THE POSITION OF AN EMERGING GLOBAL POWER

Abstract

After Barack Obama's April 2009 Prague speech raised expectations, Brazilian experts and government officials received the release of the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) with positive but rather skeptical feelings. The differences between the 2010 and 2001 NPRs were assessed in Brazil as constructive, and the new negative security assurances were lauded as being less threatening to non-nuclear weapon states, as was the US commitment to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Although the Brazilian government insists that it will not sign the Additional Protocol (AP) until the nuclear weapon states take much deeper, though unspecified, steps toward complete nuclear disarmament, it did not block the final statement at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons “encouraging” all states to conclude and bring into force APs and to support multinational management of the fuel cycle. Brazilian officials, however, remain doubtful about the long-term US commitment to nuclear disarmament and notice that the lack of significant progress from nuclear weapon states toward eliminating their arsenals makes it onerous for other states to enact measures to stabilize the nonproliferation regime.

Keywords:

• Brazil
• United States
• nuclear policy
• nuclear weapons

Notes

1. International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook Database,” April 2010, <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx>.

2. Seeds of many of the positive changes for the country were sown by former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

3. Irma Argüello, “Brazil and Argentina's Nuclear Cooperation,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22597>. All BRIC members except for Brazil possess nuclear weapons and nuclear propulsion; this fact is seen by many in Brazil as a disadvantageous asymmetry.

4. Clare M. Ribando, “US-Brazil Relations,” Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2007, <www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/RL33456.pdf>.

5. Author's discussions with Tomas Gerbasio of the NPSGlobal Foundation. (The author is founder and CEO of NPSGlobal.)

6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>; and Sam Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, and Carina Solmirano, “Military Expenditure,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmaments, and International Security (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2010), <www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/05>. See also, “Brazil and France Sign the Largest Military Agreement in Recent History,” NPSGlobal Foundation, September 7, 2009.<npsglobal.org/eng/news/25-international-security/697-brazil-france-largest-military-agreement.html>.

7. Yana Feldman, “Brazil: Overview,” SIPRI: Countries and Issues of Nuclear Strategic Concern, undated, <www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/nuclear/researchissues/past_projects/issues_of_concern/brazil/brazil_default#overview>.

8. Argüello, “Brazil and Argentina's Nuclear Cooperation.”

9. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, “Estratégia Nacional de Defesa” [National Defense Strategy], December 18, 2008, <www.mar.mil.br/diversos/estrategia_defesa_nacional_portugues.pdf>.

10. Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, “Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Development,” Nuclear Threat Initiative/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 29, 2009, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_brazil_new_nuclear_defense.html>.

11. Note that industrial-scale uranium enrichment (at the Resende plant in Rio de Janeiro) is a civilian project carried out by the Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), with strong participation from the Brazilian Navy, which maintains control over the ultracentrifugation technology and the centrifuges’ supply.

12. Brazil still has not mastered the phases of converting uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride (for which it depends on Canada's Cameco), or of uranium enrichment (for which it depends on Europe's Urenco) on an industrial scale. Both the LABGENE and uranium hexafluoride facilities are covered by safeguards agreements monitored by the IAEA-ABACC system. Meanwhile, INB has been increasing the capacity of the Resende plant in an effort to meet fuel requirements for all Brazilian current and future nuclear reactors, which is expected to happen by 2014.

13. Eduardo Fujii and Sarah Diehl, “Brazil Challenges International Order by Backing Iran Fuel Swap,” Nuclear Threat Initiative/James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 15, 2010, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_brazil_iran_diplomacy.html>; “Brazilian Navy Explains Importance of Usexa Project,” Parcerias Estratégicas [Strategic partnerships], Open Source Center document LAP20080923357004, June 30, 2005; Diehl and Fujii, “Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Development”; and Argüello, “Brazil-Argentina's Nuclear Cooperation.”

14. Brazilian Navy, “Programa Nuclear da Marinha” [Navy nuclear program], <www.mar.mil.br/pnm/pnm.htm>

15. Irma Argüello, “Nuclear Energy in Latin America: Between Economic Development and Proliferation Risks,” Security Index 16 (2010), pp. 73–84. The whole project is expected to be finished by 2021, as confirmed by Brazilian Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim during a presentation in August 2009 to the Brazilian Senate.. See Nelson Jobim, “Apresentacão do Ministro Nelson Jobim” [Presentation by Minister Nelson Jobim], August 2009,<www.senado.gov.br/sf/comissoes/cre/ap/AP20090827_Apresentacao_do_Ministro_Nelson_Jobim.pdf>.

16. Celso Amorim, foreign minister of Brazil, “Statement to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” United Nations, May 3, 2010, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/brazil_en.pdf>.

17. Merval Pereira, “Visão Nuclear” [Nuclear vision], O Globo, May 20, 2010.

18. Irma Argüello, “The Value of Confidence to Control Regional Proliferation Risks,” presentation at the event “Improving the Proliferation Resistance of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle through New Governance Norms,” Royal Society, London, June 28 and 29, 2010, <npsglobal.org/eng/component/content/article/147-articles/923-the-value-of-confidence-to-control-regional-proliferation-risks-irma-arguello.html>.

19. Argentina deposited its instrument of accession on February 10, 1995 with the US government and with the UK government on February 17, 1995, while Brazil deposited on September 18, 1998, <unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/treatystatus.nsf>.

20. “Declarações adotadas no encontro do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva com a Presidenta da Argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner” [Joint declaration about nuclear cooperation adopted by Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner], San Juan, August 3, 2010, <www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracoes-adotadas-no-encontro-do-presidente-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-com-a-presidenta-da-argentina-cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner-san-juan-3-de-agosto-de-2010>.

21. Ribando, “US-Brazil Relations.”

22. Renato Yoichi Ribeiro Kuramoto and Carlos Roberto Appoloni, “Uma breve historia da política nuclear brasileira” [A short history about the Brazilian nuclear policy], Cad. Bras. Ens. Fís., 19 (December 2002), pp. 379–92, <www.fsc.ufsc.br/cbef/port/19-3/art/a6.pdf>.

23. The idea of an independent nuclear program began to grow in the mid-1970s, and a parallel program was developed, with mixed civil and military participation. It was mostly focused on uranium enrichment technologies (alternatives to “jet nozzle” technology, which turned out to be unviable) and the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1987 President José Sarney announced that Brazil had successfully enriched uranium on a laboratory scale to 20 percent. The native uranium enrichment technology of ultracentrifugation had been achieved under the Navy's control. However, Sarney's successor Fernando Collor de Mello made substantial cuts in defense expenditures and took measures to restrict Brazilian nuclear plans and to transfer them to full civilian control, but this was never totally achieved and the Navy remained a key player in Brazilian nuclear programs.

24. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act mandated termination of nuclear cooperation with countries that did not accept full-scope safeguards, i.e., IAEA inspections of all nuclear facilities. See more details at Kuramoto and Appoloni, “Uma breve historia da política nuclear brasileira” [A short history about the Brazilian nuclear policy].

25. Leonam dos Santos Guimarães, speech at the International Seminar: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament—The Future of the NPT, Panel 4: Impacts of Nonproliferation Initiatives Involving Fissile Material, Rio de Janeiro, October 29 and 30, 2009, <npsglobal.org/eng/images/stories/pdf/Rio2009/Panel4.pdf>.

26. Amorim, “Statement to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”

27. Author's interview with government officials, academic experts, and a former diplomat, July 2010, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo. Names withheld by request.

28. Achilles Zaluar, “Shared Responsibilities, Shared Rights,” in Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010), pp. 40–44.

29. Author's interview with a recognized Brazilian academic expert, July 2010, São Paulo. Name withheld by request.

30. Author's interview with government officials, academic experts, and a former diplomat, July 2010, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo. Names withheld by request.

31. Amorim, “Statement to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”

32. Author's interview with a Brazilian government official, July/2010, Brasilia. Name withheld by request.

33. Author's interview with Brazilian government official involved in nuclear matters, July 2010, Rio de Janeiro. Name withheld by request.

34. This paragraph's quotations: author's conversations with senior military personnel involved in nuclear activities. Names withheld by request; Orlando Ribeiro, “A Better NPR,” speech at the conference, “International Perspectives on the Nuclear Posture Review,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010,<www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=2842>.

35. Comments from author's interviews with a nuclear expert, and with a former government official who currently works on military education, July 2010, Rio de Janeiro. Names withheld by request.

36. Ribeiro, “A Better NPR.”

37. Ribeiro, “A Better NPR.”

38. Private communications with Brazilian officials and experts, November 2010. Names withheld by request.

39. Ministry of Defense of Brazil, Estratégia Nacional de Defesa [National Defense Strategy].

40. Author's interview with Brazilian nonproliferation expert, July 2010, Rio de Janeiro. Name withheld by request.

41. “Statement by Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares,” Main Committee I, 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 2010, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/7May_Brazil.pdf>.

42. Ribeiro, “A Better NPR.” For additional divergent positions concerning the AP signature, see Ribando, “US-Brazil Relations.”

43. Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, “Mudança de Clima e Energia Nuclear” [Climate change and nuclear energy], Valor Econômico, June 11, 2010, <www.sae.gov.br>.

44. José Goldemberg, private communication, July 2010.

45. Author's interview with Brazilian nuclear expert, July 2010, Rio de Janeiro. Name withheld by request.

46. “Statement by Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares,” 2010 NPT Review Conference.

47. Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, remarks at “Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Toward the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” NPSGlobal Foundation international seminar, Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 3–5, 2010. According to Macedo Soares, the NPT Review Conference stated clearly that the AP is a sovereign decision of each country and an important trust-building measure that should be generalized once nuclear disarmament is achieved, not sooner. In the last 2010 session of the General Assembly, Brazil abstained from a resolution put forward by Japan because, among other things, it proposed the universalization of the AP. In Brazil's opinion, only a multilateral treaty can be universalized; the AP is a bilateral agreement between the IAEA and a state party and therefore cannot be universalized.

48. Denise Chrispim Marin e Leonêncio Nossa, “Amorim Viaja e Prepara Visita de Lula ao Irã” [Amorim travels and preapres the Lula visit to Iran], O Estado de S. Paulo, April 23, 2010.

49. Author's conversations with Brazilian officers, July 2010, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro. Names withheld by request.

50. “Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil,” Embassy of Brazil, May 17, 2010, <www.brasilemb.org/press/press-releases/142-joint-declaration-by-iran-turkey-and-brazil-may-17-2010>.

51. “Iran Signs Uranium Exchange Deal with Brazil, Turkey,” Global Security Newswire, May 17, 2010, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100517_6125.php>.

52. US State Department, “Background Briefing on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts with Regard to Iran and the Brazil/Turkey Agreement,” May 28, 2010, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142375.htm>; “West ‘Still Concerned’ about Iran,” May 17, 2010, Aljazeera, <english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/05/2010517134649831836.html>; and Irma Argüello, “The Brazil-Turkey-Iran Agreement Was Received with Skepticism,” NPSGlobal, May 18, 2010, <npsglobal.org/eng/news/25-international-security/942-brazil-turkey-iran-agreement-received-skepticism.html>.

53. From Assis Moreira, “Brasil Vê Ação Forte do Governo Obama Contra a Mediação de Lula” [Brazil sees a strong action by the Obama's government against Lula's mediation], Valor Econômico, May 19, 2010.

54. Fujii and Diehl, “Brazil Challenges International Order by Backing Iran Fuel Swap.”

55. Fernando Exman, “Brazil Says Likely to Sign Iran Oil Sector Deal,” Reuters, May 15, 2010.

56. “José Alencar defende que o Brasil tenha bomba atômica” [José Alencar defends that Brazil has got an atomic bomb], Estadão, September 24, 2009, <www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,jose-alencar-defende-que-brasil-tenha-bomba-atomica,440556,0.htm>; “General defende que Brasil desenvolva a bomba atômica” [General defends Brazil developing an atomic bomb], Estadão, November 15, 2007, <www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,general-defende-que-brasil-desenvolva-bomba-atomica,81062,0.htm>.

57. Brazil's 1988 Constitution states in its Article 21 that “all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress.”

58. Kuramoto and Appoloni, “Uma breve historia da política nuclear brasileira” [A short history about the Brazilian nuclear policy].

59. Feldman, “Brazil.”

60. Author's interview with a former government official, who currently works on military education, July 2010, Rio de Janeiro. Name withheld by request.

61. Daryl G. Kimball, “Obama's Message to India: Proliferation Violations Don't Have Consequences,” Arms Control Association, November 6, 2010, <armscontrolnow.org/2010/11/06/obamas-message-to-india-proliferation-violations-dont-have-consequences/>.

62. Luis Kawaguti, “‘Vaga no Conselho de Segurança da ONU está ligada ao poderio militar do país,’ diz pesquisador,” [“Seat at the UN Security Council is tied to a country military power,” says researcher], Folha, November 10, 2010, < www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/828084-vaga-no-conselho-de-seguranca-da-onu-esta-ligada-ao-poderio-militar-do-pais-diz-pesquisador.shtml>.

63. Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” Daedalus 138 (Winter 2009), pp. 157–68.

64. Zaluar, “Shared Responsibilities, Shared Rights.”