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Notes
This essay was written initially in 2001 at the request of the French journal CEMOTI (Cahiers D'Etudes sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco Iranien) for a special issue on agriculture and rural society in the Near East and North Africa. At the request of the editor, the essay was written in general terms, with a historical overview, for non-specialist general readers. I have made only minimal editorial adjustments to the essay, mainly adding footnotes and references. For reasons that remain obscure to me, that issue of CEMOTI was never published. I am grateful to Eric Hooglund for encouraging me to submit it to Critique. I would like to express my appreciation to Mostafa Azkia, who mentored and supported my initial research in Khuzestan on the problems of rural development in post-revolutionary Iran; and to Eric Hooglund whose work on rural Iran has been a model for my own.
58 Until now, ‘Green Revolution’ measures have been focused on agro-chemical (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides) and agro-mechanical (mechanization) components.
57 See Schirazi, ‘The saga,’ for the latest survey.
56 State support tends to be concentrated in short-term financial credit extensions, guaranteed purchases, supplies of inputs, and support prices for certain strategic crops. For example, banking facilities extended by the Agricultural Bank more than trebled, from 11 trillion Rls in 2000–01 to 37 trillion Rls in 2004–05; and the guaranteed purchase price of wheat in the same period increased from 1050 Rls/kg to 1700 Rls/kg. However, the same support did not materialize in the equally important research and extension, marketing and packaging, information and distribution assistance, and insurance services. See CBI Annual Review, various years.
55 Neshat, 27 February 1999.
54 See CitationKaveh Ehsani, ‘Crisis of water, crisis of Abadan,’ Goft-o-Gu, 27 (2000), pp. 162–172 [in Persian].
53 Iran Times, 28 October 1994; and IRNA, 19 April 2001.
52 Iran Times, 28 October 1994; and Ettelaat, 18 September 2000.
51 In 1994 Kalantari, the minister of agriculture, declared that wheat production was going to increase by 40 percent during the second development plan (1993–98) and reach 14 mt/yr. The same ministry announced in 1998 that wheat production was reaching 11 mt that year, and that 3 mt of wheat still had to be imported! Until 2001, as a result of four years of severe drought, imports of wheat surpassed 7 mt/yr, making Iran the largest importer of wheat in the world for a number of years. See MEED, 25 February 1994; IRNA, 21 April 1998; and Financial Times, 10 July 2001. Since 2002, owing mainly to improved climate and precipitation, as well as increased price supports and purchase guarantees, wheat production area and yields increased, finally reaching the 14 mt mark. Average wheat yields in Iran have vacillated between 1.6 t/ha and 2 t/ha since the mid-1990s, mostly in response to climatic conditions. In the same period, wheat yields for the Near East region, which includes Turkey, have averaged around 2.2 t/ha. See FAO, Food Balance Sheets.
50 See CitationAbbas Zargar, ‘Sugary dreams: agribusinesses in Khuzestan,’ Goft-o-Gu, 25 (1999), pp. 81–94 [in Persian].
49 CBI, Annual Review (various years).
48 See Kaveh CitationEhsani, ‘Tilt but don't spill: Iran's economic performance,’ Middle East Report, 191 (1994), pp. 16–21; and CitationMehrdad Haghayeghi, ‘Agricultural development planning under the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ Iranian Studies, 23(1–4) (1990), pp. 5–30.
47 See Mahdavi, ‘Tahavolat’; Ehsani, ‘Islam, modernity’; and Eric Hooglund, ‘Social change in rural areas,’ paper presented at the ‘Iranian Social History’ conference, International Institute of Social History, June 2001, Amsterdam. As this paper was going to the editor I came across the valuable recent study of CitationAmir Ismail Ajami, ‘From peasant to farmer: a study of agrarian transformation in an Iranian village, 1967–2002,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37(3) (2005), pp. 327–349. Ajami's findings parallel many of the arguments made in the present paper.
46 See CitationA. V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), esp. the essay entitled ‘Peasant farm organizations,’ pp. 29–270 (originally published in 1925).
45 These consumer items are thought of as savings, not necessarily as luxuries, as they can be reconverted to money at any time, with little fear of depreciation in value.
44 Schirazi, Islamic Development, pp. 295–298.
43 See Schirazi, Islamic Development, p. 290; and Mahdavi, ‘Tahavolat.’
42 This was as much a measure to control inflation by encouraging savings and reducing liquidity as to dispense loans and credit to farmers.
41 Jehad-e Sazandegi, Hameh ba Ham; Azkia and Ghaffari, Tose-eh Roustaee, pp. 122–125; and MEED, 11 June 1993.
40 See Reinhold Loeffler, ‘Economic changes’; and Jehad Sazandegi, Hameh ba Ham [All together] (Tehran: Jehad Sazandegi, 1987).
39 For more detailed discussion of the effects of the Revolution and war in the countryside and provinces see Ehsani, ‘Islam, modernity’; and Ehsani & Pourparviz, ‘Revolution and war.’
38 The most detailed discussion of this process can be found in Schirazi, Islamic Development. For other informative accounts see Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs; and Ahmad Ashraf, ‘Dehqan, zamin, va enqelab.’ Ironically, it was the conservative Guardians’ Council that mounted an uncompromising defense of private property rights against populist and radical regime factions, who were spearheading the effort to carry through a more far-reaching land redistribution. For a discussion of the reaction among the ulama and landlords during the 1960s see the revisionist account of the land reform by CitationM. G. Majd, Resistance to the Shah (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000).
37 CitationMinistry of Agriculture, Ravand-e Harkat-e Bakhsh-e Keshavarzi [Trends in the agriculture sector].
36 These contradictory aims were very much a reflection of the nature of the Islamic Republic regime, which has been variously labeled as middle class, theocratic, clerical, petit bourgeois or populist. However, an equally significant characteristic of this regime is its provincial nature. While many of the of men of power in the Islamic Republic come either from the lower middle-class or working-class areas of the capital, the vast majority are from provincial towns, or have close and recent roots to the provinces. In other words, they are from those geographic regions left outside the circuits from which the elite of the ancien régime were drawn.
35 This upper limit was decreed to be set at three times the local minimum agricultural land needed to sustain a household.
34 For specific occurrences see CitationMinistry of Agriculture & Yekom Engineering Consultants, Gozaresh-e Bazdid az Arazi-ye Zir-e Shabakehe-ye Dez-e Bozorg [Report on the inspection of the land irrigated by the Grand Dez Dam network] (Tehran: MoA, 1984); CitationMinistry of Agriculture, Olgou-ye Kesht va Nezamha-ye Bahrebardari va Shiveha-ye Towlid dar 37,000ha Arazi Abkhour Zir-e Sad Dez Bozorg [Cultivation models and modes of production in the 37,000 ha irrigated by the Grand Dez Dam] (Tehran: MoA, 1985); Azkia, Jame'eh Shenasi, pp. 216–256; Mahdavi, ‘Tahavolat’; and Dowlat et al., ‘Les Paysans et la révolution.’ Much of this information is also based on research I conducted in Khuzestan between 1989 and 1992, including extended conversations with managers of the remaining agribusinesses in Dezful, cooperatives in Behbahan, and agrarian shareholder corporations in Dezful and Golpayegan (the latter situated in the Central Province); as well as former farm employees and present small land owners.
33 See Azkia, Jame'eh Shenasi, pp. 252–255.
32 See CitationMansour Moadell, ‘Class struggle in post-revolutionary Iran,’ International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 23(2) (1991), pp. 317–343; CitationShaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Ahmad Ashraf, ‘Dehqan, zamin, va enqelab’ [Peasant, land, and revolution], in: Ketab-e Agah, Mas'el Arzi va Dehqani (Tehran: Agah Publishers, 1982), pp. 6–49; Azkia, Jame'eh Shenasi; Mahdavi, ‘Tahavolat’; Mahdavi, ‘Molahezati’; Schirazi, Islamic Development; and CitationDowlat et al., ‘Les Paysans et la révolution.’
31 For urban areas see Bernard CitationHourcade & Farhad Khosrokhavar, ‘L'Habitat révolutionnaire a Téheran, 1977–81,’ Hérodote, 31, October/December 1983; CitationAsef Bayat, Street Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Ehsani & Pourparviz, ‘Revolution and war.’ For rural areas see Schirazi, Islamic Development; Azkia, Jame'eh Shenasi; Azkia & Ghaffari, Tose'eh Roustaee; Dowlat et al., ‘Les Paysans et la révolution’; and CitationMahdavi, ‘Tahavolat.’
30 See further CitationKaveh Ehsani, ‘Islam, modernity, and national identity,’ Middle East Insight, 9(5) (1995), pp. 48–53; and CitationKaveh Ehsani & M. R. Pourparviz, ‘Revolution and war in Ramhormoz: evaluation of an experience,’ Goft-o-Gu, 25, Fall 1999, pp. 95–120 [in Persian].
29 See Azkia & Ghaffari, Tose'eh Roustaee, p. 125.
28 The arguments and conclusions in this section are based on my fieldwork in the province of Khuzestan. During 1989–90 and 1992 I discussed with numerous villagers their experience of the Revolution, its aftermath, and the Iran–Iraq war. My interlocutors and informants were from quite diverse ethnic and geographic backgrounds, as well as from different generations, and economic strata. I equally questioned women whenever possible. The bulk of the research was conducted in villages around the towns of Ramhormoz, Ramshir, Baghmalek, Dezful, Ahvaz, and Shadegan.
27 CitationErvand Abrahamian & Farhad Kazemi, ‘The non-revolutionary peasantry of modern Iran,’ Iranian Studies, 11 (1978), pp. 259–304, and Ahmad Ashraf, ‘State and agrarian relations,’ fall into the first category; while CitationEric Hooglund, Land and Revolution, Hossein Mahdavi, ‘Tahavolat-e Si Saleh,’ Mahdavi, ‘Molahezati dar Bare-ye,’ CitationReinhold Loeffler, ‘Economic changes in a rural area since 1979,’ in CitationEric Hooglund & Nikki Keddie (Eds) The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), and Manijeh Dowlat, Bernard Hourcade & Odile Puech, ‘Les Paysans et la révolution iranienne,’ Peuples Méditerranéens, January/March 1980, pp. 19–42, all are examples of the second category.
26 FAO, Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for Iran (Rome: FAO, 1974).
25 Ahmad Ashraf, ‘State and agrarian relations,’ p. 286; and Hossein Mahdavi, ‘Molahezati dar Bare-ye Masa'ele Arzi Iran’ [Observations regarding the land question in Iran], in: Ketab-e Agah; Majmoué Maghalat dar Bareh Iran va Khavar Mianeh (Tehran: Agah Publishers, 1984), p. 172.
24 Hossein Mahdavi, ‘Tahavolat-e Si Saleh Yek Deh Dar Dasht-e Qazvin’ [Thirty years in the development of a village in the Qazvin plain], in: Ketab-e Agah; Massaél Arzi va Dehqani (Tehran: Agah Publishers, 1982), pp. 61–62.
23 The most vocal and influential proponent of large-scale experimentation in agriculture during the 1970s was Mansour Rohani, the Minister of Water and Electricity, and later of Agriculture. Rohani was executed after the collapse of the monarchy. The irony is that many of the current policy makers and senior functionaries of the MoA are silent but ardent admirers of the late minister. For an exposition of CitationRohani's strategy see Mansour Rohani, ‘Siasat-e Tose'e-ye Keshavarzi dar Qotbha-ye Manabe'e Ab-o Khak’; and for a critique of Rohani's strategy of growth poles see CitationHoushang Saedloo, ‘Naqdi bar Siasat-e Tose'e-ye Keshavarzi dar Qotbha-ye Manabe'e Ab-o Khak,’ both published in Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi, 23/24 (Fall/Winter 1970), pp. 66–88. The most disturbing first-hand account of the social impact of the growth poles policy is Goodell's Elementary Structures.
22 CitationFrancois Perroulx's theory of ‘growth poles’ as well as Albert Hirschman's theory of ‘unbalanced growth’ had a strong influence on Iranian state planners at the time. Both these theorists argued that an even distribution of limited resources throughout the economy would not create bursts of growth as much as an uneven high concentration of capital, labor, and know-how in the most promising sectors of the economy, in order to create backward and forward linkages with the rest of the economy, acting as the engine of growth for the economy as a whole. Within the Iranian context this theory had a strong appeal for state technocrats, especially in the increasingly authoritarian and aggressively modernizing late 1960s. The main proponent of the growth poles theory was the influential minister Mansour Rohani (see next footnote). See further François Perroulx, ‘Note sur la notion de pole de croissance,’ Economie Appliquée, 8, Serie 8 (1955); Jacques CitationBoudeville (Ed.), L'Espace et les pôles de croissance (Paris: PUF, 1968); and CitationAlbert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Growth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).
21 Although controversial and historically patchy, the best account of this attitude can be found in Grace Goodell, Elementary Structures. The irreplaceable value of Goodell's work is that it is the only work of comparative political anthropology of modernization on this scale, and from this perspective.
20 The best way to get a sense of the trials and tribulations of the elite technocracy in the 1960s and 1970s is to consult the invaluable (if uncritical) oral history archives and publications of the Foundation for Iranian Studies in Washington, DC, edited by Gholamreza Afkhami; as well as the publications and archives of the Iranian Oral History Project of Harvard University, edited by Habib Ladjevardi. See also CitationGrace Goodell, Elementary Structures of Political Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Abolhassan Ebtehaj, Khaterat [Memoirs], in 2 vols. (Tehran: Elmi, 1996); and Hosain Razavi & Firouz Vakil, The Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran 1971–1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).
19 See Zahra Aliakbari, ‘Dafn-e Keshavarzi dar Zaminhaye Qat'eh Qat'eh’ [Burial of agriculture in parcellized lands], Yaas-e Eqtesadi, no. 180, 15 October 2003. Contrary to a number of Orientalist claims, the multiple parcels of peasant holdings in Iranian agriculture are not primarily a product of the Islamic inheritance laws. Historically, the reason behind this practice had to do with topography (necessary slope and location for irrigating land by gravity and the location and quality of different pieces of land) and a distributive social arrangement that was egalitarian among the producers (each sharecropper in this system would receive a just and equally productive portion of land). In addition, this equality of shares ensured that each sharecropper would owe an equal portion of unpaid labor for communal work. The 1962 land reform, by failing to conduct national cadastral surveys prior to land distribution, and by formalizing the existing land share arrangements into individual property, in effect froze this pre-modern but flexible practice into its present rigid and inadequate form. For a detailed description of land parcellization in Iran see CitationJavad Safinejad, Boneh (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1989). Similar mechanisms of land division were practiced in feudal Europe. See CitationWitold Kula, Measures and Men (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
18 Hooglund, Land and Revolution, pp. 90–91.
17 One of the most insightful analyses of this trend in mid-century Iran is still CitationPaul Vieille's La Féodalité et l'état en Iran (Paris: Anthropos, 1975). See also CitationMarvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
16 CitationAshraf, ‘State and agrarian relations,’ estimates that two-thirds of parliamentary seats were occupied by landlords. The best analyses of the land reform are Eric Hooglund, Land and Revolution in Iran (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and CitationMostafa Azkia, Jame'e Shenasi. See also CitationAnn Lambton, The Persian Land Reform, 1962–66 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); and CitationKhosro Khosravi Jame'eh Shenasi-ye Roustayi-ye Iran (Tehran: Payam, 1976). The land reform did not proceed without significant conflict. According to CitationGeorge Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 105, more than 100 civilians and soldiers were killed in confrontations over land distribution in the initial phases of the land reform.
15 See further CitationAfsaneh Najmabadi, Land Reform and Social Change in Iran (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1987); and CitationAhmad Ashraf, ‘State and agrarian relations before and after the Iranian Revolution, 1960–90,’ in John Waterbury & Farhad Kazemi (Eds) Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991), pp. 277–311.
14 Mostafa Azkia, Jame'e Shenasi-ye Tose'e va Tose'e Nayaftegi-e Roustayi-e Iran (Tehran: Ettelaat Press, 1986), p. 117.
13 Land reforms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were among the inspirations for Iran's land reform. The fact that the experience of these East Asian countries was undertaken under US occupation or heavily influenced by its military-ideological hegemony speaks volumes for the attitude of the Iranian state toward its own countryside and rural populations, no matter how ‘progressive’ the land reform program may have been.
12 The per capita subsidies expended on urban versus rural areas is a reflection of the continuity of this trend. In 1976 per capita expenditures of state subsidies to rural areas were 29 percent of the total. Throughout the 1980s, the first decade of the Revolution, this figure increased to an average 37 percent of the total. It declined steadily in the 1990s, to an average 13 percent in 1995. See Mostafa Azkia & Gholamreza Ghaffari, Tose'eh Roustaee ba Ta'kid bar Jame'eh Roustaee-ye Iran (Tehran: Nay, 2004), p. 126.
11 I use the term ‘peasantry’ throughout this article in a rather general and informal way. The concept of ‘peasantry’ was a major source of theoretical debate among academics and development practitioners throughout the 1970s and 1980s. I do not wish to engage this vast literature at this point. Suffice it to say that I agree with the general tenets forwarded by Theodor CitationShanin (Ed.), Peasant and Peasant Studies, 2nd ed. (New York: Blackwell, 1987) and use the term ‘peasant’ as a fluid concept that refers to small rural populations engaged primarily but not exclusively in agriculture, and whose main unit of production and reproduction is the household.
10 Item 3, clause 13 and item 43, clause 9 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For an insightful and critical analysis of the Islamic Republic's commitment to self-sufficiency in food production see CitationAsghar Schirazi, ‘The saga of agricultural self-sufficiency,’ Goft-o-Gu, 28 (2000), pp. 113–128 [in Persian].
9 According to the CitationStatistical Center of Iran (SCI) Statistical Yearbook (Tehran: SCI, 2003–04 (1382)), 23 percent of the employed labor force worked in the agriculture sector; and, according to the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Annual Review (2004–05), agricultural products were 27 percent of Iran's non-oil exports in 2004–05, down from 45 percent in 2000–01. The change is a reflection of rising industrial exports. Note that carpets, a major export item, are classified as an agricultural product.
8 See CBI, Annual Review; CitationHoushang Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 134–137; IRNA, 4 January 2001; and Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 25 February 1994.
7 In the 1970s CitationHoma Katouzian was an influential proponent of this thesis; see his ‘Oil versus agriculture: a case of dual resource depletion in Iran,’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 5(2) (1978), pp. 347–369. This theme was also a key criticism of the monarchy by Ayatollah Khomeini and a major political slogan of his during the Revolution; see his collected statements on economic matters in CitationKhomeini (Imam), Mataleb, Mozouat, va Rahnamoudha-ye eqtesadi dar bayanat-e hazrat-e Imam Khomeini (Tehran: n.p., 1984); see also CitationThierry Brun & Rene Dumont, ‘Des prétentions impériales à la dépendance alimentaire,’ Peuples Méditerranéens, 1(2) (1978), pp. 3–24; and Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ravand-e Harkat-e Bakhsh-e Keshavarzi [Trends in the agriculture sector] (Tehran: MoA, 1986).
6 Wheat grain yields increased to 2.1 t/ha in 2003 and 2004 as a result of unusually good precipitation. In terms of production yields and consistency of maintaining supplies this still leaves Iran's performance in the production of its main food staple well behind neighboring countries, such as UAE (3.4 t/ha), Saudi Arabia (5.1 t/ha) and Turkey (2.2 t/ha). See FAO, Food Balance Sheets. See also CitationMehdi Dehghan, Barresi-ye Ravand-e Taqirat-e Avamel-e Tolid va Mahsoulat-e Tolidi dar Bakhsh-e Keshavarzi dar Haft Saleh Qabl va Haft Saleh Ba'd az Enqelab-e Islami (Tehran: Ministry of Planning and Budget, 1988); CitationAsghar Schirazi, Islamic Development Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 285; and CitationPlan and Budget Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran Annual Report (Tehran: PBO, 1997).
5 CitationKaveh Ehsani, The Economic Impact of Drought in Iran, unpublished report (Tehran: UNDP, 2000); Ettelaat, 20 August 2000; Iran, 3 September 2000; BBC, 21 June 2001; Financial Times, ‘Drought may force Iran to buy more wheat,’ 10 July 2001. The severe drought of 1997–2001 was followed by unusually good precipitation in 2002–04. However, the positive effect of rainfall was offset partially by recurring floods and damaging frost to orchards and cash crops. The considerable fluctuations of various crops can be seen in FAO (various years) Food Balance Sheets and Agricultural Production Indices, available at < http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collections?version = ext&hasbulk = 0&subset = agriculture>; CitationStatistical Center of Iran (SCI), Sarshomari Omoumi-ye Keshavarzi (Tehran: Markaz Amar-e Iran, various years); and in CitationCentral Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran (CBI) Annual Review (Tehran: Bank Markazi, various years), available at < http://www.cbi.ir/publications/#annual>.
4 His type of politics of confession about the malfunctioning of the institutions trusted to their care has been a common feature among the officials of the Islamic Republic. See, for example, the former minister of industries Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh's statement in Iran Times, 26 November 1993: ‘The faulty mentality of some officials who mistakenly classify food industries as consumer industries and as a result refuse to support them is making us fall behind by a thousand years!’
3 Ettelaat International, 14 March 2001. The main imported items were 6.4 million tons of wheat, 600,000 tons of rice, 851,000 tons of cooking oil, and 900,000 tons of sugar. For the sake of simplicity in this article I will limit my analysis of the food economy to a single crop, wheat. A more comprehensive analysis of the political economy of food in Iran should encompass other key cash and food crops, as well as livestock and poultry.
2 Ettelaat International, 24 January 2001, ‘The former agriculture minister's critique of the government's agricultural policies!’ However, Kalantari also took credit for an average annual growth of 4.4 percent in the value of agricultural products, from 200 billion Rls to 420 billion Rls in fixed prices, during his ministry (1989–2001).
1 The average sectoral growth of Iran's economy since 1960 shows steady, modest growth for agriculture in real terms of about 4 percent, compared to major fluctuations in all other sectors of the economy; see further Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran Annual Review (various years); and IMF Country Report 04/308, 2004.