Conceptualizing China and India’s Transforming Strategic Force Postures under the Essentials of Minimum Deterrence

Abstract

As China and India gradually rise and become the centre point of world politics in the 21st century, both these nuclear states tend to transform their strategic force postures to hide their vulnerabilities and ensure the credibility of their deterrence force. This article conceptualizes the gradual transformation of China and India’s strategic force postures under the essentials of minimum deterrence. In doing so, it examines the conceptualization of minimum deterrence, doctrinal use of deterrent forces and the modernization of strategic forces, though the perceptional aspects of these three imperatives may differ between these two nuclear states. This article attempts to find out whether or not these strategic imperatives, in relation to their transformation of strategic force postures, are consistent with the essentials of minimum deterrence conceived here. This article concludes that if China and India’s deterrence force modernization falls within these essential categories (i.e. modernization, accuracy, upgrades, correcting ranges, credibility, penetrability, survivability), they may be consistent with minimum deterrence. Alternatively, if both China and India go beyond the minimum deterrence that they initially conceptualized, this may remain inconsistent with the minimum deterrence conceptualized here.

Notes

¹ For an interesting account on India’s nuclear policy, see Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (California: Stanford University Press, 2006); Bharat Karnad, India’s Nuclear Policy (Westport CT: Praeger, 2008); K. Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindustan: India–Pak Nuclear War (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1993).

² Zafar Khan, ‘Emerging Shifts in India’s Nuclear Policy: Implications for Minimum Deterrence in South Asia,’ Strategic Studies Journal 34(1), 2014, pp. 94–11.

³ Wu Riqiang, ‘Limit missile defense or expand it? A Chinese response,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 71(2), (2015), pp. 9–12; Lu Yin, ‘How to approach nuclear modernization? A Chinese response,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 71(3), (2015), pp. 8–11.

⁴ For excellent work on this see, Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

⁵ Zafar Khan, ‘The growing Indo–US Strategic Partnership and its impact on regional security,’ Journal of Pakistan’s Army Green Book (forthcoming, 2016).

⁶ Zafar Khan, ‘India’s grand nuclear strategy: a road towards deployment of ballistic missile defense system,’ Regional Studies XXXIV (1), (2016), pp. 48–64.

⁷ Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s evolving nuclear posture,’ The Non-Proliferation Review, 21(3/4), 2014, pp. 295–315.

⁸ Julian Ku, ‘While the courts have ruled, China is not leaving the South China Sea,’ The National Interest, (15 July 2016), available at: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/while-the-courts-have-ruled-china-not-leaving-the-south-16980 (accessed 9 September 2016); Richard Javed Heydarian, ‘Can China really ignore international law?’ The National Interest, (1 August, 2016), available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-china-really-ignore-international-law-17211 (accessed 9 September 2016).

⁹ For an interesting analysis see, Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese anti-access/area denial, US air sea battle, and command of the commons in East Asia,’ International Security 41(1), (2016), pp. 7–48.

¹⁰ ‘Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,’ (4 January 2003), available at: http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html (accessed 9 September 2016).

¹¹ Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Mao Zedong’s selected works on diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994), p. 540.

¹² Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong wenji (Mao Zedong’s collected works), Vol. 7 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1999), p. 407.

¹³ Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping junshi wenxuan (Deng Xiaoping’s selected works on military affairs), Vol. 3 (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2004), p. 15.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 263.

¹⁵ M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s search for assured retaliation: the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and force structure,’ International Security 35(2), (2010), pp. 48–87; Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, pp. 121–152.

¹⁶ Zhongyang junwei bangongting ed., Deng Xiaoping guanyu xin shiqi jundui jianshe Lunshu xuanbian (Selection of Deng Xiaoping’s exposition on army building in the new period) (Beijing: Bayi chubanshe, 1993), pp. 44–45.

¹⁷ M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s search for assured retaliation: the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and force structure, pp. 75–80.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 75–80.

¹⁹ China’s White Paper (2015), ‘China’s military strategy: the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015,’ available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/ (accessed 4 August 2016).

²⁰ Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Prospects for Chinese nuclear force modernization: limited deterrence versus multilateral arms control,’ China Quarterly 146, (1996), pp. 555–557; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China’s new old thinking: the concept of limited deterrence,’ International Security 20, (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5–42.

²¹ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 71(4), (2015), available at: http://thebulletin.org/2015/july/chinese-nuclear-forces-20158459 (accessed 9 September 2016).

²² Prime Minister’s Office of India, ‘Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,’ (4 January 2003), available at:http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html (accessed 15 July 2016).

²³ Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security, p. 44.

²⁴ Douglas Busvine, ‘India’s Modi says committed to no first use of nuclear Weapons,’ Reuters, (16 April 2014), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-nuclear-idUSBREA3F15H20140416 (accessed 9 September 2016); Manoj Joshi, ‘The bigger picture: Modi’s prime ministerial tone makes him a promising future leader,’ Daily Mail, (29 April 2014), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2615170/THE-BIGGER-PICTURE-Modis-prime-ministerial-tone-makes-promising-future-leader.html (9 September 2016).

²⁵ Indrani Bagchi, ‘India not revisiting its nuclear doctrine, Modi assures Japan,’ The Times of India, (30 August 2014):http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-not-revisiting-its-nuclear-doctrine-Modi-assures-Japan/articleshow/41231521.cms (9 September 2016).

²⁶ Prime Minister’s Office of India, ‘Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews.’

²⁷ Scott Sagan, “The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrine,” in Scott D. Sagan (ed.), Inside Nuclear South Asia (California: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 219–264.

²⁸ The terms ‘absolute first use’ and ‘no early first use’ are borrowed from the key readings with regard to the production of this piece see, for example, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, ‘Nuclear weapons and Atlantic Alliance,’ Foreign Affairs (1982), pp. 753–786; Michael S. Gerson, ‘No first use: the next step for US nuclear policy,’ International Security 35(2), (2010), pp. 7–47.

²⁹ Quoted in Zafar Khan, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear policy: a minimum credible deterrence’ p. 89.

³⁰ Kanti Bajpai, ‘India’s nuclear posture after Pokhran II,’ International Studies (New Delhi), 37(4) (2000), pp. 1–31.

³¹ Abdul Sattar, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Agha Shahi, ‘Securing the Nuclear Peace,’ The News (5 October 1999).

³² Vipin Narang, ‘Five myths about India’s nuclear posture,’ Washington Quarterly 36(3), (2013), p. 151.

³³ Ibid., p. 151.

³⁴ Shashnk Joshi, ‘India’s nuclear anxieties: the debate over doctrine,’ Arms Control Today, (May 2015), available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_05/Features/India-Nuclear-Anxieties-The-Debate-Over-Doctrine (accessed 9 September 2016).

³⁵ Swaran Singh, ‘India’s nuclear doctrine: ten years since the Kargil conflict,’ in Bhumitra Chakma (ed.), The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 57–74.

³⁶ Scott D. Sagan, ‘The case for no first use,’ Survival 51(3), 2009, pp. 175–176.

³⁷ Paul Kapur, ‘Ten years of instability in a nuclear South Asia,’ International Security, 33(2), (2008), p. 90; Walter C. Ladwig, ‘A cold start for hot wars? The Indian army’s new limited war doctrine,’ International Security 32(3), (2007), p. 160; Zafar Khan, ‘Cold start doctrine: the conventional challenge to South Asian stability,’ Contemporary Security Policy 33(3), 2012, pp. 577–594.

³⁸ Ralph L. Powell, ‘Great powers and atomic bombs are “paper tigers”’, China Quarterly 23, (1965), pp. 55–63

³⁹ Joseph Kahn, ‘Chinese general threatens use of A bomb if US intrudes,’ New York Times, (15 July 2005), available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/washington/world/chinese-general-threatens-use-of-abombs-if-us-intrudes.html?_r=0 (accessed 9 September 2016).

⁴⁰ Pan Zhenqiang, ‘China insistence on no-first-use of nuclear weapons,’ China Security 1, (2005), pp. 5–9.

⁴¹ Wu Tianfu, ‘Guoji Hezhanlue Xichao’ (Schools of Nuclear Strategic Thinking in the World) (Beijing: Jushi Yiwen Chubanshe, 1999), p. 207.

⁴² Su Xiangli, ‘Zhonggo hezhanlue pingxi’ (‘China’s nuclear strategy’), in China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, (Beijing, Yearbook on International Arms Control and Disarmament 2005).

⁴³ Keir A. Lieber and Darly G. Press, ‘The end of MAD? The nuclear dimension of US primacy,’ International Security 30(4), (2006), pp. 1–38.

⁴⁴ Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: the strident turn,’ Journal of Contemporary China 22(82), (2013), pp. 535–553.

⁴⁵ Priya Ranjan Sahu, ‘First canister-based nuclear-capable ballistic missile Agni-5 test fired,’ The Hindustan Times, (1 February 2015) available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/first-canister-based-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile-agni-5-test-fired/story-c5hjNhyXYVy4ukM3SxIc8 N.html (accessed 9 September 2016).

⁴⁶ ‘The Second Modhi–Obama Summit: Building the India-US Partnership,’ The Brookings Institute (January 2015), pp. 1–75, available at: www.brookings.edu/...building-the-india-us-partner.

⁴⁷ For a gradual shift in India’s deterrent force strategy see, Zafar Khan, ‘Emerging shifts in India’s nuclear policy: implications for minimum deterrence in South Asia,’ pp. 94–112.

⁴⁸ Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, ‘Chinese theater and strategic missile force modernization and its implications for the United States,’ Strategic Studies 32(1), (2009), pp. 67–114.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 74–76.

⁵⁰ For detail on China’s force modernization see, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008 (Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, 2008). For more recent detailed analysis on this see, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, Annual Report to Congress, 2013: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf (accessed 22 March 2015).

⁵¹ Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: the strident turn,’ p. 553.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 538–541.

⁵³ Wang Qiang (ed.), ‘The CIIS Blue Book on International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs’, (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2013).

⁵⁴ ‘China’s White Paper on Military Strategy,’ May 2015, The Information Office of State Council, available at:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm (accessed 7 July 2016).

⁵⁵ ‘Annual report to Congress on the military power of the People’s Republic of China,’ 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf (accessed 10 July 2016); For a fresh view on this, see ‘Annual report to Congress on the military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,’ 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at: http://www.defense.gov/F71FD3D8-A769-4C56-B0CD-22B15C1D2185/FinalDownload/DownloadId-427A829EC9CDC3B9962E6DB87D5EBC0F/F71FD3D8-A769-4C56-B0CD-22B15C1D2185/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. (accessed 20 July 2016).

⁵⁶ ‘Annual report to Congress on the military power of the People’s Republic of China,’ 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf , p. 15 (accessed 20 July 2016).

⁵⁷ Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Advanced US conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament: why the Obama plan will not work,’ The Non-Proliferation Review 20(1), (2013), pp. 107–122.

⁵⁸ Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw ‘Chinese theatre and strategic missile force modernization and its implications for the United States,’ p. 94.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 96–97.

⁶⁰ Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?’ International Security 37(4), (2013), pp. 7–48.

⁶¹ Vipin Narang, ‘Five myths about India’s nuclear posture,’ p. 144.

⁶² Author’s interview with Zafar Ali working officer in Strategic Plans Division Pakistan, September 2012.

⁶³ ‘Pakistan’s 21st century naval modernization program,’ (15 May 2012), available at: http://pakdefenceunit.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/pakistans-21st-century-naval-modernisation-programme-indian-nuclear-submarine-programme/ (accessed 21 June 2012).

⁶⁴ Vipin Narang, ‘Five myths about India’s nuclear posture,’ p. 146; Also, for a more recent studies see Sumit Ganguly, ‘India’s pursuit of ballistic missile defense,’ The Nonproliferation Review 21(3/4), (2014), pp. 373–382.

⁶⁵ See Note 51.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 553.