BALLISTIC TRAJECTORY

Abstract

North Korea has been one of the world's most active suppliers of ballistic missile systems since the mid-1980s, but the nature of its missile export business has changed significantly during this period. Unclassified, publicly available data show that the great majority of known deliveries of complete missile systems from North Korea occurred before 1994. The subsequent fall-off took place a decade too early to be explained by the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003. It can be explained by a combination of factors that have reduced demand. First, after selling production equipment for ballistic missiles to many states, especially in the Middle East, North Korea by the late 1990s had become primarily a supplier of missile parts and materials, not complete systems. Second, after Operation Desert Storm, some missile-buying states shifted their attention away from ballistic missiles in favor of manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and missile defense systems supplied by Western powers. Third, some states experienced pressure from the United States to curtail their dealings with North Korea. During the last decade, having shed most of its previous customer base, North Korea has entered a phase of collaborative missile development with a smaller number of state partners, particularly Iran and Syria. Its known sales of complete missile systems are relatively small and infrequent. North Korea's time as missile supplier to the Middle East at large has ended, but there is a risk that regional states will turn to North Korea as a supplier of nuclear technology in the future.

Keywords:

• North Korea
• Middle East
• proliferation
• ballistic missiles
• exports

Notes

¹ Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002–2009,” Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 1.

² Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2002–2009,” Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2010, p. 63.

1. “It is the consistent principle maintained by the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] government in national defence that as long as it remains subjected to military threat from outside, it should produce by itself and deploy military equipment to safeguard the security of the country and the people. On this principle, we will continue developing, testing and deploying missiles. With missiles of the United States, which is at war with the DPRK technically, aiming at our territory, we find no reason to refrain from developing and deploying missiles to counter them. … Our missile export is aimed at obtaining foreign money we need at present. As the United States has pursued economic isolation of the DPRK for more than half a century, our resources of foreign money have been circumscribed. So, missile export is the option we could not but take.” Korean Central News Agency, “Nobody Can Slander DPRK's Missile Policy: KCNA Commentary,” June 16, 1998, <www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/047th_issue/98061708.htm>.

2. UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 14 January 2010 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2010/28, January 18, 2010. Four cases were reported by UN member states on August 14, October 12, December 23, and December 28, 2009. For the details of these cases, see UN Security Council, “Note by the President of the Security Council,” S/2010/571, November 5, 2010, pp. 25–26. Three new cases were reported in 2010, but as of this writing, it is unclear whether they concern attempted arms exports. See UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 18 February 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2011/84, February 22, 2011, pp. 5–6.

3. Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security 15 (Fall 1990), pp. 5–34; Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?” International Security 16 (Summer 1991), pp. 5–41; and W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Military Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 27–30. For most observers, the first clear-cut success of defenses against theater ballistic missiles took place in the opening phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. However, Middle Eastern militaries appear to have viewed defensive systems as worthwhile during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, based on their subsequent willingness to purchase Patriot theater ballistic missile defense systems. On this point, see Khaled bin Sultan with Patrick Seale, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 351–52.

4. For versions of this idea, see, Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 11; and John Barker, Michael Elleman, John Harvey, and Uzi Rubin, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control (Stanford: Center of International Security and Arms Control, 1991), pp. 80–81.

5. Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 74–95; and Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 28–46.

6. For a detailed examination of the MTCR, see Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003). Dennis Gormley's argument that the MTCR has made cruise missile acquisition more promising than ballistic missile acquisition applies more clearly to countries attempting local production than to buyers of complete exported systems. Dennis M. Gormley, “Winning on Ballistic Missiles but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle,” Arms Control Today 39 (December 2009), pp. 22–29.

7. So far, there are no news reports of buyers for North Korea's KN-02 solid-fueled short-range missiles.

8. There is some reason to believe that Saudi Arabia has sought to replace its existing Chinese-made ballistic missile force, potentially buying from China; however, as shown in Table 1, China does not appear to have exported missiles since 1992. This omission may reflect the limits of publicly available US government data. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions (London: Praeger, 2003), pp. 327–28.

9. Mark J. Valencia, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Glass Half-Full,” Arms Control Today, June 2007, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Valencia>.

10. Wade Boese, “Key U.S. Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/print/1848>; State Department, Daily Press Briefing, May 31, 2005.

11. Geoffrey Forden, “How the World's Most Underdeveloped Nations Get the World's Most Dangerous Weapons,” Technology and Culture 48 (January 2007), pp. 92–103. For those “less capable” states determined to acquire ballistic missiles, the possibilities may include importation of complete systems, failed assimilation of complex technologies, or a lengthy course of capacity-building as a preliminary to technology transfer.

12. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “North Korean Missile Exports,” Risk Report 2 (November–December 1996).

13. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010” (hereafter the “721 Report for 2010”), 2011, p. 4.

14. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010” (hereafter the “721 Report for 2010”), 2011, p. 7.

15. Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 83.

16. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2009” (hereafter the “721 Report for 2009”), 2010, p. 7.

17. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “721 Report for 2010,” p. 6.

18. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Pyramid Scheme: Egypt's Ballistic Missile Test and Launch Facility,” Jane's Intelligence Review, February 9, 2010.

19. Gormley, Missile Contagion, pp. 47–82.

20. Aaron Karp, “The Middle East in Strategic Transition: From Offense to Defense Dominance?,” in Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2001), pp. 77–87.

21. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 15.

22. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II: The Iran-Iraq War (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 495–502.

23. Martin S. Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 56–59.

24. Sultan with Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 145.

25. Josh Pollack, “Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931–2002,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6 (September 2002), pp. 82–83.

26. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Saudis Reaffirm a Right to Vary Arms Dealings,” New York Times, July 28, 1988, <www.nytimes.com/1988/07/28/world/saudis-reaffirm-a-right-to-vary-arms-dealings.html>.

27. Peter Hayes, “The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade,” in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 148–51; Navias, Going Ballistic, pp. 43–61.

28. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1999, pp. 12, 19.

29. Khaled bin Sultan later explained: “If ever there was a right moment to unleash our Chinese-built surface-to-surface missiles, this seemed to be it. We felt we needed to hit back in self-defense to as to deter further Iraqi Scud attacks. … But, after some anxious hours, King Fahd decided not to escalate the conflict. … He did not want to cause casualties among innocent Iraqi civilians and he no doubt judged that the Coalition's air campaign being waged against Iraq was sufficient retaliation.” Sultan with Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 350.

30. While meeting with visiting reporters from South Korea in August 2000, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il mentioned that his country “has been selling rockets to Surinam [i.e., Syria] and Iran.” See “Kim Jong-il's Dialogue with South Korean Media Heads,” Chosun Ilbo (English edition), August 13, 2000, as reprinted by Federation of American Scientists, <www.fas.org/news/dprk/2000/200008130358.htm>.

31. Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” pp. 23–25.

32. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “KPA Lessons Learned from Foreign Conflicts, 1960–Present, Part I,” KPA Journal 1 (September 2010), p. 4; and Amin Tarzi and Darby Parliament, “Missile Messages: Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq,” Nonproliferation Review 8 (Summer 2001), pp. 125–33.

33. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “For the Iraqis, a Missile Deal That Went Sour,” New York Times, December 1, 2003, <query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E2D8103AF932A35751C1A9659C8B63> ; and Charles Duelfer, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004, pp. 119–21, 273–80.

34. Philip Finnegan, “Saudis Study Missile Buy To Replace Aging Arsenal: US Fears Move May Spur Arms Race in Middle East,” Defense News, March 17–23, 1997.

35. Gary Samore, ed., North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 82.

36. Khalil Fulayhan, “Interview with Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi,” An-Nahar (Lebanon), December 21, 2002.

37. The United States imposed sanctions on North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation in mid-August 2002 in response to missile exports to Yemen. See “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, factsheet, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>. A spokesman for the Yemeni Embassy told a reporter that a single previous shipment had taken place. See Bill Gertz, “N. Korea Ships Fuel, Missiles to Yemen,” Washington Times, December 2, 2002. Secretary of State Colin Powell told reporters that Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh had described the shipment as “the last of a group” and gave assurances that they would not be retransferred to any third party. See State Department, “Powell Explains Decision to Allow Missile Delivery to Yemen,” Washington File, December 11, 2002.

38. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “721 Report for 2010,” p. 8; Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Statement for the Record for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010, p. 13; and Department of Defense, “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” April 2010, p. 11.

39. On this point, see Karp, “The Middle East in Strategic Transition,” p. 85.

40. Department of Defense, “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,” February 2010, pp. 7–8.

41. Joshua Pollack, “Another North Korean Missile First,” ArmsControlWonk.com, October 10, 2010, <pollack.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3388/another-north-korean-missile-first>.

42. See Appendix 2, Table 4 for sources.

43. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Background Briefing with Senior US Officials on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement,” April 24, 2008.

44. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “KPA Lessons Learned from Foreign Conflicts, 1960–Present, Part II,” KPA Journal 1 (October 2010), pp. 2–3.

45. Counting Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Arab states, fifteen of the twenty-eight countries listed in a recent study of states with ambitions to launch nuclear power programs are located in the Middle East. See Sharon Squassoni, Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), pp. 48–56.

46. For an overview, see Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 35–60.

47. Joshua Pollack, “North Korea's Nuclear Exports: On What Terms?,” 38North.org, Special Report No. 9, October 13, 2010.