ACCEPTANCE AND ANXIETY

Abstract

US nuclear weapons have been an important part of Turkey's security strategy since their first deployment on Turkish soil in the early 1960s. Turkey's NATO membership and its close relationship with the United States have been perceived to be integral to maintaining its security. The release of the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with its focus on disarmament and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, has a number of potential consequences for Turkey. This article provides background on the history of Turkish-US nuclear weapons policy in light of issues ranging from Middle Eastern politics to the development of NATO's new Strategic Concept. It then describes how actors in the government, military, and academia in Turkey have reacted to the NPR, why they reacted as they did, and how the Obama administration's initiatives may be received in Turkey in the future. This article concludes that both military and civilian actors in Turkey have reacted favorably to the NPR and are pleased by its emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation and the maintenance of extended deterrence; however, there is less agreement in Turkey about the emphasis placed by the NPR on the danger of nuclear terrorism.

Keywords:

• Turkey
• United States
• NATO
• nuclear policy
• nuclear weapons

Notes

1. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report” (hereafter 2010 NPR) April 6, 2010, p. iii, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

2. As rare examples of studies conducted in Turkey on nuclear proliferation matters (other than those of the author), see Duygu B. Sezer, “Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation,” Comparative Strategy 14 (1995), pp. 149–73; Sebnem Udum, “Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon Status: A Theoretical Assessment,” Journal on Science and World Affairs 3 (2007), pp. 57–65; and Sinan Ulgen, “Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?” Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Discussion Paper Series, No. 2010/2, June 2010.

3. The official website of the Turkish General Staff is accessible at <www.tsk.tr>.

4. For Turkish media pieces on the NPR, see Fikret Ertan, “Obama'nin Nukleer Stratejisi: Olumlu Adim” [Obama's nuclear strategy: a positive step], Zaman Online, April 8, 2010, <www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=970659>. The title of the article is self-explanatory regarding the views of the author on the subject. For an earlier assessment of the NPR, see “Obama Faces Reality Test on US Nuclear Posture,” Agence-France Presse, February 21, 2010, <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=obama-faces-reality-test-on-us-nuclear-posture-2010-02-21>. The 2010 NPR was also the subject of a think tank news item, although it only highlighted the main points of the review, rather than making any comments about its impact on Turkey: see Özlem Pinar Oran, “Obama'nin Yeni Nükleer Stratejisi” [Obama's new nuclear strategy], Stratejik Dusunce Enstitusu [Institute of Strategic Thinking], April 13, 2010, <www.sde.org.tr/tr/haberler/965/obamanin-yeni-nukleer-stratejisi.aspx>.

5. Nur Bilge Criss, “Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair (1959–1963),” Journal of Strategic Studies 20 (1997), pp. 97–122.

6. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Shared Responsibilities,” in Scott Sagan, ed., Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010), p. 25.

7. General Ergin Celasin (ret.), former commander of the Turkish Air Force (1999–2001), recalls flying with these jet fighters in the early 1960s when he was at the rank of lieutenant. Author's interview with General Celasin, February 15, 2010, Ankara.

8. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” Arms Control Today, June 2010, p. 11, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu>.

9. Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegul Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch—Turkey: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), p. 49.

10. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey,” in Harald Müller, ed., Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political Attitudes in 16 European Countries (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1998), p. 170.

11. Kibaroglu, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” p. 11.

12. Hans M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005), p. 9.

13. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Isn't It Time to Say Farewell to US Nukes in Turkey?” European Security 14 (December 2005), pp. 443–57.

14. Author's interview with General Celasin, February 15, 2010, Ankara.

15. Kibaroglu, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” p. 11.

16. If one excludes the rather distant neighborhood across the Black Sea.

17. Author's interviews with Turkish military experts, Ankara, 1996. Names withheld because the conversations were not on the record.

18. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey,” pp. 164–65.

19. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey,” pp. 165–66.

20. Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch—Turkey.

21. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey Says No,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2003, pp. 22–25.

22. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey Says No,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2003, p. 23.

23. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Clash of Interest Over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads,” Middle East Journal 59 (Spring 2005), pp. 246–64.

24. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Clash of Interest Over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads,” Middle East Journal 59 (Spring 2005), p. 246.

25. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Clash of Interest Over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads,” Middle East Journal 59 (Spring 2005), p. 249.

26. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “No Short-Term Fix to Relations,” Bitterlemons-International: Middle East Roundtable 8 (June 2010), <www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=1275>.

27. Author's recollection from his conversation with Professor Ahmet Davutoglu during a one-day workshop convened in Vienna, Austria, October 20, 2008.

28. Until about 2005, the NSC meetings were the most topical agenda item in Turkish politics. The council used to meet on the last working day of every month, and speculation about the content of the resolutions issued by its General Secretariat dominated public discussions, especially in times of heightened political debate about issues relating to the regime's secular character. Governments were expected by the military side of the NSC to ascribe utmost urgency to its “recommendations.” The famous NSC resolution of February 28, 1997, also known as the “post-modern coup” of the military, paved the way to dissolution of the then one-year-old coalition government that was formed by the center-right Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) under the leadership of Tansu Ciller and the “Islamist” Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) under the leadership and premiership of Necmettin Erbakan. With the democratization process gaining deeper and wider ground in Turkey over the last several years, especially since the start of accession negotiations with the European Union in 2005, the traditional role of the military in Turkish politics has much diminished. Today, NSC meetings are hardly mentioned in the press, unless there is an extraordinary event in national security arena that captures public attention.

29. Author's interviews with Turkish government officials, including advisers of top executives, Ankara, June and July 2010. Names withheld by request.

30. Author's interviews with Turkish government officials, Ankara, June and July 2010. Names withheld by request.

31. 2010 NPR, p. iv.

32. “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 6, 2010, p. 1, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/turkey_en.pdf>.

33. Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” Middle East Policy 15 (Winter 2008), p. 59.

34. The Vienna Group, which consists of the United States, Russia, and France in coordination with the IAEA, was supposed to provide the Tehran Research Reactor with 120 kilograms (kg) of 20 percent enriched uranium, in return for Iran's acceptance of storing in Turkey 1,200 kg of its low-enriched uranium stocks for one year, in accordance with the “swap deal” that was reached in Tehran between Turkey, Brazil, and Iran on May 17, 2010.

35. United Nations, “Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, Voting 12 in Favor to 2 Against, With 1 Abstention,” SC/9948, UN Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, June 9, 2010, <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm>.

36. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 33.

37. For more on this issue, see Kibaroglu and Caglar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” pp. 69–72.

38. For more on this issue, see Kibaroglu and Caglar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” pp. 72–73.

39. “Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for Consideration at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” NPT/CONF.2010/WP.69, New York, May 11, 2010, p. 3, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/papers/WP69.pdf>.

40. Author's interviews with high-ranking diplomats from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, July 2010.

41. Author's interviews with high-ranking diplomats from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, July 2010.

42. Author's interviews with high-ranking diplomats from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, July 2010.

43. Author's interviews with high-ranking diplomats from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, July 2010.

44. Written notes on the 2010 US NPR (in Turkish), given to the author upon his request by officials from various branches of the government, July 2010, Ankara. Name of the note taker withheld by request.

45. Views expressed by Ambassador Tacan Ildem, director general, International Security Affairs Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during a one-day workshop convened in Ankara by the Foreign Policy Institute, June 4, 2010. For proceedings of the meeting, see “NATO's New Strategic Concept Conference June 2010, Ankara,” Dis Politika/Foreign Policy 36 (Autumn 2010), pp. 9–12.

46. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, p. 9.

47. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “The Future of Extended Deterrence: The Case of Turkey,” in Bruno Tertrais, ed., Perspectives on Extended Deterrence (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2010), p. 92.

48. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “The Future of Extended Deterrence: The Case of Turkey,” in Bruno Tertrais, ed., Perspectives on Extended Deterrence (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2010), p. 92.

49. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “The Future of Extended Deterrence: The Case of Turkey,” in Bruno Tertrais, ed., Perspectives on Extended Deterrence (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2010), p. 92. pp. 92–93.

50. Author's recollection from his conversations with US and Israeli diplomats and military personnel in the early 2000s on various occasions.

51. Tulay Karadeniz, “Turkey Says Anti-Missile Should Not Single out Iran,” Reuters, October 18, 2010, <www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69H3BX20101018>.

52. View expressed by a high-level Turkish diplomat during an international workshop in Ankara, October 4, 2010.

53. 2010, NPR, p. 13.

54. Author's interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomats, Ankara, July 2010. Names withheld by request.

55. “Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for Consideration at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 4.

56. 2010, NPR, p. 13.

57. “Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for Consideration at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 4.

58. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, May 6, 2010, p. 2

59. “Turkey's Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, undated, <www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>.

60. “Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for Consideration at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 6.

61. “Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for Consideration at the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 6.

62. 2010 NPR, p. 3.

63. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “National Counter Terrorism Law Case Studies: Turkey,” in Tyler Rauert, ed., Lifting the Fog of Law: Legal Regimes to Combat Terrorism in Near East and South Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense University, forthcoming).

64. Author's not-for-attribution interview with Turkish military official, Ankara, March 2010, Ankara.

65. Author's not-for-attribution interview with Turkish government official, Ankara, March 2010.

66. Guy Roberts, “Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Building International Partnership to meet the Challenge,” in Osman Aytac and Mustafa Kibaroglu, eds., Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009), p. 9.

67. Peter Zimmerman, “Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” Defence Against Terrorism Review 2 (Fall 2009), pp. 1–14.

68. Kibaroglu and Caglar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” pp. 59–80.

69. Ibrahim Kalin, chief foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Erdogan, reportedly said that Turkey won't necessarily fight to keep the US tactical deployment: “As for his own personal opinion, Kalin said, Turkey ‘would not insist’ that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Conventional forces are sufficient, he added, to meet Turkish security needs.” See Jeffrey Lewis, “Official: Ankara Doesn't Need NATO Nukes,” ArmsControlWonk.com, December 8, 2009, <lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2561/official-ankara-would-not-insist-on-nato-nukes>.

70. Author's not-for-attribution interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat, Ankara, July 2010.