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Abstract
Becoming a nuclear weapon state and sustaining a militarily credible nuclear weapons capability is far from trivial, especially for medium powers. Such a capability is demonstrated by much more than firing a first test or acquiring significant quantities of fissile material; capability is indicated by factors including weaponization, delivery of weapons, reliability and effectiveness of weapons and their delivery systems, fissile material availability, and nuclear and non-nuclear testing. Files in the British National Archives shed considerable light on the problems faced by the nuclear weapon program of the United Kingdom from 1952 through the late 1960s. The question is whether this experience is unique or if it instead offers insights into the potential problems faced by, or facing, other medium or aspiring nuclear weapon states. The proliferation-related topics highlighted include: fissile material production, nuclear testing, the first weapon, weapon delivery rates, non-nuclear testing, delivery platform problems, and long-term maintenance and capability sustainability. Further research could provide clearer insights.
Notes
1. See Jacques C. Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapon State’? An Exercise in Measurement Validation,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (March 2010), pp. 161–80. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses the term “significant quantity” in its safeguards system to indicate the amount of fissile material required to make a weapon: 8 kilograms of plutonium and 25 kilograms of HEU.
2. Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952 Vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 389. After 1952 the piles were producing 75 kilograms of plutonium a year. See The TNA (TNA), AB 48/335, Windscale Piles, Broadhurst to J.L. Gillams, October 20, 1964.
3. TNA, DEFE 19/45, Confidential Annex to COS (53) 9th Meeting, Atomic Weapons, January 20, 1953.
4. John R. Walker, British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954–1973: Britain, the United States, Weapon Policies and Nuclear Testing, 1954-1973: Tensions and Contradictions (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), see Chapter 2.
5. TNA, AIR 2/13726, Air Ministry Ops (B) 3, January 18, 1957, implies designs of upwards of 117.5 kilograms of HEU for Orange Herald Large, but it is not clear whether this amount was actually used in the May/June Grapple 1957 tests at Christmas Island. See also Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), p. 104.
6. TNA, AIR 2/13705, J. Searby to ACAS (Ops), Storage of Yellow Sun Mark 1 at Faldingworth, April 17, 1959; and TNA, DEFE 7/2294, W.G. Penney to Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermont A. Boyle, Chief of the Air Staff, February 16, 1958.
7. TNA, CAB 128/31, Part II C.C. (57) 47th Conclusions, June 24, 1957.
8. TNA, DEFE 7/1888 Sub-Committee on Strategic Aspects of Atomic Energy, 1958–1962. As early as July 1961, the Treasury was placing heavy pressure on the Ministry of Defence to cut back on uranium-235 production at Capenhurst, but this was being resisted because the rate of production up to 1966 was fully committed for the Phase I warhead requirements (strategic weapons). See R. Press, “DRPC Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy Brief for Meeting 12 July 1961,” July 12, 1961.
9. TNA, CAB 21/6037 Nuclear Tests (General) Draft Paper for Cabinet Polaris Economy Test Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 1965.
10. TNA, AB 16/2631, C. Hinton to Sir W.G. Penney, Manufacture of Lithium 6, October 3, 1955. See also Donald McIntyre, “Project Crystal: Lithium 6 for Thermonuclear Weapons,” UK Nuclear History Working Paper Number No. 5, <www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/nuclear_history/Working_Paper_No_5.pdf>. The plan in May 1955 had been to be producing 500 kilograms of lithium per year by 1959. See TNA, AB 16/2631, E.N. Plowden, UKAEA [United Kingdom Atomic Energy Agency] to Sir James Helmore, Ministry of Supply, May 2, 1955. By July 1955 requirements were changed and reduced as a result of revised weapon designs. TNA, AB 16/2631, Plowden, UKAEA to Helmore, Ministry of Supply, July 19, 1955. The new requirement was 200 kilograms per year by the start of 1958.
11. The UKAEA had been established in 1954 to take charge of all aspects of the UK military and civil nuclear R&D and production programs. See TNA, AB 16/1745, Action on the Waverley Report, 1953–54.
12. TNA, AVIA 65/1440, William Cook, UKAEA to E.S. Jackson, DGAW, Ministry of Supply, January 1, 1958.
13. TNA, AB 16/2631, E.N. Plowden, UKAEA to Sir James Helmore, Ministry of Supply, May 2, 1955.
14. Walker, British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954–1973, Chapter 3.
15. TNA, AVIA 65/1114, Staffing of The Permanent Proving Ground Memorandum by DGAW, DRP (A.E.S)/P (56) 19, November 16, 1956.
16. TNA, AVIA 65/1114, Staffing of The Permanent Proving Ground Memorandum by DGAW, DRP (A.E.S)/P (56) 19, November 16, 1956. TNA, DEFE 16/432 Proposal for Survey of Possible Site for an Underground Atomic Weapons Test: Allocation of Plutonium for Assessment Tests, 1958–1959, Sir F. Brundrett, MOD to W., Penney, AWRE, September 2, 1958; and TNA, ES 1/1349, Project Orpheus Trials 1956–1959, Contained Nuclear Explosions Part II Suitable Sites, April 22, 1959. Over 120 separate areas were considered; however, only 20 were suitable, and these were in the United Kingdom (Western Highlands and Islands, Cumbria, and Snowdonia), Canada, New Zealand, and East Africa. In fact, there was only one really suitable candidate—the Fraser Valley, British Columbia in Canada.
17. Ola Dahlman, Jenifer Mackby, Svein Mykkeltveit, and Hein Haak, Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban? (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), p. 112.
18. TNA, AIR 20/1080, Design Changes Related to the introduction of the Red Snow Warhead, February 9, 1959.
19. Humphrey Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces (London: HMSO, 1994), p. 97.
20. TNA, AVIA 65/1114, Defence Research Policy Committee Atomic Energy Sub-Committee, Serviceability of Blue Danube Mark I and II, Note by the Air Ministry, D.R.P.(A.E.S.)/P.(56) 20, November 19, 1956.
21. TNA, AVIA 65/1160, A Note on A.W.R.E. Blue Danube Trials, W.J. Challens, December 12, 1956.
22. TNA, AIR 2/13680, Group Captain P.B. Wood, D.D.O.R. (2) to D.A. Arm and D.A.W.D.P, Ministry of Supply, Nuclear Weapon Reliability, draft June 1956.
23. TNA, DEFE 19/45, COS (52) 171st meeting, December 16, 1952. At this Chiefs of Staff meeting, Lieutenant General Sir F. Morgan (Ministry of Supply) was dubious about the first bomb being produced for RAF by mid-1953.
24. TNA, AVIA 65/1114, Defence Research Policy Committee Atomic Energy Sub-Committee, Serviceability of Blue Danube Mark I and II Note by the Air Ministry, D.R.P.(A.E.S.)/P.(56) 20, November 29, 1956.
25. TNA, AVIA 65/1160, A Technical Review of Bomb, Aircraft, H.E., 10,000 lb. M.C., A.F. Hutton, Air Vice Marshall D.G. Eng., Air Ministry, February 21, 1957.
26. TNA, AVIA 65/1167, Air Vice Marshall, A.C.A.S. (O.R.) to C.A.W., 10,000 lb H.E. M.C. Bomb, July 24, 1954.
27. TNA, AVIA 65/1160, 10,000 1b HE MC Bomb: Acceptance Trials and Acceptance for Service Use, 1951–1960.
28. TNA, AIR 2/13683, P.B. Wood, Group Captain, D.D.O.R to A.C.A.S (OR), Blue Danube Carcases, September 13, 1957.
29. TNA, AIR 6/152, Annex to A.C. (63) 39, Nuclear Weapons, November 8, 1963.
30. Wynn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, p. 97.
31. TNA, AIR 2/13705, G.M. Brisbane A/DDOR 2 to DD Ops (B) OR 1136 Yellow Sun—Application Policy, August 2, 1957.
32. Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons 1958–64, p. 114.
33. TNA, AVIA 65/1217, N. Levin, AWRE to E.S. Jackson, DGAW, Ministry of Supply, May 1, 1959; TNA, AVIA 20/1080 Design Changes Related to the Introduction of Red Snow Warhead, February 9, 1959; AVIA 65/1249, Appendix to AC (59) 88, 1959.
34. TNA, AVIA 65/1064, Notes of a Meeting on Inspection of Atomic Weapons, June 19, 1959.
35. TNA, AIR 2/13705, J. Searby to ACAS (Ops) Storage of Yellow Sun Mark 1 at Faldingworth, April 27, 1959.
36. TNA, AVIA 65/1792, History of Atomic Weapon Production, 1963.
37. TNA, AIR 6/151, Annex to AC (62) 12, Nuclear Weapons, October 9, 1962.
38. TNA, AIR 2/13774, R.J. Penney, Air Ministry to C.W. Fogarty, Treasury, February 10, 1960.
39. TNA, DEFE 19/103, Chief Scientific Advisor, The WE177 Nuclear Weapon System, undated, but probably 1965; see also TNA, AIR 2/18210, Nuclear Weapons for the RAF Factors Affecting the Requirement for Nuclear Weapons, 1969–70.
40. TNA, AIR 2/13705, J. Tait to DD OR 2, UK Megaton Weapon Programme, October 16, 1958.
41. TNA, AIR 2/13705, Summary of Discussion and Decisions at Air Ministry, November 29, 1957, to discuss the introduction of new weapons.
42. TNA, AIR 2/13705, J. Tait A/Dof Ops (B & R) to ACAS (Ops) Violet Club and Yellow Sun Mark 1, January 17, 1959.
43. TNA, AIR 2/13718, D.D.B.O. J.B. Tait to AOC Bomber Command, February 27, 1958; TNA, AIR 2/13718, Violet Club Safety and Hazards, Appendix 3 to XY/246/01.
44. TNA, AIR 6/167, Annex to AFB (65) 14, Quarterly Report to the Air Force Board on New Aircraft and Weapons Systems, May 19, 1965.
45. TNA, AIR 6/169, Annex to AFB (66) 13, Progress to the Air Force Board on New Aircraft and Weapon Systems British Nuclear Weapons, January 13, 1966.
46. See John R. Walker, “British Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles, 1953–78,” RUSI Journal 156 (October/November 2011), p. 68.
47. TNA, CAB 134/2241, N.D. (64) 5, Implications of a Possible Cut-Off of Supplies of Fissile Material, Report by a Working Party of the Committee, April 27, 1964.
48. TNA, DEFE 7/921, Minute to Sir Frederick Brundrett, January 22, 1958.
49. TNA, CAB 131/27 (D (62) 7th meeting Item I; and TNA, AB 16/4189 Future of Capenhurst Effect of the proposed Revised Nuclear Warhead Programme, Memorandum by the Atomic Energy Authority, May 29, 1962; see also Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, Appendix 1, “Estimated Deliverable Nuclear Weapons.”
50. Walker, “British Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles, 1953–78,” p. 68.
51. See table in Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality that lists the operational requirements for a diverse range of warheads for the RAF, Royal Navy, and Army, pp. 81–82, such as Seaslug (surface-to-air guided weapon) and Blue Water (surface-to-surface missile).
52. TNA, AVIA 65/1064, Atomic Weapons, Note of a Meeting at Ministry of Supply, June 11, 1959.
53. See TNA, DEFE 19/103 Weapons Development Nuclear Sub-Committee, WE177 Surveillance Programme, Brief for Meeting on April 28, 1965 for example.
54. TNA, DEFE 19/103, Extract of WDC (N.S. /M (65) 1, WE177 Surveillance Programme, May 4, 1965; see also TNA, AVIA 65/1064, Surveillance Rounds for Nuclear Weapon, Final Draft, undated.
55. TNA, AIR 2/13749, H.J. Dodson to Ops B3, In-flight Life of Nuclear Weapons, January 12, 1959.
56. TNA, AIR 6/152, Appendix to A.C. (63) 28, Nuclear Weapons, November 8, 1963.
57. TNA, AIR 2/13745, Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, Annex to AFB (64) 13, July 7, 1964.
58. TNA, AIR 20/11515, Minister of Aviation to Prime Minister, May 14, 1964. For a recent history of Orford Ness's role in nuclear weapons development, see Chapter 9 in Paddy Heazell, Most Secret: The Hidden History of Orford Ness (Stroud: The History Press, 2010).
59. TNA, AIR 20/12198 J.W. Allan, DOR3 (RAF) to D. Air Plans Nuclear Weapons for the Jaguar, April 17, 1969.
60. James Hamilton-Paterson, Empire of the Clouds: When Britain's Aircraft Ruled the World (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), p. 150.
61. TNA, DEFE 19/115, E.C. Cornford to Chief Scientific Adviser, January 18, 1962.
62. See for example TNA, PREM 13/1316, Healey to McNamara, April 10, 1967; and TNA, DEFE 13/700, A.R.M. Jaffray (PS) to Secretary of State, Polaris Improvements, Meeting with CDS, CA (PR), PUS, CNS and DUS (P), May 4, 1970. See also Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70 (London: Palgrave, 2012).
63. TNA, DEFE 19/240, P.G.E.F. Jones Deputy Director/Chief of Warhead Development, AWRE to V.H.B. Macklen, DCA (PN), MOD, UK Stockpile Reliability in a CTBT Context, February 1, 1978, covering a slide presentation for meeting with the United States.
64. TNA, AIR/1014, D.C.A.S. to Secretary of State, Low Level Blue Steel, October 16, 1963.
65. TNA, AIR 2/17065, BS Post-Acceptance Launch Programme Annex to Memo AF/T661/64/DDOR 9 (RAF), January 8, 1965.
66. TNA, AIR 19/1014, Defence Committee D. (62) 1st Meeting, January 12, 1962, Draft Memorandum by the Minister of Aviation, Blue Steel.
67. TNA, AIR 2/16577, Blue Steel—Definition of the State of Preparation for Operational Use, Under-secretary of State Air Ministry to RAF/B2/MOA et al., October 23, 1963.
68. TNA, AVIA 65/1064, Proposals for Inspection Policy on Plastics, Rubber and Adhesive Components and Assemblies for Red Snow, October 20, 1959. Red Snow was a British-built version of the US Mark-28 warhead; certain components and materials were different.
69. TNA, AVIA 65/1064, Sir William Penney, D/AWRE to Sir Thomas Barnard, Director-General of Inspection, Ministry of Supply, April 30, 1958.
70. TNA, DEFE 13/1038, V.H.B. Macklen to PUS Maintenance of the Nuclear Capability in Event of Option M, June 15, 1973.
71. See TNA, DEFE 7/2294, MOD Nuclear Weapons Safety Committee: Formation, 1958–60.
72. TNA, DEFE 19/98, Costs of Military Nuclear R & D in AEA Weapons Group (Kings Norton Hypothesis A), Paper Submitted by E.F. Newley, Director AWRE, November 15, 1968.
73. Tacit knowledge, unlike explicit knowledge, is not easily shared from person to person in writing or via the spoken word. Rather, it is learned from practical, hands-on experience, by doing something, often over time and under the guidance of an experienced practitioner.
74. Blue Danube—first generation; Red Beard—second generation; Violet Club—third generation; Red Snow—fourth generation; WE177 and Polaris—fifth generation.
75. Dahlman, Mackby, Mykkeltveit, and Haak, Detect and Deter, p. 80.