FLEXIBLE RESPONSES

Abstract

The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) received more attention in European NATO member states than did its predecessor, the 2001 NPR, thanks in large part to President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague speech and to the context of work on NATO's new strategic concept. The pivotal issue for most NATO states was how to handle the US sub-strategic nuclear weapons that remain in Europe. NATO member states perceived the issue differently, depending on the security interests and preferences of the country; each state read into the NPR what matched its preferences best, from an encouragement to pursue nuclear disarmament to a rather conservative preservation of the existing deterrence system. The reactions of five NATO states—France, Estonia, Poland, Germany, and Norway—illustrate this. There is widespread consent that the US sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe are militarily obsolete, but some countries ascribe to them a certain political-symbolic function, be it as the “glue of the alliance” or as disarmament showstoppers. Ultimately, the NPR did not end the existing cleavages on the issue of US nuclear weapons based in Europe, but rather postponed resolving them. The current way out for NATO is to move the issue to negotiations with Russia—if Russia is game.

Keywords:

• NATO
• France
• Estonia
• Poland
• Germany
• Norway
• United States
• nuclear policy
• nuclear weapons
• nonproliferation

Notes

1. For an excellent introduction into this issue, see Johan Bergenäs, Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-Strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2010, <cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf > ; see also Steven Andreasen, Malcolm Chalmers, and Isabelle Williams, “NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Is a New Consensus Possible?” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), RUSI Occasional Paper, August 2010.

2. The difference between “strategic” and “sub-strategic” has traditionally been defined from a US perspective: strategic nuclear weapons are those that can reach the United States across the oceans; sub-strategic nuclear weapons have shorter range. Although Europeans have adopted this definition, from their vantage point all nuclear weapons are “strategic.”

3. Martin A. Smith, “To Neither Use Them Nor Lose Them: NATO and Nuclear Weapons since the Cold War,” Contemporary Security Policy 25 (2004), pp. 524–44.

4. For more on Turkey's reaction to the US NPR, see Mustafa Kibaroglu's article in this special issue of the Nonproliferation Review.

5. The op-ed was written by Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, “Germany Opens Pandora's Box,” Centre for European Reform, February 2010, <www.cer.org.uk/pdf/bn_pandora_final_8feb10.pdf>. For Germany's position, see Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's speech at the Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010, <www.securityconference.de/Joseph-R-Biden.451.0.html?&L=1>. Some government officials, as well as experts, felt that Germany was beaten up for taking President Obama's disarmament rhetoric too seriously. It was left to two prominent advocates of the mainstream German security establishment to refute the criticism by Miller et al.; see Wolfgang Ischinger and Ulrich Weisser, “NATO and the Nuclear Umbrella,” New York Times, February 15, 2010, <www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/opinion/16iht-edischinger.html?emc=eta>.

6. On doubts about BMD, see Götz Neuneck and Hans Christian Gils, “The New US Missile Defense Plans in Europe: Status and Implications,” in Subrata Ghoshroy and Götz Neuneck, eds., South Asia at a Crossroads: Conflict or Cooperation in the Age of Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Space Rivalries (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), pp. 55–74.

7. Lewis Dunn et al., “Foreign Perspectives on US Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications,” 2006, <www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/ForeignPerspectivesUSNuclearPolicyCompleteReport.pdf>.

8. Andy Butfoy, “Washington's Apparent Readiness to Start Nuclear War,” Survival 50 (2008), pp. 115–40.

9. Letter to Anders Rasmussen from foreign ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Norway, February 26, 2010, <www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:200281&type=org>.

10. Group of Experts, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO,” NATO, May 2010, pp. 43–44.

11. Hillary Clinton, “Secretary Clinton's Press Availability in Tallinn, Estonia: Clinton Discusses Afghanistan, Russia and NATO's Nuclear Posture,” State Department, April 23, 2010; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, monthly press briefing, 2010, <www.nato.int/cps/natolive/opinions_62697.htm>.

12. Natalie Nougayrède, “Paris réticent face à l’élimination de l'arme nucléaire” [Paris reluctant to face elimination of nuclear weapons], Le Monde, February 2, 2010, p. 6.

13. See Alain Juppé, Bernard Norlain, Alain Richard, and Michel Rocard, “Pour un désarmement nucléaire mondial, seule réponse à la prolifération mondiale” [For global nuclear disarmament, the only response to global proliferation], Le Monde, October 15, 2009, p. 21; Michel Rocard and Georges Le Guelte, “Le rêve du Docteur Folamour. Il faut mettre un terme à la prolifération nucléarie en éliminant les arsenaux” [The dream of Dr. Strangelove: It is necessary to end nuclear proliferation by eliminating the arsenals], Le Monde, May 4, 2010, p. 22.

14. Nougayrède, “Paris réticent face à l’élimination de l'arme nucléaire” [Paris reluctant to face elimination of nuclear weapons].

15. According to Norway's foreign minister. See Jonas Gahr Støre, “Disarmament as a Global Challenge,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 22, 2010.

16. “Obama limite l'emploi de la bombe atomique, in 24 heures,” [Obama restricts the use of atomic bomb in 24 hours], Tribune de beneve, April 2, 2010; “Obama restraint son recours” [Obama limits use], La Nouvelle Republique, April 7, 2010; François D'Alençon, “Barack Obama limite l'emploi de l'arme nucléaire par son pays” [Barack Obama limits his country's use of nuclear arms], La-Croix.com, April 6, 2010.

17. Isabelle Lasserre, “Les ‘abolitionistes’ pressent Washington et Moscou d'ouvrir de nouvelles négociations pour réduire leurs arsenaux” [The “abolitionists” urging Washington and Moscow to open new negotiations to reduce their arsenals], Le Figaro, May 2, 2010, p. 7.

18. “La France exclut tout changement dans sa politique de dissuasion nucléaire” [France excludes any nuclear deterrence policy change], Agence-France Presse, April 10, 2010.

19. Ben Cramer, “La France face à l'option zero” [France facing the zero option], LeMonde.fr, May 7, 2010.

20. Natalie Nougayrède, “L'OTAN sepenche sur le sort des armes nucléaires tactiques en Europe” [NATO focuses on the fate of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe], Le Monde, April 23, 2010, p. 6.

21. It is in this regard representative of all three Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia). Maria Mälksoo, “The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe,” Security Dialogue 37 (September 2006), pp. 275–98.

22. International Centre for Defense Studies, “The Mentality of the Russian Elite and Society and Its Influence on Foreign Policy,” Executive Summary, 2009.

23. David Brunnstrom and Mohammed Arshad, “NATO Debates Future of Nuclear Arms in Europe,” Reuters, <www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63L2UH20100422>.

24. “Foreign Minister Paet: Unilateral Disarmament of NATO Would be Dangerous,” NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers, April 23, 2010, <www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/9375>; “Foreign Minister Paet and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen: New Threats Receive the Same Attention,” NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers, April 23, 2010, <www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/9374>.

25. “Foreign Minister Paet: Unilateral Disarmament of NATO Would be Dangerous,” NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

26. See also Laura Chappell, “The End of Old Europe? Poland in Transition: Implications for a European Security and Defence Policy,” Contemporary Security Policy 31 (August 2010), pp. 225–48.

27. Radoslaw Sikorski, speech at the third annual international conference on NATO and international security, Warsaw, March 12, 2010, <www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/20100315NATO/2010%2003%20NATO%20CSM%20Conference.pdf>.

28. Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, “Next, the Tactical Nukes,” New York Times, February 1, 2010, < www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html>.

29. Wojciech Moskwa, “Norway, Poland Seek Curbs on Tactical Nuclear Arms,” Reuters, April 9, 2010, <www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6384GW20100409>.

30. Lukasz Kulesa, “Roma Locuta, Causa Finita? The Nuclear Posture Review and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Analysis, April 29, 2010, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40714#kulesa>.

31. A well-informed, concise presentation of Polish views by a nongovernmental expert is Lukas Kulesa, “Reduce US Nukes in Europe to Zero, and Keep NATO Strong (and Nuclear): A View from Poland,” Polish Institute for Foreign Affairs, PISM Strategic Files No. 7, March 2009.

32. “Wachstum 2009: Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Der Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU, und FDP” [Growth 2009: growth, education, unity: the coalition agreement between CDU, CSU, and FDP], seventeenth legislature period, Berlin, 2009, <www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091026-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp.pdf>.

33. German Parliament, “Drucksache 17/1150” [Printed matter 17/1150], seventeenth legislature period, March 23, 2010, <dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/011/1701150.pdf>.

34. German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Bericht zur Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung 2009” [Report on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation 2009], Berlin, 2010, p. 4, <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Broschueren/ABRBericht2009.pdf>.

35. A leak about the probable outcome in early March sparked articles in no fewer than six German dailies: Tagesspiegel, Die Welt, Frankfurter Rundschau, Berliner Zeitung, Berliner Morgenpost, and Aachener Nachrichten, all on March 2, 2010.

36. For example, Ansgar Graw, “USA: Obamas Nuklearstrategie dient nur noch der Abschreckung von Atomstaaten—Konventionelle Systeme sollen dafür schlagkräftiger werden; Alte Waffen, neue Gegner” [USA: Obama's nuclear strategy serves only as deterrence of nuclear states; conventional systems should be made stronger; old weapons, new enemies], Berliner Morgenpost, April 7, 2010, p. 3; Thomas Spang, “Obama begrenzt Atomstrategie; US-Präsident vollzieht Kehrtwende bei Nuklearstrategie der Supermacht” [Obama limits atomic strategy: US president makes a U-turn on superpower's nuclear strategy], Aachener Nachrichten, April 7, 2010, p. 1; Dietmar Ostermann, “Neue Haltung; Seit Dienstag drohen die USA nur noch Nuklearmächten mit Atomwaffen” [New position: since Tuesday the USA threatens only nuclear powers with nuclear weapons], Frankfurter Rundschau, April 7, 2010, p. 6; and “Obama entschärft Atomdrohung” [Obama tones down nuclear threat], Spiegel Online, April 6, 2010, <www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,687333,00.html>. There was the exception of some accounts in the conservative media that took a more “Gaullist” position: Richard Herzinger, “Obamas trügerische Atomstrategie” [Obama's deceptive nuclear strategy], Welt am Sonntag, April 11, 2010, p. 13.

37. Gregor Mayntz, “Jetzt Russland überzeugen” [Now convince Russia], Rheinische Post, April 8, 2010.

38. Severin Weiland, “US-Atomwaffen: Union sieht Westerwelles Abrüstungskurs skeptisch” [US nuclear weapons: Union views Westerwelle's disarmament path skeptically], SPIEGEL Online, March 5, 2010, <www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,681493,00.html>.

39. “Westerwelle at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Tallinn: ‘A New Momentum in Disarmament,’” April 23, 2010, <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/InternatOrgane/Nato/Aktuelles/100422BM-NATO-AMTreffen-Tallinn,navCtx=132736.html>.

40. Hans Martin Sieg, “Eine Atomwaffenfreie Welt? Präsident Obamas Initiative zur nuklearen Abrüstung” [A nuclear-weapon-free world? President Obama's initiative for nuclear disarmament], KAS AuslandSinformationen 26 (2010), pp. 94–126; but compare this to the highly critical editorial published by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's former eminent nuclear expert Karl-Heinz Kamp (now with the NATO Defence College), in which he declares NATO's current nuclear doctrine and posture implausible and asks for consideration about whether US sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe are still needed: Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Was sollen amerikanische Atomwaffen in Europa?” [What's with American nuclear weapons in Europe?], Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntatgszeitung, September 5, 2010, p. 11.

41. See Rainer Pörtner and Thomas Weigold, “Wir müssen die Soldaten schützen” [We must protect the soldiers], FOCUS Magazin, May 10, 2010, p. 36, <www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/deutschland-wir-muessen-die-soldaten-schuetzen_aid_506260.html>.

42. Støre, “Disarmament as a Global Challenge.”

43. Støre, “Disarmament as a Global Challenge.”

44. Støre, “Disarmament as a Global Challenge.”

45. Tobias Schmidt, “Rasmussen lehnt Westerwelles Abrüstungsvorstoße ab” [Rasmussen rejects Westerwelle's push for disarmament], Lëtztebürger Journal, April 23, 2010 ; “‘US-Atomwaffen gehören zu glaubwürdiger Abschreckung’—Außenministertreffen in Tallinn” [US nuclear weapons are part of a credible deterrent—foreign minister meeting in Tallinn], Associated Press Worldstream, April 22, 2010.

46. NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon,” Brussels, November 19, 2010, preface and para. 26, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm>.

47. On the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty, see ibid., para 26.

48. See Sam Nunn, “NATO, Nuclear Security and the Terrorist Threat,” International Herald Tribune, November 16, 2010, <www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/opinion/17iht-ednunn.html?pagewanted=all>.