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Abstract
This article uses the case studies of Australia and Malaysia to examine how diverse states in the Asia-Pacific region approach asylum seekers in practice and in discourse. Using a social constructionist approach to identity, the article highlights how governments in each country have grappled with “irregular” migration and the challenges it poses for national identity through processes of “othering” and “exclusion.” This comparison shows that the process of excluding asylum seekers on the basis of identity is not a Western phenomenon, but one extending to countries across the region. It is maintained that state discourses around asylum seekers within the two countries are framed in similar arguments centred around the concepts of “irregular” mobility, “national” identity, and “exclusive” citizenship. More specifically, it is demonstrated that both the Malaysian and Australian governments have projected asylum seekers in the public realm primarily as “illegal” through their undocumented mobility, and within this discourse as “threats” to national identity and security and therefore “unworthy” of citizenship privileges through resettlement or local integration. It is argued that each government has used trajectories specific to their own nation-building process to make their arguments more relevant and appealing to their constituents. A key premise of this article holds that an understanding of the rationale underpinning each government's asylum approach will contribute to establishing more open and constructive regional dialogue around the asylum issue.
I acknowledge The Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies (CAPSTRANS) at the University of Wollongong (Australia) for the critical feedback they provided in the development of this article. Acknowledgements for editorial support must also given to Anthony Langlois and Susanne Schech (Flinders University), Hazel Easthope (University of Tasmania), Tom Conley (Griffiths University). Finally, I thank the anonymous reviewers who provided valuable suggestions in the finalization of this article. The author accepts sole responsibility for all errors and omissions.
Notes
1. Asylum seekers are defined in this article as those people who enter a country with or without the legally required documentation who seek to obtain refugee status, and whose status has not yet been determined. Refugees are defined as those who have been assessed against the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Refugee Protocol and recognised to be in need of protection.
2. In October 2000, an ASEAN Plan of Action on Immigration Matters was adopted during the 4th Meeting of ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration Departments and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Davao City, Philippines, 16–18 October. Theoretically, this serves as an institutional framework for cooperation and information exchange on immigration matters. It is interesting, however, to note that “trafficking of persons” has been on the ASEAN agenda for several years now, although asylum and refugee issues are not.
3. Only Cambodia and the Philippines have acceded to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention within the South East Asian region.
4. Although both governments are working together on issues of irregular migration, Malaysia was the largest source country for people refused clearance at Australian airports in 2001–2002, according to the Department of Immigration, Multicultural, and Indigenous Affairs.
5. Both are approximately the same size with around twenty million people; in both countries public administration is organised by ministries or portfolios that are headed by a Cabinet minister, and both have British-style budgetary institutions. In addition, both can be described as constitutional monarchies. The two countries can be broadly categorised as federal in structure in the sense that both display central and state institutions of government, and there is an express division of powers and responsibilities between the central government and parliament.
6. Although the Badawi government has been publicly committed to a less-corrupt bureaucracy and an end to unjust laws, hopes for a more liberal climate have been dampened as the administration's strict actions and rhetoric have indicated a tighter reign on power.
7. In recent years, however, debate in Australian public discourse around the importance of migrants acquiring “Australian values” and the relevance of multiculturalism in Australian society has been prevalent. Such debate has become more vocal after the 11 December 2005 riots at Cronulla beach in Sydney, sparked by the bashing of a life-saver by Middle Eastern youth. Comments by Australian politicians condemning those who do not assimilate into Australian culture have further fuelled the debate. In an article dated 6 March 2006 (The Age), for example, Federal Treasurer Peter Costello spoke out against “confused, mushy, misguided multiculturalism.”
8. Nationalist activity in Malaysia has always been led by the Malays who have ensured that the Malay language and Islamic religion are paramount in the nation-state. Islam became the official religion, but Malaysia was not to be an Islamic state.
9. The BN is dominated by the ruling UMNO Coalition, which largely represents the Malays, with the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) representing the Indian minority and the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) lobbying for the Chinese vying for power.
10. Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, the British had encouraged large-scale Chinese and Indian immigration to Malaysia, to supply their manpower need in the tin mining industries and rubber plantations, which were mainly located in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia.
11. Bumiputra, which means literally “the sons of the soil,” refers in Peninsula Malaysia to the Malays and the aborigines; in Sabah and Sarawak, it refers to over twenty indigenous ethnic groups, such as the Iban, Bidayuh, Kadazan, Murut, Dusun, etc. The term non-Bumiputra refers to those of immigrant descent, chief of which are the Chinese and Indians.
12. This refers to a “Malaysian” nation. The Bangsa Malaysia policy was introduced by Mahathir Mohamad, then Prime Minister of Malaysia, to create an inclusive national identity for all inhabitants of Malaysia, thus abandoning the National Culture Policy that asserted a Malay ethnic national identity.
13. Approximately two million migrants work in Malaysia, primarily in construction, palm oil plantations, and domestic service. Foreign workers comprise about 9 percent of the total population of the country. More than one million lack valid work permits.
14. Having an identity card is one of the basic requirements for a citizen, hence illustrating CitationSadiq's (2005) argument around documentary citizenship. Malaysia's efforts to define and restrict citizenship is problematic, however, given that a large section of its population, as in so many developing countries, do not possess adequate documentation such as a passport or birth certificate. Consequently, the state will not insist on being provided with such a document to exercise an individual's social, political, or civil rights.
15. Filipino Muslims in Malaysia number more than 57,000 and are not part of the UNHCR's active caseload. Given this as well as the fact that Sabah has its own immigration legislation, this population does not comprise the main focus of this article. Instead, this article concentrates on the plight of those asylum seekers residing in Peninsular Malaysia, who have been registered or remain unregistered by the UNHCR as persons of concern.
16. This number represents twice as many as the total since 1989, and more than the total number of unauthorized migrants arriving on boats since the end of the Vietnam War. At the same time, various commentators have pointed out that Australia's “problem” with asylum seekers is modest, particularly when compared with poorer nations of West Asia or Africa.
17. To a large degree, the “off-shore” refugee intake, which comprises those who apply overseas and are accepted as Convention refugees or under the Special Humanitarian Program, has remained out of public contention, since those refugees are resettled as part of the government's planned system. Those people who have had their asylum claims approved prior to arriving in Australia and have been recognized as refugees will not be explored in this article, given that they are subject to extremely different treatment by DIMIA.
18. This department was previously known as the Department of Immigration, Indigenous, and Multicultural Affairs (DIMIA) and then the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA).
19. At the end of 2003, 9,205 were registered as asylum seekers with the UNHCR, a huge jump from the 2000 figure of 25. This jump can be attributed to a number of factors that cannot be explained fully here but include a significant change in the climate of protection (as a result of the 2002 amendments) and the declaration of Martial law in Aceh.
20. In addition, the Malaysian government does not necessarily provide official protection and recognition to people whom the UNHCR has recognized as refugees under its mandate, although it is evident that a recent administrative framework on the issue is emerging with several decrees issued by several heads of Department on issues including reduced cost health services for registered refugees and police recognition of UNHCR documents.
21. In Malaysia the “Asian values” discourse was an attempt by the Mahatir government to justify authoritarianism amongst the country's large middle classes. “Asian values” were offered as the antidote to all that was wrong with Westernisation: rising crime and divorce rates—as well as new tastes in music, television, and film. The “Asian values” discourse did not necessarily enjoy a high degree of popular support in Malaysia. But the claim of distinctive “Asian values” helped to set the political agenda, marginalising dissidents who made “radical” demands for Western-style democracy.
22. Withreference to Malaysia, because no asylum policy exists and asylum seekers are not recognized, only verbal comments from government officials given to the media are available to draw upon.
23. Italics added by author.
24. Terrorism has been more clearly linked with local organisations such as the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), and strategies were seen by some observers as based more on placating the instigators of terrorism rather than punishing them. In a keynote address to the 16th Annual Asia Pacific Round Table held in Kuala Lumpur, then-Deputy Prime Minister Badawi on 3 June 2003 noted, “A successful counter terrorism strategy cannot be confined to punitive or deterrent action alone … To successfully defeat terrorism we have no choice but to address the root causes the issues which terrorists use to mobilize support will have to be neutralized. This will necessitate reform concession and compromise.”
25. The Malaysian NGO the Chin Refugee Centre estimates Chin numbers in 2006 at 14,000. According to the human rights NGO, Suaram, Chins “constitute the largest asylum seeker and refugee population held in detention” in Malaysia.
26. These work permits are for two years and allow the Acehnese to reside and work in Malaysia.
27. In April 2006, the arrival of a boatload of West Papuan asylum seekers in Australia who were subsequently found to be refugees caused diplomatic tension between the two countries. It subsequently resulted in the former Federal government attempting to process asylum seekers in off-shore zones to deter arrivals from Indonesia and maintain good relations.
28. On 25 March 2002 the Senate Select Committee on “A Certain Maritime Incident” which examined these allegations about asylum seekers throwing their children overboard began hearings in Parliament. The report on “A Certain Maritime Incident” was delivered on 23 October 2002; it found that in contrast to the government's portrayals that this was an act of “blackmail”—women and children “were forced to enter the water when the vessel sank.”