The Problem of Weak Nuclear States

Abstract

Governments are increasingly recognizing the problem posed by internally weak nuclear-capable states. The problem, however, is under-theorized. This article brings together literature on sovereignty and international order, the nonproliferation regime, and weak states, and introduces new concepts to provide a more structured understanding of this problem. Insight comes from focusing attention on the function and governance of two nuclear estates (termed the production and operational estates), and on their resilience to decay and disorder occurring within the state and society. Drawing on empirical observation, the authors suggest a typology of weakness in nuclear states, involving state fragmentation typified by the former Soviet Union, the “hard weak state” typified by North Korea, and the internally conflicted state typified by Pakistan. Although these types give rise to distinctive difficulties, their alleviation depends heavily on the maintenance of internal authority within the state and estates, the presence or absence of cooperative relations, and the international regulatory framework's vitality.

KEYWORDS:

• Sovereignty
• international society
• weak states
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• nuclear security
• United States
• Russia
• Pakistan
• North Korea
• Iran

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

Notes

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4. On this concept, see William Walker, “The UK, threshold status and responsible nuclear sovereignty,” International Affairs 86 (March 2010), pp. 447–64. On responsibility in world politics, see Mlada Bukovanska, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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6. On these proposals’ fate, see Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

7. On this order and its evolution, see William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order (London: Routledge, 2012).

8. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

9. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

10. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970, Article IX, para. 3.

11. Walker, “The UK, threshold status and responsible nuclear sovereignty,” pp. 447–64.

12. Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Duty to Prevent,” Foreign Affairs 83 (January/February 2004), pp. 136–51.

13. On issues raised by such states, see Robert S. Litwak, Outlier States: American Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

14. On the “pluralist” conception of international society, see Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 51–73.

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16. Justin Vaïsse, Transformational Diplomacy, Chaillot Paper 103 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2007), p. 69.

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18. Susan E. Price and Stewart Patrick, Index of States Weakness in the Developing World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008).

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21. William Zartman, “Posing the Problem of State Collapse,” in William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 6.

22. William Zartman, “Posing the Problem of State Collapse,” in William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 7.

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25. Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (London: Hurst & Company, 2006).

26. Note that production here refers to scientific and technological development and testing as well as manufacturing.

27. For discussions of the Soviet Union's disintegration, see Reneo Lukic and Allan Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

28. On the Scottish referendum's implications, see Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, “Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent?,” Washington Quarterly 36 (Summer 2013), pp. 107–22.

29. On Libya's disarmament, see Wyn Bowen, Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink, Adelphi Paper 380 (London: Routledge, 2006). On South Africa, see Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996, pp. 3–8.

30. On North Korea, see Jonathan D. Pollack, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development: Implications for Future Policy (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Spring 2010).

31. On Iran, see Ali Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Mark Fitzpatrick, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-Case Outcomes, Adelphi Paper 398 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).

32. On Pakistan's nuclear program and strategic behavior, see Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Christopher Clary, Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security in Peacetime, Crisis and War, IDSA Occasional Paper 12, New Delhi, September 2010; and Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

33. Musharraf claims in his memoir that “neither the Pakistan Army nor any of the past governments of Pakistan was ever involved or had any knowledge of A.Q.'s proliferation activities.” Pevez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 292.

34. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. xv.

35. Shaun Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan,” Defense & Security Analysis 23 (2007), pp. 315–30.

36. Interviewed by James Naughtie, BBC Radio 4, November 17, 2007.

37. Jon Meacham, “A Highly Logical Approach: A Conversation with Barack Obama,” Newsweek, May 16, 2009, <www.newsweek.com/id/197891>.

38. Naeem Salik and Kenneth N. Luongo, “Challenges for Pakistan's Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, March 2013, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security>.

39. Clary, Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security, p. 5.

40. Clary observes at one point that “Secrecy is Pakistan's most important protective measure against external threats.” Clary, Thinking about Pakistan's Nuclear Security, p. 13. See also Greg Miller, Craig Whitlock, and Barton Gellman, “Top-secret U.S. Intelligence Files Show New Levels of Distrust of Pakistan,” Washington Post, September 2, 2013, <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-02/world/41690725_1_intelligence-u-s-spy-agencies-other-adversaries>.

41. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 19, 2013, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf>.

42. Michael O'Hanlon, Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The Cases of North Korea and Pakistan, Princeton Project on National Security Papers, Princeton University, 2006.

43. On the lack of democratic accountability in Israel and its costs, see Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).