FROM PROLIFERATION TO PEACE

Abstract

Despite both regional and international efforts to establish a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, regional support beyond mere rhetoric seems unattainable. The lack of commitment to WMD disarmament results from the complexity of regional security dynamics, which are characterized by a high level of weaponization and crosscutting conflicts. This article examines a strategy for WMD disarmament in the Middle East. First, such a strategy must reflect the motives underlying a state's WMD aspirations. Security and prestige may be identified as two motives that affect the acquisition, and thus also the abandonment, of WMD. Second, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syria are important actors because their reasons for desiring WMD cannot be considered apart from each other, and progress will consequently depend on the inclusion of all these actors. In this regard, we recommend the establishment of a parallel process between efforts to establish a WMDFZ and peaceful relations in the Middle East. Solving central problems, like the lack of political determination and security cooperation, is vital to create consensus on the final framework of a zone. This study suggests a way forward by analyzing the central causes of conflict in the region and recommending ways to resolve them in order to establish a WMDFZ.

Keywords:

• Middle East
• Egypt
• Israel
• Iran
• Libya
• Syria
• weapons of mass destruction
• disarmament

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors' work was supported by a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notes

1. We define WMD to comprise nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. For more information about WMD proliferation in the Middle East, see Richard L. Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest (London: Routledge, 2005); James A. Russell, ed., Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Barry R. Schneider, ed., Middle East Security Issues: In the Shadow of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Alabama: Air University Press, 1999); Gawdat Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007). See also Zeev Maoz, Emily B. Landau, and Tamar Malz, eds., “Building Regional Security in the Middle East: International, Regional and Domestic Influences,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26 (September 2003, Special Issue).

2. For more information, see “Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East (ARCS),” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 1, 2003, <cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/acrs.pdf>.

3. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first NWFZ to cover a densely populated area, was signed in 1967. Since then, several regions have followed this Latin American initiative and created NWFZs. Today, Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia and Oceania are covered by such treaties; however, the Central Asian zones have yet to enter into force. In addition, Mongolia has proclaimed itself nuclear weapon–free, and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty declares Antarctica as a demilitarized zone that prohibits nuclear explosions.

4. To read more about WMDFZs and/or NWFZs, see for example: UN Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences (Geneva: UN Publications, 2004); Etel Solingen, “Middle East Denuclearization? Lessons from Latin America's Southern Cone,” Review of International Studies 27 (July 2001), pp. 375–94; Claudia Baumgart and Harald Müller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Pie in the Sky?” Washington Quarterly 28 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 45–58; Gerald M. Steinberg, “Realism, Politics and Culture in Middle East Arms Control Negotiations,” International Negotiation 10 (2005), pp. 487–512; Peter Jones, “A Gulf WMD Free Zone within a Broader Gulf and Middle East Security,” Gulf Research Center, policy paper, March 2005.

5. Global Security Newswire, “Mediterranean Coalition Seeks WMD-Free Middle East,” July 14, 2008, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008/7/14/4179464F-92C0-4D16-ADFE-8C859306C416.html>.

6. Baumgart and Müller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East,” p. 46.

7. Glen M. Segell, “The Middle East,” in Jeffrey A. Larsen, ed., Arms Control: Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 223.

8. Chemical weapons were used by Egypt in Yemen in the 1960s; in the Iraq-Iran War from 1980 to 1988; and in Iraq against the Kurds in 1988.

9. Kenneth E. Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 13 (emphasis in original). The definition of peace has been subject to widespread debate within international relations theory. For more discussion about the conditions of peace and conceptualizations of the concept, see also Emanuel Adler, “Condition(s) of Peace,” Review of International Studies 24 (1998), pp. 165–92.

10. For a discussion of states' motives, see for example: T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forego Nuclear Weapons (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000); Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); and Maria Rost Rublee, Non-Proliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009).

11. According to F.W. de Klerk, former South African president, the multiple fears “reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary, as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance should it be attacked.” Quoted in Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 23 (Winter 1996–97), p. 60.

12. David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, pp. 37–47.

13. Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East, p. 6.

14. Prestige as a motive can be hard to define. This is partly because it is difficult to measure in a direct way. For example, it is difficult to determine when and how a state has achieved the goal of prestige. We thus use the concepts of positive and negative prestige to separate between states' motives when experiencing different levels of conflict. This may be a useful tool to identify prestige as a motive in foreign policies.

15. To read more about how prestige and national pride may explain both nuclear proliferation and abrogation, see for example Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

16. Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Libya's Nuclear Turnaround: Perspectives from Tripoli,” Middle East Journal 62 (Winter 2008), pp. 59–62.

17. George Perkovich, “Changing Iran's Nuclear Interests,” Policy Outlook, May 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 9.

18. Alan Cowell and William J. Broad, “Iran Reports Missile Test, Drawing Rebuke,” New York Times, July 9, 2008.

19. “Iran Missile Test Alarms Israel,” BBC News, July 7, 2003.

20. Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 110.

21. Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, “Syria and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities,” Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2004, p. 23.

22. Quoted in Frank V. Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Programme: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review 2 (Fall 1995), p. 10.

23. International Crisis Group, “Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean?” Middle East Briefing, No. 18, August 4, 2005, p. 7.

24. Joby Warrick and Robin Wright, “Suspected Location of Syria's Reactor Cleared: Building Allegedly Bombed by Israel Gone,” Washington Post, October 26, 2007, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/25/AR2007102502884.html>.

25. For more information on security dilemma theory, see for example Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978), pp. 167–214.

26. For more information about security complex theory, see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 187–218.

27. For more information about security complex theory, see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 43.

28. For more information about security complex theory, see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 51: “Subcomplexes represent distinctive patterns of security that are nonetheless caught up in a wider pattern that defines the RSC [regional security complex] as a whole.” The Middle East security complex consists of the Levant, the Gulf, and the Maghreb sub-complexes, p.189. Over the past years, North African states in the Maghreb sub-complex have become marginal players in the Arab-Israeli peace process and have “drifted away from the core, relating less to Arab issues, and becoming more like an independent RSC in its own right,” p. 213. In addition, the North African states can be party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, although most of them have not ratified it.

29. Because Libya committed to dismantling its WMD programs, it is not included in this suggestion. However, Libya was termed an “essential state” in the IAEA suggestion. See Ibrahim Othman and Maha Abdulrahim, “Establishment of a Zone Free of Mass Destruction Weapons in the Region of the Middle East: Requirements and Constraints,” in UNIDIR, Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone.

30. For an analysis of key state actors and regional reasons for proliferation, see Sara Kristine Eriksen, “Establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Prospects and Challenges,” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Report No. 01821, 2007, <rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/01821.pdf>.

31. James F. Leonard and Jan Prawitz, “The Middle East as a NWFZ or WMDFZ Application,” excerpts from Pacifica Review 11 (October 1999), pp. 263–64.

32. To read more about the “Gulf model” and the “Levant model,” see Linda Mari Holøien, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zones in the Middle East,” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Report No. 02488, 2006, pp. 24–28, <rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/02488.pdf>.

33. The Gulf model includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Iraq, and it is built on an already existing initiative made by the Gulf Research Center in Stockholm in 2004. See Jones, “A Gulf WMD Free Zone within a Broader Gulf and Middle East Security.” The main function of this zone will be to demonstrate to other states in the region that a WMDFZ can be created and thereby provide the groundwork for a future zone covering the entire Middle East. It is therefore important that this zone include specific arrangements and benefits, which in turn will encourage the later accession of other states. The Levant model, on the other hand, starts out with the central actors in the Levant security sub-complex: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors has traditionally been at the core of the region's high militarization. The Palestinian question is at the heart of this conflict, and it has been an important factor in both inter-Arab rivalries and Arab-Israeli tensions. In this model, the inclusion of the Gulf states in a WMDFZ comes later.

34. Eriksen, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.”

35. Bahgat, Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 28.

36. Baumgart and Müller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East,” p. 57.

37. Mark A. Heller, “Prospects for Creating a Regional Security Structure in the Middle East,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26 (September 2003), p. 135.

38. Adler, “Condition(s) of Peace,” p. 167.

39. Brazil and Argentina have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. See Hans Blix et al., “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms,” Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006; Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1994), pp. 148–49.

40. Solingen, “Middle East Denuclearization?” p. 394.

41. Solingen, “Middle East Denuclearization?” pp. 379, 393.

42. Aluf Benn, “Converging Interests: Essential, but Not Enough,” Strategic Assessment 11 (June 2008), p. 7.

43. Proponents of this view used the disarmament processes in South Africa, Ukraine, Brazil, and Argentina to support this argument, which gained strength after the end of the Cold War. According to this view, nonproliferation was to take place through security assurances, democratization, and integration into the globalized economy of the liberal international order. See Robert S. Litwak, “Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change,” Survival 45 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 7–32; Keith Krause, “State-Making and Region-Building: The Interplay of Domestic and Regional Security in the Middle East,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26 (September 2003), p. 104.

44. Litwak argues that proliferation is not unique to a particular type of regime. Regime change in itself will therefore not lead to durable nonproliferation, unless the underlying motivations for proliferation are addressed. Proliferation does not stem from regime character but from various domestic and international or systemic factors. See Litwak, “Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change.” In addition, democratization in the Middle East may lead to a strengthened rejection of Israel's nuclear monopoly. For this view, see Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, “Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observation,” in Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pp. 326–27.

45. Segell, “The Middle East,” p. 216.

46. Goldblat, Arms Control, p. 4.

47. Verification measures are also discussed in the final section of this paper.

48. Goldblat, Arms Control, p. 4.

49. Gitty M. Amini, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Issue Brief, Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 2003, < www.nti.org/e_research/e3_24a.html>.

50. Grégoire Mallard, “Can the Euratom Treaty Inspire the Middle East? The Political Promises of Regional Nuclear Communities, ”Nonproliferation Review 15 (November 2008), pp. 459–77.

51. Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50 (October 1997), p. 182.

52. Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, Bridging the Gap: Building a Future Security Architecture in the Middle East (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), p. 78.

53. Emily B. Landau, “Syria, September 6: Sharpening Questions and Dilemmas,” Strategic Assessment 10 (December 2007), <www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=1379>.

54. Goldblat, Arms Control, p. 149.

55. Goldblat, Arms Control, p. 149.

56. The dual-use problem is more severe for biological agents than for chemical agents. Microorganisms and toxins that could be used for offensive purposes are widely available from both culture collections and the natural environment. It is possible to produce a biological or toxin arsenal in a matter of weeks, since nutrient media are widely traded and bacteria multiply exponentially under optimal conditions. In addition, dangerous pathogens have become commercial products. See Jonathan B. Tucker, testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors,” November 7, 2001, 107th Cong., 1st sess., <bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/official/congress/tucker110701.pdf>.

57. Baumgart and Müller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East,” p. 51.

58. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention,” Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 24, 1998.

59. Trevor Findlay, “Biological Weapons: Minding the Verification Gap,” VERTIC Brief No. 4, February 2004, p. 6.

60. Trevor Findlay, “Biological Weapons: Minding the Verification Gap,” VERTIC Brief No. 4, February 2004, p. 6.

61. The group concluded: “If multidisciplinary inspection teams are allowed sufficient time on site and empowered to use pre-inceptions research and analysis, site tours, document review, interviews, and sampling, they can discern legitimate from cheating facilities.” See “Compliance Through Science: U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Experts on a Strengthened Bioweapons Nonproliferation Regime,” Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 48, September 2002, p. 25.

62. Baumgart and Müller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East,” p. 50.

63. Under the Treaty of Pelindaba, parties undertake to destroy all capabilities for the manufacture of nuclear devices and any previously manufactured nuclear explosive devices and any facilities for their manufacture. If possible, the nuclear devices are to be converted into peaceful use, and the IAEA shall verify the dismantling process. Peaceful nuclear activities are allowed under IAEA safeguards. The treaty encourages cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. See “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2009, <nuclearthreatinitiative.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptanwfz.pdf>.

64. The problem of postponing WMD disarmament is also called “hedging.” See Jones, “A Gulf WMD-Free Zone within a Broader Gulf and Middle East Security,” for a discussion.

65. Peter Jones, “Negotiating Regional Security and Arms Control in the Middle East: The ACRS Experience and Beyond,” Journal of Strategic Studies 26 (September 2003), p. 144.

66. The idea that states outside a zone should offer security guarantees and sign protocols was discussed in Leonard and Prawitz, “The Middle East as a NWFZ or WMDFZ Application.”

67. Ray Takyeh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 145.