Theorizing Relational Agency

Abstract

Gergen's conception of human agency as a relational phenomenon and its adequacy to the tasks of psychological description and explanation are examined. A contrasting view is discussed that shows how psychologically capable agency can be rendered intelligible only by attending to its developmental emergence in historically established sociocultural contexts. It is argued that an elaborated developmental account is necessary to comprehend how psychological agency, once it has emerged, is a unique form of relational being capable of transcending its biophysical and sociocultural origins. From this perspective, agentive personhood is not simply “a social performance,” but rather, an active structuring of existence.

Acknowledgments

This article was originally presented at the 118th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in San Diego, August 2010. The presentation was part of a symposium entitled “Exploring and Critiquing Ken Gergen's Book Relational Being.”