THE EFFECTS ON SOUTH ASIA OF DEEP US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

Abstract

Significant nuclear reductions by the United States can affect other states in one of five ways: by directly altering their strategic calculations and postures; by indirectly altering their strategic calculations and postures by affecting the behavior of third-party states; by undermining formal US deterrence commitments; by eroding the United States's perceived ability to provide “informal” deterrence through the maintenance of an active global presence; and by creating normative pressure for states to emulate US nuclear reductions. Only the erosion of “informal” deterrence is likely to affect South Asia; to the extent that significant US nuclear reductions affect South Asia, then, their impact is likely to be destabilizing.

Keywords:

• India
• Pakistan
• South Asia
• United States
• nuclear weapons
• deterrence
• strategic balance

Notes

1. See Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered>.

2. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

3. Elias Groll, Margaret Slattery, eds., “The FP Survey: The Future of War,” Foreign Policy, March-April 2012, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/fp_survey_future_of_war>.

4. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bullletin of the Atomic Scientists 69 (2013), pp. 77–86.

5. By “major reduction” I mean cutting the US nuclear arsenal at least to the levels mentioned above, resulting in a maximum force of roughly 1,000 to 2,000 accountable strategic warheads.

6. These examples are illustrative and not exhaustive; other possible effects exist. For instance, if the state in question did not possess nuclear weapons, but was contemplating the development of a nuclear capability, major US nuclear cuts might reduce its incentives to do so.

7. See William J. Burns, “India's Rise and the Promise of US-Indian Partnership,” Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 1, 2010, <www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm>.

8. See Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New York, Columbia University Press, 2002).

9. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Indian Nuclear Forces 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68 (2012), pp. 96–101; and Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67 (2011), pp. 91–99.

10. See Economist, “China and India: Contest of the Century,” August 19, 2010, <www.economist.com/node/16846256>; and Shalendra D. Sharma, China and India in the Age of Globalization, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

11. See S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of US-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey 47 (2007), pp. 642–56.

12. For an example of opposing views, see George Perkovich, “Toward Realistic US-India Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2010), <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/realistic_us_india_relations.pdf>; and Ashley J. Tellis, “Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in US-India Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2013, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/07/opportunities-unbound-sustaining-transformation-in-u.s.-indian-relations/ezut>.

13. See Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

14. See Karen DeYoung and Karin Brulliard, “As US-Pakistani Relations Sink, Nations Try to Figure Out a ‘New Normal,’” Washington Post, January 16, 2012, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-16/world/35441080_1_pakistani-soldiers-pakistani-intelligence-border-clash>.

15. See, for example, Jane Perlez, “Pakistani Army Chief Warns US on Another Raid,” New York Times, May 5, 2011, < www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/asia/06react.html>; and Asif Haroon Raja, “Pakistan-US Fractured Relations,” Pakistan Tribune, November 6, 2012, <http://paktribune.com/articles/Pakistan-US-Fractured-Relations-242988.html>. The Pakistanis do worry, however, that the United States might try to seize their nuclear assets using special operations forces. See David E. Sanger, “Obama's Worst Pakistan Nightmare,” New York Times, January 8, 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.html>.

16. “Nuclear Anxiety: India's letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, May 13, 1998, <www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html>. See also Toby Dalton and Jaclyn Tandler, “Understanding the Arms Race in South Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Paper, September 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/understanding-arms-race-in-south-asia/dtj0>.

17. This point was not lost on the Chinese, who warned India not to think that the missile test had bought them too much leverage against China. As an editorial in the state-run Global Times put it, “India should not overestimate its strength. Even if it has missiles that could reach most parts of China, that does not mean it will gain anything from being arrogant during disputes with China. India should be clear that China's nuclear power is stronger and more reliable. For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China.” “India Being Swept Up by Missile Delusion,” Global Times, April 19, 2012, <www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/705627/India-being-swept-up-by-missile-delusion.aspx>.

18. See “Failed States: The 2012 Rankings,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2012); Robert D. Kaplan, “What's Wrong with Pakistan?” Foreign Policy (July/August 2012),<www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/whats_wrong_with_pakistan>; R.S.N. Singh, “Pakistan's Offensive Defense Strategy,” Indian Defence Review, February 18, 2011, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/pakistans-offensive-defence-strategy/>; and S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia,” International Security 37 (2012), pp. 111–41.

19. See Kapur and Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox.”

20. See “Pak Army Will Remain India-Centric: Kayani,” Hindustan Times, February 5, 2010, <www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Pakistan/Pak-Army-will-remain-India-centric-Kayani/Article1-505497.aspx>. New Pakistani military doctrine has reportedly identified internal militancy as the greatest threat to Pakistani security. Whether or not the Pakistani military wholly internalizes this view remains to be seen. Even if it does, however, India will remain Pakistan's biggest international threat. In addition, diverting forces to internal security duties will further erode Pakistani external defenses, creating an even greater need for nuclear deterrence against India. See “New Doctrine: Army Identifies ‘Homegrown Militancy’ As Biggest Threat,” Express Tribune, January 3, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/488362/new-doctrine-army-identifies-homegrown-militancy-as-biggest-threat/>; and Feroz Hasan Khan, “Pakistan As a Nuclear State,” in Maleeha Lodhi, ed., Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 279.

21. See Khan, “Pakistan As a Nuclear State,” pp. 278–79; Michael Krepon, “Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Stability,” Stimson Center, December 10, 2012, <www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Krepon_-_Pakistan_Nuclear_Strategy_and_Deterrence_Stability.pdf>; and Rajesh Basrur, “South Asia: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Risk,” RSIS Commentaries 65, April 27, 2011, <www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0652011.pdf>.

22. S. Paul Kapur, “More Posture Than Review: Indian Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (2011), pp. 76–77.

23. For a detailed discussion of the possible effects of US nuclear retrenchment on extended deterrence commitments, see Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack, “US Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 3, June 2010, <www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/06/nuclear-deterrence>.

24. See “India's Strategic Autonomy a Constraint in Defence Ties with US,” Hindu, April 7, 2011, <www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/economy/indias-strategic-autonomy-a-constrain-in-defence-ties-with-us/article1607845.ece?css=print>; and Guillem Monsonis, “India's Strategic Autonomy and Rapprochement with the US,” Strategic Analysis 34 (2010), pp. 611–24.

25. See Department of Defense, “Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense,” January 2012, p. 2, <www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf>; Tanguy Struye de Swieland, “The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Parameters 42 (Spring 2012), pp. 75–89; and John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (Winter 2010), pp. 381–96.

26. I base this analysis on discussions with senior serving members of the Ministry of External Affairs and of Parliament in New Delhi between 2010 and 2012.

27. The Indians are already increasing military cooperation with Southeast Asian states. See Pankaj K. Jha, “India's Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Defence Studies 5 (2011), pp. 47–63; and Narendra Kaushik, “India Focuses on Southeast Asia,” Asia Pacific Defense Forum, January 23, 2013, <http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/01/23/india-asean-analysis>.

28. On this emulation logic, see Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine,” in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 221.

29. See Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998), < www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54391/jaswant-singh/against-nuclear-apartheid>.

30. See Kapur, “More Posture than Review,” pp. 77–79.

31. See Department of Defense, “Sustaining Global Leadership;” and Jonathan Greenert, “Sea Change: The Navy Pivots to Asia,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2012, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/14/sea_change>.

32. Of course, such signals could also threaten China, leading to destabilizing Chinese behavior. If, however, the United States makes clear its intention to maintain its regional leadership role while encouraging China's current developmental trajectory, it may be able to avoid such problems. See Kenneth Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia,” Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia>.