TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITALY: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations

Abstract

Despite the fact that Italy hosts almost half of the remaining estimated 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) that are currently deployed in Europe, case studies of Italy have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill that gap by outlining the key elements of Italy's position regarding the presence, role, and future of TNW in Italy. By considering both the military and political-symbolic dimensions of TNW, the author argues that Italy has largely embraced the process of the devaluation of nuclear weapons; however, this is offset by the country's determination to preserve the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. By making the alliance's cohesion a priority, Italy appears willing to postpone the complete elimination of TNW from its territory if necessary; despite this, Italy otherwise considers TNW to be not only weapons of little intrinsic value but also obstacles to the global nuclear disarmament program that it strongly supports.

Keywords:

• Tactical nuclear weapons
• Italy
• NATO
• disarmament

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Leopoldo Nuti, Miles A. Pomper, and David S. Yost for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Notes

1. The debate and the different positions are discussed in Johan Bergenäs, Miles A. Pomper, William C. Potter, and Nikolai N. Sokov, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2010, <cns.miis.edu/activities/100510_reducing_tnw/>. See also Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, December 2009, pp. 19–33, <cns.miis.edu/activities/091211_tnw_europe/index.htm>; Paul Ingram and Oliver Meier, eds., “Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate,” Arms Control Association and British American Security Information Council, May 12, 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/TacticalNuclearReport2011>; Mark Fitzpatrick, “How Europeans View Tactical Nuclear Weapons on Their Continent,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2011, pp. 57–65.

2. NATO, “Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (hereafter “Strategic Concept 2010”), November 19, 2010, para. 17, <www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>. According to Lucio Demichele, who participated in the Lisbon Summit, Italy is fully satisfied with the new Strategic Concept. “In our opinion everything went fine and what we expected has actually happened. We were already in agreement with the initial approach laid down by the secretary-general in the early drafts, which changed very little in the final document.” Author's interview by phone with Demichele, December 13, 2010. Demichele is first counselor to Italy's Permanent Representation at the Atlantic Council and is responsible for disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear dossiers. All interviews were conducted in Italian and translated into English by the author.

3. This includes experts whose opinions are likely to be considered when decisions are made.

4. Leopoldo Nuti, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche 1945–1991 [The Nuclear Challenge: Italian Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons 1945–1991] (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), p. 7.

5. Virgilio Ilari, Storia militare della Prima Repubblica: 1943–1993 [Military History of the First Republic: 1943–1993] (Ancona: Nuove Ricerche, 1994), pp. 63–64.

6. See Nuti, La sfida nucleare, pp. 10–13.

7. Paolo Cacace, L'atomica europea. I progetti della guerra fredda, il ruolo dell'Italia, le domande del futuro [The European Atomic Bomb: The Cold War's Projects, the Role of Italy, the Questions for the Future] (Roma: Fazi, 2004); Achille Albonetti, “Storia Segreta della Bomba Italiana ed Europea” [The secret history of the Italian and European bomb], Limes 2 (1998), pp. 157–71.

8. From a military perspective, TNW are designed to perform specific functions in support of military operations on the ground. They are intended for use in combat in order to achieve circumscribed (i.e., tactical) objectives in a limited nuclear war scenario. The “flexible response” doctrine that was introduced in NATO in the 1960s foresaw the use of European-based TNW on European battlegrounds in order to counter Soviet conventional superiority and hamper or halt the Red Army's advance into allied territory.

9. Nuti, La sfida nucleare, p. 12.

10. NATO, “Alliance's Strategic Concept 1999,” April 24, 1999, para. 63, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm>.

11. NATO, “Strategic Concept 2010,” para. 17.

12. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2011, pp. 64–73. Diplomatic correspondence recently released by WikiLeaks confirmed the locations of deployment and the total number of TNW in Europe. The confirmation of the five NATO states that host US tactical nuclear weapons was provided in a confidential conversation between German National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and US Assistant Secretary Phil Gordon, <mgx.com/blogs/2010/11/29/cablegate-us-nuclear-weapons-in-the-netherlands-wikileaks/>. In another classified cable published by WikiLeaks, US Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder refers to a briefing dated July 16, 2009 by Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller to NATO permanent representatives in which he refers to “180 NATO sub-strategic warheads” in Europe (and estimates the Russian tactical arsenal to be from 3,000 to 5,000 warheads), <www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/22384/>.

13. Currently in service are the B61-3, B61-4, and B61-10 versions, which were constructed between 1979 and 1989 and have selective yields from 0.3 to 170 kilotons. American F-15E and F-16C/D aircraft can transport the bombs, as can aircraft of the European allies, including the Belgian, Turkish, and Dutch F-16s and the Italian and German Tornados. The bombs are stockpiled under US supervision by the US Munitions Support Squadrons. For more technical details on bombs, vectors, bases, safety systems, maintenance, and stockpiling, see Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,” Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005, pp. 8–23.

14. The aircraft are based at Ghedi Torre. Malcom Chalmers, “NATO Dual-Capable Aircraft: A Stocktake,” in Malcom Chalmers and Simon Lunn, “NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma,” RUSI Occasional Paper, March 2010.

15. Such an assessment was largely shared by the participants in a roundtable on TNW in Italy organized by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and held on June 15, 2011, in Rome. See the roundtable report by Laura Spagnuolo, “NATO's Nuclear Posture and Burden Sharing Arrangements: An Italian Perspective,” BASIC, July 14, 2011, <www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/report_from_roundtable_doc_0.pdf>.

16. For an analysis of the Italian security threat assessment in the post–Cold War era, see Paolo Foradori and Paolo Rosa, “New Ambitions and Old Deficiencies: Italy's Security Policy in the XXI Century,” in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 69–97. However, Lucio Caracciolo, editor of the Italian geopolitical journal Limes and authoritative opinion maker, expressed a more conservative view and counseled caution by emphasizing the risk of structuring the country's defense capacity solely on the basis of current threats. Author's interview, Rovereto, June 26, 2010.

17. Author's phone interview with Gianfranco Fini, July 15, 2010. Fini, a member of the parliamentary group Futuro e Libertà per l'Italia (Future and Freedom for Italy), served as deputy prime minister in the second and third Berlusconi administrations (2001–06), minister of foreign affairs (2004–06), and is currently president of the Chamber of Deputies. Given his institutional role, Fini answered the questions in a personal capacity.

18. Author's interview with Stefano Silvestri, Rome, June 23, 2010. The Istituto Affari Internazionali was founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli, its first director; it is a nonprofit organization funded by individual and corporate members, public and private organizations, major international foundations, and by a standing grant from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Silvestri has been president of the institute since 2001. He has been the Italian undersecretary of state for defense (1995–96), adviser to the undersecretary for European affairs (1975), and consultant to the prime minister under several governments. He has also worked, and works, as a consultant for the Foreign, Defense, and Industry ministries.

19. According to NATO, the readiness posture of dual-capable aircraft has been greatly reduced since the mid-1990s, from an order of minutes to one of weeks. In 2002, “the readiness requirements for these aircraft were further reduced and are now being measured in months.” See NATO, “NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment,” June 2004, <www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NATOissue060304.pdf>.

20. Author's interview with Federica Mogherini Rebesani, Rome, June 17, 2010. Mogherini, a member of the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) group in Parliament, is secretary of the Defense Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and a member of the Italian parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe and the Western European Union.

21. Author's interview with Massimo D'Alema, Rome, July 15, 2010. D'Alema belongs to the Partito Democratico. He is a member of the Foreign and Community Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and is president of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic. He was the prime minister (1998–2000) and minister of foreign affairs (2006–08).

22. Osvaldo Croci, Paolo Foradori, and Paolo Rosa, “Italy as a Security Actor,” in Maurizio Carbone, ed., Italy in the Post–Cold War Order: Adaptation, Bipartisanship, Visibility (Lanham: Lexington, 2011), pp. 81–102.

23. Author's interview with a senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, September 10, 2010 (name withheld by request). This argument closely recalls the position that was recently expressed by James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, according to whom there are no missions of TNW that cannot be carried out with US conventional or strategic nuclear weapons. See James Cartwright, “Meeting on Nuclear Postures Review,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, <www.cfr.org/publication/21861/nuclear_posture_review.html>.

24. Author's interview with Ambassador Giancarlo Aragona, Rome, July 28, 2010. Aragona has occupied important posts in Italian and multilateral diplomacy, among them general secretary of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, cabinet chief for the minister of foreign affairs, deputy head of the Italian delegation to NATO, director of the Political and Multilateral Affairs Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ambassador to Moscow and London. He was a member of the group of experts chaired by Madeleine K. Albright tasked with advancing proposals for NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, which is published in the report “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO,” May 17, 2010, <www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>.

25. Author's interview with a senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, September 10, 2010 (named withheld by request).

26. On the generally conservative but diversified positions toward TNW of the new NATO members from Central and Eastern Europe, see Lukasz Kulesa, “Polish and Central European Priorities on NATO's Future Nuclear Policy,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, November 2010, <tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No2.pdf>. The point is discussed in more detail in the next section.

27. “In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.” NATO, “Strategic Concept 2010,” para. 26.

28. Author's interview with Giorgio La Malfa, Rome, June 14, 2010. La Malfa belongs to the mixed Republican/Popular Regionalist group in Parliament. He is a member of the Foreign and Community Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, member of the Italian parliamentary delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and erstwhile minister of European affairs (2005–06).

29. Such an opinion was, for instance, expressed by Lapo Pistelli. Pistelli belongs to the Partito Democratico group in Parliament and is responsible for the Foreign Department in that party. He is a member of the Foreign and Community Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Author's interview, Rome, June 17, 2010.

30. Author's interview with Francesco Calogero, Rome, June 14, 2010. Calogero is a professor of physics in the Department of Physics at the University of Rome. From 1989 to 1997, he was general secretary of Pugwash and still sits on the Pugwash Council. He was a member of the Steering Committee of SIPRI from 1982 to 1992 and was one of the founders of International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts and the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament. He is a co-signatory to the Italian appeal for a world free from nuclear weapons.

31. Author's interview with Fini, July 15, 2010. The CFE, which was signed in 1990, establishes a substantial balance between NATO's conventional forces and those of the former Warsaw Pact countries.

32. Author's interview with Ambassador Carlo Trezza, Rome, July 29, 2010. Trezza has occupied important posts in Italian and multilateral diplomacy, including ambassador to South Korea, Italy's permanent representative at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2003–07), president of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2007), and coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (2007). He is currently diplomatic adviser to the president of the Italian Center for High Defense Studies, co-director of the Italian Institute for High Defense Studies, and chairman of the secretary-general's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.

33. Author's interview with Ambassador Carlo Trezza, Rome, July 29, 2010. Trezza has occupied important posts in Italian and multilateral diplomacy, including ambassador to South Korea, Italy's permanent representative at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2003–07), president of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (2007), and coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (2007). He is currently diplomatic adviser to the president of the Italian Center for High Defense Studies, co-director of the Italian Institute for High Defense Studies, and chairman of the secretary-general's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. For Lucio Caracciolo, only by sitting at this table and playing this important political-diplomatic game—which appears extremely difficult as well as unlikely—could Italy be adequately compensated for its renouncement. Author's interview with Caracciolo, Rovereto, June 26, 2010.

34. This is the case in Belgium, where much of the discussion on TNW is kept alive thanks to actions of the peace movement that showcase security vulnerabilities at the Kleine Brogel Air Base, where TNW are believed to be hosted. See Global Security Newswire, “Peace Activists Trespass at Belgian Base Housing U.S. Nukes,” February 17, 2010, <wipww.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100217_5906.php>.

35. According to the report, host-country security arrangements for nuclear units varied from country to country; however, the majority of bases did not meet security standards established by the US Department of Defense. See “Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures,” Polly A. Peyer, chair, February 8, 2008, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/usaf/BRR-2008.pdf>. See also the analysis by Hans M. Kristensen, “USAF Report: ‘Most’ Nuclear Weapons Sites in Europe Do Not Meet U.S. Security Requirements,” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, June 19, 2008, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/usaf-report-“most”-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-requirements.php>.

36. Author's interview.

37. The bipartite military and political nature of TNW is summarized by Jeffrey Larsen as follows: “The original purpose of the TNW in NATO Europe was to deter and, if necessary, defeat an overwhelming Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe by escalating the conflict to the next level of the conflict spectrum—specifically from conventional war to theater nuclear weapons. This would not only force an attacker to stop and reassess his goals, but would also couple the fate of Europe to that of the United States, risking a further move up the escalatory ladder—the final rung being strategic use employing weapons based at sea or in North America. This showed America's political commitment to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance.” See Jeffrey Larsen, “The Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for NATO: Drifting Toward the Foreseeable Future,” NATO Public Diplomacy Division, October 31, 2006, pp. 52–53, <www.nato.int/acad/fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf>.

38. Quoted in David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs 85 (July 2009), p. 756.

39. NATO, “Alliance's Strategic Concept 1999,” paras. 62, 63.

40. Francesco Calogero thinks very differently and argues that the complete withdrawal of TNW would eliminate a cause of dissent that undermines the cohesion of the alliance. Author's interview with Calogero, Rome, June 14, 2010.

41. Author's interview with Fini, July 15, 2010.

42. Author's interview with Demichele, Brussels, September 1, 2010.

43. Author's interview with a senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, June 23, 2010 (named withheld by request).

44. Author's interview with Mogherini, Rome, June 17, 2010.

45. Author's interview with Fini, July 15, 2010. Some reservations were expressed by Aragona, according to whom the transatlantic link consists of many elements, and the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe sends a strong signal of political commitment to the continent's security. Author's interview with Aragona, Rome, July 28, 2010.

46. Quote from author's interview with Fini, July 15, 2010.

47. Author's interview with Aragona, Rome, July 28, 2010.

48. Author's interview with La Malfa, Rome, June 14, 2010.

49. Author's interview with Silvestri, Rome, June 23, 2010.

50. For this reason, Germany's activism and its explicit request for TNW removal was criticized by some interviewees for having “embarrassed and caused difficulties” for the allies, especially Turkey and the countries of Eastern Europe. Author's interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, June 23, 2010. Judged to be an error of “public diplomacy” (author's interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, September 10, 2010b), Germany's position is considered “today much more moderate and closer to the Italian approach; it was essentially motivated by domestic political factors, not considerations about strategy and security balances” (author's interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, September 10, 2010a). The quote about a difficult dialectic is from author's interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, June 23, 2010. According to the same diplomat, “If we embark on exercises that increase the paranoia of NATO's new members, we shall find ourselves in a situation much more strained than the present one.” Silvestri's quote is from author's interview with Silvestri, Rome, June 23, 2010.

51. Author's interview with Fini, July 15, 2010.

52. As stated by a diplomat of the Italian mission at NATO, “Consensus is fundamental and sacrosanct. The downside is the fact that evolutions tend to be slow, proceeding incrementally, and novelties always find it difficult to get established; however, it is essential that this should be so.” Author's interview with Demichele, Brussels, September 1, 2010.

53. Frattini is on record as saying, “The issue of nuclear weapons has to be decided by all NATO members, with no unilateral sprints ahead… . We all want a nuclear-weapons-free world, but we have to make decisions together.” See “NATO: Frattini on Nuclear Issues: No Unilateral Moves,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2010, < www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2010/04/20100423_NATO_Frattini_su_nucleare.htm?LANG=EN>.

54. Author's interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (name withheld by request), Rome, July 1, 2010.

55. Author's interview with a senior official of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, June 23, 2010 (named withheld by request). The new Strategic Concept has embraced the same principle when it calls for “the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements.” NATO, “Strategic Concept 2010,” para. 16.

56. Author's interview with Calogero, June 14, 2010.

57. However, some of the interviewees expressed a more nuanced point of view. Among them, Aragona believes that TNW-hosting countries have always been “countries with a more vigorous profile … incurring costs in terms of risk.” Consequently, the presence of TNW continues to give Italy “a politically stronger voice within NATO,” but not externally. Author's interview with Aragona, Rome, July 28, 2010.

58. Author's interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, September 10, 2010a.

59. Author's interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, September 10, 2010b.

60. Author's interview with D'Alema, Rome, July 15, 2010.

61. Author's interview with Silvestri, Rome, June 23, 2010.

62. Stefano Silvestri, “Nato, attenzione al due di briscola!” [NATO: Watch for the low-value card!], AffarInternazionali, February 22, 2010, <www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1397>. For a possible scenario of NATO nuclear sharing even without nuclear forward-basing, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Nuclear Sharing Instead of Nuclear Stationing,” research paper, NATO Defence College, Rome, 68, May 2011, pp. 1–8.

63. See “Address by Minister Frattini at the Conference ‘Overcoming Nuclear Dangers,’” Rome, April 16, 2009, <www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Interventi/2009/04/20090416_InterventoMinistro_Conferenza.htm?LANG=EN>.

64. Address by Giorgio Napolitano, President of the Italian Republic to the North Atlantic Council, March 2, 2010, <www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=Discorso&key=1794>. This point is also made strongly by former Prime Minister D'Alema, who argues that “we want to relaunch, as President Obama has done, a commitment against nuclear weapons and for non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear arsenals … for this to have credibility we must start by dismantling useless arsenals; from the point of view of uselessness I think that the tactical weapons deployed in Europe represent the maximum.” Author's interview with D'Alema, Rome, July 15, 2010.

65. Italy and other NATO members base the compatibility of TNW and NPT obligations on an interpretation that the NPT ceases to apply in times of war: because the “dual-key” system implies no transfer of the weapons or their control from the United States to the hosting state in times of peace, there is no violation. In addition, it is argued that the NPT was ratified after the signing of the legal agreements and regulations for US nuclear forward deployment and that these arrangements were known to the other NPT signatories at the time of signing.

66. This issue was discussed at length in the aforementioned roundtable organized by BASIC, during which several compatibility problems were raised. See Spagnuolo, “NATO's Nuclear Posture and Burden Sharing Arrangements.”

67. Author's interviews with Calogero, D'Alema, Pistelli, and Mogherini (June and July 2010). Doubts were also expressed by international law professor Natalino Ronzitti in Natalino Ronzitti, “Armi nucleari americane in Italia: che fare?” [American nuclear weapons in Italy: what has to be done?], AffarInternazionali, March 11, 2010, <www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1412>.

68. Author's interview with Mogherini, Rome, June 17, 2010.

69. Author's interview with Caracciolo, Rovereto, June 26, 2010.

70. Stratcom, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Survey Results in Six European Countries,” a Study Coordinated by Strategic Communications for Greenpeace International, May 25, 2006.

71. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A13.

72. Massimo D'Alema, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi, and Francesco Calogero, “Per un Mondo Senza Armi Nucleari” [For a world without nuclear weapons], Il Corriere della Sera, July 24, 2008. According to one of the signatories, the article did not arouse significant reaction, nor was it followed by intense political discussion in the country. Author's interview with Calogero, Rome, June 14, 2010.

73. See the report of the parliamentary debate, Chamber of Deputies, Motion 1/00374, June 3, 2010, <www.camera.it/view/doc_viewer_full?url=http%3A//documenti.camera.it/apps/resoconto/getDocument.aspx%3FidLegislatura%3D16%26tipoDocumento%3Dsi%26idDocumento%3D1-00374&back_to=http%3A//www.camera.it/465%3Farea%3D2%26tema%3D290%26Il+Trattato+di+non+proliferazione+nucleare>.

74. See the report of the parliamentary debate, Chamber of Deputies, Motion 1/00374, June 3, 2010, <www.camera.it/view/doc_viewer_full?url=http%3A//documenti.camera.it/apps/resoconto/getDocument.aspx%3FidLegislatura%3D16%26tipoDocumento%3Dsi%26idDocumento%3D1-00374&back_to=http%3A//www.camera.it/465%3Farea%3D2%26tema%3D290%26Il+Trattato+di+non+proliferazione+nucleare>.

75. See the report of the parliamentary debate, Chamber of Deputies, Motion 1/00374, June 3, 2010, <www.camera.it/view/doc_viewer_full?url=http%3A//documenti.camera.it/apps/resoconto/getDocument.aspx%3FidLegislatura%3D16%26tipoDocumento%3Dsi%26idDocumento%3D1-00374&back_to=http%3A//www.camera.it/465%3Farea%3D2%26tema%3D290%26Il+Trattato+di+non+proliferazione+nucleare>, p. 33.

76. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dichiarazioni all'agenzia di stampa M.E.N.A. dell'On. Ministro Franco Frattini” [Statements by Minister of Foreign Affairs the Honourable Franco Frattini to MENA Press Agency], May 18, 2010, <www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2010/05/20100518_Dichiarazioni_AgenziaStampaMENA.htm?LANG=IT>.

77. One of the major contributions noted by interviewees was Italy's role in the drafting and approval of “L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation,” which was released at the conclusion of the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting. The meeting was held in the country in 2009, at which time the G-8 leaders declared their “commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT.” See “L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation,” G-8 Summit, July 6, 2009, para. 6, <www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/2._LAquila_Statent_on_Non_proliferation.pdf>.

78. On multilateralism over unilateralism, see Paolo Foradori and Paolo Rosa, “Italy: Hard Tests and Soft Responses,” in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 66–85.

79. See Paolo Foradori and Paolo Rosa, “Italy and the Politics of European Defence: Playing the Logic of Multilevel Network,” Modern Italy 9 (2004), pp. 217–33; Paolo Foradori and Paolo Rosa, “Italy and Defence and Security Policy,” in Simona Piattoni and Sergio Fabbrini, eds., Italy in the European Union, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 173–91; and Croci, Foradori, and Rosa, “Italy as a Security Actor.”

80. Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” Daedalus 138 (2009), pp. 157–68.