Charles Dudley Warner, co-author (with Mark Twain) of the 1873 novel The Gilded Age, once remarked, “Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.” In the same vein, many people today complain about the inability of the international community to keep determined states from using overt or covert nuclear energy programs as a means to acquire nuclear weapons, even as solutions prove elusive. As this issue was being finalized, the latest debate (sparked by an article in the September issue of the Atlantic) was well under way over whether Israel will bomb Iran to retard its nuclear ambitions. Watchful acquiescence or military action often seem to be the only options on the table when discussing the Iranian “problem,” replicating to some degree the debates about the dangers posed by North Korea's nuclear program in the 1990s.
Could there be another way, one that might not “solve” all aspects of the complex Iranian conundrum yet strengthen the entire nonproliferation regime and prevent states in the future from mimicking its actions?. In an article that is sure to generate much discussion, Christopher E. Paine and Thomas B. Cochran (Natural Resources Defense Council) offer a new, detailed plan to address the significant shortcomings in the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to prevent states from diverting materials (especially highly enriched uranium) and technology from certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as the historical inability of the international community to hold states accountable when this happens. Building on previous proposals, and taking into account the ongoing standoff with Iran, they advocate creating an independent International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association that would arrange long-term leases of sensitive fuel cycle installations (starting with enrichment plants), guarantee their exclusive use for peaceful purposes, and help protect them against attacks. It is an idea that deserves the careful consideration of governments, international organizations, and the nonproliferation community.
Lani Miyoshi Sanders, Sharon M. Deland, and Arian L. Pregenzer (Sandia National Laboratories) make a case that the dual nuclear policy objectives of the Obama administration—making concrete progress on nuclear disarmament while simultaneously maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal—can best be served by integrating them, rather than treating them as mutually opposing goals. Their article explains how such integration would work, reviews historical cases where a lack of integration led to problems, and suggests specific ways to help transform the U.S. nuclear weapons complex to give it the flexibility to support a number of future arms control and disarmament scenarios.
Johan Bergenäs (Henry L. Stimson Center) examines the growing role of the European Union (EU) in nonproliferation policy, particularly its unsuccessful negotiations with Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. He explores why in 2003 the E3 (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), joined by the EU the following year, sought negotiations given the limited prospects for success—and what the outcome of the negotiations means for future EU involvement in nonproliferation policy.
Thomas Lorenz and Joanna Kidd (King's College London) take a close look at how Turkey could play a role in reducing tensions and uncertainties in the Middle East, where interest in developing nuclear power programs is growing in many countries. They argue that a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, to increase cooperation between states, would be preferable to multiple individual programs. Turkey, with long-standing interest in and experience with nuclear energy, a strong connection to the West, and a foreign policy designed to prevent problems with its neighbors, is, they believe, in a strong position to initiate or participate in joint measures on nuclear energy, including jointly developing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
Charles Streeper (Los Alamos National Laboratory) addresses the problems posed by radioactive sealed sources. These “sources” are used in medical, industrial, and agricultural applications, they are distributed worldwide, are frequently abandoned or lost—and could be used to fabricate a radiological weapon, a so-called dirty bomb, which is a less demanding task than constructing a nuclear weapon. Unlike fissile materials, the control of which has become a top priority of the Obama administration and the international community, sealed sources are not subject to legally binding international agreements or regulations. Streeper proposes several short- and long-term changes to reduce the threat posed by these materials.
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro) reviews Brazil's nuclear policy positions under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula, whose term ends next January, has sought the role of mediator between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, not only to strengthen Brazil‘s standing as strong and reliable negotiator and to pressure nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but also to secure gains as a more active participant in international institutions and preserve the autonomy of its own nuclear energy program.
Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass (Henry L. Stimson Center) argue in a thoughtful viewpoint that the nuclear proliferation status quo is not sustainable and that periodic treaties and agreements to try to control it can no longer contain the long-term threat. Instead, they call for a multilateral disarmament initiative, citing a growing understanding of the diminishing value of nuclear weapons as well as the technological advances necessary to implement and verify a disarmament regime.
We wrap up this issue with a book review by Sumit Ganguly (Indiana University), who looks at a recent critique of nuclear security on the Indian subcontinent and offers his own policy prescriptions for the region.