has become a base for imperialist activity against Syria.’ See Al-Siyassa, 26 December1957, p. 3.
84 Arslan boycotted cabinet meetings from late December until early January. When the government dropped its plan to turn the North into a military zone, Arslan withdrew his resignation. Arslan's threat to resign received extensive press coverage. See, for example, Al-Nahar, 22 December 1957, p. 2; 24 December 1957, p. 2; 29 December 1957, p. 2; 31 December 1957, p. 2; 7 January 1958, p. 3; and Al-Siyassa, 31 December 1957, p. 1.
83 Ghassan Toueini wrote in Al-Nahar: ‘The government's preferred solution to the security problem was to hand over responsibility in troubled areas to the army one by one … The person in charge of the army, however, did not accept this plan, rendering its implementation impossible.’ Al-Nahar, 27 December 1957, p. 1; see also Al-Nahar, 24 December 1957, p. 8.
82 Al -Nahar, 20 December 1957; and 22 December 1957, p. 2.
81 Al-Siyassa, 21 December 1957, p. 1; and 24 December 1957, p. 5.
80 Al-Siyassa, 7 December 1957, p. 5.
79 Al-Siyassa, 7 December 1957, p. 5.
78 One only can speculate on why Suleiman Franjieh (and his son Tony) chose to ally themselves with Father Douaihi after their bitter, even mortal, rivalry. Three reasons come to mind: First, both sides wanted to avoid electoral competitions that could degenerate quickly into actual fights; second, Suleiman Franjieh's relations with Chamoun improved in the early 1960s as both men found common cause in confronting Chehabism (Douaihi was Chamoun's main ally in Zgharta); and third, Suleiman and Tony wanted to consolidate their hold over the Franjieh clan by warding off challenges from the sons of the incapacitated Hamid. Their alliance with the Douaihis (the largest family in Zgharta) served such a purpose.
77 Al-Nahar, 6 April 1964, pp. 1, 5. When prior to the 1960 parliamentary election the number of deputies was increased from 66 to 99, Zgharta obtained a third seat.
76 After the Mizyyara massacre, Moawad and Suleiman Franjieh (Hamid's brother who was implicated in the shootings) fled to Syria to escape arrest warrants. From there they engaged in anti-Chamoun polemics and directed the insurrection in Zgharta. Glass, Tribes with Flags, pp. 301–302.
75 Al-Siyassa, 30 June 1957, p. 1. According to Abou Zaid, Meouchi did not denounce Douaihi's candidature publicly because he knew better than to get his hands burned in Zgharta's internal politics.
74 Al-Siyassa, 30 June 1957, p. 1.
73 CitationRichard Glass, Tribes with Flags: A Dangerous Passage through the Chaos of the Middle East (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), p. 300.
72 Abou Zaid noted that Meouchi's first remark upon hearing the news about Mizyyara was ‘Amalha Chamoun’ (Chamoun did it). Interview with Abou Zaid.
71 Al-Siyassa, 17 June 1957, p. 5.
70 Farshakh, Hamid Franjieh, p. 253.
69 Moussa, The Maronites in History, p. 293.
68 Al-Siyassa, 6 June 1957, p. 1.
67 Al-Siyassa, 6 June 1957, p. 1; CitationMoussa, The Maronites in History, p. 293.
66 Al-Siyassa, 4 June 1957, p. 3.
65 For the opposition's account of the 30 May disturbances, see al-Siyassa, 31 May 1957, p. 1; for the government's version of events see Al-Nahar, 31 May, 1957, p. 1.
64 Al-Siyassa, 28 May 1957, p. 1.
63 Here the opposition was complaining, in essence, about gerrymandering. I did not use the term ‘gerrymandering,’ though, because I seriously doubt that the opposition at the time was aware of the concept.
62 Al-Nahar, 14 May 1957, p. 2.
61 Farshakh, Hamid Franjieh, p. 273.
60 Hamid Franjieh and other opposition leaders were Meouchi's guests for a Saturday lunch in February. Al-Nahar, 24 February 1957, p. 2.
59 Franjieh was treated as head of state when he visited Egypt in August 1957. During his meeting with President Nasser the two men developed a quick rapport and came to admire one another. Franjieh resigned as foreign minister shortly after the visit. CitationGeorge Farshakh, Hamid Franjieh wa-Jumhuriat al-Istiqlal [Hamid Franjieh and the independent republic] (Beirut: Al-Muassasa al-Arabiyya lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, 1997), pp. 234–235.
58 The cabinet was headed by Sami al-Solh and was formed on 9 July 1955; Franjieh resigned on 7 September and the whole cabinet resigned on 19 September. CitationJean Melheh, Hukumat Lubnan [Governments of Lebanon] (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 2004). In the 1952 presidential election, most Muslim deputies supported Chamoun because they perceived Franjieh to be pro-French. During his very brief tenure as foreign minister, Franjieh established good rapport with President Nasser of Egypt and grew increasingly critical of Chamoun's tilt toward the countries of the Baghdad Pact. Franjieh was the only Christian deputy to resign his parliamentary seat in protest of the 1957 electoral law.
57 See, inter alia, the following issues of Al-Nahar, 6 April 1957, p. 2; 7 April 1957, p. 2; 11 April 1957, p. 2; 27 April 1957, p. 2; 4 May 1957, p. 2; 21 May 1957, p. 2; and 29 May 1957, p. 1.
56 Al-Siyassa, 25 June 1957, p. 5.
55 Al-Nahar, 17 June 1957, p. 1.
54 The Patriarch asked his chief assistant Abi-Nader to bring Junblatt in his car to Bkerké. According to Abi-Nader, Meouchi wanted to send a clear message to the authorities that Junblatt was always welcome at Bkerké, despite his open conflict with the president. Interview with Archbishop Abi-Nader.
53 Interview with Archbishop Abi-Nader. Upon his return from Rome at end of the First World War, Meouchi became the secretary to Bishop Bustani, but since he departed to the United States in 1919 he must have served in that capacity for only a few months. See Al-Nahar, 12 January 1975, p. 8.
52 A news commentary in Al-Nahar noted that the opposition had managed to persuade the Patriarch to spearhead the demands for raising the number of deputies to 88. Al-Nahar, 24 February 1957, p. 2.
51 For the role of foreign governments in funding rival candidates in the 1957 election, see CitationWilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (London: W.W. Norton, 1980), pp. 250–253.
50 Lebanon's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine came at the conclusion of a visit to Beirut by James P. Richards, former US Congressman and President Eisenhower's special ambassador in charge of promoting the doctrine. For the text of the US–Lebanese Communiqué issued at the conclusion of Richards’ visit, see Al-Nahar, 17 March 1957, p. 1. Scholarly works on the Eisenhower Doctrine are numerous; see, for example, the recent book by CitationSalim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
49 Quoted in Al-Nahar, 13 January 1975, p. 13.
48 Al-Nahar, 22 March 1958, p. 8.
47 Al-Nahar, 13 March 1967, p. 4.
46 See, for example, his speech to a multi-confessional delegation from Akkar in Al-Nahar, 12 February 1958, p. 3.
45 CitationMatti Moussa, The Maronites in History (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), p. 293. Meouchi first visited Basta on 12 March 1956, where he was received warmly by the Sunni crowds. In an improvised speech, he urged all the Lebanese ‘to work together to insure Lebanon's development and prosperity and to strengthen ties with their Arab neighbors and brethren.’ For Meouchi's remarks and reactions to the visit, see Al-Nahar, 13 March 1956, pp. 1, 4.
44 Ibid., p. 25; see also the following issues of Al-Nahar: 6 November 1956, p. 2; 7 November 1956, p. 2; 9 November 1956, p. 2; 16 November 1956, pp. 1, 2; 17 November 1956, pp. 1, 2; 18 November 1956, p. 2.
43 For a discussion of how official Lebanon dealt with the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Egyptian pressure not to join it, see CitationKalawoun, The Struggle for Lebanon, pp. 10–13.
42 Interview with Abou Zaid.
41 The Baghdad Pact was formed officially on 24 February 1955. Dozens of works have dealt with the formation and implications of the Baghdad Pact. See, for example, CitationMalcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 5–7; CitationPatrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-war Arab Politics 1945–1958, 2nd ed. (London: I. B. Taurus, 1986), esp. pp. 168, 186–237.
40 Interview with Abou Zaid.
39 Junblatt admitted that Chamoun had been quite successful in disguising himself as an Arab nationalist. According to Junblatt, Chamoun ‘had immersed himself from head to toe in Arabism, to the extent that he was accused of advocating Arab unity. The Beirut Street would say about him: This is a Muslim and not a Maronite.’ CitationKamal Junblatt, Haqiqat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniya [The truth about the Lebanese revolution] (Beirut: Dar al-Nasher al-Arabiyya, 1959), p. 27.
38 Munah Citational–Solh, Al-Marouniya al-Siyassa [Political Maronitism] (Beirut: Markaz al Safir lil Maaloumat, 1977), p. 45.
37 CitationMiles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), p. 235.
36 For the motivations behind al-Khoury's support for Arab causes, see CitationEyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), esp. p. 145.
35 CitationEyal Zisser, ‘The Maronites, Lebanon and the State of Israel: early contacts, Middle Eastern Studies, 31(4) (1995), pp. 889–918.
34 Interviews with Abou Zaid, André Meouchi-Aziz, and Archbishop Abi Nader.
33 Al-Nahar, 4 June 1958, pp. 1, 8.
32 Interview with N. Asmar.
31 Interview with Archbishop Abi-Nader, Beirut, 8 May 2004; see also Naoufal, Arab America, pp. 116–117.
30 Kamil Naoufal, the Arabic translator for the White House, provides a vivid account of Meouchi's visit to the United States and his meeting with President Kennedy; see CitationKamil Naoufal, Arab America: ‘Raha‘in Ba’isa min Eisienhower ila Ford [The Arabs of America: destitute captives from Eisenhower until Ford] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2003), pp. 113–117.
29 Accounts differ as to how strongly Meouchi backed Chehab's candidacy. According to Abou Zaid, Chehab was Meouchi's favorite candidate all along. The stories that appeared in the Lebanese press support this version. Frankel notes that in his meeting with US special envoy Robert Murphy, Meouchi suggested Bishara al-Khoury for the presidency, only to be told that he was too old and corrupt. Meouchi then conceded that Chehab was actually his favored candidate; see Frankel, ‘The Maronite Patriarch,’ p. 251.
28 For the Lebanese complaint, see Al-Nahar, 23 May 1958, p. 1. See also CitationFahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 89–109.
27 Mrs. André Meouchi-Aziz, the Patriarch's niece, said her uncle was so happy in Los Angeles that when he received news of his appointment as Bishop of Tyre he hesitated for a week before accepting the new position; interview, 3 May 2004.
26 Al-Nahar, 4 June 1958, p. 1.
25 According to Robert Murphy, US special envoy to Lebanon, Meouchi was at one point a US citizen. Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Beirut, 24 July 1958, Citation Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), vol. XI (1958–1960), p. 386.
24 Nassif, Camille Chamoun, p. 19.
23 Meouchi kept the purchase of the house and land in Jezzine secret. It was only after his death that the identity of the owner and the purposes for which the estate was to be used were revealed. In his will Meouchi requested that his remains be moved to the social services center after it was built. The eruption of the Civil War halted plans to build the center. For many years, Meouchi's estate was occupied by the South Lebanese Army of Antoine Lahad. After the militia left Jezzine in early 2000, the Sisters of the Holy Family began renovating the old house.
22 Interview with Abou Zaid.
21 Interviews with Mrs. André Aziz-Meouchi, Beirut, 3 May 2004; and N. Asmar, 28 July 2004.
20 As a child, my mother, a Chamoun sympathizer, told me this story many times.
19 Interview with Joseph Moawad, Hazmieh, 2 December 2004.
18 Interviews with Abou Zaid, 28 April 2004; and Nassif Asmar, Jezzine, 28 July 2004.
17 Magazine (Beirut), 27 March 1957, no. 27, p. 23.
16 Magazine (Beirut), 27 March 1957, no. 27, p. 23.
15 Al-Nahar, 29 May 1958, p. 1; and 12 January 1975, p. 8.
14 Interviews with journalist Hikmat Abou Zaid, Beirut, 28 April 2004; and Mrs. Adma Nassif Meouchi, Jezzine, 28 July 2004.
13 CitationNassif, Camille Chamoun, p. 19.
12 Al-Nahar, 12 January 1975, p. 8.
11 CitationNassif, Camille Chamoun, p. 21.
10 CitationFouad Khouri, Al-Niyyaba Fi Lubnan: Nushu'ha, Atwaruha, Atharuha, Alamuha min 1860 ila 1977 [Parliamentary life in Lebanon: its origins, evolution, legacy and prominent figures from 1860 until 1977] (Beirut: n.p., 1980), pp. 51, 72, 82.
9 CitationNicholas Nassif, Camille Chamoun: Akhir al-Amaliqa [Camille Chamoun: the last of the giants] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1988), p. 20.
8 For a brief biography of Auguste Adib see Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia, pp. 62–63.
7 Although Jezzine is presently part of the governorate of South Lebanon, it was part of Mount Lebanon under the Mutasariffiya (1860–1914).
6 This thesis can be found in the works of CitationRaghid al-Solh, Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation (London: I. B. Tauris in association with the Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2004), esp. pp. 14–18; and CitationAsher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
5 Abbas CitationAbou Saleh, Al-Azama al-Lubnaniyya ‘Am 1958 [The Lebanese crisis of 1958] (Beirut: Al-Arabiyya lil-Manshurat, 1998).
4 CitationSamir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and CitationNasser Kalawoun, The Struggle for Lebanon: A Modern History of Lebanese–Egyptian Relations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
3 CitationEphraim A. Frankel, ‘The Maronite Patriarch: an historical view of a religious Za'im in the 1958 Lebanese Crisis,’ Muslim World, 66(3) (1976), pp. 213–225; and 66(4) (1976), pp. 246–258.
2 Studies deserving special mention include CitationIrene Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention and the Middle East, 1945–1958 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999); CitationErika Alin, The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis: American Intervention in the Middle East (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994); CitationCaroline Attiyé, Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s (London: I. B. Tauris in association with the Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2004); and CitationRoger Louis & Roger Owen (Eds), A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
1 CitationJohn Entelis lists the main groups and individuals who backed Chamoun in 1958: ‘Sham'un [sic] had the backing of the Kata'ib, SSNP, Tashnaq, and National Bloc organizations as well as some leading notables like Sami al-Sulh, Na'im Mughabghab, and for a time, Majid Arslan.’ See CitationJohn P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib, 1936–1970 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 177.