ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Abstract

The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance.

Keywords:

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• disarmament
• nuclear zero

Notes

1. George P. Shultz, Stephen P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, and James Goodby, eds., Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008).

2. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,” April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered>.

3. Fred C. Iklé, “Nuclear Abolition, A Reverie,” National Interest 103 (September/October 2009).

4. “Joint Statement by President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America,” April 1, 2009.

5. UN Security Council Resolution 1887, S/RES/1887, September 24, 2009.

6. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15; Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsäcker, Egon Bahr, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Für eine Atomwaffenfreie Welt” [For a nuclear-weapon-free world], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 1, 2009, p. 10; Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen, and George Robertson, “Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb,” The Times, June 30, 2008; Alain Juppe, Michel Rocard, General (Ret.) Bernard Norlain, and Alain Richard, “Pour un désarmement nucléaire mondial, seule réponse à la prolifération anarchique” [For global nuclear disarmament, one answer to uncontrolled proliferation], Le Monde, October 14, 2009, < www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/10/14/pour-un-desarmement-nucleaire-mondial-seule-reponse-a-la-proliferation-anarchique_1253834_3232.html>.

7. Joseph Cirincione and Uri Leventer, “The Middle East's Nuclear Surge,” New York Times, August 13, 2007; Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey's Pact With Russia Will Give it Nuclear Plant,” New York Times, May 12, 2010, p. A12; BBC, “Nuclear Power in the Middle East,” April 25, 2008.

8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 15, 1970.

9. These arguments have been aired publicly in the United Kingdom. See Field Marshal Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbotham, and General Sir Hugh Beach, “UK Does Not Need a Nuclear Deterrent,” The Times, January 16, 2009. U.S. military officers have made similar comments, in private conversations, to the authors.

10. The necessary steps to overcome the technical obstacles to disarmament are discussed in Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass, eds., Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (Washington, DC: Stimson, 2010).

11. Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), p. 240.

12. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), April 24, 1997; Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, <www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treatytext.tt.html>.

13. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf>.

14. How to verify a disarmament treaty is discussed in detail in Steve Fetter and Ivan Oelrich, “Verifying a Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons,” in Blechman and Bollfrass, eds., Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, pp. 27–56.

15. How a nuclear disarmament treaty could be enforced is described in detail in Rebecca Bornstein, “Enforcing a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty,” in Blechman and Bollfrass, eds., Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, pp. 149–68.