ACHIEVING THE VISION OF THE NPT

Abstract

This article assesses the prospects for a strategy of incrementalism to lead to achievement of the core bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: non-nuclear weapon states' nuclear nonproliferation in exchange for nuclear weapon states' nuclear disarmament to the point of “global zero.” Game theory, prospect theory, and liberal international theory are used to evaluate the potential of a strategy of incrementalism. While separately each has insights to offer, it is when all three theoretical approaches are used in tandem that meaningful explanatory gains emerge. The article concludes that incrementalism probably cannot lead to complete nonproliferation and global nuclear zero. Instead, signal events (as described by prospect theory) are needed to “punctuate” incremental processes in negotiations (best explained by liberal international theory) in order to move past hindrances such as international structural constraints (exemplified by game theory) and the conservative risk-taking propensities of state elites (described by prospect theory).

Keywords:

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• incrementalism
• nonproliferation theory

Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

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4. Aaron M. Hoffman, “The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships: Why Rivals Do Not Overcome Suspicion Step by Step,” Political Science Quarterly 122 (Summer 2007), pp. 290–93. See also Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler, “Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History,” in Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, pp. 414–23.

5. Hoffman, “The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships,” p. 291.

6. Here, “nested” describes how customs and routines that channel interstate relations can be emplaced in a deliberately designed, more formal interstate agreement. My use is a looser version of a concept developed by Vinod K. Aggarwal in “Reconciling Multiple Institutions: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting,” in Vinod K. Aggarwaal, ed., Institutional Designs for a Complex World: Bargaining, Linkages, and Nesting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 1–2. See also Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p. 26.

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9. George Downs and Peter Barsoom, “Arms Control: A Formal Approach,” in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 361.

10. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight. See also Lewis A. Dunn, “The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (July 2009), p. 158.

11. Downs and Barsoom, “Arms Control: A Formal Approach,” p. 361.

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27. Barnett and Adler, “Studying Security Communities,” p. 420.

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37. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about Cooperation?,” p. 280.

38. Hoffman, “The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships,” p. 291.

39. Fields and Enia, “The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” p. 191.

40. The quote is from Downs and Barsoom, “Arms Control: A Formal Approach,” p. 361; on controlling defection benefits see Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about Cooperation?,” pp. 297–98.

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48. Gersick, “Revolutionary Change Theories,” p. 33.

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