Freudian Frontiers of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy: A Case of Improvement of Scientific Knowledge?

Abstract

As a clinical method for treating psychopathology through dialogue between a patient and the psychoanalyst, the methodological challenges of psychoanalysis are many. The paper draws on author’s earlier work focusing on the (i) scientific construal of the clinical claims psychoanalysis makes and (ii) its philosophical-hermeneutic construal that extends to metapsychology. The former involves mainly a therapy premised on the empirically testable causal hypotheses, while the latter involves claims to meaning connections. As a “theory of human nature and therapy,” the claims of psychoanalytic inquiry are subjected to a thought-experimental-test-design patterned after what I call the paradox of the lost original text. The linguistic analog of the lost original text having any number of surviving translations in any number of languages is relevant in the context of psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, especially to “recovering” the latent contents of a dream from its manifest contents. The thought-experimental-test-design sets limit to the possibilities of exploring the unconscious mind without rendering Freud’s methodology irrelevant or useless. The paper then briefly rethinks the frontier(s) of psychoanalytic inquiry, viewed as a branch of clinical psychology, for its relevance to the contemporary issues of individual psychical well-being. Premised on the methodological imperative of opening these frontiers to a deeper investigation than has been possible over the past hundred years, the challenging task of probing the frontiers of research opened by psychoanalytic inquiry in the world of individual psychical life, well-being and suffering is shown to extend to far deeper worlds in the ecology of consciousness, demanding carefully crafted methodological variance.

Keywords:

• Unknown knowables in science;
• motivational explanations;
• explanations of action by explanatory reasons (ER explanations);
• explanations of action by relevant causal explanations (RC explanations);
• methodological variance

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Although it is disputed whether psychoanalysis can be given, or even requires, a scientific foundation, Achim Stephan (1993b, pp. 1–9) looks to a new kind of “connectionist” metapsychological theory in order to do the job better than Freudian metapsychology of the psychic architecture (i.e., the so-called “psychic apparatus”) involving an association system with dynamic, economic and topographic aspects. See also Kitcher (1992, pp.43, 56, 61, 65, 73-74, 98, 109-110, 166).

2 See Gruenbaum (1990, pp. 559–577; 1984, p.7) In the original Gruenbaum text, the initial term used was “homosexuality”. However, APA presents suggestions for avoiding heterosexual bias in language concerning lesbians, gay men, and bisexual persons. As such, this article uses the preferred terminology consistent with APA guidelines.

3 See Popper (1986) “Predicting Overt Behaviour versus Predicting Hidden States”, in Gruenbaum (1986): “Precis of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis – A Philosophical Critique & Author’s Response to 39 Reviewers: Is Freud’s Theory Well-Founded?”, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 9 (217–284), pp. 254–255.

4 According to Gruenbaum (1990, p. 561), the view that “the discernment of so-called meaning connections, as distinct from causal connections, is at the heart of the psychoanalytic enterprise” is very dangerous. Psychoanalysis construed hermeneutically is bound to lose its original Freudian scientific character and orientation. See Habermas (1973); Ricoeur (1970); and G. S. Klein (1976)

5 Caplan (1986, pp. 228–229).

6 See Freud 1915, S. E. 14: 263–272; Freud (1933), S. E. 22: 7-30.

7 For example, we might raise here problems about Freud's metapsychological notions of “id, ego and superego” - i.e., problems about possible alternatives to Freudian metapsychology. Turn to Freud (1914), S. E. 14:16.

8 In private correspondence dated 13^th December 1985, 20^th August 1986, and 12^th December 1986; and in formal discussion with Gruenbaum during one of our meetings in Berlin on 3^rd/4th September 1993.

9 Gruenbaum's (1984, 1990) philosophical critique of the hermeneuticians is acceptable in so far as they say exactly what Freud himself said, merely repeating his claims instead of vindicating them. For Robert Shope's (1973) systematization of Freud's general thesis that the manifest phenomena have sense turn to Shope (1973).

10 Already by the year 1939, Freud is said to have rejected it as irrelevant in the light of psychoanalysis. In his relatively unknown preanalytic work, Freud (1891, p. 79) distinguishes (I) word-associations composed by sound patterns (Klangbild), written patterns (Schriftbild), reading patterns (Lesebild) and speech performance patterns (Sprachbewegungsbild) from (ii) object-associations composed by visual, tactual, acoustic and other types of ideas.

11 Among others, e.g., J. S. Mill (1843): A System of Logic; Salomon Stricker (1880): Studien ueber die Sprachvorstellungen; Salomon Stricker (1883): Studien ueber die Association der Vorstellungen.

12 Freud meant by the psychic architecture - i.e., “human speech apparatus” - a system that is responsible for performing speech, listening, understanding, reading, writing, etc.

13 For a discussion of Freud's schema for language associations turn to Stephan (1989, p. 80)

14 Mill's view in this context expresses exactly what Freud had himself meant (Stephan 1989, p. 86).

15 For more details turn to Kitcher, P., 1992: Freud’s Dream: A Complete Interdisciplinary Science of Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/M.I.T. Press, 1992, pp. 43, 56, 61, 65, 73-74, 98, 109-110, 166

16 In his work “Das Wesen der Sprache”, Unterwegs Zur Sprache, Neske: Stuttgart, 1959, pp. 159-216, Heidegger said: “Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins”, pp. 166.

17 The writing of this paper is a “repayment of my debts”, i.e, intellectual “debts” that I incurred by becoming a student of psychology, including abnormal psychology, at the Kaschmir University, Srinagar, and Lucknow University during 1961-1965, the most crucial years that were also the most turbulent years for me and for my family in Kaschmir. The text is based on an independently undertaken project entitled "Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy: A Case of Improvement of Scientific Knowledge?” that I wrote and presented on various occasions during my postdoctoral research stays (1985-1995) at the Free University Berlin, University of Heidelberg, University of Poitiers (France), and Foundation Maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris, and during my Guest Professorship at the Institut fuer Wissenschaftststheorie und Wissenschaftsforschung, University of Vienna (SS 1996). The early drafts have benefited enormously from my discussions with Adolf Gruenbaum and Achim Stephan. Both the private correspondence and formal discussions with them began in Winter Semesters 1985-1986 and 1988-1989, respectively. On the 8^th November 1985, Gruenbaum delivered a guest lecture entitled “Are Hidden Motives in Psychoanalysis Reasons but not Causes of Human Action?” at the Institut fuer Philosophie: Frei Universitaet Berlin (West) that I had the good luck to attend. Gruenbaum’s Berlin lecture was followed by an interactive session with him over dinner in his honour in a Berlin restaurant. This provided an occasion for my first meeting with Gruenbaum that was followed by my correspondence with him dated 13^th December 1985, 20^th August 1986, and 12^th December 1986, which was as inspiring as our private discussions later on during one of our meetings in Berlin on 3^rd/4^th September 1993, focusing on the issues that are addressed in this paper. With Achim Stephan, my discussions and correspondence resumed during 1995, notably in his last letter dated 26th May, 1995. Without all these discussions, my original interest in psychoanalysis – i.e., in its scientific, philosophical and cultural foundations – would have remained deeply buried in my memories, traceable to a forgotten past when I was an undergraduate student of psychology at the Government Sri Pratap College Srinagar, Kaschmir (1961-1963) and, later on, a graduate student of psychology and philosophy at Lucknow University, Uttarpradesch, India (1963-1965). An invitation to Thomas Slunecko’s and Fritz G. Wallner’s Seminar for Psychologists at the Institut fuer Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsforschung, Universitaet Wien provided me an opportunity to present the main ideas developed by me before an interdisciplinary group of students and colleagues on 14^th October, 1993. I remain deeply thankful to all of them for their presence on that occasion, making a valuable contribution to the discussion, and asking important questions. Last, but not least, I am highly thankful to Lisa M. Osbeck. Lisa not only made it possible for me to retrieve the present paper from my personal archives, where it lay in oblivion, but she also went through the manuscript, making valuable suggestions for an abridged version for publication in the Special Issue of the Journal of Constructivist Psychology.

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Giridhari Lal Pandit

Giridhari Lal Pandit. Science & Technology Studies: Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation, Institut fuer Theoretische Physik: Fakultaet Physik u. Astronomie Universitaet Heidelberg, Germany; Visiting Professor (http://isec.ac.in/giridharilal-pandit.htm) Center for Ecological Economics and Natural Resources: Institute for Social and Economic Change, Dr. V. K. R .V. Rao Road, Nagarabhavi, Bangalore – India; Mitglied: Internationale Ernst Cassirer-Gesellschaft E.V., Hamburg, Germany.

Dedicated to the memories of Robert Sonné Cohen (18 February 1923–19 June 2017); Lorenz Krueger (3 October 1932–29 September 1994); Erhard Scheibe (24 September 1927–7 January 2010); Peter Meusburger (14 March 1942–18 December 2017) and Adolf Gruenbaum (15 May 1923–15 November 2018), this essay is part of an independently undertaken project in preparation, “Knowledge Resources Dynamics, Human Rights and Individual Freedom.”

“For lack of space, detailed arguments developed in the longer version of the present article could not be included in their entirety for the Special Issue of Journal of Constructivist Psychology.”