NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND MIDDLE EAST STABILITY

Abstract

The United States faces a series of strategic and policy conundrums as it attempts to promote strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. This article examines the relationship between a reduced US nuclear arsenal and strategic stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It argues that a series of interrelated political and military factors play a much more significant role in regional security and stability than the US strategic arsenal, which has never, with a few extraordinary exceptions, played a direct role in maintaining regional security. The United States has constructed a system of regional stability based on conventional deterrence and defense that has seen it forward base forces at various installations in the region in combination with efforts to arm, train, and equip host-nation militaries. Nuclear weapons have never played a prominent role in this regional system. Evidence presented in this article suggests that there is no compelling reason for the United States to abandon and/or modify the defensive system of conventional deterrence and defense by adding nuclear-backed guarantees to the mix.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapons
• extended deterrence
• Middle East
• Iran
• Saudi Arabia
• Gulf Cooperation Council

Notes

1. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” May 3, 2010, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf>; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69 (March 2013) pp. 77–86.

2. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.

3. Various officials have indicated that the United States would use all necessary means to defend Israel if it was ever attacked by Iranian nuclear weapons, but absent that scenario, it is not clear that the United States has ever publicly stated its intent to defend specific states with nuclear weapons.

4. There is surprisingly little recent literature that links numbers of actual nuclear weapons and the targeting of those weapons to political strategies of extended deterrence. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a robust debate about the relative merits of counterforce vs. countervalue targeting for nuclear weapons. See Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Desmond Ball, “Strategic Targeting for Nuclear Deterrence,” Adelphi Papers No. 185, Routledge: 1983. For history on this issue, see David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71; Walter Slocombe, “The Countervailing Strategy,” International Security 5 (Spring 1981), pp. 18–27.

5. This ambiguity is preserved in the latest Nuclear Posture Review. See Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington DC, April 2010.

6. Hezbollah currently holds fourteen out of 120 seats in the Lebanese parliament.

7. As reported by David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” New York Times, June 1, 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html>. Israel's assassination of Iranian scientists is reported in Richard Engel and Robert Windrem, “Israel Teams with Terror Group to Kill Iran's Nuclear Scientists, US Officials Tell NBC News,” NBC News, February 9, 2012, <http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/08/10354553-israel-teams-with-terror-group-to-kill-irans-nuclear-scientists-us-officials-tell-nbc-news>.

8. As an example, see Nicholas Kullish, Eric Schmitt, and Mathew Brunwasser, “Bulgaria Implicates Hezbollah in July Attack on Israelis,” New York Times, February 5, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/world/europe/bulgaria-implicates-hezbollah-in-deadly-israeli-bus-blast.html>.

9. “President Obama Chats with Telemundo's Jose Diaz Balart,” Telemundo, September 13, 2012, <http://tv.broadwayworld.com/article/President-Obama-Chats-With-Telemundos-Jose-Diaz-Balart-20120913#ixzz26MjaR591>.

10. Views detailed in David D. Kirkpatrick and Steve Erlanger, “Egypt's New Leader Spells Out Terms for US-Arab Ties,” New York Times, September 22, 2012, <www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/middleeast/egyptian-leader-mohamed-morsi-spells-out-terms-for-us-arab-ties.html>.

11. Details and analysis of Morsi's speech in Hamid Dabashi, “Morsi in Tehran: Crossing the Boundaries,” Al Jazeera, September 5, 2012, <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/20129375930824837.html>.

12. Some states, like Iraq and Syria, pursued clandestine nuclear programs that were discovered and destroyed. Others, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, while having stated their desire to abide by their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, may nonetheless be potential nuclear weapon aspirants, should Iran cross the nuclear threshold. Still others have expressed interest in generating electricity through nuclear power, though perhaps not in developing the full fuel cycle, such as the GCC, Egypt, and Jordan.

13. For details, see Wyn Bowen, “Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink,” Adelphi Papers 46, No. 380, Routledge: April 2006.

14. The International Atomic Energy Agency concluded: “Based on all the information available to the Agency and its technical evaluation of that information, the Agency assesses that it is very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency.” See IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, GOV/2011/23, May 24, 2011.

15. Developments and background summarized in Kelsey Davenport, “WMD-Free Middle East Proposals at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, November 2012, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz>. Also see Kelsey Davenport and Daniel Horner, “Meeting on Middle East WMD Postponed,” Arms Control Today, December 2012, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_12/Meeting-on-Middle-East-WMD-Postponed>.

16. Michael Slackman and Mona El-Naggar, “Mubarak's Son Proposes a Nuclear Program,” New York Times, September 19, 2006, <www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/world/africa/20egypt.html>.

17. Raymond Stock, “Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood Bomb?” Gatestone Institute, September 7, 2012, <www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3333/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-bomb>.

18. Summarized in William Burr, “The History of Iran's Nuclear Energy Program,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 19, 2009, <www.thebulletin.org/print/web-edition/op-eds/the-history-of-irans-nuclear-energy-program>.

19. History summarized in Jim Walsh, “Security Assurances and Iran: Assessment and Re-conceptualization,” in Jeffrey W. Knopf, ed., Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012) pp. 111–36.

20. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement And Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, February 21, 2013. GOV/2013/6, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf>.

21. David Albright, Christina Walrond, and Andrea Stricker, “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report, Rev. 1,” Institute for Science and International Security Report, November 16 2012, <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_safeguards_Report_November_16_2012-final.pdf>.

22. As outlined by Joseph Cirincione and Elise Connor, “How Iran Can Build a Bomb,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2010, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/01/how_iran_can_build_a_bomb?>.

23. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated in an interview: “The consensus is that, if they decided to do it, it would probably take them about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one to two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon.” “Defense Secretary Panetta,” 60 Minutes, January 29, 2012, <www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57448437/the-defense-secretary-leon-panetta/>.

24. See Statement for the Record, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” James R. Clapper, March 12, 2013, p. 7.

25. Detail on Iran's nuclear infrastructure is widely available. A particularly comprehensive description of Iran's program and its infrastructure has been compiled by the Institute for Science and International Security <www.isisnucleariran.org/>.

26. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), p. 16.

27. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. and Allies Warn Iran over Nuclear Deception,” New York Times, September 25, 2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/world/middleeast/26nuke.html>.

28. The latest status of Iran's nuclear program and its standoff with the international community is contained in Paul N. Kerr, “Iran's Nuclear Program: Status,” Congressional Research Service, October 17, 2012.

29. As noted in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (IISS, London: 2008), p. 7.

30. As asserted by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal in Mariam Hakeem, “GCC's Nuclear Programme Will be a Role Model,” Gulf News, January 14, 2007, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/01/14/10096775.html>; Joby Warrick, “Spread of Nuclear Capability is Feared,” Washington Post, May 12, 2008, p. A1.

31. Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, “Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2009 <www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PTF-Iran.pdf>.

32. Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, S. Prt. 110–34, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. February 2008. For more nuanced treatment of this issue, see the debate between Kenneth N. Waltz and Colin H. Kahl, “Iran and the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 91 (September/October 2012), <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137781/colin-h-kahl-and-kenneth-n-waltz/iran-and-the-bomb>. Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton, and Mathew Irvine argue against such a cascade in “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” Center for a New American Security, February 2013, <www.cnas.org/atomickingdom>.

33. Discussed in James A. Russell, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East's Security Dilemma: the Case of Saudi Arabia,” in James J. Wirtz and Peter R. Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012). Also see Associated Press, “Prince Hints Saudi May Join Nuclear Arms Race,” December 6, 2011.

34. Summarized in Thomas W. Lippman, “Nuclear Weapons and Saudi Strategy,” Middle East Institute Policy Brief, January 4, 2008.

35. Various estimates of Israel's nuclear arsenal are summarized by the Federation of American Scientists <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/>.

36. “Operation Samson: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs on Subs from Germany,” Spiegel Online, January 4, 2012, <www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-built-submarines-a-836784.html>.

37. See Shlomo Aronson with Oded Brosh, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality an Israeli Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).

38. Background in Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 1–7. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of a Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (Fall 2000), pp. 48–49; Zeev Maoz, “The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy,” International Security 28 (Fall 2003), pp. 44–77.

39. In a confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in December 2006, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates openly referred to Israel as a nuclear power. See Associated Press, “Incoming US Defense Secretary Tells Senate Panel Israel has Nuclear Weapons,” December 9, 2006. Several days later, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also implicitly acknowledged Israel's possession of nuclear weapons when he stated, “We never threatened any nation with annihilation. Iran openly, explicitly, and publicly threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Can you say that this is the same level, when they are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as France, America, Russia and Israel?” As quoted in Phillipe Naughton and news agencies, “Olmert's Nuclear slip-up Sparks Outrage in Israel,” Times (London), December 12, 2006, <www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2606115.ece>.

40. Quoted in various sources. See Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, “Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_07-08/SpectorCohen>.

41. As argued by Gerald Steinberg in “The Begin Doctrine at 25,” Jerusalem Post, July 4, 2006, <www.jpost.com/Features/The-Begin-Doctrine-at-25>.

42. Summarized in more detail in James A. Russell, “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Weapons: US Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf,” Strategic Insights 8, Center for Contemporary Conflict, December 2009, <www.hsdl.org/?view&did=30834>.

43. Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Clinton Speaks of Shielding Mideast from Iran,” New York Times, July 22, 2009, < www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html>.

44. For background, see The Gulf Security Architecture Partnership With the Gulf Cooperation Council, Majority Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate S. Prt. 112–35, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., June 19, 2012.

45. Israel initially claimed that Iron Dome hit 90 percent of the targets it engaged, while some analysts suggest that the success rate was closer to 40 percent. See William J. Broad, “Weapons Experts Raise Doubts Over Israel's Anti-Missile System,” New York Times, March 20, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/israels-iron-dome-system-is-at-center-of-debate.html>.

46. This section and the quotes are drawn from “US ‘Negative Security Assurances’ At a Glance,” Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, September 2012, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/negsec>.

47. As argued in James A. Russell, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales Proliferation Papers 26 (Spring 2009), pp. 33–38.

48. As argued by Kathleen J. McInnis, “Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East,” Washington Quarterly 28 (Summer 2005), pp.169–86.