BIODEFENSE AND TRANSPARENCY

Abstract

This article assesses, via analysis of two case studies, the relationship between the dual-use nature of biological research and negative perceptions of the US biodefense program. The primary case study is the controversy over the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories, an as-yet-unopened maximum-containment biodefense facility in Boston that some locals suspect will be used for illegal offensive biological weapons (BW) work. Lessons from this controversy are considered in the international context via a second case study: the Cold War-era Soviet bioweapons program, which was continued in part due to the Soviet belief that the US biodefense program was really a cover for offensive BW work. The two case studies demonstrate that misperceptions of US biodefense can have serious consequences that may threaten US national security. Underlying such misperceptions is the unavoidable dilemma of dual-use—legitimate peaceful research and technologies can overlap with offensive military activities. Politics play a critical role in determining outsiders’ interpretations of the intent of US biodefense activities, transforming the dual-use dilemma from a descriptive concept into a problem in which misperceptions can be highly damaging. Taking into account the important role of political relations, the article argues that negative perceptions of the US biodefense program should not be simply accepted as a fait accompli, intrinsic to the dual-use nature of the life sciences, but rather that they can and should be addressed. The article identifies greater transparency measures as crucial to doing this.

Keywords:

• Biological weapons
• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
• United States
• Soviet Union

Notes

1. From July 2008 to March 2009, the author researched and performed fieldwork on the NEIDL controversy for his undergraduate honors thesis, “Biodefense in Boston: The Political Controversy, Profound Social Stakes, and Threat of Incurable Diseases Concerning a High-Containment Laboratory,” presented to the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, March 2009. Fieldwork included in-person interviews with representatives of the Boston University Medical Center and the local opposition to the NEIDL as well as attending Boston City Council and other public meetings concerning the NEIDL.

2. ”Our Mission,” NEIDL, BUMC, undated, <www.bu.edu/neidl/about/our-mission/>.

3. In addition, Cuba has on several occasions made unsubstantiated allegations that the United States caused infectious disease outbreaks, as well as an insect infestation. See Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Cuban Allegations of US Biological Warfare,” in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 144–64; and Charles H. Calisher, “Scientist in a Strange Land: A Cautionary Tale,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (November 2009), pp. 509–19, <www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a915797018>.

4. New biodefense facilities, and proposals for them, have encountered varying degrees of public opposition in different cities: Boston, MA; Frederick, MD; Butner, NC; Manhattan, KS; Columbia, MO; Livermore, CA; Davis, CA; Seattle, WA; Hamilton, MT; and Galveston, TX. For an overview of the debate within the scientific community, see Martin Enserink and Jocelyn Kaiser, “Has Biodefense Gone Overboard?,” Science 307 (March 2004), pp. 1396–98.

5. Frank Gottron and Dana A. Shea, “Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2009, p. 18, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R40418.pdf>.

6. For discussion on how biodefense research elicits international suspicions, see Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?” Arms Control Today, October 2004, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker>; Sidney Altman et al., “An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni,” Science 307 (March 4, 2005), pp. 1409–10, <www.sciencemag.org/feature/misc/microbio/307_5714_1409c.pdf>; and Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester, “Biohazard: Why US Bioterror Research Is More Dangerous than Bioterrorism,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2009, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/13/biohazard?page=full>.

7. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World—Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Dell Publishing, 1999), p. 235.

8. “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” (2005 Noncompliance Report), State Department, August 2005, pp. 17–18, 27–31, < merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/wmd/State/52113.pdf>.

9. For discussion, see Ronald M. Atlas and Malcolm Dando, “The Dual-Use Dilemma for the Life Sciences: Perspectives, Conundrums, and Global Solutions,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 4 (2006), pp. 276–86.

10. Kathryn Nixdorff, “Biological Weapons Convention,” in Rudolf Avenhaus, Nicholas Kyriakopoulos, Michael Richard, and Gotthard Stein, eds., Verifying Treaty Compliance: Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions (Berlin: Springer, 2006), p. 127.

11. Gregory Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 67–70.

12. For a comprehensive review on the complexity of verifying offensive BW activities, see ibid., pp. 53–105.

13. John A. Lauder, special assistant to the director of central intelligence for nonproliferation, statement to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat,” March 3, 1999, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/lauder_speech_030399.html>.

14. ”Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments” (2010 Noncompliance Report), State Department, July 2010, p. 11.

15. Crystal Franco and Tara Kirk Sell, “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2010–FY2011,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 8 (2010), pp. 129–49, <www.liebertonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/bsp.2010.0013>.

16. Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel, “Biodefense Crossing the Line,” Politics and the Life Sciences 22 (September 2003), p. 3. Also see Dana A. Shea, “The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, February 15, 2007, p. 4, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32891.pdf>; and Christian Enemark, “United States Biodefense, International Law, and the Problem of Intent,” Politics and the Life Sciences 24 (July 2006), pp. 32–34.

17. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, “US Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits,” New York Times, September 4, 2001, <www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/world/us-germ-warfare-research-pushes-treaty-limits.html?sec=health>; and Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment.”

18. Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester, eds., Breeding Bio Insecurity: How US Biodefense is Exporting Fear, Globalizing Risk, and Making Us All Less Secure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 6.

19. Regarding the risk assessments: the National Research Council in 2007 judged a key federal risk analysis of the NEIDL to be “not sound and credible.” See Stephen Smith, “US Review of BU Biolab Inadequate, Panel Finds,” Boston Globe, November 30, 2007, <www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/11/30/us_review_of_bu_biolab_inadequate_panel_finds/>.

20. Melvin King, et al. v. Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al., No. 07-10861-PBS, 2008 US District Court, August 26, 2008, <pacer.mad.uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/recentops.pl?filename=saris/pdf/mel+king+v+office+for+civ+rights.pdf>.

21. Researchers will not study Variola major and Variola minor (the viruses that cause smallpox) and Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (herpes B virus) at the NEIDL due to federal regulations that limit study of these pathogens to single locations.

22. Kirk C. Bansak, “Biodefense in Boston: The Political Controversy, Profound Social Stakes, and Threat of Incurable Diseases Concerning a High-Containment Laboratory,” thesis presented to the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, March 2009, available at Tozzer Library, Harvard University.

23. Stephen Smith, “BU Delayed Reporting Possibly Lethal Exposure,” Boston Globe, January 20, 2005, <www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2005/01/20/bu_delayed_reporting_possibly_lethal_exposure/>; and Steve Bailey, “BU Flunks the Trust Test,” Boston Globe, January 19, 2005, <www.boston.com/business/technology/biotechnology/articles/2005/01/19/bu_flunks_the_trust_test/>.

24. “Providing Scientific and Technical Advice to the NIH,” NIH Blue-Ribbon Panel, undated, <nihblueribbonpanel-bumc-neidl.od.nih.gov/>. The panel's official name is the Blue Ribbon Panel to Advise on the Risk Assessment of the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories at Boston University Medical Center.

25. Glen Berkowitz, resident, public comment at NIH Blue-Ribbon Panel Public Meeting, Hibernian Hall, Boston, MA, October 14, 2008.

26. Video records of NIH Blue-Ribbon Panel meetings can be accessed through the panel's website, < nihblueribbonpanel-bumc-neidl.od.nih.gov/meetings.asp>. For more on the October 5, 2010 meeting, see Emily Cataneo, “Tensions High at BU BioLab Meeting,” South End News, October 6, 2010, <www.bu.edu/neidl/2010/10/06/tensions-high-at-bu-biolab-meeting/>. For more on the April 28, 2010 meeting, see Travis Andersen, “Foes Question Public Stake in BU Lab: Doubt Benefit of Biohazard Facility,” Boston Globe, April 29, 2010, <www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/04/29/foes_question_public_stake_in_bu_lab/>.

27. Alexander Kelle, “Securitization of International Public Health—Implications for Global Health Governance and the Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime,” University of Bradford, Bradford Regime Review Paper No. 1, May 2005, <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/regrev/Kelle_securitization.pdf>.

28. See Julie E. Fischer, “Stewardship or Censorship? Balancing Biosecurity, the Public's Health, and the Benefits of Scientific Openness,” Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2006, <www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Stewardship.pdf>.

29. Laurie Garrett, “The Nightmare of Bioterrorism,” Foreign Affairs 80 (2001), pp. 76–89.

30. Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, “Biological Threats: A Matter of Balance,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2, 2010, <thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/biological-threats-matter-of-balance>; Enserink and Kaiser, “Has Biodefense Gone Overboard?,” pp. 1396–98.

31. David Ozonoff, testimony to the Boston City Council on Boston University's proposed biodefense lab, Boston City Hall, April 20, 2004, reprinted in GeneWatch 17 (May/June 2004), <www.mindfully.org/GE/2004/Bioterror-Deception-Ozonoff20apr04.htm>.

32. This view is shared by many within the general microbiology community. See Enserink and Kaiser, “Has Biodefense Gone Overboard?,” pp. 1396–98.

33. The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (Public Law 101-298), enacted on May 22, 1990, provides for US national implementation of the BWC.

34. In addition, the anti-NEIDL community also doubts that the NEIDL will respect the 1994 ban by the Boston Public Health Commission on all recombinant DNA research within BSL-4 facilities in Boston.

35. Public comments at NIH Blue-Ribbon Panel Public Meeting, Hibernian Hall, Boston, MA, October 14, 2008, videocast available at <nihblueribbonpanel-bumc-neidl.od.nih.gov/meetings.asp>.

36. Author's interview with a senior-level BUMC official who requested anonymity, Boston, Massachusetts, November 2008.

37. Newton resident, public comment at NIH Blue-Ribbon Panel Public Meeting, Hibernian Hall, Boston, MA, October 14, 2008, videocast available at <nihblueribbonpanel-bumc-neidl.od.nih.gov/meetings.asp>.

38. H. Patricia Hynes, Klare Allen, and Eloise Lawrence, “The Boston University Biolab: A Case of Environmental Injustice,” paper submitted to The State of Environmental Justice in America 2007 Conference, Howard University Law School, March 29–31, 2007, pp. 23–24, <www.ejconference.net/images/Hynes_Allen_Lawrence.pdf>.

39. Author's interview with a senior-level BUMC official who requested anonymity, Boston, Massachusetts, January 2009.

40. Also see Gigi Kwik Gronvall et al., “High-Containment Biodefense Research Laboratories: Meeting Report and Center Recommendations,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 5 (2007), pp. 75–85, <www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007_article_pdfs/2007-04-04-highcontainmentbioresearchlab.pdf>.

41. Also see Gigi Kwik Gronvall et al., “High-Containment Biodefense Research Laboratories: Meeting Report and Center Recommendations,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 5 (2007), pp. 75–85, <www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007_article_pdfs/2007-04-04-highcontainmentbioresearchlab.pdf>.

42. Eric Berger, “Biodefense Lab Meets Scant Opposition,” Houston Chronicle, April 1, 2004.

43. See Ragnar Löfstedt, “Good and Bad Examples of Siting and Building Biosafety Level 4 Laboratories: A Study of Winnipeg, Galveston and Etobicoke,” Journal of Hazardous Materials 93 (2002), pp. 47–66; and Eric Berger, “Galveston UTMB Lab to Handle World's Deadliest Viruses,” Houston Chronicle, March 14, 2004, <www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/2448766.html>.

44. Löfstedt, “Good and Bad Examples of Siting and Building Biosafety Level 4 Laboratories,” pp. 47–66.

45. “Not in my backyard” is commonly known by its acronym, NIMBY, and refers, usually pejoratively, to local cases of opposition to nearby construction projects. Reasons NIMBY objections are raised include noise, health hazards, and aesthetic burdens.

46. David Ozonoff, public testimony to the Boston City Council on the NEIDL, Boston City Hall, October 10, 2008. Also see Boston Coalition to Stop the BioTerror Lab, et al., “Statement on the US Biodefense Program from Communities Living in its Shadow,” Joint Statement, September 17, 2008, <www.stopthebiolab.org/documents/biodefense-programs-statement.pdf>.

47. Alibek, Biohazard, p. 41.

48. Alibek, Biohazard, p. 41. Igor Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine (Prometheus Books, 2003); Amy E. Smithson, “Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 32, December 1999, <www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Toxic_Archipelago.pdf>.

49. “Interview with Serguei Popov,” Journal of Homeland Security, November 1, 2000 (updated November 19, 2002), <www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Default.aspx?oid=3&ocat=4>; David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Anchor Books, 2010), pp. 324–25; Smithson, “Toxic Archipelago”; and Ken Alibek and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek,” Nonproliferation Review 6 (Spring/Summer 1999), pp. 1–10, <cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/alibek63.pdf>.

50. The most notable BW advocates were General Yefim Smirnov, who commanded the Soviet Fifteenth Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, the lead agency for all biological defense and offense activities, and molecular biologist Yuri Ovchinnikov, who is famous for leading the scientific efforts to harness modern molecular biology for BW research and development. In addition, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, efforts by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin to shut down the BW complex were obstructed by internal politics, in which powerful military leaders managing the BW program struggled to keep it alive for their own interests. See Hoffman, The Dead Hand, pp. 301–303, 339–357, 424–438.

51. Alibek, Biohazard, pp. 234–35, also see p. 53.

52. “Interview with Serguei Popov,” Journal of Homeland Security.

53. Alibek and Tucker, “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union.”

54. David C. Kelly, “The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification,” in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification Yearbook 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002), pp. 93–109, <www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Kelly.pdf>.

55. David C. Kelly, “The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons Verification,” in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., Verification Yearbook 2002 (London: VERTIC, 2002), pp. 93–109, <www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Yearbooks/2002/VY02_Kelly.pdf> and Michael Moodie, “The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001), pp. 59–69, <cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/81moodie.pdf>.

56. Kelly, “The Trilateral Agreement,” pp. 93–109.

57. Kelly, “The Trilateral Agreement,” and Moodie, “The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.”

58. Raphael Della Ratta et al., “Reducing Biological Risks to Security: International Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, January 2008, <www.armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/biothreats_initiatives.pdf>.

59. For US suspicions, see State Department, 2005 Noncompliance Report and 2010 Noncompliance Report. For discussion on China's suspicions of the United States, see Eric Croddy, “China's Role in the Chemical and Biological Disarmament Regimes,” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Spring 2002), pp. 16–47, <cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91crod.pdf>.

60. For an example of discontent among the Non-Aligned Movement, see “The Establishment of a Mechanism for the Full Implementation of Article X of the Convention, Submitted by Cuba on Behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties,” BWC/MSP/2009/MX/WP.24, BWC Meeting of Experts, Geneva, August 25, 2009, <www.opbw.org/new_process/mx2009/BWC_MSP_2009_MX_WP.24_E.pdf>.

61. For concerns over a biological weapon arms race, see Susan Wright, “Taking Biodefense Too Far,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004, pp. 58–66; Enemark, “United States Biodefense, International Law, and the Problem of Intent,” p. 39; and Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW et al., “Draft Recommendations for a Code of Conduct for Biodefense Programs,” November 2002, <www.fas.org/bwc/papers/code.pdf>.

62. Since its inception, the BWC has lacked a legally binding mechanism for verifying the compliance of states parties. For a discussion, see Koblentz, Living Weapons, pp. 53–64; and Ronald M. Atlas and Judith Reppy, “Globalizing Biosecurity,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 3 (2005), pp. 51–60.

63. Kathleen M. Vogel, “Biodefense: Considering the Sociotechnical Dimension,” in Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier, eds., Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 229–33.

64. Kathleen M. Vogel, “Biodefense: Considering the Sociotechnical Dimension,” in Andrew Lakoff and Stephen J. Collier, eds., Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 229–33. Enemark, “United States Biodefense, International Law, and the Problem of Intent,” pp. 39–40; Joshua Lederberg, “The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Spread of Infectious Diseases,” prepared testimony to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 24, 2001, <www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10290&page=235>; Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW et al., “Draft Recommendations for a Code of Conduct for Biodefense Programs”; Shea, “The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center,” pp. 10–11; James B. Petro, Theodore R. Plasse, and Jack A. McNulty, “Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 1 (September 2003); Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment”; and Ronald M. Atlas, “Biodefense Research: An Emerging Conundrum,” Current Opinion in Biotechnology 16 (2005), pp. 239–42.

65. This sort of engagement has been carried out with Russia through various State and Defense Department threat reduction programs, but many of these programs have been discontinued due to political complications. Tucker recommends reviving these programs. See Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New US Strategy on Biothreats,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2010, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Tucker>. Also see National Research Council, The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007).

66. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Addressing the Spectrum of Biological Risks: A Policy Agenda for the United States,” testimony before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, March 18, 2010, <cns.miis.edu/testimony/pdfs/tucker_jonathan_b_100318.pdf>. Also see Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 186–89.

67. For example, a collaborative effort between the Geneva Forum, BIOS Centre of the London School of Economics, and the governments of Switzerland, Norway, and Germany yielded three workshops in 2009 and 2010 on options and proposals to update the CBM system. For the final report of this effort, see Filippa Lentzos and R. Alexander Hamilton, “Preparing for a Comprehensive Review of the CBM Mechanism at the Seventh BWC Review Conference,” BIOS Centre, London School of Economics, August 2010. Also see Kirk C. Bansak, “Issues Develop as BWC Review Approaches,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/BWCReview>; and “Policy Issues for the Seventh Review Conference—Submitted by Canada,” discussion paper submitted during the Meeting of States Parties to the BWC, Geneva, December 7–11, 2009, BWC/MPS/2009/WP.4, p. 6.

68. Ellen O. Tauscher, “Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher: Address to States Parties of the BWC,” US Mission to the United Nations, Geneva, December 9, 2009, <geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/09/tauscher-bwc/>; National Security Council, “National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,” White House, November 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/National_Strategy_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf>.

69. For instance, Jonathan Tucker proposes that “procedures should be developed to notify all member states about the results” of bilateral compliance consultations. See Jonathan B. Tucker, “Is Washington Prepared to Lead at the BWC Review Conference?,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011, p. 27, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/Tucker>.

70. For instance, Jonathan Tucker proposes that “procedures should be developed to notify all member states about the results” of bilateral compliance consultations. See Jonathan B. Tucker, “Is Washington Prepared to Lead at the BWC Review Conference?,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011, p. 27, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/Tucker>.