An Institutional Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power

Abstract

Xi Jinping swiftly centralized political power shortly after the 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Congress in 2012, opposing what was predicted when he was elected general secretary. This action also compromises China’s long-term efforts to avert an over-concentration of power among a few elites. This study deals with Xi’s strong ascent to power, defined as the result of institutional change in China’s political power game from the perspective of new institutionalism. The author identifies triggers of institutional change, ideas and norms introduced for changing informal institutions, and the actual transformation of formal institutions, arguing that Xi took advantage of social demand for reform coordination as well as some top elites’ serious political misbehavior to commence institutional change for the centralization of political power. To do so, Xi introduced new reform ideas – systemic thinking and top-down design, originating from complex systems theory – in the name of coordinating and comprehensively deepening reform. Xi eventually succeeded in justifying the centralization of power and the establishment of central organizations to deepen reforms comprehensively and coordinate internal and external security. As a result, Xi seized power while practically nullifying the principle of division of work.

Notes

¹ For details, see Wang Yang, The Building of Institutions for the Party’s Cadres in the New Era [新时期党的干部制度建设] (Beijing: CCP History Publishing House, 2006), pp. 89–176.

² David Shambaugh, ‘The dynamics of elites politics during the Jiang era,’ The China Journal 45 (2001), p. 109; Shiping Zheng, ‘The new era in Chinese politics,’ Issues and Studies 41(1), (2005), pp. 195–196.

³ Deng Xiaoping, ‘On the reform of the party and state leadership system’ [‘党和国家领导制度的改革’], Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1994), pp. 320–342.

⁴ Alice Miller, ‘The 18th Central Committee leadership with comrade Xi Jinping as general secretary,’ China Leadership Monitor 48, (2015), p. 1.

⁵ For some predictions for Xi’s weak power, see William A Callahan, ‘Who is Xi Jinping, and where will he lead China?,’ CETRI Website, 8 November 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cetri.be/Who-is-Xi-Jinping-and-where-will?lang=fr; Jiang Xueqin, ‘West should prepare for confusing new Chinese leader,’ CNN, 7 November 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/07/west-should-prepare-for-confusing-new-chinese-leader/; Alice Miller, ‘Prospects for solidarity in the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China Leadership Monitor (April 2012); Fang Yuan, ‘Xi to be ‘weak’ President,’ RFA, 12 November 2012 available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/xi-jinping-11122012110129.html; Akio Yaita, Xi Jinping: The Weakest Leader in Communist China [習近平：共產中國最弱勢的領袖] (Taipei: Common Wealth Magazine, 2012); Robert Lawrence Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, 2nd ed.(Singapore: Wiley & Sons, 2011), p. xiv.

⁶ See Gao Yi, ‘Analysis: How Xi Jinping can get to be like Deng Xiaoping?’ [‘分析：怎样的习近平才能是邓小平？’], BBC (18 August 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2014/08/140818_deng_xi_comparison_politics; Chris Buckleynov, ‘Xi Jinping’s rapid rise in China presents challenges to the U.S.,’ The New York Times (11 November 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/president-xi-jinping-makes-it-his-mission-to-empower-china.html; Jeff Mason and Steve Holland, ‘Obama says China’s Xi has consolidated power quickly, worrying neighbors,’ Reuters (4 December, 2014), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-usa-china-obama-idUSKCN0JH21420141204; Willy Lam, ‘Xi Jinping: a 21st-century Mao?,’ Prospect Magazine, 21 May 2015, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/xi-jinping-a-21st-century-mao

⁷ W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th ed., (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2013), pp. 55–85.

⁸ Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 36; Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston, ‘Institutions: rules or equilibria?,’ in Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero, eds., Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting (Berlin: Springer, 2011), p. 14.

⁹ James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 10.

¹⁰ Marc Schneiberg, ‘Combining new institutionalisms: explaining institutional change in American property insurance,’ Sociological Forum, 20(1), (2005), pp. 93–137.

¹¹ John L. Campbell, Institutional and Globalization (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 102–103.

¹² Wolfgang Streeck, and Kathleen Thelen, ‘Introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies,’ in Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 1–39; James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, pp. 14–37.

¹³ See David M. Lampton, ‘Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: policy coordination and political power,’ Journal of Contemporary China 24(95), (2015), pp. 4–9; Fan Chuangui, ‘The profound and figurative meaning of proposing overall national security outlook’ [‘‘总体国家安全观’提出之背后深意’], Legal Daily (21 April 2014), p. 4.

¹⁴ Alice L. Miller, ‘Prospects for solidarity in the Xi Jinping leadership,’ China Leadership Monitor 37, (2012), pp. 9–11; David M. Lampton, Following the Leaders: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2014), p. 68.

¹⁵ For details, Huang Xiaohua, ‘Chi Fulin member: establishing central reform coordination organization’ [‘迟福林委员：建立中央改革协调机构’], Hainan Daily (13 March 2008), p. 2; Kuang Xianming ‘The goals and missions of the eleventh five-year reform: the overview of meeting for reform situation’ [‘十一五’改革:目标与任务 – 改革形势分析会综述’], Review of Economic Research,76(2005), pp. 17–22; Gao Shangquan, ‘Some opinions on report of government work (draft for comments)’ [‘对《政府工作报告（征求意见稿）》的几点意见’], Reformdata.org (February 2005), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.reformdata.org/index.do?m=wap&a=show&catid=301&typeid=&id=5141; Gao Shangquan, ‘Accelerating reforms in key areas: pushing for China’s economic transformation’ [‘加快重点领域改革 推进中国经济转型’], China Reform, 12 (2010), pp. 42–43.

¹⁶ For examples, see Geng Kuanmou, ‘Chu Fulin: a top-down design transmits three signals, a reform organization at central level should be established’ [‘迟福林：顶层设计释放三个信号 应建中央层面改革协调机构’], People’s Daily Online, 12 March 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/148980/17355259.html; An (unknown) editorialist, ‘Coordination mechanism for improving system reform’ [‘完善体制改革的统筹协调机制’], South China Daily (19 February 2013), p. 2; 陈佳贵主编, Report On China's Economic System Reform 2012 to Build a Mature Socialist Market Economy [中国经济体制改革报告 2012: 建设成熟的社会主义市场经济体制] (Beijing: Economy Management Publishing House, 2012); Ren Zhongyuan, et al., ‘Unveiling: comprehensive interpretation for reform roadmap’ [‘揭幕：改革路线图全解读’], New Century, 44 (2013), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cb.com.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=26&id=1023059&all; Wang Zhangjiang, ‘A series of conversations on scientific development: do not make top-down design deformed’ [‘科学发展系列谈：莫让’顶层设计’走形’], China Youth Daily, 2 July 2012, p. 2.

¹⁷ The World Bank & Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society (Washington: The World Bank, 2012), pp. 66–67.

¹⁸ Xiansheng Tian, ‘When Chongqing challenges Beijing: the Bo Xilai case,’ in Xiaobing Li and Xiansheng Tian, eds., Evolution of Power: China's Struggle, Survival, and Success (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), pp. 323–350.

¹⁹ Wang Yuanyuan, ed., ‘Bo Xilai expelled from CPC, public office,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/28/c_131880079.htm; Cheng Li, ‘The Bo Xilai crisis: a curse or a blessing for China?,’ Brookings, 18 April 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2012/04/18-china-boxilai-li

²⁰ Sun Chun, ‘Ling Jinhua’s entering the PBSC is hopeless, making efforts to enter the Politburo,’ [‘令計劃入常無望 努力入局’], China’s Secret Report, 1 (October 2012), pp. 14–20; Zhou Yongkun, ‘The history and evolution of the Political and Legal Affair Commission’ [‘政法委的历史与演变’], Spring and Autumn Annals, 9 (September 2012), pp. 7–14.

²¹ ‘A whole record for the investigation into the Zhou Yongkang case for two years’ [‘周永康案查办两年全纪录’], People’s Daily Online, 30 July 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0730/c1001-25370099.html

²² After the 18th Party Congress, the Party’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping publically criticized Bo Xiali, Zhou Yongkang, and Ling Jihua for violating the Party’s political discipline (政治纪律) and political rules (政治规矩) thus putting the Party in much greater peril by pointing out that they built ‘‘an independent kingdom’’ (独立王国) for their personal interests at their jurisdiction. See Zhong Zuyi, ‘Resolutely safeguard the authority of the Party Central Committee’ [‘坚决维护党中央权威’], Seeking Truth, 18 (September 2015).

²³ Zheng Yongnian, ‘The 18th CCP National Congress and China’s reform issues’ [‘十八大与中国的改革问题’], 2 August 2012, Seeking Truth Website, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/tslj/201208/t20120824_177566.htm

²⁴ For the process of drafting the report of the 18th Party Congress, Xu Jingyue, Wu Jing, and Zhao Chao, ‘A political declaration and a program of action for winning new victory for socialism with Chinese characteristics: recording the birth of the report for the 18th party congress’ [‘夺取中国特色社会主义新胜利的政治宣言和行动纲领: 党的十八大报告诞生记’], People’s Daily (21 November 2012), p. 1.

²⁵ For the work reports of the successive party congresses since the foundation of the party, see the Archives of the CCP National Congresses [中国共产党历次全国代表大会数据库], accessed 18 September 2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html

²⁶ ‘Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,’ The Xinhua News Agency, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_131981259_6.htm

²⁷ Du Qiang, ‘Wang Yukai, a professor of China's National School of Administration: the establishment of independent organization for considering system reform’ [‘国家行政学院教授汪玉凯：设独立机构协调体制改革’], Yunnan Information Daily, 10 November 2012, p. A09.

²⁸ ‘Hu Jintao's Report at 18th Party Congress’.

²⁹ See Qian Xuesen, Yu Jingyuan, and Dai Ruwei, ‘A new discipline of science: the study of open complex giant system and its methodology’ [‘一个科学新领域: 开放的复杂巨系统及其方法论’], Chinese Journal of Nature, 13(1), (1990), pp. 3–10.

³⁰ Jifa Gu, Xijin Tang, ‘Some developments in the studies of meta-synthesis system approach,’ Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, 12(2), (2003), p. 172.

³¹ Xu Guozhi eds., Systems Science [系统科学] (Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific and Educational Press, 2000), pp. 307–308.

³² Qian Xuesen, Yu Jingyuan, and Dai Ruwei, ‘A new discipline of science: the study of open complex giant system and its methodology,’ p. 9; Jifa Gu, Xijin Tang, ‘Some developments in the studies of meta-synthesis system approach,’ p. 172.

³³ Sun Dongchuan eds., Introduction to Systems Engineering [系统工程引论], 3rd ed. (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2014); Dai Ruwei, Li Yaodong, and Li Qiudan, Social Intelligence and Meta-synthetic System [社会智能与综合集成系统] (Beijing: Posts & Telecommunications Press, 2012), pp. 79–83.

³⁴ Sun Dongchuan ed., Introduction to Systems Engineering, pp. 376–424.

³⁵ Zheng Na, ‘The decryption of the Central Party School’ [‘解密’中央党校’], The People's Daily (Overseas Edition), 2 July 2010, p. 4.

³⁶ For the evidences of systems theory’s impact on Xi Jiping, see ‘World vision and strategic thinking should be established’ [‘要有世界眼光和战略思维’] and ‘The dialectical unity of Four-in-One’ [‘四位一体’的辩证统一’], in Xi Jinping, New Sayings from Zhejiang[之江新语] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2007), pp. 20, 201.

³⁷ Sun Dongchuan, eds., Introduction to Systems Engineering, preface, and p. 64.

³⁸ Tang Yi eds. Unabridged Dictionary for China’s Society Construction [中国社会建设大辞典] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 2013), p. 65; Zeng Jun, ‘Utilizing top-down design to deepen reform’ [‘用’顶层设计’来深化改革’], Study Times, 13 June 2011, accessed 18 September 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/14885422.html

³⁹ Wang Hejin, ‘Bite words and chew characters’ [‘咬文嚼字’发布 ‘2014年十大流行语’], People’s Daily Online, 15 December 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://culture.people.com.cn/n/2014/1215/c87423-26211903.html

⁴⁰ ‘Xi Jinping vows no stop in reform, opening up,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 11 December 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/11/c_132034269.htm; CCP Central Document Research Bureau ed., The Selection of Xi Jinping's Discourses on Comprehensively Deepening Reform [习近平关于全面深化改革论述摘编] (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2014), pp. 30-31.

⁴¹ For details, see the CCP Central Document Research Bureau ed., The Selection of Xi Jinping's Discourses on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, pp. 32–50.

⁴² See the COD Cadre Education Bureau ed., The Lecture Hall of Cadres' Courses: the Selection of Courses for the Department- and Bureau-Level Cadres of Central or State Organs [干部选学大讲堂: 中央和国家机关司局级干部选学课程选编], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Party Building Reading Publishing House, 2012), pp. 68–87, 112–136.

^{43 ’}The Central Propaganda Department and the Central Organization Department release a notice demanding the organization of earnest study of Ten Lectures on Marxism Philosophy (Textbook for Party-Members and Cadres)’ [‘中宣部中组部通知要求: 认真组织学习《马克思主义哲学十讲(党员干部读本)》’], People’s Daily (26 December 2013), p. 4.

⁴⁴ According to China’s systems theorists, these types of thinking are deeply connected with systems theory. For details, see Ten Lectures on Marxism Philosophy (Textbook for Party-Members and Cadres [马克思主义哲学十讲(党员干部读本)] (Beijing: Study Press & Party Building Reading Materials Publishers, 2012).

⁴⁵ Wang Quanbao, ‘The decryption of the Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’ [‘解密全面深化改革领导小组’], People Digest, 2 (2014), pp. 18–19.

⁴⁶ Ibid; Gao Shangquan, ‘Proposals on the topics of the third plenum of the 18th National Congress’ [‘关于十八届三中全会主题的建议’], CIRD Brief, 947 (June 2013), accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.cird.cn/WeAreCird/Research/Briefing/201306/t20130615_169353.htm

⁴⁷ Wang Quanbao, ‘The decryption of the Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms,’ p. 18.

⁴⁸ ‘Decision of the CCCPC on some major issues concerning comprehensively deepening the reform,’ China.org.cn, 17 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2014-01/17/content_31226494.htm

⁴⁹ ‘Explanatory notes for the ‘decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on some major issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reforms’, China.org.cn, 16 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31210122.htm

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ See Zhu Ningzhu, ‘National security matter of prime importance: President Xi,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 15 April 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264574.htm

⁵² See Liu Yuejin, ‘The overall national security outlook in the great security era’ [‘大安全时代的总体国家安全观’], Beijing Daily, 19 May 2014, p. 17.

⁵³ For systemic security theory, see Liu Yuejin, ‘The systemic security outlook and its three layers’ [‘系统安全观及其三层次’], Journal of University of International Relations, 2 (June 2001), pp. 3–9; Liu Yuejin, ed., The Science of National Security [国家安全学] (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2004); Che Li, ‘National security outlook in the new situation should be the comprehensive systemic security outlook’ [‘新形势下的国家安全观应是全方位的系统安全观’], The Journal of International Security Studies, 6 (November 2008), pp. 87–87.

⁵⁴ Zhu Ningzhu, ‘National security matter of prime importance: President Xi’.

⁵⁵ ‘Constitution of the Communist party of China,’ revised and adopted at the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on November 14, 2012, China.org.cn, 16 November 2012, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm

⁵⁶ Huang Shan, ‘The individual works of the seven PBSC members is clear: there is a difference with the earlier predictions from the outside world’ [‘七常委分工明确: 与早前外界预测有差别’]，International Business Times, 16 March 2013, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/23659/20130316/104910.htm

⁵⁷ See the source of table 1.

⁵⁸ Outwardly, the principle of division of work seems to be complied with well within the Politburo, similar to the PBSC. For the division of work in the Politburo including the PBSC members, see Yan Yirong, ‘China’s political system of division of six authorities’ [‘中国的六权分工政治体制’], The Observer, 14 December 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/ZuoYiLong/2014_12_14_303270_s.shtml

⁵⁹ ‘President Xi to head leading group for overall reform,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 30 December 2013, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/30/c_133007127.htm

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ ‘China's reform leading group holds first meeting,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 22 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/22/c_133066240.htm

⁶² ‘President Xi to head leading group for overall reform’.

⁶³ See Wang Shu, ‘Eight questions on the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform’ [‘中央全面深化改革领导小组八问’], The Beijing News, 14 November 2013, p. A06.

⁶⁴ ‘Xi Jinping to lead national security commission,’ China Daily Online, 24 January 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/24/content_17257409.htm

⁶⁵ See articles 4 and 5 of the National Security Law of the PRC.

⁶⁶ For overall national security look, see Liu Dan, ed., ‘Commentary: China to follow specific national security strategy,’ The Xinhua News Agency, 16 April 2014, accessed 18 September 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/16/c_133267984.htm

⁶⁷ For a comparison between the Department of Overall Design and top-down design, see Wei Hong-sen, ‘The Department of Overall Design and top-down design’ [‘总体设计部与顶层设计: 学习十八届三中全会的一点认识’], Journal of Systems Science, 22(4), (2014), pp. 4–9.

⁶⁸ For details on the way a certain PBSC member affected the policy areas of other PBSC members in the previous Party sessions, see Hu Angang, China's Collective Leadership System [中国集体领导体制] (Beijing: Chinese People's University Press, 2013), pp. 61–62.