We begin this issue with a survey by Paolo Foradori (University of Trento, Italy) of Italian perspectives on and policies toward US tactical nuclear weapons assigned to NATO. Although approximately half of all such weapons still assigned to NATO are deployed at two air bases in Italy, Foradori argues that insufficient attention has been paid to them within Italy. In particular, Foradori examines the tension between the desire to maintain a cohesive alliance and the growing chorus in Europe calling for the weapons to be withdrawn. He finds that even though Italian policy makers see little value today in nuclear weapons (and are, in fact, committed to their global elimination), they also oppose a hasty withdrawal that could undermine NATO solidarity, preferring instead a gradual, cooperative process. Foradori concludes that this ambivalent approach ill serves both Italy and the alliance and calls on Italy to play a more active role in deciding the future of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons.
Next, Clifton W. Sherrill (Troy University) plunges into the debate over Iran's nuclear program. Sherrill maintains that Tehran's interest in developing nuclear weapons stems from a desire to use them as instruments of coercion, a desire originating from the country's domestic political situation. Iran's hardline theocratic leaders also use the nuclear program as a tool to boost public support for their rule. According to Sherrill, attempts to end the program by resolving Iran's security concerns will have little effect on its efforts; sanctions can slow down the program but are unlikely to curtail it—only a change in the ruling regime can accomplish that.
A little over three years ago, we published in these pages Ward Wilson's “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” which had won the grand prize in the first Doreen and Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Challenge. Today we present a three-part debate about that article, starting with Derrin Culp (National Center for Disaster Preparedness), who challenges Wilson's titular declaration and identifies shortcomings in his arguments, deficiencies that he argues make Wilson's case unpersuasive and fatally flawed. Ward Wilson (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies) then responds to Culp's critique, followed by a final word from Culp.
Jeffrey W. Knopf (US Naval Postgraduate School) explores the intriguing concept of nuclear learning, which includes acquiring basic facts about nuclear weapons as well as the ability to use implications from sets of facts to draw inferences. Knopf also discusses several issues associated with learning itself, including whether it is something only individuals can do or whether institutions and states are also capable of learning. As he notes, this concept is important to the nonproliferation field because assessing the stability of nuclear deterrence depends on one's views “on what learning has taken place or will take place within and across nuclear-armed states.” He concludes that there is no single best answer and that specific analytical goals should guide which concept to adopt.
Jane Esberg and Scott D. Sagan (Center on International Cooperation at New York University and Stanford University, respectively) examine the invaluable and innovative role that simulations play in teaching students at Stanford University about the intricacies of nuclear nonproliferation negotiations. While students are capable of learning the basic facts in a classroom setting, simulations require them to assume the role of a government official (sometimes of a different nationality), encouraging greater empathy and understanding and offering deeper insight into why such negotiations succeed or fail. Esberg and Sagan describe Stanford's pedagogical approach to simulations and demonstrate how they have offered both theoretical and substantive insights that more scholarly assessments of nonproliferation frequently neglect, helping to improve our understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations in the real world.
Using declassified documents from the British National Archives, John R. Walker (Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) reviews the early years of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons program (1952–69), demonstrating that becoming a nuclear weapon state is neither easy nor quick, particularly for smaller powers. If the problems the United Kingdom encountered in the development, testing, manufacture, and maintenance of its nuclear weapons are not unique, he writes, they may offer important insights into the potential problems confronting other medium or aspiring nuclear weapon states.
Alexander Glaser (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Department of Mechanical Engineering, Princeton University) considers how national declarations of stockpiles of fissile materials—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—could support growing international interest in nuclear disarmament by increasing both the transparency and the irreversibility of the process. Glaser describes what an effective fissile material declaration should include, how and in what order states might choose to release such information, and the difficulties in reconstructing historic production data. He also addresses the challenges of verifying such declarations and points the way toward future research in this area.
We conclude this issue with three book reviews. Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. (Lightbridge Corporation) considers an important new interpretation of “the world's most important international security treaty,” the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; George Michael (Air War College) assesses an evaluation of the dangers inherent in today's multipolar nuclear landscape, and Kenneth D. Rose (California State University, Chico) critiques a visually appealing yet academically flawed book about the mixed messages of Cold War–era civil defense programs in the United States.
Stephen I. Schwartz, Editor