THE MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE CONFERENCE

Abstract

This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process.

Keywords:

• Middle East
• weapons of mass destruction
• regional security
• Israel

Notes

1. See Patricia Lewis and William C. Potter, “The Long Journey Toward a WMD-Free Middle East,” Arms Control Today, September 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/The_Long_Journey_Toward_A_WMD-Free_Middle_East>.

2. See Roberta Mulas, “Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and the Nuclear Powers,” Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, Policy Brief No. 5 (December 2011), <http://hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/Policy_Brief_No_5_webversion.pdf>; and Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast From Iran,” New York Times, July 22, 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html>.

3. For further details and lessons from other NWFZs for the Middle East, see Lewis and Potter, “The Long Journey Toward a WMD-Free Middle East.”

4. On comparisons to other regional zone experiences, see Mark Fitzpatrick, Towards a more secure and WMD-free Middle East, United Nations Association-United Kingdom (2012), pp. 9–10, <www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Towards%20a%20more%20secure%20and%20WMD-free%20Middle%20East%20-%20Mark%20Fitzpatrick.pdf>.

5. For an overview of these unique challenges, see on comparisons to other regional zone experiences, see Mark Fitzpatrick, Towards a more secure and WMD-free Middle East, United Nations Association-United Kingdom (2012), pp. 9–10, <www.una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Towards%20a%20more%20secure%20and%20WMD-free%20Middle%20East%20-%20Mark%20Fitzpatrick.pdf>, p. 11.

6. While Israel has not declared its nuclear capability and is not a party to the NPT, it is believed to have a significant nuclear weapons arsenal, as well as extensive delivery vehicles (long-range missiles and nuclear-capable submarines). See Mark Fitzpatrick, Nuclear Capabilities in the Middle East, Background Paper prepared for the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Brussels, July 6–7, 2011, <www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/backgroundpapers/fitzpatrick.pdf>. For an extensive discussion of the evolution and nature of Israel's nuclear posture, see Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

7. As Mark Fitzpatrick notes, other regions that have pursued successful zones already had such institutions, such as the African Union, the Organization of American States, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See Fitzpatrick, Towards a more secure and WMD-free Middle East, p. 11.

8. While analysts may associate “arms control” with conventional weaponry and “nonproliferation” with unconventional WMD (nuclear, biological, and chemical), this distinction is often blurred in practice. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where the reduction of conventional weaponry is linked to WMD (including missile capabilities), due to the asymmetry of power across the region. Regional dialogues on the subject often use the term “regional arms control and security” when discussing issues that also relate to nonproliferation goals, including nuclear issues and other WMD.

9. For an excellent overview of the zone concept, challenges of applying it the Middle East, and practical interim steps that might be possible to advance it, see Fitzpatrick, Towards a more secure and WMD-free Middle East.

10. On the appointment of the facilitator and his role, see Bernd W. Kubbig et al, “Welcome, Mr. Facilitator!—The Track II Community Endorses Ambassador Jaakko Laajava,” Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, Policy Brief No. 6 (December 2012), <http://academicpeaceorchestra.com/download.php?downloadid=24>.

11. For detailed accounts of ACRS, see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Beyond The Handshake: Multilateral Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 76–109; Peter Jones, “Arms Control in the Middle East: Is It Time to Renew ACRS?,” Disarmament Forum 2 (2005), <http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2278.pdf>; Nabil Fahmy, “Special Comment,” Disarmament Forum 2 (2001), pp. 3–5; Emily B. Landau, Arms Control in the Middle East: Cooperative Security Dialogue and Regional Constraints (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006).

12. On these and other treaty challenges, see Fitzpatrick, Towards a more secure and WMD-free Middle East, pp. 12–14.

13. Benjamin Hautecouverture and Raphaëlle Mathiot, “A Zone Free of WMD and Means of Delivery in the Middle East: An Assessment of the Multilateral Diplomatic Process, 1974–2010,” Background Paper prepared for the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Brussels, July 6–7, 2011, p. 1,<www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/doc/backgroundpapers/hautecouverture.pdf>.

14. Avner Cohen outlined these Israeli positions during a presentation at “Moving Toward a Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Challenges for 2012,” a conference held at The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, June 14–15, 2011. Cohen also provides a more detailed account of Israeli views toward a weapons-free zone in his book, The Worst Kept Secret, pp. 41–43.

15. For more on the concept of a WMDFZ in the Gulf, see: Mustafa Alani, The Case for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Gulf (GWMDFZ) (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, March 2006); Gulf Research Center, “Gulf WMD Free Zone,” in Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin, No. 1 (October 2005); and Gulf Research Center, “Nuclearization in the Gulf,” Security and Terrorism Research Bulletin, No. 7 (December 2007).

16. For details on agreements in the maritime arena, see David Griffiths, Maritime Aspects of Arms Control and Security Improvement in the Middle East, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper No. 56, 2000.

17. See Fitzpatrick, Towards a more secure and WMD-free Middle East p. 6.

18. For further details, see Hautecouverture and Mathiot, “A Zone Free of WMD and Means of Delivery in the Middle East,” pp. 12–14.

19. For further elaboration of this position, see Emily B. Landau, “Placing WMD in Context,” Arms Control Today, September 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/Placing_WMD_in_Context%20%20%20%20>.

20. See Claudia Baumgart and Harald Müller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Pie in the Sky?” Washington Quarterly 28 (Winter 2004–05), pp. 48–49.

21. For detailed discussions of concrete steps that would be necessary to establish and operationalize a WMDFZ in the Middle East, including issues related to geographic scope and verification, see Sara Kristine Eriksen and Linda Mari Holoien, “From Proliferation to Peace: Establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (July 2010), pp. 281–99. Also see Baumgart and Muller, “A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East,” pp. 45–58.

22. For more than three decades, Egypt has also raised the Israeli nuclear issue in international diplomatic forums beyond the NPT, including the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly First Committee, the UN General Assembly, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. See Shimon Stein, “Between Israel and Iran: Egypt and the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” in Emily B. Landau and Tamar Malz-Ginzburg, eds., The Obama Vision and Nuclear Disarmament, Memorandum No. 107, The Institute for National Security Studies (March 2011), p. 102.

23. For example in the ACRS process, states like Qatar and Jordan were more open to incremental CBMs and regional security cooperation before more extensive disarmament measures, leading Egypt to reassert its regional leadership position by linking the continuation of ACRS to progress in the NPT arena. See Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Security Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and Its Limits in the Middle East,” Security Studies 8 (1998), pp. 204–38.

24. The reference to a conference is included in the Middle East resolution of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document: “The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction ….” 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. I, New York, 2010, pp. 29–31, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I>.

25. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, May 25, 2011.

26. Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.

27. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, June 13, 2011.

28. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, June 13, 2011.

29. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, June 13, 2011.

30. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, May 25, 2011. This official noted that the 1995 NPT resolution did not include a reference to Israel, and in the 2000 Final Document, there was a reference to Israel but also one to Iraq (in 2005 there was no final agreement).

31. See Stein, “Between Israel and Iran,” p. 108. US officials opposed these efforts to single out Israel at the IAEA, known as the Israel nuclear capability (INC) resolutions, as they believed they politicized the process and detracted attention away from critical challenges like Iran and Syria. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, May 25, 2011.

32. Stein, “Between Israel and Iran,” p. 109.

33. See Sameh Aboul-Enein, “NPT 2010: The Beginning of a New Constructive Cycle,” Arms Control Today, November 2010, p. 14.

34. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, May 25, 2011. For a review of the broader achievements made at the 2010 NPT conference, see: Aboul-Enein, “NPT 2010: The Beginning of a New Constructive Cycle”; Jayantha Dhanapala, “Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Special Report 258, United States Institute of Peace, October 2010, <www.usip.org/files/resources/SR258%20-%20Evaluating%20the%202010%20NPT%20Review%20Conference.pdf>; and William Potter, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, and Miles Pomper, “The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus,” CNS Special Report, James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 17, 2010, <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/100617_npt_2010_summary.pdf>.

35. Statement by the National Security Advisor, General James L. Jones on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, May 28, 2010, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-national-security-advisor-general-james-l-jones-non-proliferation-treaty->.

36. White House official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, June 14, 2011.

37. Statement by the Government of Israel on NPT Review Conference Middle East resolution, May 29, 2010, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2010/Statement_Government_Israel_NPT_Review_Conference_29-May-2010.htm>

38. Israeli official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Jerusalem, July 26, 2011.

39. Stein, “Between Israel and Iran,” p. 112.

40. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, May 25, 2011.

41. Emily B. Landau, “Israel and the Proposed 2012 WMDFZ Conference: Framing a Regional Process,” INSS Insight No. 221, November 3, 2010, <www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=4541>.

42. See Landau, “Israel and the Proposed 2012 WMDFZ Conference.”

43. In Gen. Jones’s words, “The United States has long supported such a zone, although our view is that a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations are essential precursors for its establishment … the US understands that a WMD free zone in the Middle East is a long-term goal.” Statement by National Security Advisor General James L. Jones on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, May 28, 2010.

44. Jones’s statement promised that “The United States will insist that this be a conference for discussion aimed at an exchange of views on a broad agenda, to include regional security issues, verification and compliance, and all categories of weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery.” Statement by National Security Advisor General James L. Jones.

45. Israeli official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Jerusalem, July 26, 2011.

46. See Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein, “The 2012 WMDFZ Conference: Assessments from Track II Discussions,” INSS Insight No. 270, July 24, 2011, <www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1311767050.pdf>.

47. Nabil Fahmy, “Salvaging the 2012 Conference,” Arms Control Today, September 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/Salvaging_the_2012_Conference>.

48. Aboul-Enein, “NPT 2010,” p. 14.

49. Aboul-Enein, “NPT 2010,” p. 13. Also see Sameh Aboul-Enein, “NPT 2010–2015: The Way Forward,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 31, 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/31/npt-2010-2015-way-forward/5fc>.

50. For a review of Iran's general position toward nuclear weapon free zones, see Alireza Nader, “Iran and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Middle East,” Arms Control Today, September 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/Iran_and_a_Nuclear-Weapon-Free_Middle_East%20%20%20%20>.

51. These points were made by speakers at a track-two conference in which the author participated in February-March 2011.

52. These points were made by speakers at a track-two conference in which the author participated in February-March 2011.

53. White House official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, June 14, 2011.

54. These points were made in a number of author meetings with both State Department and White House officials in Washington, DC, May-June 2011.

55. State Department official (name withheld by request), personal meeting with author, Washington, DC, May 24, 2011.

56. See Landau and Stein, “The 2012 WMDFZ Conference.”

57. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran (London: IISS, May 2008).

58. For an argument advocating separating regional security discussions from the peace process, see Peter Jones, “The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group: still relevant to the Middle East?” Background paper, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2011, <www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/doc/backgroundpapers/jones.pdf>.

59. For an argument advocating separating regional security discussions from the peace process, see Peter Jones, “The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group: still relevant to the Middle East?” Background paper, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2011, <www.nonproliferation.eu/activities/doc/backgroundpapers/jones.pdf>, p. 4.

60. On the notion of reducing the salience of nuclear capabilities in line with the Obama administration's policies, as well as specific nuclear CBM ideas, see Yair Evron, “Israel and the Nonproliferation Regime,” in Landau and Malz-Ginzburg, eds., The Obama Vision and Nuclear Disarmament, pp. 119–26.

61. On the notion of reducing the salience of nuclear capabilities in line with the Obama administration's policies, as well as specific nuclear CBM ideas, see Yair Evron, “Israel and the Nonproliferation Regime,” in Landau and Malz-Ginzburg, eds., The Obama Vision and Nuclear Disarmament, pp. 119–26.

62. See Fitzpatrick, Towards a More Security and WMD-free Middle East, p. 10.