EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

The article presents and analyzes the US extended deterrence commitments in the Middle East as well as those provided by regional states, and assesses the effectiveness and credibility of these commitments. The article then proceeds to analyze a situation wherein Iran successfully develops nuclear weapons. It considers first the security requirements and alternatives of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and then proceeds to assess the stability—or instability—of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The enhancement of US extended deterrence in the region is required in order to deter Iran, reassure allies, and contribute to the stability of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear balance. The article also discusses several contextual issues, such as: the future form of US extended deterrence; distinguishing between the latter and other US extended deterrence commitments; and the different approaches of specific GCC states and Israel.

Keywords:

• Middle East
• Iran
• Israel
• deterrence
• extended deterrence
• nuclear balance

Notes

1. Since the initial preparation of this article, the RAND Corporation published an extensive study of some of the issues it discusses. See Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini, Alireza Nader, Dalia Dassa Kaye, James T. Quinlan, and Paul Steinberg, Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical US Policy Choices (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2011).

2. See Robert J. Lieber, “U.S.-Israel Relations Since 1948,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 2 (Summer 1998), pp.11–20; George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Ariel Ilan Roth, “Reassurance: A Strategic Basis of U.S. Support for Israel,” International Studies Perspectives 10 (2009), pp. 378–393; A. F. K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

3. Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel, The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

4. Luke Harding, “WikiLeaks cables show close US relationship with Egyptian president,” Guardian, January 28, 2011, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/28/wikileaks-cairo-cables-egypt-president>.

5. Yoel Guzansky, ”The Gulf and the ‘Arab Rage’,” INSS Insight, No. 244, March 6, 2011 <www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1299408113.pdf>.

6. Tariq Khaitous, “Egypt and Saudi Arabia's Policies toward Iran's Nuclear Program,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 1, 2007 <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/egypt-and-saudi-policies-toward-iran/>. For an overall view of Egyptian-Iranian relations since the Islamic Revolution, see Liora Hendelman Baavur, “Up Close and Personal: The Rollercoaster of Iran-Egypt Relations,” Iran Pulse No. 29, Center for Iranian Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2009 <www.tau.ac.il/humanities/iranian_studies/pulse29.eng.html>.

7. This assertion is based on dozens of meetings the author held with Egyptian diplomats and ex-officials in various international conferences.

8. Yoel Guzansky, “The Saudi Nuclear Option,” INSS Insight, No. 176, April 26, 2010, <www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=3973>.

9. Shalev Chemi, “Dennis Ross: Saudi king vowed to obtain nuclear bomb after Iran,” Haaretz, May 30, 2012 <www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/dennis-ross-saudi-king-vowed-to-obtain-nuclear-bomb-after-iran-1.433294>.

10. See, for example, Simon Henderson, ”Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option: The Saudi-Pakistani Summit,” PolicyWatch No. 793, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2003, <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/toward-a-saudi-nuclear-option-the-saudi-pakistani-summit>

11. See, for example, Simon Henderson, ”Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option: The Saudi-Pakistani Summit,” PolicyWatch No. 793, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2003, <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/toward-a-saudi-nuclear-option-the-saudi-pakistani-summit>.

12. See Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Toward Turkey's Own Bomb? Not Yet,” in Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, eds., Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East, Memorandum No. 122, (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, September, 2012), pp. 91–102.

13. Doron Paskin, “B'etzel Ha'Mehomot b'Tehran: Nasie Turkiya dan behrhavat ha'ksharim ha'kalkalim b'Tehran [Commotion in Iran: Turkish President Discusses Expanding Economic Relations with Tehran],” Calcalist, February 5, 2011, <www.calcalist.co.il/world/articles/0,7340,L-3508306,00.html>.

14. For Turkey's stand on these issues, see Sinan Uglen, “Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?” Discussion Paper Series-2010/2, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (June 2010).

15. The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: 2011), p. 313.

16. See “Operation Samson: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs from Germany,” Der Spiegel, June 4, 2012, <www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-built-submarines-a-836784.html>.

17. For a recent account of the Dolphin submarines, see “Operation Samson: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs from Germany,” Der Spiegel, June 4, 2012, <www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-built-submarines-a-836784.html>..

18. The two schools emerged in the 1960s. But for a comprehensive discussion, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995).

19. See Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), and “An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability,” in Ephraim Kam, ed. Israel and a Nuclear Iran, INSS Memorandum No. 94, July 2008, pp. 47–63, <www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1216203658.pdf>

20. For an extensive discussion of current American extended deterrence, see, inter alia Clark Murdock, Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010).

21. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010, p. 33, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

22. The literature on deterrence, in general as well as on extended deterrence, is enormous. For useful accounts of the main types of deterrence, including an account of deterrence during the Cold War, see, inter alia, Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

23. For an early definition of these two types of deterrence, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1959).

24. See, inter alia, Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2012).

25. Reports about these steps have appeared extensively in the media. See, for example, David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “To Calm Israel, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran,” New York Times, September 2, 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/world/middleeast/us-is-weighing-new-curbs-on-iran-in-nod-to-israel.html>; Patrick M. Cronin, “Can U.S. help Gulf shield itself against Iran?” CNN Opinion, August 14, 2012, <www.cnn.com/2012/08/14/opinion/cronin-missile-shield/index.html>; and Aaron Stein, “Turkey Marches toward Missile Defense,” The National Interest Online, August 23, 2012, <nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkey-marches-toward-missile-defense-7387>.