TURKEY AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

As many states in the Middle East are considering whether to embark on nuclear power programs, there is an urgent need to develop confidence-building measures to reassure states in the region that the programs are peaceful. One possible path would be to consider multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle in order to foster nuclear cooperation between states in the region, instead of each state going it alone, which would likely increase suspicions and the risk of a cascade of nuclear proliferation. With its policy of “zero problems with neighbors,” strategic connection to the West, and long-standing experience in the nuclear field, Turkey would be well-placed to take the lead on such a nuclear confidence-building agenda. Over time and under the right political conditions, Turkey could initiate or participate in measures including cooperation on nuclear education, safety and security, research and development, and joint fuel cycle facilities such as a regional fuel fabrication center.

Keywords:

• Turkey
• Middle East
• nuclear energy
• nuclear cooperation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is based on field research conducted by the authors for a project commissioned to the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King's College London by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project aims to identify the most feasible multilateral nuclear options for the Middle East vis-à-vis the development of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Notes

1. This article draws heavily from material collected in interviews conducted in Turkey with the following government offices and nongovernmental organizations: Prime Ministry of Turkey; Energy Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Committee on Industry, Commerce, Energy, Natural Resources, and Information and Technology, Turkish Parliament; the Institute of Energy, Istanbul Technical University; Bilkent University; and the International Strategic Research Organization.

2. For a historic overview of effort to international fuel cycle, see Lawrence Scheinman, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: A Challenge for Nonproliferation,” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 76 (2004).

3. “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” IAEA, 2005, p. 31, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna-2005_web.pdf>.

4. For a comprehensive review of concerns from non-supplier states, see Yuri Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The Need to Build Trust (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010), <www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92-9045-197-6-en.pdf>.

5. Authors’ interviews with U.S. government representatives in Washington, DC, January 2010; and discussions with U.K. government officials, February 2010.

6. For an extensive discussion on nuclear power aspirations in the Middle East, see “Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Dossier, May 20, 2008.

7. “KEPCO Wins UAE Civil Nuclear Bid,” Nuclear Engineering International, January 4, 2010, <www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2055052>.

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9. “US-UAE 123 Agreement Enters into Force,” press release of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington, DC, December 17, 2009, <www.uae-embassy.org/media/press-releases/17-Dec-2009>; for a recent overview of the UAE's strategies of attracting foreign nuclear assistance and how these can shape regional nuclear development, see Bryan Early, “Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Strategic Lessons from the United Arab Emirates,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (July 2010).

10. Taylor Luck, “Kingdom, S. Korea Sign Deal on Nuclear Research Reactor,” Jordan Times, March 31, 2010, <www.jordantimes.com/?news=25329>.

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12. “Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran,” IISS.

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15. “Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran,” IISS, 2008, pp. 8–9.

16. Authors’ interviews with energy officials and academics in Israel, March 2010.

17. “Iran Offers to Improve Energy Ties with Turkey in Pars,” Today's Zaman, April 27, 2010, <www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-208571-105-iran-offers-to-improve-energy-ties-with-turkey-in-pars.html>.

18. “Iran Offers to Improve Energy Ties with Turkey in Pars,” Today's Zaman, April 27, 2010, <www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-208571-105-iran-offers-to-improve-energy-ties-with-turkey-in-pars.html>.

19. Emrullah Uslu, “Turkey Signs Strategic Cooperation Agreements with Syria and Iraq,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 6 (October 16, 2009), <www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35666>.

20. “Report: Turkey and Syria Consider Joint Nuclear Energy Project,” Reuters, June 13, 2008, <www.haaretz.com/news/report-turkey-and-syria-consider-joint-nuclear-energy-project-1.247770>.

21. A good non-threatening example is Turkey's current effort to mediate in the Iran nuclear impasse with its offer to store Iranian LEU on its territory.

22. Sinan Ülgen, “Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?” Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Discussion Paper Series-2010/2, June 2010, p. 4, <www.edam.org.tr/images/PDF/yayinlar/makaleler/gmf-ulgen-final.pdf>.

23. Authors’ personal interviews with Turkish officials, November 2009, Ankara, Turkey.

24. Daniel Horner, “IAEA Board Approves Russian Fuel Bank Plan,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2010, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/FuelBank>.

25. For a history of Turkish nuclear power plant attempts, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 33–44, <cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/kibaro43.pdf>.

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31. Nonproliferation analyst in Turkey, interviews with the authors, Turkey, November 2009.

32. “World Giants Eye $20 bn Nuclear Energy Market in Turkey,” Today's Zaman, January 6, 2009.

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34. “Russia, Turkey Inked Akkuyu N-plant Construction Deal,” Rosatom, press release, May 13, 2010, <www.old.rosatom.ru/en/about/press_centre/news_ROSATOM/index.php?from4=2&id4=18942>.

35. “Akkuyu Construction to Begin in 2011,” Nuclear Engineering International, June 15, 2010, <www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2056681>.

36. Saban Kardas, “Turkey Signs Nuclear Deal with South Korea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (March 24, 2010), <www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36190&tx_ttnews[backPid]=484&no_cache=1>.

37. TAEK, “Türk Devletleri Nükleer Isbirligi Arastirma ve Egitim Merkezi” [Turkish State Nuclear Cooperation Research and Training Center], <www.taek.gov.tr/tudnaem.html>.

38. TAEK (in Turkish), <www.taek.gov.tr>.

39. “Bilateral Co-operative Programmes,” TÜBITAK, <www.tubitak.gov.tr/sid/999/pid/547/index.htm>.

40. TÜBITAK, for example, is a member of COST (European Cooperation in the field of Scientific and Technical Research) and the European Science Foundation.

41. Arab Atomic Energy Agency, <www.aaea.org.tn/>.

42. SESAME, “SESAME Council,” <www.sesame.org.jo/Council/CouncilMembers.aspx>.

43. SESAME, “About SESAME,” <www.sesame.org.jo/About/Description.aspx>.

44. SESAME, “SESAME: Brief Description and Status Report,” April 7, 2005, <www.sesame.org.jo/About/Description.aspx>.

45. SESAME, “SESAME: Brief Description and Status Report,” April 7, 2005, <www.sesame.org.jo/About/Description.aspx>.

46. TAEK (in Turkish), <www.taek.gov.tr>.

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48. A. Aksoy, A.K. Ciftci, O. Karsli, B. Ketenoglu, Ö. Yavas, and S. Sultansoy, “The Status of Turkish Accelerator Complex Project,” Proceedings of European Particle Accelerator Conference 2008, Genoa, Italy, <accelconf.web.cern.ch/Accelconf/e08/papers/wepp124.pdf>.

49. Fieldwork interviews in Turkey in November 2009.

50. “Turkey May Enrich Uranium,” Hurriyet, January 15, 2008.

51. Mark Hibbs, “Turkey Will Press for Fuel Technology Transfer,” Nuclear Fuel, February 11, 2008.

52. TAEK (in Turkish), <www.taek.gov.tr>.

53. IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, “IAEA-TC Project Datasheet,” Project No. TUR/3/009, <www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/projectinfo_body.asp>.

54. “The Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group (Working Group) of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Held a Meeting and Workshop in Vienna, Austria on February 23–24, 2010,” International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, <www.gneppartnership.org/meetings.htm>.

55. Authors’ interviews with scientists at Istanbul Technical University and government representatives in Ankara, November 2009.

56. The nuclear reactor for the desalination project would have to be built by the established nuclear industry because none of the three countries possesses the technology. This would also serve to reduce suspicions of proliferation concerns. For a more general overview of the water resources problems in the Middle East, see Gloria Park, “The Challenges of Water Politics in the Middle East,” Harvard International Review 29 (Winter 2008), <hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1700>.

57. The nuclear reactor for the desalination project would have to be built by the established nuclear industry because none of the three countries possesses the technology. This would also serve to reduce suspicions of proliferation concerns. For a more general overview of the water resources problems in the Middle East, see Gloria Park, “The Challenges of Water Politics in the Middle East,” Harvard International Review 29 (Winter 2008), <hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1700>.

58. Thomas Seibert, “Turkish Leaders Frustrated with Tehran's Nuclear Vacillation,” The National, March 31, 2010, <www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100401/FOREIGN/703319866/1002>.

59. “Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil,” Islamic Republic News Agency, April 17, 2010, <www.irna.ir/En/View/FullStory/?NewsId=1120627&idLanguage=3>.

60. For a short analysis of the current state of the main terms of the deal, see S. Samuel C. Rajiv, “Iran-Turkey Nuclear Swap Deal,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, May 19, 2010, <www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IranTurkeyNuclearSwapDeal_sscrajiv_190510>.

61. Reuters published the full text of the Vienna Group's letter to the IAEA expressing concerns about the Iran-Brazil-Turkey joint statement: “Text: Powers Dismiss Iran Fuel Offer Before U.N. Vote,” Reuters, June 9, 2010, <www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6582W120100609>.

62. Colum Lynch and Glenn Kessler, “U.N. Imposes Another Round of Sanctions on Iran,” Washington Post, June 10, 2010, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060902876.html>.

63. Janine Zacharia, “Turkey Hopes to Grow Economic Ties and Influence within Middle East,” Washington Post, April 8, 2010, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/07/AR2010040705012.html>.

64. Gareth Jenkins, “Is Turkey Playing a Regional Role at Last?” Eurasia Daily Monitor 5 (April 28, 2008).

65. F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey's New Geopolitics,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52 (April/May 2010), p. 159.

66. F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey's New Geopolitics,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52 (April/May 2010), p. 159.

67. Asher Susser, “The Rise of Hamas in Palestine and the Crisis of Secularism in the Arab World,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, Crown Essay Series, February 2010, p. 22, <www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/ce/CE1.pdf>.

68. Paul Handley, “Prize Signals Saudi Nod for Erdogan as Mideast Force,” Daily Star, March 11, 2010, <www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=2&article_id=112580#axzz0nWJnT1oR>.