Chinese Re-Examinations of Russia? The Strategic Partnership in the Wake of Russia’s War Against Ukraine

ABSTRACT

This article asks whether Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has prompted a reevaluation within the Chinese expert community on China’s strategic partnership with Russia. This article examines how Chinese experts and academics assess the impact of the war on the partnership and Russia’s future role for China with regard to: security and military affairs; economy and technology; and global governance and regional interaction. Chinese analysts recognize that the war has put China in a difficult situation. Several voices express caution and calls to avoid becoming too closely associated with Moscow are prevalent, not least as Chinese experts view China and Russia diverging in the future on issues concerning the global order. Moreover, Russia’s development prospects are considered dim, which in turn affects the potential for concrete cooperation with China. Chinese assessments advocate for selective engagement with Russia, largely on Chinese terms as the balance of power continues to shift in China’s favor. Nonetheless, this article finds that the Chinese expert community overall assesses that the basic tenet for maintaining the strategic partnership remains unchanged. Crucially, under current US global dominance, Russia is considered a key partner to jointly counter-balance American global power and regional influence.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine poses severe challenges to the strength and endurance of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and has prompted a lively debate in the international expert community on how the war will impact the long-term trajectory of Sino-Russian relations.¹ Existing studies have looked at the potential costs and benefits of the war for China, including analyzes of challenges related to China’s ‘tacit support’ of Russia²; potential lessons China can draw from Russia’s war against Ukraine³; and the war’s impact on more specific issues, such as energy relations or interactions in Central Asia.⁴ To date, what is missing are larger studies, specifically examining the academic and expert debate in China across a spectrum of sources and prominent themes.⁵

Since the Cold War ended Sino-Russian relations have steadily deepened. An important shift occurred in 2014, following the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donetsk republic. This increased collaboration was largely fueled by a shared perception of the ‘West’, especially the US, as the prime antagonist.⁶ Today, their bilateral relationship is defined as ‘a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era’⁷; China’s highest form of strategic partnership with another country. During Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing on 4 February 2022, China and Russia issued a joint declaration proclaiming there were ‘no limits’ and ‘no forbidden areas’ to Sino-Russian cooperation.⁸ The two countries also engage in robust defense collaboration and have broadened bilateral trade and economic exchanges, especially in natural resource sectors. Both are more globally aligned too, particularly within the United Nations Security Council, coordinating their respective policies in regions of common interest including Central and East Asia and, increasingly, the Arctic.⁹

Yet, several issues plague their relationship. Deep-rooted mutual mistrust due to historical animosity and competition, especially during the latter stage of the Cold War, remains prevalent. Cultural differences and limited people-to-people exchanges make the relationship top-down. Although trade and economic links have grown, China is a much more important trading partner for Russia than contrariwise.¹⁰ Crucially, however, the bilateral balance of power has markedly shifted in China’s favor. This trend was exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. Over time, the growing power asymmetry poses a significant challenge to the long-term endurance of their relationship.¹¹

The main objective of this article is to explore whether the war in Ukraine prompted a reevaluation of the strategic relationship within the Chinese expert community.¹² This article examines how Chinese experts and academics assess the impact of the war on the partnership and Russia’s future role for China with regard to: security and military affairs; economy and technology; and regional and global interaction.

This article is situated in two separate but inter-related academic debates. First, it engages with literature on Sino-Russian relations. A comprehensive scholarly and policy debate exists on Sino-Russian relations with various theoretical perspectives and approaches.¹³ However, few studies address ‘domestic sources’ to understand the dynamic and features of this relationship.¹⁴ This is particularly true for studies that specifically focus on the Chinese side, not least those pertaining to domestic discourses and perspectives held.¹⁵ This article contributes to this approach within Sino-Russian relation literature.

Second, it engages with Chinese foreign policy studies that analyze debates and perspectives held by domestic expert communities.¹⁶ Such studies are part of a broader academic focus which questions the development, role, and function of Chinese think tanks regarding Chinese foreign and security policy, sometimes even taking expert debate as a proxy for the opinions of the Chinese government.¹⁷ Although there is broad consensus that Chinese think tanks have proliferated, constituting a meaningful subject of research, debate continues regarding their influence on the content and implementation of China’s foreign and security policy, especially as foreign policy has become increasingly centralized and personalized around Xi Jinping.¹⁸ However, academic communities retain an important role as external intellectual contributors,¹⁹ potentially bolstering prevailing policy stances while introducing intricacies to public discourse, thus creating an important feedback loop for decision-makers.²⁰ Though not measuring the direct influence of expert commentaries on policymaking, this research does, however, agree that through their publications, scholars can indirectly mold foreign policy narratives.²¹ This analysis further acknowledges that experts’ viewpoints often align with government-sanctioned narratives, which in turn shapes research priorities and defines the acceptable range of published perspectives.²²

This analysis is based on written, open-access data up to the beginning of 2024, comprising Russia-focused journal articles²³ and articles published by research institutes affiliated with the ministries of Foreign Affairs, State Security, Education, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).²⁴ Opinions expressed in commentaries and op-eds by leading experts on Russia and the Sino-Russia relationship are also incorporated.²⁵ While it is recognized that the Chinese internal debate on Russia and Sino-Russian relations is multifaceted, this article provides generalized and representative observations, capturing the main perspectives and thoughts of China’s Russia experts.²⁶ Events in Ukraine are ongoing and the effects of the war remain uncertain; therefore, assessments and views held by Chinese experts remain circumspect. Finally, it is recognized that Sino-Russian relations are particularly sensitive in China, resulting in varied degrees of self-censorship, which ultimately impacts what researchers can uncover.

This article is organized thus: a brief overview of China’s official position on the war in Ukraine is provided. Subsequent parts analysis the Chinese expert community’s perspectives and views on Russia and China–Russia relations by investigating three broad dimensions of Sino-Russian interaction: security and military; economy and technology; and regional and global interaction. For each dimension, the authors contrast previously held views and assessments made by the Chinese expert community with analysis produced after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The final part analyzes the main findings and discusses implications.

China’s Official Line: Pro-Russia and Anti-War

Russia’s war against Ukraine poses several acute challenges for China, most crucially how to balance its vital strategic partnership with Russia and important relations with the West, notably the US and Europe.

The Chinese government’s official stance and rhetoric remains strongly anti-American and anti-Western. Chinese officials have avoided condemning Russia’s violation of sovereignty, instead blaming the US and NATO,²⁷ and has not yet officially called the war an invasion. Whether China knew about the invasion, or overestimated Russia’s ability to conduct a swift and decisive military campaign, is an ongoing debate. Regardless, Beijing initially fumbled its response but soon devised a strategy referred to by international observes as ‘tacit support’ for Russia or a ‘pro-Russia neutrality’ position.²⁸ The Chinese government refers to global sanctions against Russia as ‘financial terrorism’, ‘economic hegemonism’, and ‘economic weaponization’²⁹; coordinates the dissemination of misinformation about Ukraine with Russia³⁰; and maintains tight control over the narrative and public perceptions in China, making sure they generally align with the official line.³¹ In early 2024, top Chinese leaders remain openly committed to further strengthening the relationship with Russia while simultaneously communicating to a western audience that China wants to see a negotiated solution. In this regard, the Chinese government proposed a 12-point plan in February 2023 for ‘the peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine’.³² Many observers interpret this as an attempt to represent China as a globally responsible stakeholder in the eyes of the ‘Global South’ than an actual attempt at ending the war.³³

China’s actual support to Russia has been mixed, but overall supportive. China has maintained trade relations with Russia, even increasing imports of oil and gas, although more in terms of value than volume.³⁴ This has bolstered the Russian economy in the face of western imposed sanctions. However, large commercial actors with operations in China remain cautious and Chinese banks and financial institutions generally adhere to Western sanctions.³⁵ When Xi met Putin in Moscow in March 2023, no second Power of Siberia Pipeline was signed, something the Russians had pushed for. Reporting indicates that China is leveraging its stronger position to push prices down.³⁶ Militarily, there is to our knowledge no publicly available evidence of lethal weapons supply, although the purchase of other products and dual-use electronic and vehicular items has been documented.³⁷ Altogether, Chinese high-ranking government officials and top Party leaders have officially shown relatively consistent support for Russia, despite the apparent reputational costs, global economic ramifications, and increasingly strained ties with the US and Europe. Officially, the relationship is robust and even has the potential to further deepen.³⁸ The question, however, is whether the Chinese expert community holds similar views.

Security and Military Domains

Similar to the situation during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the current Chinese debate following the full-scale invasion also featured individuals expressing criticism of the war. Within the academic and expert communities surveilled, there is no clear consensus as to what extent China should support or distance itself from Russia.³⁹ Though rare, some Chinese observers have criticized the Russian so-called ‘sovereignty first’ principle, identifying the contradiction between its expressed values and action.⁴⁰ Such criticism can also be interpreted as implicitly critiquing Beijing, as observers warn about Russia’s weakening economic and world-wide political influence.

This survey of Chinese sources reveals that Russia is still viewed by China as an important security and military partner, despite what some view as a poor Russian war performance.⁴¹ Russia has made several strategic errors, but Russia’s value as Chinas most crucial partner in counter-balancing US global dominance and regional strategic pressure is clearly evident. Generally, three sub-themes characterize Chinese expert assessment regarding China–Russia security and military issues: maintaining the bilateral relationship; the Ukraine war as a proxy for larger geopolitical competition; and Russia as a military power and Sino-Russian defense collaboration.

The Essence of Maintaining the Bilateral Relationship

Following the invasion of Ukraine, the principle of cooperation as the (seemingly only) alternative to confrontation, remains central to arguments for maintaining Sino-Russian relations.⁴² Chinese experts determined that the internal drivers of the relationship—being neighboring countries and sharing a roughly 4,200 km long border—were unchanged by the war and China was not obligated to sever normal relations with Russia.⁴³ According to one observer, ‘China will not damage the hard-won Sino-Russian relations because of the Ukraine crisis’.⁴⁴ Or, as another expert noted, while not ‘one hundred percent’ on Russia’s side, this relationship is viewed as one of stability of long-term prospects.⁴⁵

Russia being China’s largest neighbor with whom it also shares a long border and confrontational history, particularly during the latter part of the Cold War, are principle motivators for maintaining friendly and cooperative relations. Such assessments have long been held by Chinese Russia experts.⁴⁶ As prominent Russia-scholar Zhao Huasheng explained in 2015, It can be said that security is the external and unchanging basic interest of Sino-Russian relations (…) When relations are friendly, both countries receive large security benefits, but when relations are tense, both countries become a serious strategic threat to the other’s security.⁴⁷

Chinese analysts have long recognized that settling the border issue was of fundamental importance to the relationship, establishing stability and security for the political development of the relationship post-Cold war.⁴⁸ Overall, Chinese experts acknowledge that past tensions and the high costs of a confrontational relationship have impacted Chinese leaders’ approach to Russia and constitute an enduring theme in Chinese discourse on the relationship.⁴⁹ Such discourse remains central to the Chinese debate, given it pertains to security issues, and has therefore always played a prominent role, setting the tone of the bilateral relationship.⁵⁰

Maintaining the bilateral relationship also relates to concerns over regime stability and domestic instability in Russia, a feature that broadly impacts the Sino-Russian relationship.⁵¹ This article highlights some concern about whether the domestic situation in Russia is stable. Prior to the Wagner mutiny, Chinese scholars praised the Russian ‘trinity’ of regime security systems, comprising ideology, presidential authority, and control over public discourse.⁵² The mutiny precipitated critical reassessments regarding the potential instability and anti-war sentiment building in Russia, while demonstrating that there was clear discontent among Russian troops that will likely have a long-term impact.⁵³ An unstable domestic situation in Russian, where the survival of the Putin regime is challenged, could gravely impact China. Some Chinese Russian experts note that Russia faces multiple external and internal challenges and the core goal for the current regime is to remain in power long term. As established China–Russia observer Feng Yujun observes, the Putin regime wants to create the image of a ‘powerful country’, capable of mobilizing populism and diverting Russian attention from the country’s economic and political problems.⁵⁴

Ukraine as Proxy for Larger Geopolitical Competition

Sources reveal a consensus that the root causes for the war in Ukraine are directly related to the USA and especially NATO eastward expansion. Observers consider the war the result of a ‘perception of a clash of civilizations’ in Russia, brought about by NATO expansion and the US.⁵⁵ The war is described as the ‘natural next step’, and one which was effectively ‘delayed’ by NATO until now, yet was unavoidable.⁵⁶ There is, however, also occasional criticism of this argument by, for example, CASS researcher Han Kedi: ‘When it comes to NATO expansion, the United States emphasizes the inviolability of sovereignty, while Russia emphasizes the indivisibility of security. In comparison, the inviolability of sovereignty is more important than the indivisibility of security, as sovereignty is the foundation of all international law and without sovereignty, there can be no security’.⁵⁷

Most Chinese experts express empathy for Russia’s position, and many suggest that Russia’s security concerns were unheeded.⁵⁸ Some experts even hold Zelensky partly responsible for the invasion.⁵⁹ Obversely, though some express sympathy for Ukraine, it is still viewed as a ‘pawn’ in a greater geopolitical competition.⁶⁰ Many Chinese experts also support the narrative that the US is using the war in Ukraine as a proxy to contain Russia.⁶¹

Increasing Russian-US friction has implications for US–China relations as many perceive that the west and notably the US is actually engaged in a protracted strategy to keep Russia from reemerging as a regional power in Europe, while preventing China from challenging US regional dominance in Asia and its global position.⁶² However, aversion towards the US does not translate into a call for Russia and China to enter into a military alliance. Chinese scholars have for some time questioned whether China should revise its long-held ‘non-alignment policy’, instead establishing its own version of an ‘alliance-type’ partnerships.⁶³ Some, including academic Yan Xuetong, openly advocated an alliance to counter what was perceived as US hegemony.⁶⁴ Following the invasion, this has become a more radical, but not completely fringe view. Yan Xuetong himself has abandoned this argument, instead opting for maintaining a ‘balancing act’.⁶⁵ Based on the historical experience of three ‘failed cases’ of alliances,⁶⁶ scholars express disbelief at the debate, claiming the reason this remains topical is because the international community continues speculating over a long-settled question. Conversely, the expert community has instead doubled down, declaring that the China–Russia relationship is “stronger than an alliance”.⁶⁷ Although so far as national interests go, according to Ding Xiaoxing, ‘it is reasonable for them (China and Russia) to maintain a certain security distance, just as individuals maintain ‘social distance’”.⁶⁸ One notable exception, though, is Li Yonghui at CASS, who early in the war argued that the Sino-Russian relationship had maintained ‘a good momentum of development, and economic and trade cooperation has been steadily advancing’, while the US Indo-Pacific strategy has the potential of pushing the two countries closer together, explicitly suggesting the potential for a formal alliance.⁶⁹ Indeed, some Chinese scholars recognize that a simultaneous rapid deterioration between the US and China and Russia, leading to open military conflict or war, are stronger incentives for an alliance to evolve.⁷⁰

Russia As a Military Power and Sino-Russia Defense Collaboration

Chinese sources express concerns over Russia’s war performance and how this could impact the Sino-Russian defense partnership; broader patterns of international politics; and the global balance of power. China has generally viewed Russia’s military power favorably. Overcoming its troubled decade in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s national power slowly recovered and Chinese experts were initially convinced that Russia would recover economically, socially, politically, and militarily.⁷¹ Since the Cold War ended, Chinese experts no longer consider Russia a security threat.⁷² However, some occasionally express caution. Wang Haiyun, former defense attaché to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, noted that being China’s largest neighbor with a strong strategic culture of expansionism, Russia might someday again threaten Chinese security, even though it would not hold the same level of power as the Soviet Union during the Cold War.⁷³ In the context of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Chinese experts noted, this ‘objectively proved that Russia can now stop any actions of other major countries. For its own interests, Russia can effectively project its military power to neighboring and even farther regions’.⁷⁴ Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, the picture looks different. As the war drags on, Putin’s ‘overestimation’ of both Russian military strength and his ability to mobilize the population has been suggested as part of his miscalculations.⁷⁵

Despite Russia’s military shortcoming in the war against Ukraine, mutual learning continues in areas such as hybrid warfare and new technologies. Prior to 2022, observers of military and technological cooperation noted how the increasingly difficult technological relationship with the US and Europe made China ‘pay more attention to exporting products to Russia and strengthening technological cooperation, particularly in the aerospace, aviation and military field’.⁷⁶ Military cooperation has great symbolic value for Russia as it seeks to counter the impression of international isolation. Joint military exercises have continued since the war started; the two countries held their largest joint naval and air exercise in the waters separating Japan from Russia in July 2023.⁷⁷ Military experts argue that in AI, for example, there are opportunities and expectations for deepened scientific and technological cooperation between China and Russia, while military-technology cooperation remains ongoing to a substantial degree, the two sides choosing not to publicize it. Such exchanges, along with collaboration on advanced military technology like AI and robotics, have bolstered China’s deterrence capabilities.⁷⁸ Simultaneously, as Chinese scholars noted before the invasion, a country (mentioned generally, but in a context involving Russia) will not export its more advanced weapons, meaning Russian weapons exported to China are usually one or two generations behind those used by Russian forces.⁷⁹ Recent analysis of Russian missile systems, for example, suggests that the new S-500 system has far superior detection, range, speed, altitude, and target destruction range compared to the S-400 which has been exported to China.⁸⁰ Scholars suggested before the invasion that although there is cooperation in developing high-tech weapons, manufacturing large aircraft and helicopters, and joint military exercises, there were ‘evident differences in China–Russia security cooperation from concepts to practice’.⁸¹

Economy and Technology

Chinese discourse indicates a clear awareness that Russia’s war against Ukraine has created difficulties and challenges for their economic relationship with Russia. This article identified three sub-themes of Chinese assessments regarding Sino-Russian economic and trade relations: Russia as an economic partner for China; cooperation in natural resources; and the impact of sanctions.

Overall Value of Russia as an Economic Partner

Russia’s value as an economic partner to China remains a long-standing discussion in Chinese scholarship.⁸² Broadly, economic and trade cooperation constitutes a significant component of China’s engagement with Russia. China has long stressed the complementarity of both countries’ economies and markets, and their geographical proximity, which creates favorable trading conditions.⁸³ Despite initially slow growth in economic relations during the 1990s, described by some as ‘hot politics, cold economics’,⁸⁴ significant progress began in the mid-2000s, driven by energy cooperation and Russia’s economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, Chinese analysts have long considered economic cooperation through the dual lens of serving practical benefits for China and as an important tool for enhancing the broader bilateral relationship.⁸⁵ Previously, this was described as ‘two wheels of a vehicle’ where one wheel is economical, the other political.⁸⁶

Simultaneously, Chinese observers have long been aware of several existing challenges to the economic relationship. First, the Russians are a difficult trading partner, with Moscow working its national interests in first.⁸⁷ The long, winding saga with the negotiations and completion of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Oil Ocean Pipeline (ESPO) was an important lesson for the Chinese leadership. Second, the Russians were concerned that they risked being turning into a ‘raw material appendage’ of China or growing Chinese economic presence and investments in the Russian Far East would lead to a Russian sense of decreased social and political control as economic dependence on China grew.⁸⁸ Many Chinese experts believe it was in Russia’s interest to work towards a better trade and economic exchange with China if it sought to fulfill its ambitions to develop in the Far East and further integrate into the Asia-Pacific region. This was particularly evident in the wake of the 2014 Crimea annexation and subsequent western sanctions.⁸⁹

Furthermore, following the 2014 annexation it was determined that despite events resulting in closer Sino-Russian relations, some experts noted that China suffered significant real losses.⁹⁰ At the time, Russia’s long-term economic growth prospects were described by one scholar as ‘not optimistic, which serves as a reminder that even for a country with abundant natural resources, achieving growth becomes a considerably challenging task when reforms stall and market mechanisms and civil society weaken’.⁹¹

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these concerns remain present. The current situation, Chinese experts observe, warrants caution regarding the secondary, geopolitical risks and economic disruptions. Several experts warn against becoming too dependent on Russia, instead calling for increasing cooperation with other neighboring countries.⁹² Another argument is that the war’s overall impact on energy and food prices has influenced inflationary pressures in China.⁹³

Continued Energy Cooperation Prospects but Not Flawless

Nonetheless, Chinese experts still consider economic and trade engagement with Russia valuable, especially energy cooperation which has long constituted the main pillar in the economic relationship.⁹⁴ Beijing has aimed to forge closer energy links, as major oil and gas projects with Russia help diversify energy imports.⁹⁵ Yet, there is ongoing debate concerning the dangers of increasing dependence on Russian oil and gas imports. When it comes to the political-economic strategic alignment with Russia, Chinese scholars argue, because Russia is known for using oil and gas as a bargaining chip in international negotiations, China should maintain caution about political and economic risks of its long-term strategic alignment with Russia.⁹⁶ Similarly, this explains why they argue for a diversification of China’s crude oil imports.⁹⁷ In reality of course, Russia is China’s main source of oil imports. Furthermore, trade disputes with the US and issues over crude oil trade with Russia have been proposed as reasons for China to accelerate the country’s diversification of crude oil imports and deepen international energy cooperation.⁹⁸ Other Chinese experts raise concerns whether and how China should balance and strengthen its economic relationship with Russia while maintaining cooperation with other countries. This is viewed as an increasingly difficult task because of Western nations relationship to Russia.⁹⁹

As Russia is more economically dependent on China, the latter’s dependence on Russia’s energy sector will also be influenced by China’s economic growth rate. Scholars contend that poor Russian economic growth, weakens the Sino-Russian relationship, particularly for the Chinese. This growing asymmetry is described as an important factor limiting cooperation.¹⁰⁰ However, Russia’s growing economic dependency on China, coupled with the latter’s need for Russian energy, appears enough for continued strong relations.¹⁰¹

Impact of Western Sanctions

Chinese experts and scholars view western imposed sanctions on Russia as a pressing issue that concerns economic and technological relation between them. Some worry about potential capital and investment flights from China, and that multinational corporations will look to mitigate geopolitical risks by increasing the restructuring of industry and supply chains, as companies no longer operate ‘solely on economic interests’ but must instead ‘demonstrate political correctness’.¹⁰² In other words, China fears secondary sanctions. Conversely, some argue that China’s interest in Russian technology development, energy, infrastructure, agriculture and tourism remains strong, foreseeing continued growth.¹⁰³

Global Governance and Regional Interaction

There is an ongoing debate in the Chinese expert community concerning the value China places on Russia in reshaping a western-led international order to a system that better reflects the interests of Beijing and Moscow. Cooperation is broadly viewed as comprising a similar view on global governance and manageable, if divergent, conflicts of interest in regional strategies. Differences in opinion, however, are hardly uncommon, especially in terms of regional interaction, where several areas of concerns are voiced. Crucially, Chinese experts express concerns regarding divergent views on the future of the global order. This article identified three sub-themes concerning global governance and regional interactions: international institutions and global governance; impact on relations in Central Asia; and impact on developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

Divergences on Multilateral Institutions

Despite the broad consensus on global governance, Chinese scholars point out distinct differences in Chinese and Russian regional security interests, economic disparities, and disparate views on the specific functional positioning of multilateral frameworks, which may lead to different paths of multilateral cooperation.¹⁰⁴ China is skeptical about being ‘pooled together’ with Russian, particularly in international affairs.¹⁰⁵ Experts note that, due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, China may struggle to balance a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with Russia and maintain cooperation with other countries.¹⁰⁶ Particularly since 2022 there were calls to distinguish between Russia’s ‘impulses’ and China’s ‘attitudes’, to avoid becoming overly invested in Russia’s security demands.¹⁰⁷

A related question is how China and Russia act in global institutions. A study before the war in Ukraine suggested a widening power gap might have negative effects on the voting cooperation between the two in the UN system.¹⁰⁸ Now, critics question Russia’s use of international institutions, particularly the UN, to conduct ‘damage control’.¹⁰⁹ Others suggest that China and Russia should instead improve their communication and cooperation at various levels within the UN, and create a strategic consensus that ‘helps promote the reform and improvement of the existing international system, especially in turbulent times, serving as a “stabilizer”’.¹¹⁰ Within the BRICS framework, Chinese scholars argue that in the future, Russia, China, and Brazil will face technological restrictions imposed by the US, and should thus increase cooperation in varying technological areas.¹¹¹ However, this article finds no clear ‘consensus’ on Sino-Russia collaboration in international institutions.

Impact on Relations in Central Asia

A long-standing issue in China–Russia relations is China making greater inroads in Central Asia due to Russia’s relative declining position in the region. This would negatively impact the bilateral relationship. In the war’s aftermath, Chinese experts noted that central Asian countries are ‘walking a tightrope between Russia and the West’, with obvious spill-over effects in the region.¹¹² While recognizing that it is challenging to break away from dependency on Russia in the short term, Central Asian countries are concerned about sanctions from the West and ‘becoming the next Ukraine’.¹¹³ The war in Ukraine has therefore created an opportunity for deepening cooperation between China and Central Asian countries, at Russia’s expense. Additionally, the war has increased Central Asia’s importance in the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative,¹¹⁴ with some indicating that Russian economic losses would result in greater participation in the BRI.¹¹⁵

According to some accounts, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a major Russian-led regional project, is a potential long-term casualty of the war. As Russia’s attractiveness gradually diminishes for participating countries, some might seek to break free of Russian control, and given that Russia’s power is declining, the unions prospects are described as pessimistic and dim, while Russia’s overall importance in the region diminishes.¹¹⁶ Historically, Chinese observers have highlighted Russia’s concerns that Chinese inroads into Central Asia would threaten Russia’s traditional role in the region.¹¹⁷ Prominent Chinese-Russian expert Pan Guang noted a decade ago that Russians were afraid that Chinese intensified economic integration would gradually reduce the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to a solely China-led body.¹¹⁸ Simultaneously, others argue that the current situation has encouraged new SCO cooperation, as Russian policy shifts towards inviting countries who have poor relations with the US—Iran, Belarus, and some Arab countries—while using it to mitigate the economic and energy security fallout from the war.¹¹⁹

China’s Position in the Asia-Pacific Region

Chinese experts argue the war in Ukraine has spilled over into Asia, ‘profoundly affecting’ security dynamics in the region, resulting in a schism between US–Japan and Russia–China, with the hard-fought Japan–Russia relations becoming a ‘fragile link’.¹²⁰ For long, Russia attempted to increase its presence by developing relations with other Asia states, for instance India, Vietnam, and Japan. Chinese analysts maintain this was a deliberate policy; Moscow was seeking to not become too dependent on China, and, in line with Russian broader political goals especially from the mid-2000s onwards, to regain a great power position in world politics.¹²¹ Chinese observers also recognise that Russia’s so called ‘turn to the East’ was a response to US pressure and a means of boosting its great power credentials in Asia. Ultimately, Russia has long been viewed as a western country with its core interests in the West, and because China and Asia were instrumental tools in Russia’s great power play with the West and notably the US.¹²²

Following the isolation and sanctioning of Russia by the West and certain Asian powers, notably Japan, Russia’s position in Asia has diminished and is increasingly dependent on China, better serving Chinese regional security interests. For instance, some Chinese scholars expect Russia to treat China similarly in a future Taiwan scenario—neither imposing sanctions nor condemning its actions—and continue to supply China with energy. In an escalating conflict with the US over Taiwan, Russia is the safest bet and an already hard-won relationship maintained for the future.¹²³

Conclusion

Has the Chinese expert community re-evaluated China’s strategic partnership with Russia? This analysis demonstrates that several scholars and experts have indeed criticized Russia’s aggression, suggesting China re-balance its relationship with Russia. Economic cooperation is perceived as overly beneficial, but some still argue for caution. Regarding technology cooperation, Russia remains a small market and diminishing technology provider for China over time. Chinese scholars also paint a rather bleak assessment of Russia’s long-term economic development. Their assessment suggests selective engagement with Russia, based largely on their terms as the balance of power continues to shift in China’s favor. This research however found little consideration of how this will manifest more concretely. Experts are even more skeptical in terms of global governance and multilateral institutions. On the one hand, Russia and China share comparable views, wanting a less dominant US-led international order. On the other, many Chinese experts note that China should not be too closely aligned with Russia as this challenges interactions with other countries, especially the US and Europe.

This article concludes that Chinese experts agree that the basic tenets for maintaining the strategic partnership remain unchanged. Russia remains an important strategic partner to China, jointly counterbalancing US global dominance and regional strategic influence. This is particularly prevalent when considering Sino-Russian relations in the security and military domain. Despite Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine, China still regards Russia as a major military power. The value of Sino-Russian defense collaboration and military-technology cooperation is continuously viewed as beneficial for China, not least because China faces growing tensions with western countries. NATO expansion is seen as the root cause of the Ukrainian War and for most Chinese observers is viewed as a broader conflict between Russia and the West. This does not mean that Chinese scholars advocate for a formal military alliance. Rather, most observers continue maintaining advancing an unchanged strategic partnership. A fundamental component of maintaining close relations is conserving a stable and friendly border relation with Russia, as historically an unstable border relation resulted in high costs to China.

What are the implications of this research? This article demonstrates the value in mapping and analyzing Chinese domestic debates regarding Russia–China relations and incorporating the domestic factor more deeply in the broader literature on Sino-Russian interactions. While existing limitations in what can be revealed by analyzing China’s domestic debate are recognized, especially its impact on policy, such an endeavor nonetheless remains valuable for scholars and policymakers to better understand the dynamics and features of the evolving China–Russia relationship and Chinese foreign and security policy more broadly. Notably, this article reveals that a more multifaceted picture of China–Russia relations exists than official dogma. Several critics were identified and the overall sense is that most Chinese experts and scholars call for a balanced approach, advocating some distance with Russia.

Simultaneously, the general sentiment is characterized by a recognition that the increasing strategic rivalry with the US calls for a close partnership with Russia, out of strategic necessity. In that sense, the official line and that of the Chinese expert community appears more aligned than directly apparent. This also has important policy implications. Despite the challenges and limits that Chinese scholars and experts identify, creating a ‘split’ between them will be difficult.¹²⁴ Thus, the West should be cognizant that the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is not, as some believe, fragile and problem-prone but rather enduring. However, this does not mean that the West should cease probing for friction and weakness in the bilateral relationship or prevent the relationship deepening. Rather, they must demonstrate that closer alignment has costs. China has large stakes in an overall stable global economic environment and remains dependent on functioning trade, investment, and technology exchanges with the West. Though China and Russia continue to reshape the global order in their interests, China remains far less disruptive. This article shows that potential fissures in the Sino-Russian strategic partnership do exist which can be exploited in the future, notably their long-term, divergent visions of global and regional governance.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the researchers at the Institute for Defence Studies, Elizabeth Wishnick, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Rebekka Åsnes Sagild’s research for this article was supported by the Security in Asia program at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Foreign Affairs, ‘Ask the experts—Will China and Russia Stay Aligned?’ (Foreign Affairs, June 21, 2022), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/2022-06-21/will-china-and-russia-stay-aligned. For an overview of the Russian debate see Rozman, Gilbert, and Gaye Christoffersen, eds. Putin’s‘turn to the East’ in the Xi Jinping Era (Routledge, 2023).

² Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘A “Superior Relationship”: How the Invasion of Ukraine Has Deepened the Sino-Russian Partnership’, China Leadership Monitor, China Leadership Monitor, Summer 2023, Issue 76; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, ‘China’s Response to War in Ukraine’, Asian Survey 62(5–6), (2022), pp. 751–781; Bonny Lin, ‘Can China Thread the Needle on Ukraine? Beijing Struggles to Balance Its Ties to Russia and Europe’, (Foreign Affairs, May 17, 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/can-china-thread-needle-ukraine.

³ Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter, ‘As Russia’s Military Stumbles in Ukraine, Chinese Strategists Are Taking Notes’, The Diplomat, February 24, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/as-russias-military-stumbles-in-ukraine-chinese-strategists-are-taking-notes/; Nien-Chung Chang-Liao ‘The limits of strategic partnerships: Implications for China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war’, Contemporary Security Policy 44, (2023), pp. 226–247; Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Potential Lessons from Ukraine for Conflict over Taiwan’, The Washington Quarterly 46, (2023), pp. 7–25.

⁴ Erica Downs, ‘A Friend in Need Is a Friend Indeed? China-Russia Energy Relations in the Wake of the War in Ukraine’, Journal of International Affairs (2022); Henrik Wachtmeister, ‘Russia-China Energy Relations Since 24 February: Consequences and Options for Europe’, NKK/SCEEUS Report No. 1, (2023), June 1, 2023; Carla Freeman, ‘China Looks to Fill a Void in Central Asia’, United States Institute for Peace, (2023), May 25, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/china-looks-fill-void-central-asia.

⁵ More limited examples include Alicja Bachulska and Mark Leonard, ‘China and Ukraine: The Chinese debate about Russia’s war and its meaning for the world’, Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, (2023). https://ecfr.eu/publication/china-and-ukraine-the-chinese-debate-about-russias-war-and-its-meaning-for-the-world/; Yun Sun, ‘China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More complicated than you think’ (March 4, 2022) War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-russia-more-complicated-than-you-think/.

⁶ Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo (eds), Sino—Russian Relations in the twenty-first Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

⁷ China Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Eluosi lianbang guanyu fazhan xin shidai quanmian zhanlüe xiezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming’ [Joint statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the development of a comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation in the new era], June 6, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/oz_678770/1206_679110/1207_679122/t1670118.shtml

⁸ President of Russia, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development’, February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.

⁹ Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, Chinese perspectives on Russia. Assessing how Beijing views and values Moscow now and later, FOI-R–5267–SE, October 2022.

¹⁰ Andrew Radin et al., China-Russia Cooperation. Determining factors, future trajectories, implications for the US, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2021.

¹¹ The Economist, ‘China and Russia: the new balance of power’, The Economist (London, April 23, 2023).

¹² This article defines the Chinese expert community broadly as academic scholars, policy analysts or persons with professional knowledge of issues related to Russia, China-Russia relations and Chinese foreign and security policy in a wide sense.

¹³ Recent more comprehensive overviews, include Brandon K. Yoder, ‘Theoretical Rigor and the Study of Contemporary Cases: Explaining Post-Cold War China-Russia Relations’, International Politics 57(5), (2020), pp. 741–759; Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen, and Nils Wörmer, ‘Introduction. Analyzing the shifts in Sino-Russian Strategic Cooperation since 2014’, in Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or eternal rivals?, eds. Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen, and Nils Wörmer (Springer, 2022), pp. 1–13.

¹⁴ Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘Domestic Politics: A Forgotten Factor in the Russian-Chinese Relationship’, in Russia-China Relations. Emerging Alliance or eternal rivals?, eds. Sarah Kirchberger, Svenja Sinjen, and Nils Wörmer (Springer, 2022), pp. 59–71.

¹⁵ There are generally speaking more available studies that look at the Russian side. See, Pradon Rangsimaporn, ‘Russia’s Debate on Military-Technological Cooperation with China: From Yeltsin to Putin’, Asia Survey 46(3), (2006), pp. 477–495; Alexander Gabuev, ‘Russia’s Policy towards China: Key Players and the Decision-making Process’, The Asan Forum, March 5, 2015, https://theasanforum.org/russias-policy-towards-china-key-players-and-the-decision-making-process/; Vladimir Kolosova and Maria Zotova, ‘The “Pivot to the East” and China in Russian Discourse’, Geopolitics (2021). However, some studies include Chinese domestic elite debates and perspectives. See, Lu Nanquan, ‘Chinese views of New Russia’, in Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia, ed. Sherman G. Garnett (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000); Christina Yeung and Nebojsa Bjelakovic, ‘The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: Views from Beijing and Moscow’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 23, (2021), pp. 243–281; Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘Why a strategic partnership? The View from Beijing’, in The Future of Sino-Russian Relations ed. James A. Bellacqua (The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), pp. 56–80; Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ‘Chinese Perceptions of Russian Foreign Policy During the Putin Administration: U.S.-Russia Relations and the “Strategic Triangle” Considerations’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38(2), (2009), pp. 145–168. Gilbert Rozman conducted an early, notable study of China’s Soviet watchers in 1985. See, Gilbert Rozman, ‘China’s Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship’, World Politics 37(4), (1985), pp. 435–474. There are also studies looking at more general popular views, see Yi Wang, ‘The Divisive Past and the Conflicted Other: How Chinese Netizens View Russia’, Journal of Contemporary China (2023), pp. 1–15.

¹⁶ See, David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990 (Princeton University Press, 1993). Phillip C. Saunders, ‘China’s America watchers: Changing attitudes towards the United States’, The China Quarterly 161(200), pp. 41–65. Chen, Rosalie, ‘China perceives America: perspectives of international relations experts’, Journal of Contemporary China 12, (2003), pp. 285–297; Lisheng Dong, ‘Chinese Perceptions of the European Union’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(88), (2014), pp. 756–779.

¹⁷ David Shambaugh, ‘China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process’, The China Quarterly 171, (2022), pp. 575–596.

¹⁸ Suisheng Zhao, ‘Top-level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policymaking in Xi Jinping’s China’, Journal of Contemporary China 32, (2023), pp. 73–86.

¹⁹ Hua Xin, ‘The influence of Chinese foreign policy think tanks on China’s EU policy: a comparative analysis of CIIS and SIIS’, Asia Europe Journal 21, (2023), pp. 173–208.

²⁰ Xiaoyu Ou, Chengli Wang, ‘Rethinking China’s rise: Chinese scholars debate strategic overstretch’, International Affairs 94, (2018), pp. 1019–1035.

²¹ Cheng Li, The Power of Ideas: The Rising Influence of Thinkers and Think Tanks in China (World Scientific Publishing, 2017).

²² See Andrea Ghiselli, ‘An opportunistic Russia in the Middle East, a view from China’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 37, (2023), pp. 163–181.

²³ Including Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies], Xiboliya yanjiu [Siberian Studies], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies], Eluosi dongouzhongya yanjiu [Russian, East Europe and Central Asia Studies], and Dongbei yalun [Northeast Asia Forum].

²⁴ Includes Waijiao pinglun [The Foreign Affairs Review] and Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], journals such as Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Guoji zhanwang [Global Review], and Guoji zhanlve yu anquan xingshi pinggu [Strategic and Security Review].

²⁵ Valuable sources include the Chinese websites Aisixiang and Guancha, which gather academic and opinion writing on a wider range of topics by Chinese experts and intellectuals. See https://www.aisixiang.com/ and https://m.guancha.cn/.

²⁶ This article further notes that a certain lack of views and assessments represented by PLA experts or analysts more directly affiliated to the Party structure, such as the Party School. Nonetheless, this research includes occasional examples of representative voices from the PLA or Party.

²⁷ Christian Shepherd and Vic Chiang, ‘A year later, China blames U.S. “hegemony” – not Russia—for war in Ukraine’ The Washington Post (Washington, February 22, 2023), accessed March 5, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/22/china-us-blame-ukraine-war/.

²⁸ Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s Strategic Straddle: Analyzing Beijing’s Diplomatic response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine’ PRC Leadership Monitor. (June 1, 2022), accessed June 2, 2022, https://www.prcleader.org/post/china-s-strategic-straddle-beijing-s-diplomatic-response-to-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Stephen Blank, ‘Russia, China, and Information War against Ukraine’, JOEAA 35, (2022), pp. 39–72

³¹ See public perception polls conducted by the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University (CISS). (2023), accessed May 31, 2023, https://www.chinausfocus.com/publication/2023/2023-Chinese-Outlook-on-International-Security.pdf, and by the China Institute at the University of Alberta in early 2023: https://www.ualberta.ca/china-institute/events/2023/survey-webinar.html.

³² China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis’, February 24, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html.

³³ Carla Freeman, Mary Glantz and Andrew Scobell, ‘What China’s “Peace Plan” Reveals about its Stance on Russia’s War on Ukraine’, United Institute of Peace, (2023), March 23, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-chinas-peace-plan-reveals-about-its-stance-russias-war-ukraine.

³⁴ Henrik Wachtmeister, Russia-China energy relations since 24 February: Consequences and options for Europe, NKK and SCEEUS Report No. 1, 2023.

³⁵ Alicia García-Herrero, ‘Early Warning Brief: China’s Contorted Response to Russia Sanctions’, The Jamestown Foundation, March 30, 2022, accessed March 31, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/early-warning-brief-chinas-contorted-response-to-russia-sanctions/.

³⁶ SCMP, ‘China wielding “bargaining power” with Russia over Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline’, November 24, 2023, accessed November 24, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3242612/china-wielding-bargaining-power-russia-over-power-siberia-2-natural-gas-pipeline

³⁷ US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘China’s Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine’. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-russias-invasion-ukraine

³⁸ See, for example, reactions to Putin’s 2023 Beijing-visit: Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Samantha Luand and Yu-Jie (Grace) Liao, ‘Analyzing the Latest Xi-Putin Meeting and China’s Belt and Road Forum’ Commentary, October 23, 2023, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), accessed October 23, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/analyzing-latest-xi-putin-meeting-and-chinas-belt-and-road-forum.

³⁹ Pan Guang, ‘Shang he zuzhi kuo yuan, shifou yiweizhe you geng duo de qinzai maodun xuyao guankong?’ [Does the expansion of the SCO mean that there are more potential conflicts to manage?] Guancha (Shanghai, July 6, 2023), accessed August 10, 2023, https://www.guancha.cn/PanGuang/2023_07_06_699722_1.shtml.

⁴⁰ Feng Yujun and Wen Longjie, ‘Eluosi baoshou zhuyi jiazhiguan waijiao Pingxi’, [Russia’s Conservative-values diplomacy], Guoji luntan [International Forum], (2023), pp. 139–154.

⁴¹ See, ‘Zheng Yongnian: e wu zhanzheng xiang he chu qu?’ [Zheng Yongnian: Where is the Russian-Ukrainian War Headed?], accessed February 28, 2023, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/141031.html.

⁴² Wang Xiaoquan, ‘Congxin ‘eluosi lianbang waijiao zhengce guoxiang’ xi e waijiao zhanlve tiaozheng [Analysis on the Adjustment of Russia’s Diplomatic Strategy Based on the New ‘Concept of Foreign Policy for the Russian Federation’], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies] (2023), pp. 5–26.

⁴³ Zhao Long, 2022, ‘E wu chongtu bu hui gaibian zhong e guanxi fazhan de neizai luoji he duli jiazhi’ [The conflict between Russia and Ukraine will not change the inner logic and independent value of the development of Sino-Russian relations], [International Forum], in E wu chongtu bai ri si: Shijie xiang he chu qu?—Laizi zhongguo xuezhe de guancha’ [One hundred days of reflection on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Where is the world going?—Observations from Chinese scholars], Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, pp. 17–22. See also, Wang Jian, ‘E wu chongtu zai dongya diqu waiyi xiaoying lun xi’ [On the Spillover Effect of Russia-Ukraine Conflict in East Asia], Riben Yanjiu [Japan Studies], (2022), pp. 25–33.

⁴⁴ Ding Xiaoxing, ‘Zhong e liang guo de xiangchu zhi dao’ [How China and Russia are getting along], Aisixiang. (2023), accessed May 20, 2023, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/142838.html.

⁴⁵ Yang Cheng, Interview on Kankan xinwen, news, 24.02.23. N.A.

⁴⁶ Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, Too Big to Fail: China’s Russia policy in the post-Cold War Period (PhD dissertation, Oslo University, 2019)

⁴⁷ Zhao Huasheng, ‘Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Far East and Central Asia Since 2012’, Eurasia Border Review (2015), p. 105.

⁴⁸ Jiang Changbin, ‘Zhong’E bianjie tanpan neimu’ [The inside story of Sino-Russian border talks], Shijie qiao (2005), pp. 50–53.

⁴⁹ Xing Guancheng, ‘Zhong’E guanxi 70 nian duowei sikao’ [Reflections on 70 years of the multifaceted Sino-Russian relationship] Aisixiang, March 12, 2020. accessed August 10, 2023, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/120400.html.

⁵⁰ Feng Yujun, ‘Zhong’E guanxi fazhan qianjing yu Zhongguo guoli liyi’ [Prospects for the Development in Sino-Russian relations and China’s National Interests] in Zhong’E guanxi de lishi yu xianshi (di er ji) [Sino-Russian Relations: History and Reality], (2nd Edition), ed. Guan Guihai and Luan Jinghe (Beijing Social Science Academic Press, 2009), p. 796.

⁵¹ Andrej Krickovic, ‘Catalyzing Conflict: the Internal Dimensions of the Security Dilemma’, JoGSS (2016), pp. 111–126

⁵² Pang Dapeng and Gao Wenbo, ‘Lun eluosi de zhengquan aquan’ [On Russia’s regime security], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2023), pp. 100–126.

⁵³ Feng Yujun ‘jiedu “wagena lanluan” yu eluosi de weilai’ [Feng Yujun Explains ‘Wagner’s Rebellion’ and Russia’s Future], June 24, 2023, https://news.ifeng.com/c/8Qsz5enGyHw; Zhao Long ‘Guancha: Wagena “panluan”, dui eluosi he wukelan yiweizhe shenme’, [Watch: What does Wagner’s ‘rebellion’ mean for Russia and Ukraine?], June 24, 2023, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_23601316, Wang Siyu, ‘Pu li ge ren de xia yibu: “Bei qingsuan”, haishi “zheng zongtong”?’ [Prigoschin’s next step: ‘liquidation’ or ‘presidential struggle’?], Wenhua zongheng, June 29, 2023, accessed June 25, 2023, https://www.sohu.com/a/692504702_232950.

⁵⁴ Feng Yujun, ‘Eluosi de jingji de zhengzhi shehui genyuan ji guojia fazhan qianjing’ [Political and Social Roots of Russian Economy and Prospects for National Development], Ouya jingji [Eurasia Economy], 1, (2022), pp. 1–11.

⁵⁵ Hao He, ‘Ren zhi yueshu, luoxuan duikang yu jizhi ouhe—tan yuan e wu weiji zhong eluosi de chongtu xuanze [Cognitive Constraints, spiral Confrontations, and Mechanistic coupling—Exploring Russia’s Choices in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies] (2022), pp. 39–57.

⁵⁶ Wu Wencheng, 2022, ‘Cong Kesuowo zhanzheng dao wukelan weiji: Beiyue dong kuo yu eluosi de “zhanlve juexing”’ [From Kosovo war to Ukraine war: NATO’s eastward expansion and Russia’s ‘strategic awakening’], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European & Central Asian Studies] 3, (2022), pp. 1–25.

⁵⁷ Han Kedi, 2022, ‘Beiyue dong huo yu wukelan weiji’ [NATO eastward expansion and the Ukraine crisis], Eluosi dongou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] 5, (2022), pp. 36–52.

⁵⁸ Liu Yun, ‘E’Wu chongtu beihoude shencengci dongyin yiqi yingxiang’ [The Deep-Seated Causes Behind the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Its Effects], Guangming Daily (1 March 2022), accessed March 10, 2022, https://www.gmw.cn/xueshu/2022–03/01/content_35555286.html.

⁵⁹ Zhao Huirong, ‘Wukelan weiji de duowei tan yuan’ [A multidimensional exploration of the Ukraine crisis], Eluosi dongou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2022), pp. 12–36.

⁶⁰ Li Yongquan, ‘E wu chongtu zhuyao liyi you guan fang zhi boyi ji qi yingxiang’ [The game between the main stakeholder in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its impact], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies] (2022), pp. 5–21.

⁶¹ Liu Jun, ‘E’Wu chongtu beihou de shen cengci dongyin jiqi yingxiang’ [The Deep-Seated Causes Behind the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Its Effects] Guangming Wan (1 March 2022), accessed May 5, 2022, https://m.gmw.cn/baijia/2022–03/01/35555286.html.

⁶² Zhao Huasheng, ‘Lishi de zhongbai—Sulian de jieti 30 nianyilai de guoji zhengzhi bianqian’ [The Pendulum of History—International Politics 30 Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Union], Eluosi Dongou zhongya yanjiu, [Russian, East Europe and Central Asia Studies] (2021), pp. 1–15.

⁶³ Liu Ruonan and Liu Feng, ‘Contending Ideas on China’s non-alliance strategy’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, (2017), pp. 151–171.

⁶⁴ Aizhan Kazak, ‘Time ripe for China and Russia to form an alliance—Chinese expert’ Russia Beyond (Moscow, March 17, 2017), accessed May 5, 2022, https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/03/17/china-russia-alliance-expert-721688.

⁶⁵ Yan Xuetong, ‘China’s Ukraine Conundrum. Why the War Necessitates a Balancing Act’ Foreign Affairs (New York, May 2, 2022), accessed May 2, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-02/chinas-ukraine-conundrum.

⁶⁶ Zhao Long, 2022, ‘E wu chongtu bu hui gaibian zhong e guanx fazhan de neizai luoji he duli jiazhi’ [International Forum], in E. Wu chongtu bai ri si: Shijie xiang he chu qu?—Laizi zhongguo xuezhe de guancha [One hundred days of reflection on the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Where is the world going?—Observations from Chinese scholars], SIIS pp. 17–22.

⁶⁷ Zhou Li, ‘Zhong e guanxi de fazhan qianjing- 20 nian hou kan “zhong e mulin haiyou hezuo tiaoyue”’ [Prospects of China-Russia Relations—Assessing the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation 20 Years Later], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2021), pp. 3–32.

⁶⁸ Ding Xiaoxing, ‘Zhong e liang guo de xiangchu zhi dao’ [How China and Russia get along], 30ff, in Wang Xiaoquan, Ding Xiaoxing, Bi Hongye and Zhao Long (eds), Zhong e guanxi de lishi luoji, xiangchu zhi dao, nei sheng dongle yu shijie yiyi [The historical logic, ways of getting along, endogenous motivation and world significance of Sino-Russian relations], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] pp. 22–52.

⁶⁹ Li Yonghui, Wukelan weiji beijing xia eluosi duiwai zhanlve tiaozheng ji jiben zuoshi [The adjustments and general trend of Russian Foreign strategy under the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis], Aisixiang, accessed February 1, 2023, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/140415.html.

⁷⁰ Wang Dong and Meng Weizhan, ‘Zhongguo xuezhe dui quyu zhixu wenti de taolun’ [Wang Dong and Meng Weizhan: Chinese Scholars’ Discussion on the Problem of Regional Order], August 30, 2023. https://www.igcu.pku.edu.cn/info/1026/6136.html.

⁷¹ Michael Pillsbury, China debates the future security environment (National Defense University Press, 2000).

⁷² Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, Too Big to Fail: China’s Russia policy in the post-Cold War Period.

⁷³ Wang Haiyun, ‘Xin shiqi Eluosi waijiao zhanlve zuoxiang ji Zhong’E guanxi shenhua’ [Russia’s Diplomatic Strategy Trend and Sino-Russian Relations Deepening in the New Era], Eluosi xuebao [Journal of Russian Studies] 2 (2012), p. 9.

⁷⁴ Zhao Mingwen, ‘Eluosi de zonghe guoli ji guoji diwei’ [Russia’s Comprehensive National Power and Its International Status], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies], 3, (2019), pp. 37–62.

⁷⁵ ‘Zheng Yongnian: e wu zhanzheng xiang he chu qu?’ [Zheng Yongnian: Where is the Russian-Ukrainian War Headed?], Aisixiang. February 2, 2022. https://www.aisixiang.com/data/141031.html.

⁷⁶ Li Shuangshuang, ‘Mei ou dui e jingji zhicai yingxiang xia de zhong e jingmao guanxi’ [Sino-Russian economic and trade relations under the influence of US-EU economic sanctions against Russia], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] 114ff, (2022), pp. 102–115.

⁷⁷ ‘Beibu—Lianhe − 2023’ zhong e can yan bingli quanbu jijie wanbi [All Russian and Chinese troops have been assembled for the ‘North—United − 2023’ exercise], Ministry of Defence, July 19, 2023, accessed August 10, 2023, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jsxd/ly/16238138.html.

⁷⁸ Su Chongyang, Wang Xiaojie and Wang Yuru, ‘Eluosi junshi rengong zhineng fazhan yu yingyong chutan’ [A preliminary study of the development and application of military artificial intelligence in Russia], Guofang keji [National Defense Technology] 44, (2023).

⁷⁹ Zhao Wei and Song Xiaoguang 2014, ‘Zhong e keji hezuo de xitong dongli xue yanjiu’ [Systemic Dynamics of science and technology between China and Russia] Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2014), pp. 61–68.

⁸⁰ Jiao Li and Pang Chaowei, ‘Eluosi kongtian fangyu tixi jianshe xin dongtai’ [New developments in the construction of Russia’s air and space defense system], Guofang keji [National Defense Technology] 6, (2022), pp. 37–42.

⁸¹ Li Yan, ‘Zhong e guanxi 2021 nian ban “eluosi guojia anquan zhanlve” ji zhong e anquan hezuo’ [Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy and China-Russia Security Cooperation], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies] 130ff, (2022), pp. 115–135.

⁸² See, Michael Pillsbury, China debates the future security environment; Christopher Weidacher Hsiung, Too Big to Fail: China’s Russia policy in the post-Cold War Period.

⁸³ Liu Huaqin, ‘2013 nian Zhong’E jingmao hezuo kuangzhuan yu qianjing zhanwang’ [The status of Sino-Russian economic and trade relations in 2013 and its prospects] in Eluosi fazhan baogao 2014 [Yellow Yearbook of Russia 2014], Chinese Academy of Social Science (Beijing: shehui kexue wensan chubanshe, 2014). See also Andrew Radin et al., China-Russia Cooperation. Determining factors, future trajectories, implications for the US. pp. 263–264.

⁸⁴ Shan Yurong, ‘Zhong’ E. jingmao guanxi de xianzhuang ji zhijue yinsu fenxi’ [Analysis of the state and limitations of Sino-Russian economic and trade relations] in Zhong’E guanxi de lishi yu xianshi [Sino-Russian Relations: History and Reality], ed. Guan Guaihai (Beijing: shehui kexue wensan chubanshe, 2009), p. 599.

⁸⁵ Lu Nanquan, Zhong’E jingmao guanxi xiangzhuan yu qiannjing [Current state and prospect of Sino-Russian trade relations], (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2011), p. 130.

⁸⁶ Li Jingjie, ‘Shilun Zhong’E zhanlve xiezuo huoban guanxi’, [Attempt at discussing the Sino-Russian strategic partnership], Eluosi Dongou Zhongya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (1997), p. 13.

⁸⁷ Niu Jun, Honglengzhan shidai de Zhongguo waijiao [China’s Diplomacy on the post-Cold War Years], Beijing Beijing daxue chubanshe (2009), p. 191.

⁸⁸ Xing Guangcheng, ‘Zhong’E yueqi liangguo guanzi de yingxiang’ [The rise of China and Russia and the influence on Sino-Russian relations], Dangdai yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies] (2009), p. 36.

⁸⁹ Shi Ze, ‘Eluosi dongbu kaifa: Zhong’E hezuo de shijiao’, [Development of Russia’s East: Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation], Guoji wenti yanjiu [China International Studies] (2010), pp. 15–16.

⁹⁰ Li Xiujiao, ‘Wukelan weiji zhong de zhengzhi suanshu’ [Political Arithmetic in the Ukraine Crisis] Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2015), pp. 86–114. Xujiao argues, Chinese exports to Ukraine were cut by over 40% on a year-by-year basis, and that the effects on the Russian economy resulted in a significant reduction in trade between China and Russia. He continues, China’s increasing investments in Russia are full of risks, and that the real benefits have yet to appear.

⁹¹ Li Yang, ‘Eluosi de xianshi jingji kunjing ji shengceng yuanyin tantao’ [Exploration of Russia’s Real Economic Dilemma and the Deeper Reasons for It], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2017), p. 47.

⁹² Wu Hao, ‘E. Wu chongtu dui zhongguo de jingji yingxiang’ [The economic impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on China], Dong bei ya luntan [Northeast Asia Forum] (2022), pp. 8–10.

⁹³ Xu Mingqi, ‘E. Wu junshi chongtu gei quanqiu jingji dailai de chongji he yingxiang’ [Shocks and Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Military conflict on the Global Economy], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2022), pp. 20–54.

⁹⁴ Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications (Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁹⁵ Øystein Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging against Risk (Colombia University Press, 2013).

⁹⁶ Ma Bo, ‘Eluosi “zhuanxiang dongfang” zhanlve Pingxi—dongji, yuanjing yu tiaozhan’ [On Russia’s ‘Turning East’ Strategy: Motives, Vision and Challenges], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2017), pp. 49–75.

⁹⁷ Fan jianwu and Chao Bohong, ‘E. Wu chongtu dui quanqiu yuanyou maoyi de yingxiang ji zhongguo duice’ [The impact of Russia-Ukraine conflict on global crude oil trade and China’s countermeasures], Jiage yuekan [Prices Monthly] (2022), pp. 81–86.

⁹⁸ Fan jianwu and Chao Bohong, ‘E wu chongtu dui quanqiu yuanyou maoyi de yingxiang ji zhongguo duice’ [The impact of Russia-Ukraine conflict on global crude oil trade and China’s countermeasures], Jiage yuekan [Prices Monthly] (2022), pp. 81–86.

⁹⁹ Li Shuangshuang, ‘Mei ou dui e jingji zhicai yingxiang xia de zhong e jingmao guanxi’ [Sino-Russian economic and trade relations under the influence of US-EU economic sanctions against Russia], Euosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2022), pp. 102–115.

¹⁰⁰ Chu Dongmei, ‘Diyuan zhengzhi yu chaoyue bianjie: jiyu eluosi zhiku dui wukelan weiji renzhi de fenxi’ [Geopolitics and beyond orders: An analysis on Russian think tanks cognition of the Ukraine crisis], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2023), pp. 112–137.

¹⁰¹ Li Shuangshuang, ‘Mei ou dui e jingji zhicai yingxiang xia de zhong e jingmao guanxi’ [Sino-Russian economic and trade relations under the influence of US-EU economic sanctions against Russia], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2022), pp. 102–115.

¹⁰² Xu Mingqi, ‘E wu junshi chongtu gei quanqiu jingji dailai de chongji he yingxiang’ [Shocks and Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian Military conflict on the Global Economy], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] 45ff, (2022), pp. 20–54.

¹⁰³ Bi Hongye, 2023, ‘Zhong e guanxi de neisheng dongli’ [Endogenous Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations] 38ff, (2023), in Wang Xiaoquan, Ding Xiaoxing, Bi Hongye and Zhao Long (eds), Zhong e guanxi de lishi luoji, xiangchu zhi dao, nei sheng dongle yu shijie yiyi [The historical logic, ways of getting along, endogenous motivation and world significance of Sino-Russian relations], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies], pp. 22–52.

¹⁰⁴ Liu Ying 2022, ‘Quaqiu wenji zhili Zhong de daguo quanli moshi’ [The power of great powers in global crisis governance: taking China and Russia’s participation in solving the Syria crisis as an example], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2022), pp. 18–35. See also Ding Xiaoxing, p. 33

¹⁰⁵ Ding Xiaoxing, ‘Wukelan weiji de zouxiang ji dui guoji geju de yingxiang’ [The direction of the Ukraine Crisis and its Impact on the International Landscape], Aisixiang, accessed January 5, 2023, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/139827.html.

¹⁰⁶ Li Shuangshuang, 2022, ‘Mei ou dui e jingji zhicai yingxiang xia de zhong e jingmao guanxi’ [Sino-Russian economic and trade relations under the influence of US-EU economic sanctions against Russia], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2022), pp. 102–115.

¹⁰⁷ Zhao Long: Meiguo zhengzai mouhua xin «bianyuan didai» [Zhao Long: The U.S. is planning a new ‘marginal zone’ Strategy], (August 26, 2022), Huanqiu, (accessed August 30, 2022), https://hqtime.huanqiu.com/share/article/49ODNkOQ4DF.

¹⁰⁸ Wang Zhishen, ‘Zhong e zai lianheguo anlihui de hezuo ji qi yingxiang fenxi’ [Analysis of Sino-Russian Cooperation in the UN Security Council and Factors Affecting it], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2017), pp. 96–112.

¹⁰⁹ Gu Wei, ‘Wukelan weiji yu eluosi guoji zhidu jingzheng celve de tiaozheng’ [Russia-Ukraine conflict and the adjustment of Russia’s International institutional competition strategy], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2023), pp. 35–55, 154–155.

¹¹⁰ Zhao Long 2023, Lijie zhong’e guanxi «shijie yiyi» de wu ge weidu [Understanding the ‘World Significance’ of China-Russia Relations in Five Dimensions], pp. 46-47ff, in Wang Xiaoquan, Ding Xiaoxing, Bi Hongye and Zhao Long, Zhong e guanxi de lishi luoji, xiangchu zhi dao, nei sheng dongle yu shijie yiyi [The historical logic, ways of getting along, endogenous motivation and world significance of Sino-Russian relations], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies], no. 2.

¹¹¹ Chen Weidong, Liao Shuping, Wang Youxin and Li Yingting, ‘Jin zhuan guojia shenhua jingji xiezuo tixi jianshe de zhongyao yiyi, shishi lujing he jianyi’ [Significance, Paths and Suggestions of Deepening the Construction of Economic Coordination System among the BRICS], Eluosi yanjiu [Russian Studies] (2023), pp. 20–44.

¹¹² Liu Yitong, 2022, E. Wu chongtu xia zhong ya diqu diyuan zhengzhi jingji taishi [Geopolitical and economic situation in central Asia under the Russia-Ukraine conflict], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies] 117ff, (2022), pp. 102–119.

¹¹³ Idem., 118ff.

¹¹⁴ Liu Yitong, 2022, E wu chongtu xia zhong ya diqu diyuan zhengzhi jingji taishi [Geopolitical and economic situation in central Asia under the Russia-Ukraine conflict], Eluosi xuekan [Academic Journal of Russian Studies] (2022), pp. 102–119.

¹¹⁵ ‘E wu chongtu qianjing ruhe? Xuezhe Zhao Huirong: Tan buliao, ying buliao, ye tui buliao’, [What are the prospects for the Russia-Ukraine conflict? Scholar Zhao Huirong: Can’t Talk, Can’t Win, Can’t Retreat February 24, 2023, accessed February 24, 2023, https://news.ifeng.com/c/8NfZcLTJDRe.

¹¹⁶ Gong Yanhua, Ou ya jingji lianmeng jing ji yiti hua xiaoguo ceduo ji pingjia [Measurement and evaluation of economic Integration effect of Eurasian economic union], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2022), pp. 116–143.

¹¹⁷ Russian elites express skepticism towards China, some worrying that the BRI will compromise Russia’s ability to challenge their normative power in the region. See Shakhanova, Gaziza, and Jeremy Garlick, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union: Exploring the “Greater Eurasian Partnership”’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 49, (2010), pp. 33–57.

¹¹⁸ Pan Guang, Wenbu qianjin de Shanghai hezuo zizhi [‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its Progress and Prospects’] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2014), pp. 76–77.

¹¹⁹ Deng Hao, Wukelan weiji beijing xia shanghai hezuo zuzhi xin bianhua ji qi yingdui [New changes and responses of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the context of the Ukraine crisis], Eluosi dongou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] (2023), pp. 1–19.

¹²⁰ Pan Wanli and Bai Ruchun, 2022, ‘Wukelan weiji shengji dui ri e guanxi de yingxiang ji qi weilai zouxiang’ [The influence of the Ukraine crisis escalation on Japan-Russia relations and its future trend], Eluosi dong’ou zhong ya yanjiu [Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies] 64ff, (2022), pp. 53–64.

¹²¹ Wang Haibin, ‘Shixi E’R guanxi “jiedong” jiqi qianjing’ [An Analysis of the ‘Thaw’ in Russia-Japan Relations and its prospects], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] (2014), p. 53.

¹²² Guan Guihai, ‘30 nian hedong, 30 nian hexi—Zhong’E zhijian de jiaose renting chabie’ [The coming and going of things—The different identities of China and Russia], Nanfengchuan [Southern Window Magazine] (2007), pp. 38–39.

¹²³ Zhao Huasheng, ‘Zhong’e guanxi: zouchu e wu chongtu de miwu” [Sino-Russian Relations: Out of the Fog of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict], Aisixiang. (2022), accessed September 15, 2022, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/136095.html.

¹²⁴ Before the war in Ukraine, this was referred to as a ‘reverse Kissinger’, whereby the US attempted to ‘lure [Russia] over’ from China, in a similar manner to what the US did to China during the Cold War. See Charles A. Kupchan, ‘The right way to split China and Russia. Washington should help Moscow leave a bad marriage’ Foreign Affairs (New York, August 4, 2021). Following the full-scale war of Ukraine, analysts now hope China can (again) be turned against Russia. See Ryan Haas, ‘Ukraine presents opportunity to test China’s strategic outlook’, Blog post, The Brookings Institute (March 1, 2022).