Empirical Variations of Relationality and the Question of Ontology: A Comment on Ken Gergen's Relational Being

Abstract

A friendly critique of Ken Gergen's (2009) Relational Being is advanced through reference to the ontological foundation of his own reflective explorations—in the kindred field of phenomenology. The relationship of empirical observations to their ontological foundation is given demonstration in Gergen's thorough articulation of the vicissitudes of social relationality. A cautionary suggestion regarding the potential conflation of empirical and ontological relationality is presented, followed by a more direct assessment of the position advanced by Gergen. The practical strengths and theoretical limitation of filtering relationality through the dual lens of social psychology and social constructionism are considered.

Acknowledgments

This article was originally presented at the 118th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in San Diego, August 2010. The presentation was part of a symposium entitled “Exploring and Critiquing Ken Gergen's Book Relational Being.”

Notes

1. This lecture was contained in Heidegger's 1969 book Zur Sache des Denkens, in whose title can be heard an echo of Husserl's battle cry “Zu den Sachen selbst!” It is interesting that at the end of a philosophical career marked by a profound turning away from his earlier phenomenological reflections, Heidegger would come to recognize (and implicitly affirm) the phenomenological spirit manifested in his later reflections on the affairs of thinking. Some of this spirit comes across in Heidegger's invocation, namely, that we ought to dwell in the movement of his thought. Being present to the thoughtful presence of the other—this is what I am suggesting we do in our encounter with Gergen's book.