Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism: China’s Antiwaste Campaign Since 2012

Abstract

Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general, he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political risk for the party secretary general. Why did Xi choose this politically risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, this article argues that, amongst all possible objectives, an authoritarian leader such as Xi can use this type of policy campaign to demonstrate his power. In particular, the inherent importance of informal politics, the recent developments in Chinese politics, and Xi’s personal background have increased his incentive and capacity to signal power by implementing such a campaign. A comparison with Xi’s two predecessors, interviews, and statistical analyses support this argument. The theoretical framework of this article also sheds light on the literature on the power sharing of authoritarian political elites.

Acknowledgements

The authors appreciate the valuable comments from Shuo Chen, Ting Gong, Gang Guo, Stephan Haggard, Haifeng Huang, John Kennedy, Jie Lu, Roderick MacFarquhar, Victor Shih, Susan Shirk, Xin Sun, Vivian J. Zhan, Dong Zhang, and two anonymous reviewers, as well as the excellent research assistance from Sze Chun Tsoi and Yin Yuan. All errors remain the responsibilities of the authors.

Notes

¹ Xi Jinping, speech given to the Democratic Meeting of the Hebei Party Committee, 23 September 2013.

² Ting Gong and Hanyu Xiao, The Organizational Field of Official Extravagance in China: Pull and Push Factors, Working Paper, City University of Hong Kong, 2015.

³ Jiang wrote 'Strive to continue the spirit of frugality' [‘dali fayang jianku fendou de jingshen’] on 29 January 1997, published by the People's Daily, posted on Xinhua News, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/03/content_2644994.htm (accessed 1 March 2014). Hu Jintao raised 'Eight Healthy Tendencies' (‘baxiang zuofeng’). For details see Xinhua News Agency, ‘Hu Jintao: jiaqiang ganbu zuofeng jianshe ba dangfeng lianzheng jianshe he fanfubai douzheng yinxiang shenru’ [‘Hu Jintao: enhance leaders' work style building, further the party's anticorruption combat’], available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/5263940.html (accessed 5 March 2014).

⁴ Xinhua News Agency, ‘New CPC leadership rejects extravagance, bureaucracy’, available at: http://english.people.com.cn/102774/8046103.html (accessed 5 March 2014).

⁵ People.cn, ‘Baxiang guiding man banzai xinfeng chuiluo liangqian yu weigui guanyuan’ [‘Eight Requirements has been enforced for half a year, over two thousand rule-breaking officials have been punished’], (13 June 2013), available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0613/c1001-21821498.html (accessed 4 February 2015).

⁶ According to the National Statistics Bureau, the revenue of large catering enterprises (annual revenue above two million RMB) has decreased 2.6% for the first quarter of 2013, compared with that of last year. Qiushi.cn, ‘Wenzhong qiujin kaixinju’ [‘Pursue a steady progress and a new start’], (11 November 2013) available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/jjggyfz/201311/t20131111_289150.htm (accessed 4 February 2016). Also see Andrew Wedeman, ‘Xi Jinping’s tiger hunt: anti-corruption campaign or political purge?’, Modern China, (forthcoming). Wedeman also mentions other indicators such as casino profits in Macau and the auction of government used cars. See also Nancy Qian and Jaya Wen, The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign on Luxury Imports in China, Working Paper, Yale University, 2015).

⁷ CCTV, ‘Shendu shicha zhualuoshi, “baxiang guiding’ yinian lai”’ [‘Strictly supervising and investigating, “Eight Requirements” for the first year’], (27 January 2014), available at: http://tv.cntv.cn/video/C10326/db5eaa129c374e3b9c418d81a589ca1d (accessed 4 February 2015).

⁸ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).

⁹ Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993); Yuenyuen Ang, ‘Bureaucratic incentives, local development & petty rents’, paper presented at Symposium on Economic Governance in China and the Developing World, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, 31 May 2013.

¹⁰ Interviews conducted in Tianjin (February 2014), Shanghai (March 2014), Beijing (January 2015), and Zhejiang (January 2015).

¹¹ Zengke He, ‘Corruption and anti-corruption in reform China’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32(2), (2000), pp. 243–270.

¹² Elizabeth Quade, ‘The logic of anticorruption enforcement campaigns in contemporary China’, Journal of Contemporary China 16(50), (2007), pp. 65–77.

¹³ Yufan Hao and Michael Johnston, ‘Corruption and the future of economic reform in China’, in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, eds, Political Corruption: Concepts & Contexts (New Bruswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), pp. 583–604.

¹⁴ Bueno de Mesquita et al., Logic of Political Survival; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, ‘Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats’, Comparative Political Studies 40(11), (2007), pp. 1279–1301; Milan W. Svolik, ‘Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes’, American Journal of Political Science 53(2), (2009), pp. 477–494; and Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

¹⁵ Carles Boix and Milan Svolik, ‘The foundations of limited authoritarian government: institutions and power sharing in dictatorships’, Journal of Politics 75(2), (2013), pp. 300–316. It is true that authoritarian leaders can encourage power sharing by giving economic and political benefits to allies. However, such reciprocity lacks enforcement in authoritarian regimes. See Victor Shih, ‘“Nauseating” displays of loyalty: monitoring the factional bargain through ideological campaigns in China’, Journal of Politics 70(4), (2008), pp. 1–16.

¹⁶ Svolik, The politics of authoritarian rule, pp. 53–81.

¹⁷ Ronald S. Burt, ‘The network structure of social capital’, Research in Organizational Behavior 22, (2000), pp. 345–423.

¹⁸ Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, pp. 53–81. One example of the information asymmetry between political elites concerns Mao during the Cultural Revolution. When Mao criticized Wuhan’s historical play in 1965, and even well into the Cultural Revolution, neither Mao’s followers nor his opponents fully understood Mao’s intentions.

¹⁹ Jeffrey Banks, ‘A model of electoral competition with incomplete information’, Journal of Economic Theory 50(2), (1990), pp. 209–325; Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, ‘Cheap talk’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(3), (1996), pp. 103–118; and Shih, ‘“Nauseating” displays of loyalty’.

²⁰ James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes’, American Political Science Review 88(3), (1994), pp. 577–592.

²¹ Jessica L. Weeks, ‘Autocratic audience costs: regime type and signaling resolve’, International Organization 62(1), (2008), pp. 35–64.

²² Andrew Nathan, ‘Authoritarian resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14(1), (2003), pp. 6–19; Victor Shih, ‘Factions matter: personal networks and the distribution of bank loans in China’, Journal of Contemporary China 13(38), (2004), pp. 3–19; Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph and Mingxing Liu, ‘Getting ahead in the communist party: explaining the advancement of central committee members in China’, American Political Science Review 106(1), (2012), pp. 166–187; and Cheng Li, ‘The end of the CCP's resilient authoritarianism? A tripartite assessment of shifting power in china’, The China Quarterly 211, (2012), pp. 595–623.

²³ Tang Tsou, ‘Chinese politics at the top: factionalism or informal politics? Balance-of-power politics or a game to win all?’, The China Journal 34(2), (1995), pp. 95–156.

²⁴ A search for the frequency of the term ‘leadership core’ (lingdao hexin) in the People’s Daily newspaper database revealed that 893 articles called Jiang Zemin the ‘core’ from 2000 to 2013, only one article called Hu Jintao the ‘core’, and no articles referred to Xi Jinping that way.

²⁵ Cheng Li, ‘Xi Jinping's inner circle: the Shaanxi gang’, China Leadership Monitor 43, (2014), pp. 1–21.

²⁶ Cheng Li, ‘The end of the CCP's resilient authoritarianism?’

²⁷ See Wedeman, ‘Xi Jinping’s tiger hunt’.

²⁸ Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

²⁹ Cheng Li, ‘A biographical and factional analysis of the post-2012 politburo’, China Leadership Monitor 41, (2013), pp. 1–17.

³⁰ For example, in a CNN interview right after the 18th Party Congress, the host especially asked Liu Yawei, a China expert, how Xi was going to rule the country with two predecessors alive. Liu commented that it is going to be difficult.

³¹ Tang Tsou, in ‘Chinese politics at the top’, argues that formal and informal politics often intertwine in China. The formal position is the source of the informal power, while the informal power supports the formal authority. The CC is the formal selectorate of PSC members of the CCP. Although the CC is by no means the universe of the power elite in China, arguably most officials holding important positions are CC members. CC members often wield substantial power by controlling functional bureaucracies, different provinces, military regions, and so forth. Therefore, to measure the informal power of a PSG, scholars often examine the CC members who had direct factional ties with them. See Victor Shih, Wei Shan and Mingxing Liu, ‘The central committee, past and present: a method of quantifying elite biographies’, in Allen Carlson, Mary E. Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal and Melanie Manion, eds, Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 51–68. Factional ties are measured by shared birthplace, more than one year of common working experience, and the university schoolmates of CC members (see Shih et al., ‘Getting ahead in the communist party’).

³² Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Ji You, ‘Jiang Zemin's command of the military’, The China Journal 45, (2001), pp. 131–138.

³³ Yuhua Wang, ‘Empowering the police: how the Chinese Communist Party manages its coercive leaders’, The China Quarterly 219, (2014), pp. 625–648.

³⁴ Ruixue Jia and Pinghan Liang, Government Structure and Military Coups, Working Paper, Stockholm University, 2012. There are also rumors of a coup directed by Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang before the 18th Party Congress, which featured a power transition between Hu and Xi.

³⁵ Handong Xia, Shui kongzhi zhongguo jundui [‘Who Controls China's Military] (New York, N.Y.: Mirror Books), p. 59.

³⁶ Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, p. 73.

³⁷ Shih et al., ‘Getting ahead in the communist party’.

³⁸ Pin He and Xin Gao, Zhonggong taizidang [CCP's Princeling Party] (New York, N.Y.:Mirror Books, 1992).

³⁹ Central Party History Research Office [Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiu shi], Xi Zhongxun jinian wenji [Xi Zhongxun in Memoriam] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2013).

⁴⁰ An exception is during his famous Southern Tour in 1992. Deng threatened the conservative leaders in Beijing that they would be possibly deposed if they continued stalling economic reform. This trip was entirely arranged by the police forces within the PLA and accompanied by Deng's ally in the military, Yang Shangkun, to show the military's support of Deng. See Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).

⁴¹ Pin He and Xin Gao, Zhonggong taizidang.

⁴² Enchinese.com, ‘Meiguo waijiaoguan: Xi Jinping yixin zhixiang kuajin zuigaoceng, meiyou xingqu gao minzhu’ [‘US Diplomat: Xi Jinping Only Wants to Step Into the Power Center, Not Interested in Progressing Democracy’], (10 December 2010), available at: http://www.enchinese.com/news/1210/22670.html (accessed 15 January 2014).

⁴³ Shih, ‘“Nauseating” displays of loyalty’.

⁴⁴ See ‘Chinese Military Bans Luxury Banquets’, (22 December 2012), available at: http://english.people.com.cn/102774/8067393.html (accessed 5 March 2014).

⁴⁵ Deng ordered the military not to demand higher budget allocations, because he was confident of the military’s loyalty to him. See Ji You, ‘Jiang Zemin's command of the military’.

⁴⁶ Cheng Li, ‘Xi Jinping's inner circle: friends from Xi’s formative years’, China Leadership Monitor 44, (2014), pp. 1–22.

⁴⁷ Xuezhi Guo, ‘Controlling corruption in the party: China's central discipline inspection commission’, The China Quarterly 219, (2014), pp. 597–624.

⁴⁸ Yukyung Yeo, ‘Complementing the local discipline inspection commissions of the CCP: empowerment of the central inspection groups’, Journal of Contemporary China 25(97), (2016), pp. 59–74.

⁴⁹ Jiang, with the cooperation of Zhu Rongji, did prohibit the PLA from engaging lucrative businesses in 1998.

However, in the meantime Jiang enhanced the welfare treatment of the military in order to appease the army.

See 'Yan’ zi dangtou, junwei zhuxi men de zhijun gushi' [‘Strictness comes first, the stories of all former the Chairmen of the Central Military Commission’], Liberation Daily, (9 September 2013), available at: http://newspaper.jfdaily.com/jfrb/html/2013-08/09/content_1073554.htm (accessed 4 February 2015).

⁵⁰ Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower.

⁵¹ Xi cultivated strong connections with officials in Zhejiang during his tenure there and his native ties with Shaanxi are also strong. Cheng Li, ‘Xi Jinping's inner circle: the Shaanxi gang’; and Cheng Li, ‘Xi Jinping's inner circle: political protégés from the provinces’, China Leadership Monitor 45, (2014), pp. 1–22.

⁵² Provincial official newspapers are major channels for provincial leaders to signal loyalty to national leaders. See Shih, ‘“Nauseating” Displays of Loyalty’; and Jinghan Zeng, ‘Changing manners of displaying loyalties through ideological campaigns in post-Deng China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(100), (2016), pp. 547–562.

⁵³ People.cn.com, ‘Gedi chutai xize luoshi baxiang guiding’ [‘Many localities have introduced bylaws to enforce the Eight Requirements’], (2 January 2013), available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0102/c64094-20070716.html (accessed 4 February 2015).

⁵⁴ Interviews were conducted respectively in Beijing (February 2014), Shanghai (March 2014), Henan (July 2014), and Guangdong (August 2014).

⁵⁵ See Melanie Manion, ‘Taking China’s anticorruption campaign seriously’, Economic and Political Studies 4(1), (2015), pp. 3–18; and Wedeman, ‘Xi Jinping’s tiger hunt’.

⁵⁶ For example, early on in the Hu–Wen administration, Wen Jiabao intervened in a single case of wage arrears, which created a wave of mobilization by other aggrieved migrant workers. This launched a national campaign and risked significant audience costs.

⁵⁷ See Note 43

⁵⁸ Shirk, Political Logic of Economic Reform.

⁵⁹ Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).