I Want To Be Expropriated!: the politics of xiaochanquanfang land development in suburban China

Abstract

This paper analyzes the ‘Minor Property Housing’ (XCQF) phenomenon. XCQF is an illegal residential building, constructed on rural collective land in suburban areas by a joint land development of township and village governments, land developers, and peasants for selling and renting to non-local urbanites. We argue that XCQF became a fait accompli not to be demolished nor legalized by higher authorities because the interests of lower-level governments and those non-elites converge. As a result, they jointly defy the central government and higher-level governments' land policies. It brings a rare opportunity for grassroots officials, entrepreneurs, and ordinary citizens to find a manner of co-existence, shaping this positive-sum coalition game unlike the near zero-sum game of other exploitative land developments. The XCQF phenomenon suggests that other patterns of coalition building, beyond what is in the current literature of ‘rightful resistance’, exist.

Notes

*Wooyeal Paik is an assistant professor in Academy of East Asian Studies at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, Korea. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Los Angeles and specializes in comparative politics and international relations. His research focuses on the comparative authoritarianism, political economy, and state–society relations of contemporary China and other East Asian countries. His recent publications include, ‘Economic development and mass political participation in contemporary China: determinants of provincial petition (Xinfang) activism 1994–2002’ (International Political Science Review, January 2012), ‘From autonomous areas to non-autonomous areas: the politics of Korean minority migration in contemporary China’ (Modern China, January 2012), and ‘Authoritarianism and humanitarian aid: regime stability and external relief in China and Myanmar’ (The Pacific Review, September 2011). Kihyun Lee is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, Korea. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Beijing University and specializes in state–society relations in China and China–DPRK relations. The authors would like to thank Richard Baum, Daniel A. Bell, Cari Coe, Barbara Geddes, Kyungjoon Han, Sao Ning, Xin Zhang, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. The authors can be reached by email at [email protected]

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^2. Cai, ‘Collective ownership or cadre's ownership?’; Peter Ho, ‘Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights, and deliberate institutional ambiguity’, The China Quarterly 173, (2001), pp. 394–412; Samuel P. S. Ho and George C. S. Lin, ‘Emerging land markets in rural and urban China: policies and practices’, The China Quarterly 175, (2003), pp. 682–707; Samuel P. S. Ho and George C. S. Lin, ‘Non-agricultural land use in post reform China’, The China Quarterly no. 176, (2004), pp. 758–781.

^3. Lianjiang Li, ‘Political trust in rural China’, Modern China 30(2), (2004), pp. 228–258; and Lianjiang Li, ‘Political trust and petitioning in the Chinese countryside’, Comparative Politics 40(2), (2008), pp. 209–226.

^4. O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China.

^5. Ethan Michelson, ‘Justice from above or below? Popular strategies for resolving grievances in rural China’, The China Quarterly 193, (2008), pp. 43–64.

^6. Ethan Michelson, ‘Justice from above or below? Popular strategies for resolving grievances in rural China’, The China Quarterly 193, (2008), p. 55.

^7. We are grateful to David Kelly and Daniel A. Bell for their help with translation.

^8. ‘Xiaochanquanfang “Weifa” Zhenglun Beihude Liyi Boyi’, Jinrezhongguo [China Today Forum], (September 2007), pp. 68–71; ‘Beijing Xiaochanquanfang Zhan Shoululiang Liangcheng Kaifa Chengben Shengyiban’, Zhongguojingjishibao, (4 July 2007).

^9. ‘Liyi Qudong Chuanqi Xiaochanquanfang Kaifalian’, Xinjingbao, (11 May 2007); ‘Chengdu Wu: Xiaochanquanfangde ZhunheFahua Yangben’, 21shijijingjibaodao, (16 December 2007); Jingjicankaobao, (10 December 2007).

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^11. ‘Beijing Guotuyu Jiaoting Xiaochanquanbiya Weigui Jianshe Xiangmu’, CCTV 1, Jingjibanxiaoshi, (21 June 2007).

^12. For example, the ‘Yilanxiaozhen’ XCQF community's land developer is the village committee (cunminweiyuanhui) of Huicheng Village, Liulihe Township, Fanshan District, Beijing City.

^13. Jingjicankaobao, (10 December 2007).

^14. Interview, Huilongguan Village, Beijing, 11 June 2008.

^15. In 1989, there were already about 30 million migrant workers, which increased to 62 million in 1993, and reached approximately 210 million by the mid-2000s. See G. C. Zheng and F. L. Huang, eds, Zhongguo Nongmingong Wenti yu Shehui Baohu [Rural–Urban Migrant Workers in China: Issues and Social Protection] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2007), pp. 9–35. Also see Cindy C. Fan, China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household (New York: Routledge, 2008).

^16. Zhongguojingjishibao, (4 July 2007).

^17. 21shijijingjibaodao, (16 December 2007).

^18. A land development expert, Jiang Chunhai, made a similar estimation: land developers (20–30%, up to 40%), local governments (30–40%, including provincial, city/county, township, and village), bank (5–10%) and abnormal loss (feizhengchang liushi) (5–10%). He did not find it worth mentioning the peasant's share as it is so negligible: ‘“Xiaochanquanfang” Anzhan Tudi Shouyi’, Zhongguoxinwenzhoukan, (23 July 2007).

^19. Note that this proportion may vary in different regions. One land issue expert argues that the peasants' added-value profit can be dozens and up to 100 times greater under XCQF development than non-XCQF land development; see Lin Wang, ‘Zhongguo Tesede Paleituo Gaijin—Xiaochanquanfangde Chuxian’ [‘Pareto improvement with Chinese characteristics—XCQF's emergence’], Keqichuangxindaobao [Science and Technology Innovation Herald] 4, (2008), p. 116.

^20. For the detailed laws and regulations on the XCQF, see the Urban and City Development Law (Chengxiangguihuafa, 城乡规划法); the Land Management Law (tudiguanlifa, 土地管理法) article 41; and Guowuyuan Bangongting Guauyu Jiaqiang Tudizhuanrang Guanli Yanjin Chaomaimai Tudi de Tongzhi [Politburo Directive on Enforcing Land Transfer Management and Banning Speculation in Land] no. 39, (1999).

^21. Dongfangzaobao, (25 December 2007). This number does not include the rural collective land for other purposes, mainly, farmland (nongcun gengdi, 农村耕地).

^22. Jingjicankaobao, (4 March 2008); Diyicaijingribao, (14 March 2008); Jinanfandichanwang, (9 March 2007), available at: http://house.sohu.com/news/2007-03-09/289383.html (accessed 18 October 2008); Tianjinfandichanwang, (6 July 2007), available at: http://house.sohu.com/news/2007-07-06/333085.html (accessed 9 May 2008).

^23. Jinanfandichanwang, (9 March 2007).

^24. ‘Xiaochanquanfang Beijing Remain’, Xinjingbao, (11 May 2007).

^25. For the complete list of sources, contact the author.

^26. Xianfangdicanwang, (5 July 2007).

^27. Interview, Beijing, 11 June 2008. Individually, we visited another big XCQF community with 52 apartment buildings at Huilongguan Community, Chaoyang District, Beijing, where residents and real estate agents clearly acknowledge the legal status of their XCQF.

^28. For the details, see Ho and Lin, ‘Emerging land markets in rural and urban China’; George C. S. Lin, ‘Reproducing spaces of Chinese urbanisation: new city-based and land-centered urban transformation’, Urban Studies 44(9), (2007), pp. 1827–1855. X. B. Zhang et al., ‘Industrialization, urbanization, and land use in China’, Journal of Chinese Economics and Business Studies 2(3), (2004), pp. 207–224.

^29. Xinhuanet, (12 December 2007), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2007-12/12/content_7232599.htm (assessed 18 October 2008).

^30. Jinghuashibao, (4 December 2007).

^31. Jinghuashibao, (20 and 27 March 2008); ‘Xianjianfang Guanli Banfa Gongbu Zhixing’ [‘Implementation of price limited house management manual’], Jinghuashibao, (16 April 2008); ‘Jingshefang Liangxianfang Nizhu Shoubingju’ [‘Simultaneously renting and selling economical housing and limited-price/size housing’], Jinghuashibao, (27 March 2008). For more information, see Ying Li et al., Fangdichan Kaifa [Real Estate Development] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2007), ch. 7.

^33. Li, ‘Political trust in rural China’, p. 228.

^32. Yongshun Cai, ‘Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China’, British Journal of Political Science, 38, (2008), pp. 411–432. Li, ‘Political trust in rural China’; O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China.

^34. For the political and economic coalition between local authorities and entrepreneurs in market reform China, see Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalist in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Margaret M. Pearson, China's New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); and David L. Wank, Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

^35. The XCQF owners also petition on this unfair issue: Renminxinfang [People and Petition], (March 2003), p. 25.

^36. Interview, Changchun, 11 May 2008.

^37. For detailed information, refer to the following sources: http://house.focus.cn/ztdir/xiangchanquan/, http://www.soufun.com/news/zt/200712/house01.html, and http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2007/08/10/content_6506342.htm (all accessed 10 August 2008).

^38. Xinhuanet, (10 August 2007), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2007-08/10/content_6505228.htm (accessed 10 August 2008).

^39. Interview, Beijing, 11 June 2008.

^40. Philip S. Hsu, ‘Deconstructing decentralization in China: fiscal incentive versus local autonomy in policy implementation’, Journal of Contemporary China 13, (2004), pp. 567–599; Linda C. L. Li, ‘Differentiated actors: central–local politics in China's rural tax reforms’, Modern Asian Studies 40(1), (2006), pp. 151–174.

^41. Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 38–43, 163–190; R. S. Eckaus, ‘Some consequences of fiscal reliance on extrabudgetary revenues in China’, China Economic Review 14, (2003), pp. 72–88.

^42. Linda C. L. Li, ‘Working for the peasants? Strategic interactions and unintended consequences in the Chinese rural tax reform’, The China Journal 57, (2007), p. 101; Ray Yep, ‘“Tax-for-fee” reform reduce rural tension in China? The process, progress, and limitations’, The China Quarterly 177, (2004), pp. 43–70.

^43. Jean C. Oi and Shukai Zhao, ‘Fiscal crisis in China's townships: causes and consequences’, in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, eds, Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 75–96.

^44. Zhongguoxinwenzhoukan, (23 July 2007), pp. 25–26.

^45. Zhongguoxinwenzhoukan, (23 July 2007), pp. 25–28; Jinghuashibao, (17 January 2008).

^46. Zhongguoxinwenzhoukan, (23 July 2007), p. 27.

^47. 21shijijingjibaodao, (15 December 2007).

^48. Interviews, Beijing, 12 June 2008.

^49. Interview at a village XCQF sales department, Fangshan District, Beijing, 11 June 2008. Also, one sales woman for an XCQF named ‘Sunshine e-Apartment’ (Yangguang e-Ju) in the Beijing suburb Tongzhou District said, ‘The government stipulated the ban on XCQF trade. Yet about 10,000 households are living in our community now. Can [these XCQFs] be demolished?’ (Beijingribao, 16 January 2008).

^50. We can find similar cases in other policy areas such as the mass resistance movements against the massive privatization of state-owned enterprises in the late 1990s and early 2000s as well as those against tax, environmental pollution, and birth control organized by township and village leaders in the 2000s. See, for example, Patricia M. Thornton, ‘Comrades and collectives in arms: tax resistance, evasion, and avoidance strategies in post-Mao China’, in Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds, State and Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 90; and Edward Cody, ‘China's rising tide of protest sweeping up party officials’, The Washington Post, (12 September 2005).

^51. Wang, ‘Zhongguo Tesede Paleituo Gaijin’.