PREVENTING MISUSE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES

Abstract

The scope of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is sufficiently broad to deal with new threats emerging from developments in the life sciences; however, more thought still needs to be given to updating and improving measures to encourage biodefense-related information sharing and transparency between states. Biodefense is and has been at the core of the BWC, but the threat of bioterrorism should not distract BWC state parties or cause them to disregard the risk that illicit state-run bioweapons programs will utilize new advances in the life sciences. More states are pursuing biodefense programs—and spending more on such programs. The BWC community must address the issue of how states and civil society observers can determine the point at which a biodefense program, or parts of it, could be secretly transformed into an offensive bioweapons program. The authors propose several measures for increasing the transparency of biodefense programs, including: national oversight, confidence-building measures, mandatory codes of practice, confidence-building visits, and an international mechanism to encourage and protect whistleblowers. The authors conclude that unless accountability and transparency in biodefense programs can be attained within the next five years, the BWC will lose its relevance.

Keywords:

• Biological Weapons Convention
• biodefense
• transparency
• confidence-building measures
• life sciences

Notes

1. See, in this issue, Caitríona McLeish and Ralf Trapp, “The Life Sciences Revolution and the BWC: Reconsidering the Science and Technology Review Process in a Post-Proliferation World,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (November 2011), pp. 527–43.

2. Jonathan E. Suk, Anna Zmorzynska, and Iris Hunger, et al., “Dual-Use Research and Technological Diffusion: Reconsidering the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum,” PLoS Pathogens 7 (2011), <www.plospathogens.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.ppat.1001253>.

3. Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 57.

4. In addition to the Soviet biological weapons program, in which, for example, antibiotic resistant Bacillus anthracis was developed, this was also done in the South African program, in which a scientist genetically modified E. coli bacteria to express the epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens.

5. “Additional Understanding and Agreements Reached by Review Conferences Relating to Each Article of the Biological Weapons Convention,” paper prepared by the BWC Implementation Support Unit, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, August 2007, <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/66E5525B50871CAEC1257188003BDDD6/$file/BWC_Text_Additional_Understandings.pdf>; and Final Declarations from the BWC review conferences, available at <www.opbw.org>.

6. Monya Baker, “The Next Step for the Synthetic Genome,” Nature 473 (May 19, 2011), pp. 403–8.

7. Richard Lennane, “Verification for the BTWC: If Not the Protocol, Then What?” Disarmament Forum, No. 1 (2011), <www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art3060.pdf>.

8. “Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP of 20 March 2006 Relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC),” Official Journal of the European Union (March 25, 2006), p. L 88/65, <www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/2006-0320%20EU%20BWCRC-6%20CP.pdf>.

9. Roger Roffey, “Biological Weapons and Potential Indicators of Offensive Biological Activities,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 569–70.

10. William P. Rogers, “Report on the Biological Weapons Convention, submitted to president Nixon on 21 June 1972,” in Documents on Disarmament 1972 (Washington, DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1974), pp. 380–86.

11. BWC Fifth Review Conference, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Draft Final Declaration, December 7, 2001, Article 1, para. 7, pp. 2–3, <www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd62/62bwapp.htm>.

12. Editorial, “Preventing the Hostile use of Biotechnology: The Way Forward Now,” CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 57 (September 2002), pp. 1–2. See also “The Scowcroft Memorandum,” December 23, 1975, as reproduced in CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 57 (September 2002), p. 2: “Therefore the President has directed that biological agents or toxins may be retained only for the following activities, which he has determined to be for ‘prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes’: 1. Prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of diseases of human beings, animals or plants, or research and development activities for the purpose of developing means and methods for the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of disease; 2. Activities concerned with the protection of human beings, animals, plants, and materiel from the effects of exposure to microbial or other biological agents or toxins, including vulnerability studies and research, development and testing of equipment and devices such as protective masks and clothing, air and water filtration systems, detection, warning and identification devices, and decontamination systems; 3. Research, development, testing and use of equipment, devices and techniques for detecting the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins; 4. Biomedical or other research for the purpose of increasing human knowledge and not intended for weapons development; 5. Research, development, production, or use for the enhancement or protection of agriculture and the environment; 6. Use of biological processing techniques for non-weapons purposes, including use in the chemical, pharmaceutical, food, mineral extraction and other industries, or in research and development of such techniques; and 7. Educational and instructional activities related to the above. This list may be modified or amended with the President's approval.”

13. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “Defending against Biodefense: The Need for Limits,” BWC Special Paper No. 1, Acronym Institute, January 2003.

14. Scott Shane, “Army Confirms Making Anthrax in Recent Years,” Baltimore Sun, December 13, 2001; and Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, Germs: The Ultimate Weapon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 308–9, 296–300.

15. Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando, “Back to Bioweapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2003, pp. 41–46.

16. Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel, “Biodefense Crossing the Line,” Politics and the Life Sciences 22 (May 2004) pp. 2–3.

17. Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, and Richard Spertzel, “Biodefense Crossing the Line,” Politics and the Life Sciences 22 (May 2004) pp. 2–3.

18. Stacy M. Okutani, “Structuring Biodefense: Legacies and Current Policy Choices,” PhD dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 2007.

19. Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?” Arms Control Today, October 2004, pp. 13–19.

20. See Shane, “Army Confirms Making Anthrax in Recent Years”; Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs.

21. Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, “The Role of Professionals in the South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme,” Minerva 40 (2002), pp. 77–91.

22. Chandré Gould and Marlene Burger, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2002), pp. 30–37, 201.

23. Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard (New York: Random House, 1999).

24. Igor Domaradskij, “The History of One Risky Adventure,” unpublished notes made available to Chandré Gould by Milton Leitenberg, 1996; see also Igor V. Domaradskij and Wendy Orent, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/Russian Biological War Machine (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2003).

25. Franco Crystal and Tara Kirk Sell, “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2010–2011,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 8 (2010); Nick Schwellenbach, “Biodefense: A Plague of Researchers,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June, 2005, pp. 14–16.

26. The BWC state parties that make their CBM declarations publicly available include Germany, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom see UN Office at Geneva, “Disarmament: CBM Returns,” <www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4FA4DA37A55C7966C12575780055D9E8?OpenDocument>.

27. Nicholas Isla, “Transparency in Past Offensive Biological Weapons Programmes: An Analysis of Confidence Building Measures Form F, 1992–2003,” Occasional Paper No. 1, Hamburg Centre for Biological Arms Control, June 2006. For the acknowledgement of South Africa's bioweapons program, see South African Government Communications and Information System, “Statement on the TRC Hearings on the CBW Programme,” June 15, 1998.

28. Chandré Gould, “South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme 1981–1995,” PhD disseration, Rhodes University, 2005.

29. US Congress, “Biological Weapons Convention Protocols: Status and Implementation,” Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, July 2001.

30. Jez Littlewood, “Managing the Biological Weapons Problem: From the Individual to the International,” Paper No. 14, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2004,<www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/no14.pdf>.

31. “Ensuring Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention,” meeting report, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, July 2009, p. 9, <armscontrolcenter.org/policy/biochem/articles/bwc_compliance.pdf>.

32. Jonathan B. Tucker, prepared statement for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, “Addressing the Spectrum of Biological Risks: A Policy Agenda for the United States,” March 18, 2010, p. 6, <www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/congress/house_representatives/32.pdf>.

33. Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau, “Critical Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, pp. 17–20, <www.armscontrol.org/print/2099>.

34.Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau, “Critical Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, pp. 17–20, <www.armscontrol.org/print/2099>.

35. “Biodefence: Codes of Conduct and Practice,” prepared by Canada, BWC/MSP/2005/MX/WP.5, Meeting of BWC State Parties, June 9, 2005, <www.opbw.org/new_process/mx2005/bwc_msp.2005_mx_wp05_E.pdf>.

36. “Ensuring Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

37. Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW et al., “Draft Recommendations for a Code of Conduct for Biodefense Programs,” November 2002,<www.fas.org/bwc/papers/code.pdf>.

38. Medical Biodefense Conference 2011, Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology, October 25–28, 2011, Munich, Germany, <events.bsbb.de/event/biodefense2011/Home.html> ; International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, <www.cbwsymp.foi.se/>.

39. See in this issue Iris Hunger and Shen Dingli, “Improving Transparency: Revisiting and Revising the BWC's Confidence-Building Measures,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (November 2011), pp. 513–26.

40. Filippa Lentzos and Alexander R. Hamilton, “Preparing for a Comprehensive Review of the CBM Mechanism at the Seventh BWC Review Conference, 2009–2010 Workshop Series Report,” BIOS Centre, London School of Economics, August 2010, <www2.lse.ac.uk/BIOS/research/biosecurity/pdf/Workshop_Report_Lentzos_Hamilton.pdf>.

41. “Review and Update of the Confidence Building Measures,” draft working paper submitted by Norway, Switzerland, and Germany, Geneva, April 15, 2011, <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/A22406F928C314F1C125787700453F13/$file/BWC+RevCon+2011+CBM+Draft+WP+(April).pdf>.

42. The BWC state parties that make their declarations available publicly are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, and the United Kingdom, <www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4FA4DA37A55C7966C12575780055D9E8?OpenDocument>.