OPTING OUT OF THE IRON TRIANGLE

Abstract

Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the US chemical industry went from lobbying against the Geneva Protocol and promoting increased funding for chemical warfare to refusing to produce binary chemical weapons and assisting with the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—even though the treaty included provisions that could be costly to industry. What happened in those thirty years to make the US chemical industry reverse its position on chemical weapons? This article argues these changes were largely caused by the chemical industry's desire to reform the negative public image it had acquired due to its involvement in the Agent Orange scandal and other high-profile incidents during the 1970s and 1980s. The chemical industry's assistance with CWC negotiations may be explained after an examination of the US public policy literature, which argues that industry will support apparently costly regulations if doing so helps it repair a damaged public image and ensures greater profits in the long run.

Keywords:

• Chemical weapons
• Chemical Weapons Convention
• chemical industry
• United States

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Richard Price, Brian Job, Mike Wallace, Peter Dauvergne, and two anonymous reviewers for assistance and helpful comments.

Notes

1. Elinor Langer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare (I): The Research Program,” Science 155 (January 13, 1967), pp. 174–75.

2. Jeffery K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon General–Army, 1997), p. 48.

3. Rodney J. McElroy, “The Geneva Protocol of 1925,” in Michael Krepon and Dan Caldwell, eds., The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 148–50.

4. More properly known as the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925.

5. Langer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare (I),” p. 174.

6. In 1959, national defense spending amounted to $40 billion; in 1964, it was $54.2 billion.

7. Sixty-five percent of $57 million is approximately $37 million (not an insignificant amount, considering the total value of the products of the US chemical industry amounted to just $27.7 billion in 1960, compared with $674 billion in 2009). Langer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare (I),” pp. 178–79.

8. Sixty-five percent of $57 million is approximately $37 million (not an insignificant amount, considering the total value of the products of the US chemical industry amounted to just $27.7 billion in 1960, compared with $674 billion in 2009). Langer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare (I),” p. 179.

9. Quoted in Sanford Gottlieb, Defense Addiction: Can America Kick the Habit? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 5.

10. Walter Adams, “The Military Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” American Economic Review 58 (May 1968), p. 655.

11. Walter Adams, “The Military Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” American Economic Review 58 (May 1968) p. 656.

12. John L. Boies, Buying for Armageddon: Business, Society, and Military Spending Since the Cuban Missile Crisis (New Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 1994), p. 6. Other examples from the literature include Ann R. Markusen and Sean S. Costigan, eds., Arming the Future: A Defense Industry For the 21 st Century (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); Andrew L. Ross, ed., Political Economy of Defense: Issues and Perspectives (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); and William Greider, Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1998).

13. David Horowitz, Corporations and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 9.

14. Adams, “The Military Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” p. 654.

15. Adams, “The Military Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” p. 656.

16. Elinor Langer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare (II): The Weapons and the Policies,” Science 155 (January 20, 1967), p. 299.

17. Thomas O. Perry, “Vietnam: Truths of Defoliation,” Science 160 (May 10, 1968), p. 601.

18. The Agent Orange component was 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid; the dioxin was 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin.

19. Dioxin sources include diesel engines, metal smelting, or the burning of various materials.

20. The seven firms were Monsanto, Diamond Shamrock, Dow Chemical, Hercules, Thompson Chemical, TH Agriculture & Nutrition, and Uniroyal.

21. Richard J. Mahoney, “The Agent Orange Case,” Chemtech 14 (August 1984), p. 455. Monsanto was ordered to pay 46 percent of the total settlement, or about $83 million.

22. “Government Relieved of Agent Orange Payment,” Chemical & Engineering News 63 (May 20, 1985), p. 6.

23. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

24. In 1966 and 1967, hundreds of student demonstrations took place across America when Dow's recruiters visited college campuses.  The Love Canal environmental disaster: Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation (a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum) buried 19,000 cubic yards of toxic waste containing dioxins in Love Canal between 1942 and 1952. In the 1950s, housing developers built low-income housing and an elementary school on the site, neglecting to inform the residents of the chemical waste buried beneath their neighborhood. In the 1970s, residents of Love Canal observed strange chemicals oozing up through their lawns and noticed that they and their children were suffering from an unusually high number of birth defects and illnesses such as cancer. After a lengthy legal battle, residents were able to prove that their health problems were likely a result of chemical contamination. The government moved the residents out of the area and compensated them for their homes. Occidental paid $200 million to clean up the former landfill, even though when it sold the contaminated land to the Niagara Falls school board in 1952, it had warned the board of the dangers of building on top of a toxic waste dump.  The Bhopal disaster: On the night of December 3, 1984, a holding tank containing 40 tons of methyl isocyanate at a plant owned by Union Carbide in Bhopal, India, overheated, releasing a cloud of deadly gas into the city and killing thousands. Investigations revealed extreme negligence in regards to safety on the part of Union Carbide. In 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay $470 million in damages.

25. “SCI Medalist Heckert Discusses Public View of Chemical Industry,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (October 9, 1989), p. 10.

26. George S. Hammond, “The Three Faces of Chemistry,” Chemtech 17 (March 1987), p. 143.

27. Benjamin Luberoff, “Who Leads Whom?” Chemtech 20 (May 1990), p. 257.

28. “Controversy Envelopes Environment Standards,” Chemical & Engineering News 52 (March 4, 1974), pp. 15–17.

29. Richard J. Seltzer, “Broad Changes Urged to Boost Slowing US Industrial Productivity,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (June 5, 1989), p. 10.

30. Between 1872 and 1979, this trade association was named the Manufacturing Chemists’ Association; since 2000, it has been known as the American Chemistry Council.

31. Chris Murray, “CMA Charges Ahead Under New Mandate,” Chemical & Engineering News 57 (August 13, 1979), p. 17.

32. General Accounting Office, “Chemical Warfare: Many Unanswered Questions,” GAO/IPE-83-6, Washington, DC, 1983; and Deborah Shapley, “Chemical Warfare: Binary Plan, Geneva Talks on a Collision Course,” Science 184 (June 11, 1974), p. 1267.

33. Lois R. Ember, “Chemical Arms Panel Accused of Violations,” Chemical & Engineering News 65 (February 23, 1987), p. 21.

34. John Isaacs, “Washington Report: Mother Knows Best,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1989, p. 3.

35. Shapley, “Chemical Warfare,” p. 1267.

36. Lois R. Ember, “US, Soviet Chemical Talks in High Gear,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (October 2, 1989), p. 6.

37. Lois R. Ember, “US, Soviet Chemical Talks in High Gear,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (October 2, 1989) p. 6; and Lois R. Ember, “US, Soviets Inch Closer to Chemical Arms Ban,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (July 24, 1989), p. 5.

38. “The Quiet Comeback of Chemical Warfare,” Chemical Week 143 (August 19, 1981), p. 52.

39. “The Quiet Comeback of Chemical Warfare,” Chemical Week 143 (August 19, 1981), p. 52.

40. Quoted in ibid.

41. QL is ethyl 2-(diisopropylamino)ethyl-methylphosphonite, also known as EDMP.

42. Lois R. Ember, “Army Seeks Firm to Make Nerve Gas Chemical,” Chemical & Engineering News 60 (August 23, 1982), p. 32.

43. Quoted in ibid., p. 32.

44. Quoted in ibid., p. 32.

45. Quoted in ibid., p. 34.

46. Quoted in ibid., p. 34.

47. Lois R. Ember, David J. Hanson, Janice R. Long, and Pamela S. Zurer, “Congressional Outlook '90,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (January 8, 1990), p. 10.

48. Occidental Chemical was also called OxyChem.

49. Lois R. Ember, “Chemical Weapons: Firms Deny Sale of Chemical to Army,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (April 2, 1990), p. 4.

50. Lois R. Ember, “Chemical Weapons: Firms Deny Sale of Chemical to Army,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (April 2, 1990), p. 4.

51. It should be noted that the United States made no attempt to procure the thionyl dichloride from foreign sources.

52. Chip Jacobs, “Government Loses Nerve in Effort to Force Occidental Unit to Sell Poisonous Chemical,” Los Angeles Business Journal, April 9, 1990.

53. “US Offers to Halt Binary Chemical Arms,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (May 14, 1990), p. 5.

54. John Isaacs and Jacquelyn Walsh, “A Little Chemistry for the Summit,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1990, p. 1.

55. Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr. and Erik J. Leklem, “John D. Holum—the Future of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Arms Control Today, January/February 1997, p. 2; and General Accounting Office, “Chemical Weapons: Status of the Army's M687 Binary Program,” GAO/NSIAD-90-295, September 1990.

56. On fears of chemical weapons see Michael Heylin, “A New Focus on Chemical Weapons,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (August 13, 1990), p. 3. Quotation is from Lois R. Ember, “Chemical Weapons: US Seeks to Spur Talks on Global Ban,” Chemical & Engineering News 69 (May 20, 1991), p. 4.

57. On fears of chemical weapons see Michael Heylin, “A New Focus on Chemical Weapons,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (August 13, 1990), p. 3. Quotation is from Lois R. Ember, “Chemical Weapons: US Seeks to Spur Talks on Global Ban,” Chemical & Engineering News 69 (May 20, 1991), p. 4.

58. Lois R. Ember, “Prospects Brighter for Chemical Weapons Treaty in 1992,” Chemical & Engineering News 69 (July 29, 1991), p. 16.

59. Lois R. Ember, “US-Soviet Pact on Chemical Arms Likely,” Chemical & Engineering News 68 (February 19, 1990), p. 5.

60. It should be noted that Russia likely continued research and small-scale production of its novichok nerve gas weapons until 1994, even though it had signed the CWC in 1993. This act of duplicity was galling even to Russian chemical weapons scientists and likely would have continued for far longer, had the United States not signed and ratified the CWC. Vil S. Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View,” in Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), pp. 24–31.

61. The 1960 figure is measured by global chemical shipments.

62. John V. Parachini, “US Senate Ratification of the CWC: Lessons for the CTBT,” Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), pp. 66–67, <cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/parach51.pdf>.

63. “World Chemical Makers Back Chemical Arms Ban,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (September 25, 1989), p. 7.

64. Quoted in Ronald Begley, “CMA Honored for Work on Convention,” Chemical Week 157 (May 17, 1995), p. 12.

65. Lois R. Ember, “Fashioning a Global Chemical Weapons Treaty,” Chemical & Engineering News 66 (March 18, 1988), p. 14.

66. Lois R. Ember, “Fashioning a Global Chemical Weapons Treaty,” Chemical & Engineering News 66 (March 18, 1988) p. 15.

67. Lois R. Ember, “Plant Inspection Tried for Chemical Arms Pact,” Chemical & Engineering News 67 (February 27, 1989), p. 6.

68. “CMA Urges Change in Chemical Arms Treaty,” Chemical & Engineering News 65 (October 26, 1987), p. 7.

69. Gregory D.L. Morris, “Summitry for Chem Weaponry,” Chemical Week 152 (May 30, 1990), p. 12.

70. Peter Fairley, “CMA, Helms Dispute Treaty's Impact,” Chemical Week 158 (August 14, 1996), p. 12.

71. Keeny and Leklem, “John D. Holum,” p. 6.

72. Fairley, “CMA, Helms Dispute Treaty's Impact,” p. 11.

73. Erik J. Leklem, “Senate Gives Advice and Consent; US Becomes Original CWC Party,” Arms Control Today, April 1997, p. 2.

74. Quoted in Keeny and Leklem, “John D. Holum,” p. 3.

75. Quoted in Keeny and Leklem, “John D. Holum,” p. 1.

76. Barry Kellman and Edward A. Tanzman, “Chemical Treaty Deserves Ratification,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1997, p. 16.

77. Leklem, “Senate Gives Advice and Consent,” p. 1.

78. Adams, “The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” pp. 661–63.

79. On the 1937 poisonings, Quirk wrote that the “Massengill Company had rushed this [elixir, which was used to treat streptococcal infections] to market with no prior testing for safety. Unfortunately for a large proportion of users, the solvent in which the drug was suspended produced excruciating and often fatal toxic side effects almost immediately. By the time the problem was discovered and the drug was recalled, at least 107 deaths were attributable to it.” Paul Quirk, “The Food and Drug Administration,” in James Q. Wilson, ed., Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 196; on the implementation of regulations, see ibid., pp. 195–99.

80. James Q. Wilson, “The Politics of Regulation,” in James Q. Wilson, ed., Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 364–65.

81. James Q. Wilson, “The Politics of Regulation,” in James Q. Wilson, ed., Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 370.

82. Ember, “Fashioning a Global Chemical Weapons Treaty,” p. 15.

83. Wilson, “The Politics of Regulation,” p. 358.

84. Quoted in Keeny and Leklem, “John D. Holum,” p. 3.

85. Quirk, “The Food and Drug Administration,” p. 201.

86. Ember, “Fashioning a Global Chemical Weapons Treaty,” p. 15.