Rethinking ‘nativism’: beyond the ideational approach

ABSTRACT

Existing ideational approaches to nativism tend to conflate the concept with nationalism, xenophobia and populism, as well as overlooking the role of racism and racialisation in the process of constructing the non-native ‘out-group’, against the native ‘in-group’. Inspired by the Discourse Theoretical approach to populism, this article offers a significant conceptual contribution to studies on the far right by interpreting nativism as a racist and xenophobic discourse structured around an exclusionary vision of the nation. This conceptualisation helps identify how xenophobia, nationalism, racism and racialisation all contribute to nativist discourse, how nativism can be clearly demarcated from populism, and how nativist arguments can be articulated by parties beyond the far right.

KEYWORDS:

• Nativism
• Populism
• Nationalism
• Racism
• Xenophobia
• Discourse Theory

Introduction

Nativism is a term which has gained significant currency over the past decades amongst both scholars and journalists to describe anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiment (Mudde 2020, 27–28; Betz 2019, 113; Jack 2016; Malik 2019a; Denvir 2020a). In this process, the term has also been used as a proxy for various other ideologies and/or discourses such as racism, nationalism, xenophobia and populism. Such conflation is due largely to the fact that many existing paradigms of nativism take an ideational approach which leads to a blurring of conceptual boundaries and can end up euphemising the racist ideology at the heart of hostile immigration policies which target minority groups. With these thoughts in mind, this article focuses on re-conceptualising nativism, moving beyond this ideational approach and using a discourse theoretical approach to enable a more critical application of the concept within and beyond academia. Some key distinctions between these approaches should be established here.

Inspired by Katsambekis’ (2020) critique of three elements of the ideational approach to populism these elements are adopted and adapted in line with nativism and defined here as: (1) the construal of nativism as an ideology, and thus as a belief system; (2) An assumption that what defines this ideology is a combination (to varying degrees and extents) of xenophobia, nationalism, populism and racism and (3), the argument that nativism is predominantly a far-right (or radical right) phenomenon.

A discourse theoretical approach while not negating the importance of ideology, places emphasis on ‘a precise illustration’ of the ‘political logic’ of phenomena such as nativism (Katsambekis 2017). According to Glynos (2008), ‘political logics […] emphasize the dynamic process by which political frontiers are constructed, stabilized, strengthened, or weakened and disarticulated’. In other words, the focus shifts from what is the assumed ‘ideational content’ of political phenomena to how political actors formulate this supposed content (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017). Following this formal approach, I argue that nativism is a racist and xenophobic form of politics which discursively constructs (along antagonistic and horizontal lines) a ‘non-native’, ‘foreigner’, or even the ‘non-integrated co-citizen’ against ‘the native people’. This discourse operates from a racist logic of ‘us’ v ‘them’, which presents immigration as a threat to the nation, relies on a racist and racialised process of othering and places emphasis on assimilation/acceptable transformation of the problem of difference and/or stopping the perceived invasion.

Following this introduction, my article is divided into three sections. The following section addresses and problematises existing ‘ideational’ conceptions of nativism through a review of the relevant literature. The penultimate section offers a significant conceptual contribution to studies on the far right, racism, nationalism, and populism, by providing a revised definition of nativism as a discourse. I establish how nativism’s neighbouring concepts of nationalism, xenophobia, racism and racialisation, all contribute to nativist discourse, by sharing a similar logic of us v them. This section proposes ‘3 rules of engagement’ for a more critical use of the term nativism. This includes a new conceptualisation of nativist logic, of nativism as a xenophobic and racist discourse, and argues that nativism operates within the mainstream and the extreme of political discourse. The final concluding section discusses the implications of this new discursive approach to nativism in furthering our understanding of racist ideology and proposes future avenues of research.

Definitions and debates

Ideational approaches to nativism have defined it as a ‘combination of nationalism and xenophobia’ (Mudde 2007, 2020) or a ‘subset of American racism and nationalism’ (Denvir 2020b), while others have denoted it as ‘non-racist’ (Mudde 2007), ‘race neutral’ (Bosniak 1997) or a blend of ‘nationalism and populism’ (Yarish 2019). This section highlights three key issues to these interpretations vis-à-vis the neglect of the fuzzy borders between these concepts, an under-estimation of the process of racialisation in the juxtaposition of the native against the non-native, the conflation of nativism with populism, and nativism’s connection primarily with the far-right.

Nationalism and xenophobia

Nationalism and xenophobia have long been considered key conceptual elements of nativism. The term itself originated in the USA to define ‘an ‘ideology’ or ‘certain kind of nationalism’ which expresses ‘intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign connections’ (Higham 1955, 4; Higham 1958, 149; Knoll 2012, 911; Riedel 2018, 19). Since then scholars have used nativism to denote the ‘nationalist doctrine’ or ‘ideology’ of the European ‘radical right’ (Betz 2017, 171; Mudde 2007, 2020; Zaslove 2009; Newth 2019, 2021) while also applying it to explain the decline of civic narratives of ‘African nationalism’ and the rise of xenophobic and exclusionary nationalist discourses in several African states. (Ndlovu-Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010; Neocosmos 2006). Perhaps the most ubiquitous definition of nativism is that coined by Mudde (2020, 27) as a ‘combination of nationalism and xenophobia’ and

an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state (Mudde 2007, 19)

While this minimal ideational approach has been greatly influential in studies of the European far right (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Zaslove 2009; Newth 2019, 2021), it can lead to a conflation of nativism with nationalism, overlooks the importance of the civic-ethnic binary and also neglects the fuzzy borders between nationalism and xenophobia.

The ideational approach to nativism views nationalism as a ‘political doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and political unit i.e. the nation and state respectively’ (Mudde 2007, 16). This chimes with approaches which view nationalism as an ‘ideology’ prioritising ‘national divisions over other political issues’ (Freeden 1998, 929) which present the nation ‘as the prerequisite social entity and used to justify the state’s raison d’être’ (Heinisch, Masetti, and Mazzoleni 2020, 7). While there is nothing wrong per se with interpreting nationalism as an ideology, such an approach has arguably contributed to the muddying of the definitional waters regarding nativism with the emergence of terms such as ‘nativist nationalism’ (Zaslove 2009; Albertazzi, Giovannini and Seddone 2018) and ‘regional nativism/regionalist nativism’ (Betz and Habersack 2020) which indicate conceptual slippage, thus blurring the contours between paradigms. Nationalism in this article is viewed instead as a discourse which is

structured around the nodal point “nation”, envisaged as a limited and sovereign community that exists through time and is tied to a certain space, and that is constructed through an in/out opposition between the nation and its out-groups (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 308).

This discursive rather than ideational lens is key to moving beyond an approach to nativism which views it as a set of ideas. Becoming a member of the nation and the rigidity of the ‘in/out distinction’ is contingent on nationalism’s inclusionary or exclusionary nature (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 309). This allows for more nuance in terms of the type of nationalism through which nativism can be articulated, a distinction which can be made by referring to ethnic or civic nationalism.

This leads to a second issue in the ideational approach to nativism: a ‘holistic’ approach to nationalism which eschews the ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ dualism (Mudde 2007, 16). Opting for the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ to distinguish between inclusionary and exclusionary nationalisms, Mudde (2007) claims that the latter form constitutes a component of nativism due to its focus on ‘identity and exclusion’ (Zaslove 2009). However, the civic and ethnic binary is far from trivial in understanding inclusionary and exclusionary forms of nationalism. As I have demonstrated elsewhere ‘an exclusionary attitude towards immigration and racial/cultural others’ which forms part of nativism, is more likely to be linked to an ethnic [rather than civic] discourse’ (Newth 2021, 17). This is because ethnic forms of nationalism tend to determine a more objective criteria for membership of the nation involving ‘cultural, linguistic, religious or ethnic’ factors (Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero 2014, 263; Lecours 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010, 290). It is predominantly through the more ethnic and exclusionary articulations of nationalism that ‘nativism equips the nation-state with a “national identity” by which to fashion its people. It posits a “we” whose identity is simply incommensurable with everything external and “alien” to it’. (De Genova 2016, 234).

Regarding the fuzzy borders between nationalism and xenophobia, operating from a similar logic of us versus them vis-à-vis their positing of an in-group against an out-group, nationalism tends to place more emphasis on the ‘in-group’ (us) while xenophobia tends to focus more on ‘them’ or ‘foreign-ness’ and ‘otherness’ of the out-group (Els 2013). It is therefore possible for nationalist claims to become xenophobic and vice versa. Xenophobia can be defined as ‘fear of the stranger’ and/or hostility against ‘foreigners’ (Rzepnikowska 2019, 63). Further elaborating xenophobia as a discourse, however, (Els 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010; Gotsbachner 2001) allows us to see how it is widely associated with sentiments of anti-migration’ and linked to the notion of ‘threats’ to the homogenous nation-state (Hervik 2015, 796). These threats may be articulated through so-called ‘economic nativism, centred on the notion that jobs should be reserved for native citizens’ or ‘welfare chauvinism, based on the notion that native citizens should be accorded absolute priority when it comes to social benefits’ (Betz 2019, 111).

This focus on an immigrant ‘other’ or ‘them’, not only overlaps with nationalism, but also racism. Indeed, the category of immigration can act as a substitute ‘for the notion of race’ and ‘immigrant workers have for many years suffered discrimination and xenophobic violence in which racist stereotyping has played an essential role’ (Balibar and Wallenstein 1991, 20). While studies on post-apartheid South Africa have identified xenophobia as a ‘form of racism’ (Tafira, 2015), in Europe, Sivanandan has employed the term ‘xeno-racism’ to define

racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former colonial countries, but at the newer categories of the displaced and dispossessed whites, who are beating at western Europe’s doors (Sivanandan 2001, 2).

Indeed, blurred lines between nativism and racism can be noted in right-wing media portrayal of Polish migrants in the UK in the wake of the 2008 economic crash (Rzepnikowska 2019, 66), Malik’s (2019b) assertion that the Brexit vote was ‘linked to nativism, economic frustration […] and just plain old racism’ and the Guardian’s description of UKIP’s now infamous ‘Breaking Point’ as ‘nativism at its worst’ (Jack 2016). These blurred lines deserve greater examination.

Racism and racialisation

The previous sub-section focused on the varying emphasis placed by nationalism and xenophobia on the logic of ‘us versus them’, while also raising the issue of nativism’s shared borders with racism.

Over the past three decades, the broad trend in the literature has been to distinguish between these two concepts. Claims of nativism as potentially ‘non-racist’ (Mudde 2007, 19) or ‘race neutral’ rely on a narrow ‘biological’ interpretation of racism which views it in its most ‘illiberal’ form i.e. based on skin colour and phenotypes due to the fact that nativism has been claimed to make no reference ‘to the merits or demerits of particular national groups or to the colour of anyone’s skin’ (Bosniak 1997, 287). Such distinctions, which claim that nativism ‘isn’t just a prejudice [against] non-natives’ but also ‘a view on how a state should be structured’ (Mudde, as quoted in Friedman 2017), also neglect the fact that states are often structured along racist lines (Mondon and Winter 2020; Lentin 2020; Eddo-Lodge 2017). Nativism has been distinguished from racism with the former dividing ‘insiders, who belong to the nation, from outsiders, who are in it but not of it’ and the latter being ‘more concerned with distinctions between the civilised and barbarian than with boundaries between nation-states’ (Galindo and Vigil 2006, 425) with this idea overlooking how racialisation may well determine a sense of belonging to a nation.

Furthermore, nativism has been said to be more concerned with assimilation of ‘cultural differences’ (Mudde 2007, 19; Bosniak 1997, 287). Galindo and Vigil (2006, 425) use ‘racial nativism’ to denote how ‘members of a particular ethnic group’ are ‘targeted based on physical features or cultural traits including language’, whereas Betz (2019, 127; Betz 2017, 177) coined the expression ‘symbolic nativism’ to describe the Islamophobic discourse at the heart of the so-called ‘radical populist right’. 'Symbolic nativism', according to Betz, includes viewing Islam (and its supposed culture) as incompatible ‘with western values such as liberty and democracy’ and ‘differentiates and treats differently on the basis of ethnic background, culture and religion (Betz 2019, 127, 2017, 177).

Terms such as ‘symbolic nativism’ and ‘racial nativism’ highlight how nativism may be used as a euphemism for racist ideology and eschew how racism can take liberal and illiberal forms and focus not just on skin colour, but also culture and religion. Indeed, references to ‘defence of culture’ and the idea that ‘just like Europeans, immigrants too would be happier ‘at home’, in their ‘natural surroundings’ (Lentin 2005, 390), highlight how ‘both racialist and culturalist understandings of difference’ privilege ‘one or another notion of “identity” against the rest’. (De Genova, 2016, 234).

I adopt here Garner and Selod (2015, 11) definition of racism, ‘based on an understanding of “race” as not being exclusively derived from phenotypes’ and comprised of the following three elements

1. A set of ideas [ideology] in which the human race is divisible into distinct ‘races’, each with specific natural characteristics derived from culture, physical appearance or both.

2. A historical power relationship in which, over time, groups are racialized, that is, treated as if specific characteristics were natural and innate to each member of the group.

3. Forms of discrimination flowing from this [practices] ranging on spectrums from denial of access to material resources at one end to genocide at the other

Regarding point 1), racism should be considered in both its illiberal form which ‘places unequivocally and openly “white” populations as superior to all other races and places’ (Mondon and Winter 2020, 17) and its liberal form, which defines its targets ‘at least discursively, in terms of their non-belonging to “our” liberal societies and their rules based on human rights and the legacy of the enlightenment’ (Mondon and Winter 2020, 68). At the same time, ‘cultural’ or ‘new’ racism can also contribute to our understanding of racism i.e. when ‘cultural norms, values, traditions and lifestyles of outsiders […] are now held to be problematic, rather than physiognomy’ (Lentin and Title 2009, 42). Regarding point 2), and linking to the aforementioned concept of ‘xeno-racism’, it is also useful to define the process of ‘racialisation’ which

draws a line around all the members of the group; instigates ‘groupness’, and ascribes characteristics, sometimes because of work, sometimes because of ideas of where the group comes from, what it believes in, or how it organizes itself socially and culturally (Garner and Selod 2015, 14).

This ‘groupness’ is key to the aforementioned shared logic of ‘us’ v ‘them’, and signifies a key element of nativism, in that the non-native ‘out-group’, or foreigner is juxtaposed against the nation’s native in-group in racial and racialised terms. The fact that differences of the non-native out-group which ‘might otherwise be considered ethnocultural’, through a process racialisation can become ‘regarded as innate, indelible, and unchangeable’ (Fredrickson 2002, 5) explains the fuzzy borders between nativism and racism.

Recent developments in the literature demonstrate attempts to address these blurred lines. Denvir (2020b, 11–12) for example, describes nativism as a ‘powerful subset of American racism and nationalism’ and

a concept that allows us to rethink racism itself as a bedrock nationalist population politics that functions to control the movement and status of racialised others – abroad, and in the interior

Social Scientists Against the Hostile Environment (SSAHE) (2020, 7) also interrogated connections between ‘nativist narratives’ (such as anti-alienism/anti-immigration) alongside ‘older’ forms of ‘anti-black racism’ in their study of migration, racism and the hostile environment in the UK. However, the exact overlaps between racism and nativism remained somewhat undefined. Having demonstrated how nativism can be used as a euphemistic term for racism, this article now turns to a key issue of how the racist and nativist components of the far/radical right are often conflated with populism.

‘Populism’

Various political events over the past decade in both Europe and America, including the election of Donald Trump, the result of the ‘Brexit Referendum’ in 2016, and the surge in support for Matteo Salvini’s Lega in Italy in 2017, have been referred to as evidence of a ‘populist revolt’ and the rise of ‘right-wing populism’ (Gusterson 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019). While a vertical juxtaposition of ‘the elites’ versus ‘the people’ did play a role in these events, the framing of the more xenophobic, nationalist and racist parts of these campaigns as ‘populist’ demands from ‘the people’ is a clear example of ‘populist hype’ i.e. a tendency to (mis)interpret the populist phenomenon as a simple and sizeable rise of right-wing party popularity across Europe’ as well as ‘exaggerating its significance’ and describing ‘right-wing populism’ as ‘a threat to democracy’ (Glynos and Mondon 2016, 3–4). Building on this, Brown, Mondon, and Winter (2019) have correctly pointed out how uncritical use of the term ‘populism’ has the potential to euphemise racist ideology.

Paradigms which examine populism often include an antagonistic juxtaposition of ‘the people’ not only against elites, but also against ‘dangerous others’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 3) or portray the ‘people’ as demanding a ‘defence of national culture, values, or ethnicity against immigrants’. (Johnson and Lòpez-Alves 2019, 7). Such paradigms describe ‘populists’ ‘as the voice of … an ethnicized (white, well-kept) people, excluding “alien” people and values’ (in particular Muslims) (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 166) and claim that nativism, and populism ‘intertwine, together with other neighbouring concepts, like racism or xenophobia’, (Riedel 2018, 18). Indeed, nativism has been described as ‘the consistent ideological expression when nationalism and populism combine’ and ‘as a political ideology that combined nationalism and populism’ and ‘shores up white supremacy’.(Yarish 2019, 154). Betz (2017) has also written about the ‘obvious affinity’ between nativism and populism due to the fact that both concepts rely on an antagonistic ‘demarcation’ between groups in society.

Such conflation appears to be rooted in an ideational conception of both nativism and populism. This actively contributes to a euphemisation of racist ideology by disguising nativist discourse as ‘populism’, as reflected in terms such as ‘populist nativism’ (Kešić, J., and Duyvendak 2019) or ‘nativist populism’ (Bergmann 2020), which equip nativism with the veneer of a ‘popular will’. Indeed, as noted by Mudde (2017) ‘within European and US politics, populism functions ‘as a fuzzy blanket to camouflage the nastier nativism’. (Mudde 2017). Instead, populism is understood in this article as

a dichotomic discourse in which “the people” are juxtaposed to ”the elite” along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which “ the people” is discursively constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to “the elite” conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017).

Populists ‘bring together different societal demands and identities in what Laclau and Mouffe (2001) call a ‘chain of equivalence’. In terms of what makes them ‘equivalent’, this relates to ‘the fact or the impression that they are all frustrated and endangered by “the elite”’ (De Cleen, Mondon, and Glynos 2018, 652). It is true that populist far right parties not only construct ‘the people’ against an elite but also ‘as a homogeneous group based on ethno-cultural or racial traits … [which] … contest a liberal democratic vision of society’. However, the vital point here is that rather than being an ‘extension of populism’ this particular ‘contestation of a liberal-democratic vision of society flows from the particular articulation of nativism with the logic of populism, not from populism itself’. (De Cleen, Mondon, and Glynos 2018). Ignoring this key factor contributes to ‘the conflation of populism with nativism, xenophobia or racism’ (De Cleen, Mondon, and Glynos 2018; Riedel 2018, 18).

Stavrakakis et al. (2017, 420) instead argue for a clearer differentiation between populism and what they label as ‘nationalist (xenophobic, racist) discourses’of the Extreme Right claiming that the central theme is not the staging of an antagonism between a ‘people’ and an ‘elite’, but rather the opposition of an ethnic community with its alleged dangerous ‘others’. This is

located in the figure of the invading immigrant that threatens both the native culture and the security of the citizens (Islamism, etc.) … and / … vague figures with dominant economic connotations, like ‘global governance’, ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ or the ‘New World Order’ (Stavrakakis et al. 2017, 434).

However, as previously mentioned, nationalism is not always xenophobic and/or racist, and some of the arguments highlighted above are used by political actors outside of the Extreme or Far Right. To ensure a clearer distinction from populism, nativism should be reconceptualised as a discursive strategy. This is particularly true when examining its strategic use by parties which do not belong to the far right and/or do not engage in populist discourse.

Rethinking nativism

Drawing on an approach taken by De Cleen, Mondon, and Glynos (2018) in their critical research on populism, I will use this section to propose 3 ‘rules of engagement’ when using the term ‘nativism’. First, I examine the logic of nativism which distinguishes it from populism; second, I offer a revised definition of nativism which clarifies its distinct discursive features and logic, explicitly highlighting its racist nature in order to discourage it becoming a euphemistic term for racist ideology. Third, I use this discursive approach to highlight how nativism is not solely the domain of the far right (or radical right) but now forms part of the mainstream.

1. Nativism’s logic is racist, not populist

By assuming that nativism is an ideology connected solely with the populist far right, the two concepts of nativism and populism can become conflated, thus damaging and limiting our understanding of both phenomena and inevitably contributing to ‘populist hype’, (Glynos and Mondon 2016). According to Betz (2017) ‘the logic of nativism rests on the demarcation […] between those on the inside and those on the outside, between foreigners and the native-born’. While this goes some way to accounting for nativist logic, it neglects aspects of racialisation and racism highlighted above and does not interrogate how such demarcation is pursued by ‘nativists’. Furthermore Betz’ claim that ‘nativism extends populism’s appeal horizontally, set up as a conflict between the people, largely defined in ethnocultural terms and the Other’, (2019, 132), attributes populism with an ‘anti-pluralist’ nature and ignores the fact that ‘populist politics do not have to eradicate the differences between the different groups and demands that are grouped under ‘the people’ (De Cleen, Mondon, and Glynos 2018). Such differences are, instead, vital to nativism. Moving away from an ideational to a more formal understanding of nativism, I argue that nativist politics ‘embody an articulatory pattern – a formal reason or logic’ (De Cleen, Mondon, and Glynos 2018). Nativist logic is racist not populist and can be explained in three steps:

i. The presentation of immigration as a threat to the nation (or region)

Immigration is associated with the idea of invasion or ‘an invasive stratagem aimed at the displacement and/or replacement of the autochthonous population in the nation or region (Mondon 2015, 144; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). Regionalism and nationalism can potentially be seen as two sides of the same coin operating from a similar logic of ‘us’ v ‘them’, particularly when the region is viewed as a ‘lost nation’. (Hepburn 2009) (Heinisch, Masetti, and Mazzoleni 2020, 927)

ii. A racist and racialised process of othering

This process of ‘othering’ contributes to exclusion of perceived ‘non-natives’ from belonging to the nation-state: can manifest itself in discrimination from employment, housing, welfare opportunities. This is not only relevant for migrant ‘foreigners’ but also towards racialised fellow citizens who may be recast as virtual or de facto ‘foreigners’ – indeed ‘enemies’ within the space of the nation state’ (De Genova 2016, 228).

iii. An emphasis on ‘assimilation’, ‘acceptable transformation of the problem of difference’, or ‘stopping the invasion’

Assimilation is presented as a pathway to becoming ‘native’ and belonging to the nation-state, thus ‘potentially bringing an end to discrimination and intolerance’ (Lentin and Title 2009, 43). However, due to the fact that nativism is a racist and racialised process often linked to religion and culture, if not exclusively to skin colour, such ‘assimilation’ may be an unattainable goal and part of a strategy to create a barrier between an in-group and out-group and pave the way for policies which aim to 'stop the invasion'.

By focusing on these aspects of ‘difference’ and notions of identity it is possible to identify, therefore, how nativism overlaps with cultural racism due, in part, to its demands for different cultures to assimilate and its promotion of the culture of the ‘in-group’ against an ‘out-group’, thus rendering it fundamentally racist in nature. Identifying this nativist logic which contains elements of xenophobia, exclusionary nationalism, racism and racialisation therefore paves the way for a revised definition.

2. Nativism is a racist and xenophobic discourse

While it is important to recognise the blurred lines between the conceptual elements within nativism (xenophobia, nationalism, racism, racialisation) it is equally vital from an academic (and anti-racist) perspective, to establish a working definition which draws these concepts together and takes into account nativism’s racist nature. Nativist references to race and culture may not always be overt and/or explicit, but what ‘nativism cannot do without is the more elementary pluralism that both racialist and culturalist understandings of difference share’ (De Genova 2016, 234). Building on the aforementioned discourse-theoretical approach definition of nationalism established in section 2.1 of this article, I adopt and adapt this paradigm to define nativism as

a racist and xenophobic discourse structured around an exclusionary vision of ‘the nation’ in which the ‘native’ is discursively constructed as a disadvantaged and threatened ‘in-group’ through its juxtaposition along antagonistic and horizontal lines to a racialised ‘non-native’, ‘foreigner’, or ‘non-integrated co-citizen’

This definition draws upon aforementioned aspects not only of nationalism and xenophobia but also racism and racialisation (Garner and Selod 2015). It is inspired not only by discursive approaches to populism and nationalism (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017) but also studies on African nationalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2010; Neocosmos 2006) which view nativism as a ‘discourse’ and ‘mobilising strategy’ (Ndovlu-Gatsheni 2008, 76). Regarding regionalist movements such as Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord and the Vlaams Belang of Belgium (Newth 2019, 2021) regionalism and nationalism can potentially be seen as two sides of the same coin operating from a similar logic of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, particularly when the region is viewed as a ‘lost nation’. This helps emphasise the role of ‘nation’ in nativist discourse and is reflected in the literature by paradigms such as ‘Stateless, National and Regional Parties’ (Hepburn 2009) and ‘Stateless and Minority Nationalism’ (Heinisch, Masetti, and Mazzoleni 2020, 927).

Bearing the above definition in mind, if nativism is viewed as a ‘non-racist […] natural reaction’ or ‘necessity’ springing from ‘anti-immigrant attitudes’, then the term risks euphemising racist practices and discourses, thus ‘legitimising racism or denying that cultural and political self-defence can be racist’ (Hervik 2015, 800). Instead, nativism should be considered as a discursive element of a broader racist ideology which focuses principally on ‘otherness’ identity and aspects of cultural difference based on the constructed idea of the nation. Indeed, as noted by De Genova (2016, 235) both conservative and more liberal immigration policies

are systematically concerned with what a native ‘we’ should do with a foreign ‘them’ and are defined around a variety of contending interpretations of what might be best for ‘the nation’ (our nation) and its citizens (‘us’)

The more formal understanding of nativism outlined above alongside nativism’s aforementioned logic ‘take into account’ more ‘crucial strategic dimensions’ (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 311) and allows for an examination of how nativism is employed by parties beyond the far-right.

3. Nativism forms part of the ‘extreme’ and the ‘mainstream’

Nativism has been most widely associated in Europe with the ‘radical right’, a group of parties which ‘fundamentally challenges key institutions and values of liberal democracy’ and which ‘believes the main inequalities between people to be natural and outside the purview of the state’ (Mudde 2007, 26; Zaslove 2009; Betz 2019). Such an association, while not incorrect, underplays the role of nativism in ‘mainstream’ discourse. The mainstream is defined here as

a normative, hegemonic concept that imbues a particular ideological configuration or system with authority to operate as a given or naturalize itself as the best or even only option, essential to govern or regulate society, politics and the economy (Brown, Mondon, and Winter 2021, 5)

The use of nativist discourse by so-called mainstream parties on the right and the left is, therefore, made possible through ‘mainstreaming’ which is

the process by which parties/actors, discourses and/or attitudes move from marginal positions on the political spectrum or public sphere to more central ones, shifting what is deemed to be acceptable or legitimate in political, media and public circles and contexts (Brown, Mondon, and Winter 2021, 11)

This conception of mainstreaming ‘which places discourse as a central feature with significant influence across other elements’ (Brown, Mondon, and Winter 2021, 11) aligns neatly with my discursive interpretation of nativism. The remaining paragraphs by focusing on examples of British political discourse over the past two decades will illustrate how the ‘constructed contingent and fluid’ nature of the mainstream and the extreme has seen nativist discourse used by the ‘far right’ the ‘mainstream right’ and the ‘mainstream left’ (Brown, Mondon, and Winter 2021, 5).

The term ‘far right’ is preferred to ‘radical right’ in this article, as it defines movements which espouse ‘a racist ideology’ albeit one articulated ‘often in an indirect, coded [and] covert manner, notably by focusing on culture and/or occupying the space between […] the extreme and the mainstream’ (Mondon and Winter 2020, 19). Regarding the far right in the UK, posters released by both the Leave.EU and Vote Leave campaigns in the weeks leading up to the Brexit referendum in 2016 illustrate nativist discourse. While Leave.EU’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster ‘presented ‘non-white migrants as a hostile or invading force and an imminent threat to British resources’, (Reid 2019, 630), Vote Leave’s messages to voters (in separate posters) that ‘Turkey (population 76 million is joining the EU)’ and ‘Britain’s new border is with Syria and Iraq’ conveyed the notion of ‘threat’ while also engaging in a racialised process of othering (Boffey and Helm 2016; Lythgoe 2018). Making reference to the large population of Turkey as its borders with Syria and Iraq played on long-standing ideas of Europe as ‘white’ and Christian as well as the Muslim as Other (Brown 2019). Both Vote Leave and Leave.EU claimed that ‘breaking with the EU and “taking back control of our borders” […] represented an important opportunity to limit the numbers of Muslims entering Britain’ (Virdee and McGeever 2018, 1807) and thus emphasised ‘stopping the invasion’.

The ‘mainstream right’ is here defined as consisting largely of ‘bourgeois conservative or Liberal Parties’ with a belief in market-oriented policies and that the main inequalities between people are natural and thus not the responsibility of the state. (Masetti and Schakel 2015, 869; Bobbio 1996). ‘Mainstream right’ use of nativist discourse in the UK is most clearly visible in the UK in the Conservative Party’s ‘Hostile Environment’ (Mondon and Winter 2020, 137). As Home Secretary, Theresa May presented immigration as a ‘significant problem’ for the UK and portrayed it as an invasion, stating that there were ‘millions of people in poorer countries who would love to live in Britain’ (Home Office 2013; Stone 2017). Dismissing the idea of Britain as a country of immigrants May claimed the UK was a country of ‘remarkable population stability’ (Stone 2017) and engaged in a process of racialised othering of ‘foreign criminals’ and ‘illegal migrants’, discursively constructing them not only against the ‘British public’ but also ‘legitimate migrants’ (Home Office 2013; Stone 2017). While a potential pathway for assimilation is implicit in ‘non-natives’ becoming ‘legitimate’ by ‘contributing to our society and economy’, a strong emphasis was on ‘stopping the invasion’. This was most evident through the use of ‘Go Home’ vans which inferred a sense of non-belonging and non-integration among individuals in the UK ‘illegally’ (Mondon and Winter 2020, 137).

The ‘mainstream left’, by contrast, traditionally includes ‘social-democratic and Green parties supporting state-oriented economic policies’ which views inequalities between people as artificial and advocates state-involved solutions (Masetti and Schakel 2015, 869; Bobbio 1996). Nativist discourse on the Left sees an abandonment of Internationalism in calls for ‘immigration restriction in the purported interests of “native” workers in general and “native” minorities in particular’ (De Genova 2016, 233). The native is therefore discursively constructed in the form of ‘the dishonoured working class, or “left behind” of economic globalization’. (Lentin 2020, 103) arguing that open borders threaten the ‘native worker’ (Lentin 2020, 156). With regards to nativist discourse within the mainstream left, Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2007 promised to ‘create British jobs for British workers’ a slogan which was actually borrowed from the extreme right National Front and BNP (Keter 2009; Anderson 2010). Meanwhile, Brown’s successor as leader of the Labour Party, Ed Miliband, in the run-up to the 2015 general election engaged with nativist discourse but promised to ‘distinguish between “British citizens and workers coming here from abroad” and also pledged to “‘bear down’ on illegal immigration”. (Mondon and Winter 2020, 138). Further to presenting immigration as a threat to the nation, such pledges involved an implicit racialisation of “native” (British) v “non-native” (workers from abroad). Miliband also put an emphasis on assimilation, insisting that “in the past his party had been ‘too timid’ about insisting that newcomers learn English when they arrive in the UK” and that “new immigrants must speak English”. (Gayle 2015). However, the Labour leader’s pledge to put “controls on immigration” on a mug’ in the hope it would ‘slake voters’ appetite for some comforting nativism’ (Malik 2019a), also indicated an emphasis on ‘stopping the invasion’.

Conclusion

The discursive approach towards nativism taken in this article has emphasised the role of a particular articulation of exclusionary nationalism which is rooted in ethnicity. This leads to a xenophobic and racist process of ‘othering’ against migrants and those who are perceived to not have assimilated into the nation-state.

This revised definition of nativism is indebted to the numerous scholarly contributions examined throughout this article which have furthered our understanding of slippery concepts in the field. Nevertheless, the article has also challenged and nuanced such definitions, arguing that it is important to identify which type of nationalism helps to articulate nativist discourse, while also examining how xenophobia manifests itself in opposition to migration. Such arguments have also highlighted how nativism overlaps with more recent definitions of ‘xeno-racism’ which have been preferred by some scholars to describe instances of racism against ‘white Europeans’, yet often contain the same discursive features of nativism in terms of targeting the perceived detrimental impact of migration on a nation’s economy, welfare system and culture.

Crucially, the article has also highlighted how, far from being separate to racism, nativist discourse with its focus on culture, assimilation, integration and its emphasis on identity and a ‘right to difference’, should be recognised as fundamentally racist in nature and part of a wider racist ideology. If defined clearly by making reference to its racist components, nativism should not be used as a euphemistic term for racism. It is also vital, however, that the discursive construction of the native against non-natives, is defined appropriately as nativist rather than populist in order to minimise the risk of populist hype. The conceptual nature of this article has paved the way for further examinations of the way in which ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’ are discursively constructed in both liberal and illiberal frameworks, by both extreme and mainstream political actors. The framework can therefore be adopted and adapted to examine the rise in anti-immigrant discourse which purports to protect national borders.

Such a concept holds the potential to become increasingly important in coming years as the seeming breakdown of the consensus of the freedom of movement across the EU and the re-emergence of national borders which began following the so-called ‘migrant crisis’, has accelerated even further in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. Further to the question of migration, however, questions surrounding in-groups and out-groups, belonging, assimilation and integration have been raised in the past years with perceived ‘non-native’ and racialised groups within the nation being excluded from national belonging. Such examples can be seen in rising Islamophobia in Europe and the US, the Windrush scandal in the UK and the mobilisation of the Black Lives Matter movement. Application of the framework elaborated above would further our understanding of how nativism and racism intertwine and allow for a greater discussion of the threat posed by nativist discourse as it becomes increasingly mainstreamed.

Acknowledgments

A draft of this article was first presented at the PSA populism specialist group workshop in 2021. I would like to thank the workshop organisers, discussants and participants for their helpful comments and feedback. Special thanks to Dr Aurelien Mondon, Dr Jack Copley and Dr Caterina Froio for their insightful feedback on initial drafts of this article. Thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments which helped sharpen the shape and argument of the piece.

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This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

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Funding

I received no funding for the research carried out in this manuscript