Nuclear Leverage

Abstract

Most observers would surmise that the United States applies significant pressure on certain states behind closed doors to deal with nuclear proliferation threats. While information about such pressures today remains classified, information about similar pressures in the 1970s has become available via the Freedom of Information Act. This article draws on hundreds of unpublished, declassified government documents from multiple archives to recount how the United States intervened in sensitive technology transfers to Brazil, South Korea, and Pakistan in the 1970s. In each case, US officials employed concrete sources of leverage to pressure states to cancel their nuclear arrangements. Notably, however, the United States today no longer possesses the leverage it used in the 1970s to deliver pressure. In particular, US nuclear leverage—nuclear technology, nuclear financing, and nuclear fuel—has diminished significantly over the past three decades. Policy makers in Washington therefore must ask themselves: to what extent has this loss of leverage weakened the ability of the United States to deal with nuclear proliferation threats today?

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear nonproliferation
• export controls
• technology transfer
• Brazil
• Pakistan
• South Korea

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is a shortened version of my senior thesis at Princeton University. I would like to thank Professors Harold A. Feiveson and Alexander Glaser for their supervision during the research and writing stages of the thesis. I would also like to thank Mark Hibbs for his comments and suggestions during the preparation of this article. Finally, I would like to thank the George and O'Bie Shultz Fund for supporting my archival research.

Notes

1. In addition to these three cases, the United States also intervened in Taiwan's efforts at the time to acquire a reprocessing facility.

2. H. Jon Rosenbaum, “Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations,” in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, eds., Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975), p. 255. Brazil had initially wanted the URENCO centrifuge enrichment technology, but the Dutch had vetoed its export. See Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,” Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976), p. 171. See also Hartmut Krugmann, “The German-Brazilian Nuclear deal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1981, p. 34.

3. Lewis H. Diuguid, “Brazil Nuclear Deal Raises U.S. Concern,” Washington Post, June 1, 1975, p. A1.

4. Werner Boulanger, “Nuclear Export Policy and Regulation for Non-Proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany,” paper delivered at the International Conference on Regulating Nuclear Energy, Brussels, Belgium, May 16–19, 1978, p. 3. At the time, trilateral safeguards agreements between the supplying state, the receiving state, and the IAEA were standard for transfers of nuclear material or equipment from an NPT state to a non-NPT state. West Germany would ratify the NPT on May 2, 1975.

5. William W. Lowrance, “Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany, 1975,” International Security 1 (Autumn 1976), p. 158.

6. National Security Archive (NSA), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Unpublished Collection (NNPUC), Box 6, Folder Nuclear Non-Proliferation 5703 (B6/5703), Secretary of State to US Embassy in Brasilia, “Brazil/FRG Nuclear Accord,” June 14, 1975 (hereafter “FRG/Brazil Accord Telegram”); and David Binder, “U.S. Wins Safeguards in German Nuclear Deal with Brazil,” New York Times, June 4, 1975, p. 16.

7. National Archives at College Park (NACP), Record Group 59 (RG59), Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Staff Meetings 1973–1977, Box 7 (HKS/B7), June 13, 1975, p. 3; and NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Secretary of State to US Embassy in Bonn, “FRG/Brazil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” June 27, 1975 (hereafter “FRG/Brazil NCA Telegram”).

8. NACP, RG59, Records of Henry Kissinger 1973–1977, Box 14 (HKR/B14), Folder Briefing Memos 1975/4, Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Implications of FRG-Brazil Nuclear Sale,” June 16, 1975. See also Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 241–42.

9. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Arthur A. Hartman to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, “FRG/Brazil Nuclear Accord and the Scheel Visit,” June 12, 1975. See also Robert L. Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control of Peaceful Nuclear Activities (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 232.

10. NACP, RG59, HKS/B7, June 13, 1975, p. 3.

11. Rosenbaum, “Brazil's Nuclear Aspirations,” pp. 255–56.

12. Senator John O. Pastore (Democrat of Rhode Island), Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., June 3, 1975, p. S16582.

13. NACP, RG59, HKS/B7, June 13, 1975, p. 4.

14. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, FRG/Brazil Accord Telegram.

15. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, FRG/Brazil NCA Telegram, p. 6. See also Karl Kaiser, “The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements,” Foreign Policy 30 (Spring 1978), pp. 89–90. Technology safeguards meant that any facility in the recipient state (even if indigenously built) that replicated the technology of the transferred nuclear equipment would be under IAEA safeguards. As a result, these safeguards were often called “replication safeguards” at the time.

16. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Mission to the IAEA to Secretary of State, “Comments on Draft FRG/Brazil/IAEA Trilateral Safeguards Agreement,” September 25, 1975; and Kaiser, “The Great Nuclear Debate,” p. 89.

17. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, “Brazilian Nuclear Deal: Replies to Parliamentary Questions,” June 13, 1975. The technology safeguards were operationalized by requiring IAEA safeguards on any Brazilian facility constructed within the next twenty years that used the same physical or chemical process as a nuclear facility transferred by West Germany.

18. Kaiser, “The Great Nuclear Debate,” p. 89. See also Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 242–43.

19. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 243.

20. Kaiser, “The Great Nuclear Debate,” p. 98.

21. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Brasilia to Secretary of State, “GOB Response to Secretary Vance Interview on Nuclear Accord,” February 2, 1977.

22. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Secretary of State to US Embassy in Buenos Aires, “Brazilian Nuclear Debate,” April 6, 1977.

23. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, “Hermes Delegation Visit to Washington,” February 7, 1977 (hereafter “Hermes Visit Telegram”); NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, “FRG/Brazil Nuclear Deal Media Comment,” December 9, 1976 (hereafter “FRG/Brazil Media Telegram”); and NACP, RG59, HKR/B20, Folder Nodis Briefing Memos 1977/1, Charles W. Robinson to Secretary of State, “Next Steps on Pakistan and Brazil,” January 5, 1977.

24. The effectiveness of this pressure was limited by the fact that the deal would, in theory, provide Brazil with sufficient indigenous enrichment capacity in time to fuel its own two reactors. See NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Brasilia to Secretary of State, “Brazil-FRG Nuclear Agreement,” April 16, 1977.

25. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Hermes Visit Telegram.

26. NACP, RG59, HKS/B10, July 26, 1976 and HKS/B11, October 18, 1976; and NACP, RG59, Records of Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson 1976–1977, Box 5 (CRR/B5), Folder CWR Memos to the Secretary October 1976 to January 1977, Charles W. Robinson to Secretary of State, “FRG/Brazil Reprocessing Plant,” November 12, 1976.

27. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Hermes Visit Telegram.

28. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Hermes Visit Telegram.

29. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, FRG/Brazil Media Telegram; and NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State, “FRG-Brazil Nuclear Deal,” December 10, 1976.

30. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Secretary of State to US Embassy in Bonn, “FRG/Brazil Nuclear Agreement,” February 3, 1977.

31. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Secretary of State to US Embassy in Bonn, “FRG-Brazilian Nuclear Agreement: FRG to Proceed with License Issuance,” April 6, 1977.

32. Boulanger, “Nuclear Export Policy and Regulation for Non-Proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany,” p. 6.

33. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, Gerard C. Smith to Secretary of State, “Next Steps on the FRG Brazil Agreement,” July 22, 1977.

34. NSA, NNPUC, B6/5703, US Embassy in Brasilia to Secretary of State, “Effects on U.S./Brazilian Relations of the German Agreement,” June 27, 1975.

35. Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), p. 243.

36. Young-Sun Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983), p. 179.

37. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “South Korea Nuclear Chronology,” September 2004, <www.nti.org/media/pdfs/south_korea_nuclear.pdf?_ = 1316466791>, p. 269.

38. NACP, RG59, Director's Files (Winston Lord) 1969–1977, Box 354 (WLF/B354), Folder Aug. 1–15 1975, Robert S. Ingersoll to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing,” July 2, 1975 (hereafter “Ingersoll Approach Memorandum”); and Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 180.

39. Statement by Armand Bérard, permanent representative of France to the United Nations, June 12, 1968.

40. Comprehensive safeguards agreements involve full-scope safeguards on all nuclear material and equipment in a state, whereas trilateral safeguards agreements only govern the nuclear material and equipment under a specific transaction. All non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT are required to have a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

41. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Ingersoll Approach Memorandum.

42. Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, p. 92; and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985), p. 505.

43. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Ingersoll Approach Memorandum.

44. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Ingersoll Approach Memorandum.

45. Ernest W. Lefever, Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 131.

46. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Ingersoll Approach Memorandum.

47. Amendment to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 26, 1974, Article II, para. C.

48. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Ingersoll Approach Memorandum; and Don Oberdorfer, “S. Korea Cancels A-Plant,” Washington Post, January 30, 1976, p. A1.

49. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Ingersoll Approach Memorandum.

50. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Folder Aug. 1–15, 1975, Philip C. Habib, George S. Vest, and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing,” August 7, 1975.

51. NACP, RG59, WLF/B354, Folder Aug. 1–15, 1975, Philip C. Habib, George S. Vest, and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing,” August 7, 1975.

52. Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the French Republic, and the Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards, September 22, 1975.

53. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Folder Nov. 16–30 1975, Philip C. Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Korean Reprocessing: Issues and Options,” November 18, 1975.

54. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Folder Nov. 16–30 1975, Philip C. Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Korean Reprocessing: Issues and Options,” November 18, 1975.

55. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Folder Nov. 16–30 1975, Philip C. Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Korean Reprocessing: Issues and Options,” November 18, 1975.

56. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Folder Nov. 16–30 1975, Philip C. Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Korean Reprocessing: Issues and Options,” November 18, 1975. See also NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Folder Dec. 1–15 1975, Winston Lord and Robert H. Miller to Secretary of State, “Your Meetings with the French and Canadian Ambassadors on Korean Reprocessing,” December 4, 1975 (hereafter “Ambassador Meetings Memorandum”).

57. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Folder Nov. 16–30 1975, Philip C. Habib and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Korean Reprocessing: The Next Step,” November 18, 1975 (hereafter “Next Step Memorandum”); and NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Ambassador Meetings Memorandum.

58. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Ambassador Meetings Memorandum.

59. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Next Step Memorandum.

60. NACP, RG59, WLF/B359, Next Step Memorandum.

61. Oberdorfer, “S. Korea Cancels A-Plant,” p. A1. See also Robert Gillette, “U.S. Squelched Apparent S. Korea A-Bomb Drive,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 1978, p. A1.

62. Richard Halloran, “Seoul Officials Say Strong U.S. Pressure Forced Cancellation of Plans to Purchase a French Nuclear Plan,” New York Times, February 1, 1976, p. 11. See also Oberdorfer, “S. Korea Cancels A-Plant,” p. A1.

63. Halloran, “Strong U.S. Pressure,” p. 11.

64. Freedom of Information Act Request #201100037F, filed by the author (available upon request), to the US Export-Import Bank, Operations and Data Quality Division, ERS Database, March 25, 2011 (hereafter “Freedom of Information Act Request #201100037F”).

65. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 74–75.

66. David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise (Hanover, CT: Steerforth Press, 2007), pp. 74–75; and Arvind Virmani, Trilateral Nuclear Proliferation: Pakistan's Euro-Chinese Bomb (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2006), p. 46.

67. Armstrong and Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb, pp. 74–75.

68. Armstrong and Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb, pp. 74–75. See also NSA, Nuclear Vault, Electronic Briefing Book 333 (hereafter NV/EBB333), CIA, “Pakistan Nuclear Study,” April 26, 1978, p. 19.

69. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 78.

70. NACP, RG59, WLF/B368, Folder Sensitive Non-China 1/1–7/31/76, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Winston Lord to Secretary of State, “Your Meeting with Fred Ikle,” July 16, 1976; and NACP, RG59, HKR/B17, Folder Nodis Memcons June 1976, Henry A. Kissinger to President, “Your Talks with French President Giscard d'Estaing at the Puerto Rico Summit,” June 1976.

71. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 128.

72. NACP, RG59, HKR/B19, Folder Nodis Briefing Memos 1976/2, US Department of State, “Pakistani Ambassador,” May 1976; and USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations,” reports from 1972–76.

73. NACP, RG59, HKR/B12, Folder Nodis Memcons September 1975/2, White House, Memorandum of Conversation, September 30, 1975 (hereafter “White House MOC”).

74. NACP, RG59, HKR/B19, Folder Nodis Memcons December 1976, Gerald Ford to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence, “National Security Decision Memorandum 289,” March 24, 1975.

75. NACP, RG59, HKR/B12, White House MOC. See also NACP, RG59, Records of Warren Christopher 1977–1980, Box 17 (WCR/B17), Folder Official Chrons January/December 1977/2, Warren Christopher to President, “Reprocessing Negotiations with Pakistan: A Negotiating Strategy,” April 2, 1977 (hereafter “Pakistan Negotiations Memorandum”).

76. The full text of the Symington Amendment can be found in Sec. 305 of “International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,” 94th Cong., 2nd sess., June 30, 1976, pp. 755–56.

77. USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations,” report from 1977; and Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 79–80.

78. NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, Pakistan Negotiations Memorandum; and NACP, RG59, HKR/B20, Folder Nodis Memos 1977/3, Arthur A. Hartman to Secretary of State, “Your Meeting with Giscard and Foreign Minister de Guiringaud,” September 2, 1976 (hereafter “Giscard and de Guiringaud Meeting”).

79. Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, p. 90.

80. Pierre Lellouche, “France in the International Nuclear Energy Controversy: A New Policy Under Giscard d'Estaing,” Orbis 22 (Winter 1979), p. 959; and NACP, RG59, HKR/B20, Giscard and de Guiringaud Meeting.

81. Kaiser, “The Great Nuclear Debate,” p. 100.

82. Lellouche, “France in the International Nuclear Energy Controversy,” p. 959.

83. NACP, RG59, CRR/B4, Folder October/November 1976, George S. Vest to Secretary of State, “French and German Positions on Non-Proliferation Issues at London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting,” November 15, 1976.

84. NACP, RG59, CRR/B4, Folder October/November 1976, Jan Kalicki to Mr. Lord, “French Comments on Sensitive Nuclear Issues,” November 15, 1976; and NACP, RG59, CRR/B3, Folder CWR Telegrams, Alfred L. Atherton to Secretary of State, “Bhutto Visit to Iran: Nuclear/A-7 Issue,” December 23, 1976 (hereafter “Bhutto Visit to Iran”); and NACP, RG59, CRR/B5, CWR Memos to the Secretary October 1976 to January 1977, Charles W. Robinson to Secretary of State, “Non-Proliferation Letter to de Guiringaud,” January 15, 1977 (hereafter “de Guiringaud Letter”).

85. NACP, RG59, HKR/B18, Folder Nodis Memcons September 1976/2, US Department of State, “The Pakistan Nuclear Reprocessing Issue,” September 11, 1976.

86. NACP, RG59, CRR/B55, Folder CWR Memos to the Secretary July 1976 to September 1976/3, Alfred L. Atherton to Secretary of State, “Follow-on to Your Talk with Bhutto: Nuclear Reprocessing and Other Issues,” September 27, 1976.

87. NACP, RG59, CRR/B3, Bhutto Visit to Iran.

88. NACP, RG59, HKR/B19, Folder Nodis Memcons December 1976, US Department of State, “Pakistan Reprocessing,” December 17, 1976 (hereafter “Pakistan Reprocessing Memorandum”); and NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, Pakistan Negotiations Memorandum.

89. NACP, RG59, CRR/B5, de Guiringaud Letter; and NACP, RG59, HKR/B19, Pakistan Reprocessing Memorandum.

90. NACP, RG59, HKR/B20, Folder Nodis Memos 1977/4, Alfred L. Atherton to Secretary of State, “Arms Package for Pakistan,” December 18, 1976; and NACP, RG59, HKR/B19, Folder Nodis Memcons December 1976, Henry A. Kissinger, Deputy Secretary Robinson, Ambassador Byroade, and Mr. Atherton, “Enhancing Pakistani Security,” December 17, 1976.

91. NACP, RG59, HKR/B20, Folder Nodis Briefing Memos 1977/1, Charles W. Robinson to Secretary of State, “Next Steps on Pakistan and Brazil,” January 5, 1977.

92. NACP, RG59, CRR/B3, Folder CWR Telegrams, Charles W. Robinson to Ambassador Byroade, “The Nuclear Issue,” January 17, 1977.

93. NACP, RG50, WCR/B17, Pakistan Negotiations Memorandum.

94. Joseph S. Nye, distinguished service professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, telephone interview with author, January 5, 2011. See also Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 80–81.

95. NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, Pakistan Negotiations Memorandum; and NSA, NV/EBB333, Alfred L. Atherton and Douglas J. Bennet to Acting Secretary of State, “Pakistan's Purchase of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant,” June 23, 1977.

96. NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, Pakistan Negotiations Memorandum.

97. Spector Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 361–62.

98. NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, Folder WC Official Chrons January/December 1977/1, Alfred L. Atherton and George S. Vest to Secretary of State, “The Nuclear Reprocessing Issue with Pakistan and France,” October 18, 1977 (hereafter “France/Pakistan Issue Memorandum”).

99. The full text of the Glenn Amendment can be found in Sec. 12 of “International Security Assistance Act of 1977,” 95th Cong., 1st sess., August 4, 1977, pp. 620–21.

100. NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, Folder WC Official Chrons January to December 1977/1, US Embassy in Islamabad to Secretary of State, “Economic Assistance to Pakistan,” October 14, 1977; and Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 80.

101. Virmani, Trilateral Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 48–50.

102. NACP, RG59, WCR/B17, France/Pakistan Issue Memorandum. See also Washington Post Foreign Service, “France, Pakistan to Resume Talks On Changes in Nuclear Plant Deal,” Washington Post, November 4, 1978, p. A12.

103. NSA, NV/EBB333, Secretary of State to US Embassy in Islamabad, “Reprocessing Issue,” May 30, 1978 (hereafter “Vance Memorandum”).

104. “U.S. to Renew Aid to Pakistan,” Washington Post, August 25, 1978, p. A23.

105. NSA, NV/EBB333, Vance Memorandum.

106. NACP, RG59, WCR/B56, Folder Pakistan I, Steve Oxman to Warren Christopher, Cable Draft Edits, October 4, 1978; and NSA, NV/EBB333, Vance Memorandum.

107. Don Oberdorfer, “Arms Sales to Pakistan Urged to Stave Off A-Bomb There,” Washington Post, August 6, 1979, p. A7; and Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, pp. 361–62.

108. “South Korea to Construct Fuel Fabrication Plant,” Nuclear Fuel 9 (June 4, 1984), p. 9.

109. Lewis L. Strauss, “Statement of the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,” Mutual Security Act of 1956, Hearings Before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., May 24, 1956, pp. 936–37; and Elmer B. Staats, “U.S. Financial Assistance in the Development of Foreign Nuclear Energy Programs,” Report to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, US General Accounting Office, May 28, 1975.

110. Stephan M. Minikes, “Statement of Stephan M. Minikes,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st sess., October 28, 1975; and Staats, “U.S. Financial Assistance.”

111. Freedom of Information Act Request #201100037F.

112. Ole Pedersen, “Developments in the Uranium Enrichment Industry,” IAEA Bulletin 19 (February 1977), p. 40.

113. Washington's reputation as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel had already been significantly damaged in 1974 when the US Atomic Energy Commission first stopped accepting new long-term enrichment contract requests and then classified almost half of the enrichment requests it had previously received as conditional. See Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., June 3, 1975, p. S16591; and Elmer B. Staats, “Allocation of Uranium Enrichment Services to Fuel Foreign and Domestic Nuclear Reactors,” Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, US Government Accountability Office, March 4, 1975.

114. Mark Hibbs, “Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” Nuclear Energy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 7, 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z>.

115. Freedom of Information Act Request #201100037F.

116. Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr, “The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service, R40344, December 20, 2010, p. 2.