IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY

Abstract

The confidence-building measures (CBMs) under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have been only moderately successful in enhancing transparency because of the limited participation of state parties and the poor quality of the data provided. In the absence of a verification protocol for the treaty, the CBMs constitute the primary means by which most treaty members can gain information useful for evaluating whether states are abiding by their treaty obligations. Given their importance, the CBMs need to be refashioned: in some areas the measures should be expanded to cover additional categories of life sciences activities directly relevant to treaty compliance and in other areas trimmed back to allow other organizations to handle activities closely related to their core missions and capabilities. This article explains the importance and function of transparency in the context of dual-use activities, reviews the evolution and the current status of the CBMs, identifies gaps and redundancies in the coverage of CBMs, and introduces proposals to transform the CBMs over time into stronger proto-declarations that can truly serve as source of information helpful in making judgments about compliance with the BWC's prohibitions.

Keywords:

• Biological Weapons Convention
• confidence-building measures
• verification and compliance
• transparency

Notes

1. Alan S. Krass, Verification: How Much Is Enough? (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), p. 170.

2. Ronald B. Mitchell, “Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), pp. 109–30.

3. Dan Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Kristin M. Lord, The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information Revolution May Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006).

4. Examples include the bioweapons programs of Iraq and the Soviet Union—the existence and/or extent of which were unknown for a long time—and accusations of bioweapons programs that were later withdrawn. For more details on these programs and accusations see, for example, Milton Leitenberg, “Evolution of the Current Threat,” in Andreas Wenger and Reto Wollenmann, eds., Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 39–76.

5. Some BWC treaty members provided statements on non-possession or destruction of biological weapons, and the review conferences decided that all states “should” make such statements; however, no repository exists for such statements. Review conferences have encouraged states to provide copies of their national legislation, and a number of states have; these documents were collected by the United Nations. Because national implementation of BWC obligations has received much attention in recent years, much information on this topic is now publicly available, including via the BWC Implementation Support Unit's National Implementation Database, <www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/4ADF8E868AAE82B3C1257578005563E1?OpenDocument>, and the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre's BWC Legislation Database, <www.vertic.org/pages/homepage/databases/bwc-legislation-database/introduction.php>. Usually only a small number of state parties hand in compliance reports. For the Sixth BWC Review Conference in 2006, twenty state parties submitted compliance reports, now contained in “Background Information Document on Compliance by States Parties with their Obligations under the Convention,” BWC/CONF.VI/INF.6, Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, November 20, 2006, Geneva, < daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/653/33/PDF/ G0665333.pdf?OpenElement>.

6. “Second Review Conference Final Declaration,” BWC/CONF.II/13/II, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, Geneva, 1986, p. 6.

7. “Final Document,” BWC/CONF.VI/6, Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, 2006, Geneva, p. 22.

8. For the current CBM forms, see “Final Document: Part II,” BWC/CONF.III/23, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, 1992, Geneva pp. 25–47, <www.unog.ch/bwc/cbms>.

9. For more information, see the UN summaries, <www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4FA4DA37A55C7966C12575780055D9E8?OpenDocument>.

10. “2010 Reader on Publicly Available CBMs,” Research Group for Biological Arms Control, December 2010, <www.biological-arms-control.org/publications/CBMReader2010-finalannex.pdf>; “Improving the Confidence Building Measures under the BWC,” Research Group for Biological Arms Control, 2010,<www.biological-arms-control.org/projects_improvingthecbms_sub.html>.

11. The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs prepared a detailed guide on the CBMs, giving advice on how to collect information, complete the forms, and submit the CBM declarations. The guide is available at <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/54C762C0A34CF5CAC125768D004E25FD/$file/CBM+guide+pre-production+final+2+Dec.pdf>.

12. Nicolas Isla, “Strengthening the Confidence Building Measures: A Catalogue of Recommendations,” Occasional Paper, Research Group for Biological Arms Control, March 2007, p. 14, <www.biological-arms-control.org/publications/Catalogue%20of%20recommendations_final.pdf>.

13. Examples are Iris Hunger, “Confidence Building Needs Transparency: A Summary of Data Submitted under the Bioweapons Convention's Confidence Building Measures, 1987–2003,” Sunshine Project, September 2005, <www.biological-arms-control.org/publications/hunger_CBM.pdf>; Nicolas Isla, “Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapons Programmes: An Analysis of Confidence Building Measure Form F 1992–2003,” Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Occasional Paper No. 1, June 2006, <www.biological-arms-control.org/publications/FormF_1992-2003.pdf>; and Anna Zmorzynska, “Neither Here Nor There: Disease Outbreak Data in the Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and in Open Sources,” Research Group for Biological Arms Control, Occasional Paper No. 4, December 2007, <www.biological-arms-control.org/publications/FormB_2001-2005.pdf>.

14. Iris Hunger, Biowaffenkontrolle in einer multipolaren Welt: Zur Funktion von Vertrauen in internationalen Beziehungen [Bioweapons control in a multipolar world: About the role of trust in international relations] (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2005), p. 201.

15. See Isla, “Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapons Programmes”; and Zmorzynska, “Neither Here Nor There.”

16. “Final Document: Part III,” BWC/CONF.III/23, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BWC, 1992, p. 52.

17. “Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting,” BWC/SPCONF/SR.2, Special Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, September 9, 1994 (released October 13, 1994), p. 4, <www.opbw.org/spec_conf/sc_sum.htm>.

18. “Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting,” BWC/SPCONF/SR.3, Special Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, September 20, 1994 (released September 26, 1994), p. 13, <www.opbw.org/spec_conf/sc_sum.htm>.

19. Hunger, Biowaffenkontrolle in einer multipolaren Welt, p. 201.

20. “Joint Statement on Behalf of the JACKSNNZ (Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand) to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Meeting of State Parties,” BWC Meeting of States Parties, December 6, 2010, Geneva, <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/879D123FC48A1591C12577F1005BB6B4/$file/BWC+MSP+2010+-+Canada+-+101206.pdf>.

21. See, among others: Erhard Geissler, ed., Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Confidence-Building Measures (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1990); Royal Society, “Scientific Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons,” Report of a Royal Society Study Group, London, July 1994; Iris Hunger, “Article V: Confidence Building Measures,” in Graham Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando, eds., Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference (Bradford: University of Bradford, 1996), pp. 77–92; Nicolas Isla and Iris Hunger, “BWC 2006: Building Transparency Through Confidence-Building Measures,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2006, pp. 19–22; Graham S. Pearson, “Article V: Consultation and Cooperation,” in Graham S. Pearson, Nicolas A. Sims, and Malcolm R. Dando, eds., Key Points for the Sixth Review Conference (Bradford: University of Bradford, 2006), <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key6rev/art_5.pdf>; and Filippa Lentzos, “Reaching a Tipping Point: Strengthening BWC Confidence-Building Measures,” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 89 (Winter 2008), <www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd89/89fl.htm>.

22. Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” report of the UN secretary-general, A/59/2005, March 21, 2005, p. 29.

23. For an illustration of this argument, see “Country Report: Kenya,” in “BioWeapons Monitor 2010,” BioWeapons Prevention Project, November 2010, p. 43, <www.bwpp.org/documents/BWM%202010%20WEB.pdf>.

24. Based on the personal experience of author Iris Hunger with compiling and overseeing studies for the BioWeapons Prevention Project's “BioWeapons Monitor 2010.”

25. See, for instance, “Article X of the Convention,” paper submitted by the state parties of the Non-Aligned Movement and other states, BWC/CONF.VI/WP.29, Sixth Review Conference of the BWC States Parties, November 26, 2006, <daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/654/95/PDF/G0665495.pdf>; and BioWeapons Prevention Project, “How Can Article X Be Implemented Successfully?,” 2011, <www.bwpp.org/revcon-articlex.html>.

26. See Note 5 above.

27. The Global Network of Science Academies’ activities are just one example. For more, see <www.interacademies.net/10941.aspx?catGroupId=1&CFVTopics=9>.

28. Isla, “Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapons Programmes.”

29. If the CBMs are publicly available, resources permitting, NGOs could conduct all the activities in the bullet-pointed list and the results would be independent of political consensus.

30. This estimate is based on author Iris Hunger's personal experience compiling and overseeing studies for the BioWeapons Prevention Project's “BioWeapons Monitor 2010.”

31. Ralf Trapp, “Review … and What Next?,” February 10, 2011, in BioWeapons Prevention Project, “Civil Society Preparations for the 7th BWC Review Conference 2011: What Reporting Requirements Do We Need for the BWC?,” <www.bwpp.org/revcon-reportingrequirements.html>.

32. The results of these consultations are recorded in the following publications: Filippa Lentzos and Angela Woodward, “National Data Collection Processes for CBM Submissions: Revisiting the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) after Twenty Years of CBM Submissions,” Swiss Federal Department of Defense, December 2007, <www2.lse.ac.uk/BIOS/research/biosecurity/pdf/Final_Report.pdf>; Filippa Lentzos, “Preparing the Ground for the CBM Content Debate: A Study on the Information Exchange that Builds Confidence between States Parties to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention,” Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, December 2008, <www2.lse.ac.uk/BIOS/research/biosecurity/pdf/Report%20Final%20Lentzos%202008.pdf>; Filippa Lentzos and Alexander Hamilton, “Compendium of Proposals to Improve the CBM Mechanism,” Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, July 2009, <www2.lse.ac.uk/BIOS/research/biosecurity/pdf/CBM%20Compendium.pdf>; and “Review and Update of the Confidence Building Measures,” draft working paper submitted by Norway, Switzerland, and Germany, Preparatory Meeting for the Seventh BWC Review Conference, April 15, 2011, <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/A22406F928C314F1C125787700453F13/$file/BWC+RevCon+2011+CBM+Draft+WP+%28April%29.pdf>.