Two years ago, at the conclusion of the most recent review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the final document agreed to by the state parties called for convening a conference in 2012 to consider the creation of a Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone. The endorsement of this plan, which builds on a resolution on the Middle East approved at the 1995 NPT Review Conference (and which has not progressed since that time), was possibly the most significant accomplishment of the 2010 Review Conference. The final language steered a middle course between the desire of Arab states for a conference to negotiate the creation of such a zone and the belief by the United States and others that, while negotiations would be premature, much could be gained by discussing how a zone could be implemented by states in the region.
Notwithstanding the agreement to convene a conference, progress on these issues has always been politically complicated, not least because Israel, which is one of three states that remain outside the NPT (the others are India and Pakistan), is widely believed to maintain a nuclear arsenal. The ongoing repercussions of last year's “Arab Spring,” escalating tensions over Iran's nuclear program, and the more recent turmoil that began in September have made it increasingly unlikely that the conference will take place before the end of the year. Then, on September 19, as this issue was going to press, Shaul Horev, head of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission, announced that Israel would not participate in the planned conference, declaring that, “Nuclear demilitarization in the Middle East, according to the Israeli position, will be possible only after the establishment of peace and trust among the states of the area, as a result of a local initiative, not of external coercion.”
Despite these setbacks, the issues surrounding the conference are very important, and Israel's eventual participation will be necessary if any progress is to be made. If there is no progress before the next NPT review conference in 2015, the future relevance and effectiveness of the treaty may be called into question, and with it the entire nonproliferation regime. In the spirit of starting a dialogue and paving the way for the conference, this issue of the Nonproliferation Review features a special section devoted to the topic, offering special insight into Israel's approach to and deliberations about efforts to control and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This special section, “Creating a Middle East WMD-Free Zone,” originated with another conference, one jointly organized in 2011 by the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, DC, and the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. That conference sought to bring a strong Israeli perspective into the discussion, a perspective often missing given Israel's position outside the NPT.
Douglas B. Shaw (Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University) introduces the special section by discussing the successful implementation of nuclear weapon-free zones around the world, considering some of the problems with building such a zone in the Middle East, and exploring ways to make progress on the current arms control agenda in the Middle East.
Emily B. Landau (Institute for National Security Studies) assesses the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, part of a multilateral peace process in the early 1990s and the only Middle East arms control talks to date. Looking to ACRS for guidance on future talks, she discusses its successes (including progress on a variety of confidence- and security-building measures) and limitations (the difficulties of developing a common approach when dealing with asymmetric capabilities). Landau finds that many fundamental dilemmas remain, and that the Syrian civil war and rising rhetoric over Iran's nuclear ambitions can only complicate what is an already very difficult task.
Yair Evron (Institute for National Security Studies) examines the credibility of US and other states' extended deterrence commitments in the Middle East. Will these commitments hold in the event Iran develops nuclear weapons? In particular, how would the Gulf Cooperation Council states react? And how stable—or unstable—would an Iran-Israel nuclear posture be? Evron argues that enhancements to US extended deterrence in the region will be necessary to deter Iran, reassure allies, and contribute to the stability of Israeli-Iranian deterrent.
Ephraim Asculai (Institute for National Security Studies) explores the risks and opportunities for the Middle East if states in the region respond to Iran's nuclear program by initiating their own nuclear energy projects, as nine states are considering doing. Notwithstanding these ambitions, significant economic, technical, safety, and security challenges make success problematic in the near term. Greater regional and international cooperation on nuclear energy technology, therefore, could assist these states in fulfilling their goals while simultaneously creating a foundation of trust, an essential component of any effort to implement a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
David Friedman (Institute for National Security Studies) considers the risks of biological and chemical weapons terrorism in the Middle East. Focusing on biological weapons, he suggests that if coordinated regionwide preparedness measures to mitigate illness and injuries—whether from natural or man-made outbreaks—can be developed, such efforts could not only address potential threats but contribute toward progress on establishing a Middle East WMD-free zone.
Dalia Dassa Kaye (The RAND Corporation) concludes our special section by reviewing the history of efforts to create a Middle East WMD-free zone. Considering the challenges and opportunities in the current regional environment, and the failure of previous efforts, Kaye believes that a new approach may be required to revitalize regional arms control efforts. A new regional forum, possibly modeled on one in South Asia, could help build confidence, facilitate track-two dialogues, and generate more effective ideas and solutions than those coming from official, higher-level discussions.
Justin Hastings (Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Australia) uses geography to study one critical aspect of the nuclear black market: the coordinators who link buyers with sellers and arrange for the transportation of merchandise between them. Territorially diffuse networks result when coordinators have access to state-level resources and influence, while coordinators operating without the benefits of such access rely on more centralized networks and commercial infrastructure. Both kinds of networks can be found in A.Q. Khan's activities to supply Pakistan, Libya, and Iran. Hastings also offers some observations on how this approach can be used to understand and disrupt future proliferation networks.
Gerald Felix Warburg (Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia) takes a close look at the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, first proposed by President George W. Bush in 2005 and enacted by Congress four years ago. By analyzing the negotiating record and interviewing key participants, Warburg assesses how the agreement embodies the classic tradeoff between pursuing broad multilateral goals and strengthening a specific bilateral relationship. Warburg also reviews the actual costs and benefits of this controversial agreement and considers the lessons learned from its passage.
We conclude this issue with three reviews of recently published books. Kathleen M. Vogel (Department of Science and Technology Studies, Cornell University) examines a new comprehensive history of the Soviet Union's biological weapons program; David Vielhaber and Philipp Bleek (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and the Monterey Institute of International Studies, respectively) survey six recent books offering detailed and sometimes conflicting accounts of covert US and Israeli efforts to slow or derail Iran's nuclear program; and Heather Williams (King's College London) considers a biography of American statesman George F. Kennan, and what he can teach us about engaging with Russia today.