ACQUIRING FOREIGN NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has laid out an ambitious plan to become the first Arab country to possess a civilian nuclear energy program. Central to that effort has been the Emirati government's ability to obtain foreign nuclear assistance. This article traces the UAE's strategies for overcoming the obstacles that stood in the way of nuclear suppliers providing assistance. It examines the approach taken by the UAE to assuage the safety and security concerns of nuclear suppliers, how the UAE leveraged its alliances with France and the United States to obtain their cooperation, and its strategies for engaging domestic interest groups in supplier states. The generalizable elements of the UAE's strategies are discussed and used to provide insight into the prospects for other Middle Eastern states' bids to obtain similar assistance. The article concludes with a discussion of the potentially transformative aspects of the strategies employed by the UAE in shaping other countries' pursuit of nuclear energy in the region.

Keywords:

• United Arab Emirates
• France
• United States
• nuclear energy
• nuclear assistance
• nonproliferation policy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Dubai Initiative at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Dubai School of Government for supporting this research. I would also like to thank Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, and Dale Murphy for their comments on previous drafts of the paper, and those I interviewed for it.

Notes

1. For the UAE government's official projections, see UAE, “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” April 2008, <www.uae-embassy.org/sites/default/files/UAE_Policy_Peaceful_Nuclear_Energy_English.pdf>. Nearly all of the UAE's domestically produced electricity comes from natural gas. The extent to which the global economic downturn may have diminished the UAE's future demand for electricity is unclear.

2. Amena Bakr and Cho Mee-young, “South Korea Wins Landmark Gulf Nuclear Power Deal,” Reuters, December 27, 2009.

3. For more predictions about the UAE nuclear program's timeline, see Amena Bakr, “UAE Sees Nuclear Energy Plant Ready in 2015,” Guardian, May 21, 2009; Christopher Blanchard and Paul Kerr, “The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, April 2009, R40344, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40344.pdf>. An assessment made by George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program predicts that it would likely take about fifteen years from a Gulf state's decision to order its first nuclear reactor until the time when it would come online. George Perkovich, “Nuclear Developments in the GCC: Risks and Trends,” in the Gulf Research Center, Gulf Yearbook: 2007–2008 (Dubai, UAE: Gulf Research Center, 2008), p. 229.

4. A.Q. Khan was a Pakistani nuclear scientist who directed a clandestine network of non-state actors that proliferated sensitive nuclear technology and materials to Iran and Libya. For more, see Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006); Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ Us,” New York Times, March 4, 2004, p. A31; Joseph Cirincione, “Chain Reaction,” ForeignPolicy.com, May 8, 2009, <www.ploughshares.org/news-analysis/blog/chain-reaction-how-us-uae-nuclear-deal-could-set-middle-east-arms-race>; Henry Sokolski, “UAE Nuclear Deal: Atoms for Peace or Bombs for Sneaks?” Washington Times, July 30, 2009, <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/30/uae-nuclear-deal-atoms-for-peace-or-bombs-for-snea/>.

5. Guy Dinmore, “Washington Persuaded Not to Target UAE over Iran Exports,” Financial Times, March 20, 2007, <www.dubaisharetalk.com/viewtopic.php?t=2497>; Blanchard and Kerr, “The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program,” p. 11.

6. Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, “Why Go Nuclear: A Perspective from the United Arab Emirates,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2008, pp. 14–19.

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,” December 8, 1953.

8. Matthew Fuhrmann, “Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security 34 (Summer 2009), pp. 7–41.

9. Though UN Security Council Resolution 1540 mandates all countries to impose dual-use export controls, significant variation exists in the degree to which countries have fulfilled this obligation. For more on export controls and Resolution 1540, see Michael Beck, Richard Cupitt, Seema Gahlaut, and Scott A. Jones, To Supply or Deny: Comparing Nonproliferation Export Controls in Five Key Countries (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003); Johan Bergenäs, “The Slippery Slope of Rational Inaction: Resolution 1540 and the Tragedy of the Commons,” Nonproliferation Review 15 (July 2008), pp. 373–80.

10. For a detailed discussion of how the Khan network did this, see David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” Washington Quarterly 28 (Spring 2005), pp. 111–28; and Corera, Shopping for Bombs.

11. For more detailed information on nuclear security issues, see Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2008).

12. For a broader discussion, see Matthew Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 181–208; and Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” American Political Science Review 103 (February 2009), pp. 113–33.

13. Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb.”

14. Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side.”

15. Lady Barbara Judge, chair of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, stated that, “If I was going to write a template on how to begin a new nuclear programme and to get the world behind you instead of against you, I would say Abu Dhabi is doing it exactly the right way. It's best practice multiplied by three.” John Henzell, “UK's Atomic Energy Chief Praises UAE Policy Style,” The National, November 13, 2008, <www.thenational.ae/article/20081113/NATIONAL/453693684/1010>. For other supportive examples, see William Cohen and Sam Nunn, “Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in Our Interest,” The Hill, June 2, 2009, <www.cistp.gatech.edu/spotlights/Nuclear%20cooperation%20with%20U.pdf>; and Elliot Abrams, “An Arab Counterexample,” Washington Times, April 24, 2009, <www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/24/an-arab-counterexample/>.

16. The UAE signed memorandums of understanding concerning civilian nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom in May 2008 and Japan in January 2009. The U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement, which was signed by both parties in May 2009, officially came into force on December 17, 2009. The UAE and South Korea signed their nuclear cooperation agreement on June 22, 2009.

17. Albright and Hinderstein found that the Khan proliferation network “depended on complicated transportation arrangements, mainly to confuse suppliers about the true end use of the item and to evade prying intelligence agencies or deceive them about the final destination for its products. The international free zone in Dubai, through which shipments are still subject to few meaningful controls, was particularly critical to the network.” Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” p. 120.

18. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 118.

19. The UAE minister of economy and planning publicly stated in March 2007 that the UAE had taken action against a number of firms operating in the UAE that constituted “trade diversion risks.” Such actions appear to have been taken after the fact, though, and on an ad hoc basis. “UAE Drafts New Export Control Law with U.S. Help,” Inside U.S. Trade, March 16, 2007.

20. Elena McGovern, “Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates: A Practical Manifestation of a Strategic Dilemma,” WMD Insights 30 (February 2009), pp. 12–13.

21. Matthew Swibel, “Trading With the Enemy,” Forbes, April 12, 2004, <www.forbes.com/global/2004/0419/041_print.html>; Milhollin and Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ Us”; McGovern, “Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates,” pp. 10–11.

22. Kimia Sanati, “US Efforts to Scuttle Iran-UAE Ties Fail,” Inter Press Service, February 27, 2008, <www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JB27Ak02.html>.

23. Cirincione, “Chain Reaction”; McGovern, “Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates.”

24. The text of the UAE's Federal Law No. 13 of 2007, as amended by Federal Decree No. 12 of 2008, is available in Arabic at the UAE Ministry of Justice's website, <www.elaws.gov.ae/EnLegislations.aspx>. My analysis of the law was aided by an unofficial English translation of the law I obtained from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi. A partial English translation is now available on this website.

25. For example, see McGovern, “Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates”; Bryan R. Early, “Export Control Development in the United Arab Emirates: From Commitments to Compliance,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, Harvard University, July 6, 2009, <belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Early_-_Policy_Brief_-_FINAL.pdf>.

26. “UAE Enhances Federal Export Law,” Gulf News, May 11, 2009, <gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/government/uae-enhances-federal-export-law-1.68320>.

27. These figures were reported in Jay Solomon and Margaret Coker, “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid with U.S. Help,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2009, p. A1.

28. Mycle Schneider, “The Reality of France's Aggressive Nuclear Power Push,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 3, 2008, <www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-reality-of-frances-aggressive-nuclear-power-push>; IAEA, “Nuclear ‘Newcomers’: Challenging Road to Electric Power,” July 27, 2009, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2008/nuclnewcomers.html>.

29. The agreement between the UAE and South Korea was signed on June 22, 2009, before the UAE's agreement with the United States was ratified; however, the U.S.-UAE deal was signed by President Barack Obama prior to the UAE-South Korea nuclear deal.

30. Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side,” pp. 187–88.

31. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), chapters 4 and 5; and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Oil for Nukes—Mostly a Bad Idea,” Christian Science Monitor, February 29, 2008, p. 9.

32. For a broader discussion of France's nuclear diplomacy, see Schneider, “The Reality of France's Aggressive Nuclear Power Push.” For a specific analysis of the assistance France has provided to the UAE, see Bruno Tertrais, “Why the UAE is a Target for France's Nuclear Diplomacy,” The National, March 24, 2009, <www.thenational.ae/article/20090324/OPINION/879303895/1006/REVIEW>.

33. Fuhrmann, “Oil for Nukes—Mostly a Bad Idea.”

34. “UAE and France Sign Landmark Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” Gulf News, January 15, 2008; Paul Reynolds, “French Make Serious Move into Gulf,” BBC News, January 16, 2008, <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7189481.stm>.

35. As background for my research, I interviewed an official from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, a recently retired official from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, a Foreign Service officer who worked on Persian Gulf issues posted in Washington, DC, and a senior staff member from the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs (all names withheld by request). These interviews took place from May through December 2009.

36. Richard Lardner, “The Influence Game: Pushing a Mideast Nuclear Deal,” Associated Press, April 23, 2009.

37. Cohen and Nunn discuss the strategic incentives of the United States in signing the 123 Agreement. Cohen and Nunn, “Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in Our Interest.”

38. Though the exact terms of the defense pact between the United States and the UAE are classified, the defense pact included a status of forces agreement, provisions pertaining to troop pre-positioning, U.S. naval warship visits, and the use of the Al Dhafra Air Base. See Kenneth Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RS21852, July 31, 2008, p. 4; Captain Thomas Goodwin provided the port visit figures for fiscal 2005 in an interview with Wolf Blitzer, “Storm Over Ports; What is CSI? New Terror Tape,” The Situation Room, March 6, 2006, <transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0603/06/sitroom.02.html>.

39. Over the past decade, the UAE has been one of the world's leading importers of conventional arms, making significant purchases mainly from the United States. See Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE),” p. 5. U.S. and French arms producers are often in direct competition for the UAE's lucrative contracts, of which France has increasingly captured a larger share. The U.S.-UAE strategic relationship on this front was one area that would have likely suffered if Congress had failed to approve the 123 Agreement.

40. See “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Arab Emirates,” Message from the President of the United States, House Document 111-43, May 21, 2009, <www.fas.org/man/eprint/uae-nuclear.pdf>.

41. The initial 123 Agreement had been negotiated and signed by the Bush administration just before President Bush left office, but the treaty was never submitted to Congress.

42. During the hearing on the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement held by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Howard Berman emphasized the importance of the unprecedented nature of the nonproliferation commitments made by the UAE in the renegotiated terms of the 123 Agreement, citing it as “the best one we have entered into.” U.S. House of Representatives, “Nuclear Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates Review,” Hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 8, 2009, 111^th Cong., 1^st sess., Washington, DC. The importance of these commitments for U.S. policy makers was also highlighted by many of the people I interviewed for this article.

43. Meena Janardhan, “UAE-US: ‘Civilian Nuclear Deal Hint to Iran,’” Inter Press Service, January 27, 2009, <ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45561>.

44. UAE, “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy.”

45. See Solomon and Coker, “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid with U.S. Help”; Henzell, “UK's Atomic Energy Chief Praises UAE Policy Style”; and Abrams, “An Arab Counterexample.”

46. UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, “UAE and IAEA Sign Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement,” April 8, 2009 ,<www.uae-embassy.org/media/press-releases/Protocol_Signing>. IAEA, “Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” January 27, 2010, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf>.

47. UAE, “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy.”

48. “UAE, Nuclear Suppliers Group Discuss Trade Rules,” Global Security Newswire, May 13, 2009, <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090513_3393.php>.

49. For more on UAE's approach toward addressing supplier states' nonproliferation concerns, see bin Zayed Al Nahyan, “Why Go Nuclear.”

50. Mark Fitzpatrick makes this argument in greater detail. Mark Fitzpatrick, “Drawing a Bright Redline: Forestalling Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/Fitzpatrick>.

51. UAE, “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” p. 9.

52. This insight can be garnered from a careful reading of Articles 7 and 12 of the 123 Agreement. In Article 7, the UAE commits itself to the non-acquisition of “sensitive nuclear facilities.” Article 12 specifically states, however, that by making this commitment the UAE does not forsake its fundamental rights to possessing these technologies, as guaranteed by the NPT. The UAE also negotiated for a clause in the 123 Agreement's “Agreed Minute” that would allow the UAE to renegotiate the treaty if the United States offered better terms to any other non-nuclear weapon state in the Middle East. This leaves the UAE a way to back out of its treaty commitments if the United States does not include similar nonproliferation provisions in its subsequent nuclear cooperation agreements in the region. See “Agreement for Cooperation,” pp. 11–14. For a critical discussion of the strength of the commitments the United States was able to garner in the agreement, see Henry Sokolski, “Nuclear Dealing,” National Review Online, March 25, 2009, <article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzRhYTc2OWY0MzY4ZDgxZmRkMDA4ZDQzMjJhNzE4MWY=%20=>.

53. See UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2009, <www.elaws.gov.ae/EnLegislations.aspx>.

54. This holds insofar as a country is still in compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, which is a matter of dispute in the case of Iran.

55. MOUs are informal, nonbinding statements of intent that states use to clarify and/or coordinate policies with one another. MOUs are easier to negotiate than formal treaties but entail weaker commitments that are more easily abandoned. For more on the nonproliferation MOUs negotiated by the United States in the Middle East, see Fitzpatrick, “Drawing a Bright Redline”; and Mark Hibbs, “Jordan Holding off on Agreeing to Terms for Cooperation with US,” Nucleonics Week, May 7, 2009.

56. The UAE's leadership acknowledges the precedent the UAE could be setting. See bin Zayed Al Nahyan, “Why Go Nuclear”; and Fitzpatrick, “Drawing a Bright Redline.”

57. Given the terms of the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement's “Agreed Minute,” the United States may be locked into including the same suite of commitments it did from the UAE in subsequent 123 Agreements with other Middle Eastern states, or risk triggering the UAE's right to renegotiate the treaty.

58. Solomon and Coker, “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid with U.S. Help.”

59. “ENEC — Nuclear Power Plant,” Zaywa Projects Monitor, <www.zawya.com/projects/project.cfm/pid220307020544/ENEC%20-%20Nuclear%20Power%20Plant?cc>.

60. The two lobbying firms hired by the UAE government are Akin Gump and DLA Piper. Lardner, “The Influence Game.”

61. The website, <www.usuae123.com/>, was taken down following U.S. approval of the 123 Agreement and now links directly to the UAE Embassy's website.

62. Lardner, “The Influence Game.” In 2008, the UAE spent $11 million on lobbying in the United States and had almost 2,000 contacts with Congress members. Al Kamen, “Who's Lobbying Whom, Cross-Border Edition,” Washington Post, August 21, 2009, p. A23.

63. U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council, “Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the U.A.E. Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” brochure, May 2009, <www.usuaebusiness.org/view/resources/uploaded/usuae_123_brochure6_revised.pdf>.

64. U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council, “Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the U.A.E. Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” brochure, May 2009, <www.usuaebusiness.org/view/resources/uploaded/usuae_123_brochure6_revised.pdf>, pp. 3, 13.

65. U.S. House of Representatives, “Nuclear Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates Review.”

66. U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council, “Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and the U.A.E. Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” p. 5.

67. Thomas Graham, “123 Agreement for Nuclear Energy in the UAE: An Unprecedented and Responsible Step,” Huffington Post, June 2, 2009, <www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-graham/123-agreement-for-nuclear_b_210232.html>.

68. Cohen and Nunn, “Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in Our Interest.”

69. Members of the U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council are listed on its website, along with its staff. See U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council, “About Us,” <www.usuaebusiness.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=section.home&id=1>.

70. For details of the events attended by Cohen in October 2008 and February 2009, see U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council, “Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce, the U.S.-U.A.E. Business Council, and the American Business Group of Abu Dhabi Forge Closer Ties,” <www.usuaebusiness.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=document.home&id=25>; “UAE Ministry of Foreign Trade Highlights Prospects for Enhanced UAE-US Trade and Economic Cooperation,” AMEinfo.com, February 28, 2009, <www.ameinfo.com/186559.html>.

71. Clarke is a partner at Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, which was hired to consult on safety and security issues related to the UAE's planned nuclear power program. Dan Yurman, “UAE Nuclear Deal Faces Congress,” Energy Collective, April 26, 2009, <theenergycollective.com/TheEnergyCollective/39187>. MacDougall is a senior counselor at the Harbor Group, a public relations firm that has lobbied for the 123 Agreement.

72. Solomon and Coker, “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid with U.S. Help.”

73. Daniel Horner, “UAE's Regulator Recognizes Need for Emirati Staff, Chief Says,” Nucleonics Week, March 19, 2009, p. 1.

74. Joseph Cirincione notes how remarkable it is that the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement has enjoined so much support from the U.S. nonproliferation community. Cirincione, “Chain Reaction.”

75. Cohen and Nunn, “Nuclear Cooperation with U.A.E. in Our Interest.”

76. Bakr and Cho, “South Korea Wins Landmark Gulf Nuclear Power Deal”; Margaret Coker, “Korean Team to Build U.A.E. Nuclear Plants,” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2010, <online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704905704574621653002992302.html>.

77. Summer Said, “U.A.E. Taps Blix to Head Nuclear Body,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2010, <online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704454304575081070250509484.html>.

78. Cirincione, “Chain Reaction.”

79. See Nicole Stracke, “UAE-South Korea Nuclear Deal: A Strategic Choice,” Khaleej Times, January 3, 2010; Bakr and Cho, “South Korea Wins Landmark Gulf Nuclear Power Deal.”

80. The following twelve Middle Eastern countries have been identified as aspiring nuclear power states: Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the UAE, and Yemen. Iran currently possesses a nuclear power plant that should come on line in 2010. See Steven Miller and Scott Sagan, “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” Dædalus 138 (Fall 2009), p. 10.

81. Aaron Stein, “U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation,” Issue Brief, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 13, 2009, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_uae_us_cooperation.html>.

82. The other countries with whom Jordan has signed nuclear cooperation agreements include Canada, China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. For more background, see Mark Hibbs, “Jordan Holding off on Agreeing Terms for Cooperation with US”; “Jordan Atomic Energy Commission Head Discusses Nuclear Programme,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 21, 2009.