Institutionalizing Village Governance in China

Abstract

Most studies of political reforms in rural China have concentrated on village elections, pointing out important effects of this democratic mechanism. However, while significant in broadening the ‘access to power’, even well conducted village elections fall short of altering the ‘exercise of power’, which has received far less research attention. Therefore, this article focuses on the procedural dimension of post-election village governance. It argues that there has been considerable formal institutionalization regarding the three democratic rights of decision-making, management and supervision in village affairs. This analysis is based on close scrutiny of provincial-level legislation on village governance, which constitutes a crucial, though largely untapped, source of information on village self-administration. In conclusion, the article suggests that progress in institutionalization has improved opportunities for villagers to manage their own affairs and control elected village officials, while at the same time strengthening the role played by Communist Party branches in village governance.

Notes

^*Dr Bjoörn Alpermann is assistant professor for Contemporary Chinese Studies at Wuerzburg University. His main research interests include China's rural politics and political economy as well as social stratification and political culture in contemporary China

^1. Kevin J. O'Brien and Rongbin Han, ‘Path to democracy? Assessing village elections in China’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).

^2. Somewhat in contrast to this proposition, others argue for a focus on further improving the quality of elections; see Qingshan Tan, ‘Building institutional rules and procedures: village elections in China’, Policy Science 37, (March 2004), pp. 1–22.

^3. Fubing Su and Dali Yang, ‘Elections, governance, and accountability in rural China’, Asian Perspective 29(4), (2005), p. 138.

^4. The same is of course also true for village election regulations; see Björn Alpermann, ‘Provincial legislation on village elections’, Zeitschrift für Chinesisches Recht 1, (2007), pp. 1–26; Qingshan Tan, ‘Building democratic infrastructure: village electoral institutions’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).

^5. To simplify matters only regulations (tiaoli), measures (banfa), and rules (guize) are taken into account here whereas mere opinions (yijian) or circulars (tongzhi) are left out. All official provincial documents other than IR are simply referred to as additional regulations. For exact names and sources see Table 1. A synopsis of all provincial IR is available from the author upon request.

^6. Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, ‘Elections and power: the locus of decision-making in Chinese villages’, China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 513–539.

^7. For instance township administrations still quite regularly interfere with village elections especially during candidate nomination; see Melanie Manion, ‘How to assess village elections in China’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).

^8. These are Gansu, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu and Xinjiang.

^9. Su and Yang, ‘Elections, governance, and accountability in rural China’, pp. 143–146.

^10. In Jilin no mention is made of legal responsibility. The other five are Fujian, Hunan, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Tianjin.

^11. Also see Jin Taijun and Shi Congmei, Xiangcun Guanxi Yu Cunmin Zizhi [Township–Village Relations and Villagers' Autonomy] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Remin Chubanshe, 2002), p. 249.

^12. Only six provinces use the term xuanju (Guangdong, Hainan, Henan, Jilin, Shaanxi, Shanxi), but in Shanxi this election may take place by ballot or simple show of hands. In Fujian and Sichuan both election and selection may be applied.

^13. Six include this provision in their IR: Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan. Four other provinces do so in their additional village governance regulations: Gansu, Guangdong, Hainan and Xinjiang.

^14. Susan V. Lawrence, ‘Village representative assemblies: democracy, Chinese style’, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32, (July 1994), pp. 61–68.

^15. Sylvia Chan, ‘Villagers’ representative assemblies: towards democracy or centralism?', China: An International Journal 1(2), (September 2003), pp. 179–199. Also see Björn Alpermann, Der Staat im Dorf: Dörfliche Selbstverwaltung in China [The State in the Village: Village Self-administration in China] (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, 2001), ch. 4.

^16. Varying thresholds are applied in Guangdong, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Shanghai and Shanxi.

^17. These are Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hunan, Liaoning, Shanghai and Zhejiang.

^18. This leaves seven provinces which do not limit delegation of tasks to the VRA in their IR: Beijing, Gansu, Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shandong and Xinjiang. However, Beijing does exclude VC elections and votes of recall as well as enacting village charters from delegation in its more detailed VRA rules.

^19. All provincial IR except those from Beijing, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Shanghai and Shanxi provide this right; but again, Beijing includes such a rule in its later VRA regulations.

^20. Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Hainan, Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan.

^21. Beijing, Gansu, Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Shanghai, Shanxi, Tianjin.

^22. Chan, ‘Villagers’ representative assemblies', p. 197.

^23. VC members are included in Guangdong, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Ningxia, Sichuan and Tianjin.

^24. VSG heads are included in Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Sichuan and Tianjin. They may be included in Yunnan, but only in a non-voting capacity.

^25. Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Jiangxi and Ningxia include People's Congress members with voting rights, in Tianjin they may be included. In Hainan and Yunnan they may participate in a non-voting capacity.

^26. Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongshi, Guowuyuan Bangongting [CCP Central Committee Office and State Council Office], Guanyu Jianquan He Wanshan Cunwu Gongkai He Minzhu Guanli de Yijian [Opinions on Promoting and Perfecting Village Affairs Publications and Democratic Management], (22 June 2004), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-07/12/content_1591421_1.htm (accessed 16 May 2008).

^27. According to Su and Yang, ‘Elections, governance, and accountability in rural China’, p. 154, ‘[a]mong these new innovations, the “Qingxian model” is closest to Western-style democracy, where parties are only vehicles to power’, but they hasten to add that the CCP is unlikely to give up its political dominance any time soon.

^28. Currently, at the provincial level 23 out of 31 party secretaries also serve as People's Congress chairs; see ‘China data supplement—May 2008’, China aktuell, pp. 30–36, available at: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d = /content/ias/archiv/cds/cds_0805.pdf (accessed 16 May 2008). Also see Young Nam Cho, ‘From “rubber stamps” to “iron stamps”: the emergence of Chinese local People's Congresses as supervisory powerhouses’, China Quarterly 171, (September 2002), pp. 724–740. On, however, benefits for legislative development that arise from party secretaries leading local People's Congresses, see Kevin J. O'Brien, ‘Chinese People's Congresses and legislative embeddedness: understanding early organizational development’, Comparative Political Studies 27(1), (April 1994), pp. 80–107.

^29. The five are Heilongjiang, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Xinjiang.

^30. Jonathan Unger, ‘“Bridges”: private business, the Chinese government and the rise of new associations’, China Quarterly 147, (September 1996), pp. 795–819.

^31. In Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi, Ningxia and Yunnan the VRA is directly mentioned in this context, while in Hunan this privilege is listed under the village assembly, but may be delegated to the VRA.

^32. Richard Levy, ‘The village self-government movement: elections, democracy, the Party, and anticorruption—developments in Guangdong’, China Information 27(1), (2003), p. 30; Alpermann, ‘Provincial legislation on village elections’, pp. 4–5.

^33. Chan, ‘Villagers’ representative assemblies', p. 189.

^34. This is the case in Hainan, Liaoning and Yunnan.

^35. The first is the case in Guangxi, Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu and Xinjiang; the second in Inner Mongolia, Tianjin and Shaanxi (the latter according to its additional regulations). The third applies to Anhui, Beijing, Chongqing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Henan, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan and Zhejiang.

^36. This takes IR as well as additional provincial regulations into account. That means there were only ten provinces without any regulations on establishing villagers' control groups.

^37. Su and Yang, ‘Elections, governance, and accountability in rural China’, p. 149; David Zweig and Chung Siu Fung, ‘Elections, democratic values, and economic development in rural China’, Journal of Contemporary China 16(50), (February 2007), p. 42.

^38. Richard Levy, ‘Village elections, transparency, and anticorruption’, in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, eds, Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 44–47.

^39. Lianjiang Li, ‘The empowering effect of village elections in China’, Asian Survey 43(4), (July/August 2003), pp. 648–662; Melanie Manion, ‘Democracy, community, trust: the impact of elections in rural China’, Comparative Political Studies 39(3), (April 2006), pp. 301–324; John James Kennedy, ‘Legitimacy with Chinese characteristics: “two increases, one reduction”’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).

^40. This is to say that the unit of analysis is usually either the village or the individual. For an exception focusing on the macro-level see Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, ‘Accommodating “democracy” in a one-party state: introducing village elections in China’, China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 465–489; on the meso-level see Tianjian Shi, ‘Village committee elections in China: institutionalist tactics for democracy’, World Politics 51(3), (April 1999), pp. 384–412. Interestingly, in this issue Manion is arguing for more ‘reliable, nationally representative sample surveys’, while Schubert claims that ‘[w]e definitely need more qualitative research stretching out over longer intervals’ and proposes to concentrate on the local state (village, township and county). See Manion, ‘How to assess village elections in China’, and Gunter Schubert, ‘Studying “democratic” governance in contemporary China: looking at the village is not enough’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (June 2009).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Björn Alpermann

41 *Dr Bjoörn Alpermann is assistant professor for Contemporary Chinese Studies at Wuerzburg University. His main research interests include China's rural politics and political economy as well as social stratification and political culture in contemporary China