REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON LOW NUCLEAR NUMBERS

Abstract

President Barack Obama has outlined a course toward lower numbers of US nuclear weapons. Much attention has been paid to the US-Russian context, where deterrence is believed to be basically stable and conditions ripe for gradually reducing arsenals on both sides. But considerably less attention has been paid to the possible implications of lower nuclear numbers on other regions of the world and the reactions of both adversaries and US allies. If nuclear reductions are to be stabilizing and beneficial to security, reassurance and strengthened nonproliferation efforts in various regions need to accompany nuclear cuts. But the specific problems and remedies across regions vary. This article summarizes the results of a multi-author study. It concludes that regions with US allies and formal extended deterrence pledges may pose more vexing problems than those areas of the world without such close allies or commitments.

Keywords:

• Nuclear disarmament
• strategic stability
• United States
• Russia
• China
• South Asia
• Europe
• NATO

Notes

1. Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama," Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.

2. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 6, 2010, p. xv.

3. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 6, 2010, p. 7.

4. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 6, 2010, p. xv.

5. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2003), p. 339.

6. See, for instance, James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 74–89.

7. See, for instance, James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 4 (Spring 2010), p. 82.

8. See, for example, Brodie's and Wolfers's contributions in Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Order and World Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946).

9. James Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security (Adelphi Series 50, No. 417, March 2011), p. 94.

10. Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, Matthew MacKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and Pavel Zolotarev, “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence Between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science and Global Security 19 (October 2011), p. 186.

11. Malcolm Chalmers, Andrew Sommerville, and Andrea Berger, eds., “Small Nuclear Forces: Five Perspectives,” Whitehall Reports, No. 3–11, December 2011, Royal United Services Institute, London, United Kingdom, p. 9.

12. Bret Stephens, “Obama's Nuclear Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2013, p. A13.

13. Bret Stephens, “Obama's Nuclear Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2013, p. A13.

14. See David S. Yost article in this issue, “Strategic Stability in Europe: Risks with Low Numbers of US and Russian Nuclear Weapons.”

15. See David S. Yost article in this issue, “Strategic Stability in Europe: Risks with Low Numbers of US and Russian Nuclear Weapons.”

16. See David S. Yost article in this issue, “Strategic Stability in Europe: Risks with Low Numbers of US and Russian Nuclear Weapons.”

17. See David S. Yost article in this issue, “Strategic Stability in Europe: Risks with Low Numbers of US and Russian Nuclear Weapons.”

18. See Nikolai Sokov article in this issue, “Assessing Russian Attitudes Toward Deep Nuclear Reductions: Strategic and Regional Concerns.”

19. See Nikolai Sokov article in this issue, “Assessing Russian Attitudes Toward Deep Nuclear Reductions: Strategic and Regional Concerns.”

20. See Nikolai Sokov article in this issue, “Assessing Russian Attitudes Toward Deep Nuclear Reductions: Strategic and Regional Concerns.”

21. See James A. Russell article in this issue, “Nuclear Reductions and Middle East Stability: Assessing the Impact of a Smaller US Nuclear Arsenal.”

22. See James A. Russell article in this issue, “Nuclear Reductions and Middle East Stability: Assessing the Impact of a Smaller US Nuclear Arsenal.”

23. See James A. Russell article in this issue, “Nuclear Reductions and Middle East Stability: Assessing the Impact of a Smaller US Nuclear Arsenal.”

24. See S. Paul Kapur article in this issue, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions.”

25. See S. Paul Kapur article in this issue, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions.”

26. See S. Paul Kapur article in this issue, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions.”

27. See S. Paul Kapur article in this issue, “The Effects on South Asia of Deep US Nuclear Reductions.”

28. See Wade L. Huntley article in this issue, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero: US Nuclear Reductions and Extended Deterrence in East Asia.”

29. “2/3 of S. Koreans Support Nuclear Armament,” Chosun Ilbo, English edition, February 21, 2013, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/21/2013022100645.html>.

30. The phrase “sprint to parity,” as a hypothetical future option for China, is usually attributed to Donald H. Rumsfeld, then-secretary of defense, who said in 2002 that “a country could decide that they would like to try to sprint toward parity or superiority in nuclear capabilities.” Testimony in Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 9, 17, 23, and September 12, 2002 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 99.

31. See Twomey article in this issue, “Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing.”

32. See Twomey article in this issue, “Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing.”

33. See Twomey article in this issue, “Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing.”

34. See Twomey article in this issue, “Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing.”