INVESTIGATING THE RUBBLE OF SYRIA'S SECRET REACTOR

Abstract

Damascus has severely impeded an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into Syria's construction of a covert nuclear reactor, which was destroyed in a 2007 Israeli air strike. Pressing Damascus to cooperate with the inquiry is necessary to ascertain that there are no other undeclared activities in Syria, to determine the role of North Korea in the construction of the reactor, and to help prevent future clandestine efforts. With Damascus doing its best to avoid the investigation, securing Syrian cooperation will require adept diplomacy backed by the prospect of special inspections and, if necessary, a referral to the UN Security Council. The case of Syria's secret reactor highlights areas in which the IAEA needs buttressing, from the enhanced sharing of information, to reporting that is less political and more forthright. The case also illustrates the downside of politicizing IAEA investigations and supports the new director's apparent intent to return the agency to its core technical tasks.

Keywords:

• Syria
• North Korea
• International Atomic Energy Agency
• safeguards

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article was written while the author was a senior visiting fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University. The author thanks the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for hosting a workshop in September 2009 to help him think through this subject, and for publishing an earlier version of this paper in January 2010. The author also thanks for their insights and advice the participants in a December 2009 joint workshop on the Syria investigation organized by the National Defense University's WMD Center and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Finally, the author expresses his appreciation for the tremendous work of the IAEA and the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna in working to protect the world from the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Notes

1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 2009, <www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/September/20090923110705eaifas0.3711664.html>.

2. An earlier version of this paper was published in January 2010. See Gregory L. Schulte, “Uncovering Syria's Covert Reactor,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, January 2010, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/schulte_syria.pdf>.

3. Much of the information briefed to the IAEA was contained in “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 24, 2008, <www.dni.gov/interviews/20080424_interview.pdf>. Excerpts from the video that accompanied the briefing can be found at GlobalSecurity.org, <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/syria/2008/syria-080424-dni01.htm>. A summary of U.S. information was also included in my statement to the June 2008 meeting of the IAEA Board, <vienna.usmission.gov/08-06-05syria/>.

4. Syria's 1992 safeguards agreement is available at IAEA, “Agreement of 25^th of February 1992 between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” July 1992, INFCIRC/407, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc407.pdf>. Article 41 states: “The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.”

5. Syria's Subsidiary Arrangements are not publicly available, but the IAEA has reported that all states with significant nuclear activities (e.g., including Syria) have adopted the “modified Code 3.1” with the requirement for early notification.

6. A description of the June 2008 visit is included in IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2008/60, November 19, 2008, <www.isis-online.org/publications/syria/IAEA_Report_Syria_19Nov2008.pdf>.

7. Peter Crail, “Syria Shirks Follow-Up IAEA Probe,” Arms Control Today, September 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_09/Syria>; and “Syria All But Rules Out New U.N. Nuclear Inspection,” Associated Press, November 21, 2008.

8. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

9. Paragraph 7 of IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/9, February 19, 2009, <isis-online.org/publications/syria/IAEA_Report_Syria_Feb_2009.pdf>.

10. The discovery of unexplained uranium particles at Syria's Miniature Neutron Source Reactor is described in IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/36, June 5, 2009, <www.isis-online.org/publications/syria/IAEA_Syria_Report_5June2009.pdf>.

11. “There is no limitation in comprehensive Safeguards Agreements on Agency access to information, activities or locations simply because they may be military related,” according to paragraph 14 of IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/56, August 28, 2009.

12. Paragraph 18 of IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” GOV/2009/36.

13. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” GOV/2009/56.

14. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General, GOV/2009/75, November 16, 2009, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/212/gov2009_75_syria.pdf>.

15. George W. Bush, “President Announces New Measure to Counter the Threat of WMD,” remarks by the president on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, National Defense University, February 11, 2004, <georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html>.

16. “Syria Pulls Out of Race for IAEA Board,” Agence France-Presse, October 3, 2008.

17. “Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei,” press statement 2008/06, April 25, 2008, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2008/prn200806.html>.

18. “Statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, Austria,” June 2009, <www.cubaminrex.cu/English/UNGA/Articulos/63Session/Statements/24-06-09-Statement_1.html>.

19. The NAM Vienna chapter was established in 2003, just after the IAEA started to investigate Iran's nuclear program. Tehran seized on the group as a diplomatic tool. It sought to control the drafting of NAM statements and to intimidate any delegation seeking language critical of Iran's nuclear violations. A few intrepid delegations stood up to Iran, but other ambassadors privately told me that it was not worth the trouble.

20. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” November 27, 2008, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n013.html>.

21. George Jahn, “UN Nuclear Agency Chief Critical of US,” Associated Press, November 25, 2008.

22. Article 19, Syria's Safeguards Agreement.

23. Mark Heinrich, “IAEA Overrides U.S., Clears Syria Nuclear Aid Plan,” Reuters, November 26, 2008.

24. At a December 1, 2009 workshop, “Seeking Syrian Cooperation with the IAEA sponsored by National Defense University and U.S. Institute of Peace,” participating Syria experts remained perplexed by Assad's motives.

25. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Czech Republc, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.

26. Obama, “Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 2009,

27. “Statement of Robert Ford, Ambassador-designate to the Syrian Arab Republic Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” March 16, 2010, <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/FordTestimony100316a.pdf>.

28. Article 72, Syria's Safeguard Agreement.

29. James M. Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick, and Pierre Goldschmidt, “The IAEA Should Call for a Special Inspection in Syria,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 26, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22791>.

30. Article 18, Syria's Safeguards Agreement.

31. Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute states: “The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” The IAEA Statute is available at <www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html#A1.12>.

32. Operative paragraph 1 of UN Security Council Resolution 1887, September 24, 2009.

33. IAEA, “Implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2009/82, November 27, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-82.pdf>.

34. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at the United States Institute of Peace,” Department of State, October 21, 2009, <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130806.htm>.

35. European Commission External Relations, “Syrian Arab Republic,” fact sheet, <ec.europa.eu/external_relations/syria/index_en.htm>.

36. “Note on the Implementation of the WMD Clause,” Council of the European Union, January 19, 2009, 5503/09, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st05503.en09.pdf>.

37. Article VIII of the IAEA Statute states: “Each member should make available such information as would, in the judgement of the member, be helpful to the Agency.”

38. Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, “Final Statement to the IAEA Board on ‘A World Without Nuclear Weapons: Transforming the President's Vision in Prague to a New Spirit of Vienna,’” June 15, 2009, <vienna.usmission.gov/061809final.html>.

39. UN Security Council Resolution 1887, September 24, 2009, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement>.